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INTRODU CTION
M any readers will no doubt be tempted to exclaim on seeing 
my title: “ Rousseau and no end!” The outpour of books on 
Rousseau had indeed in the period immediately preceding the 
war become somewhat portentous.1 This preoccupation with 
Rousseau is after all easy to explain. I t  is his somewhat for­
midable privilege to represent more fully than any other one 
person a great international movement. To attack Rousseau 
or to defend him is most often only a way of attacking or 
defending this movement.
I t  is from this point of view at all events that the present 
work is conceived. I  have not undertaken a systematic study 
of Rousseau’s life and doctrines. The appearance of his name 
in my title is justified, if at all, simply because he comes at a 
fairly early stage in the international movement the rise and 
growth of which I  am tracing, and has on the whole supplied 
me with the most significant illustrations of it. I  have already 
put forth certain views regarding this movement in three pre- 
vious volumes.2 Though each one of these volumes attempts 
to do justice to a particular topic, it is at the same time in­
tended to be a link in a continuous argument. I  hope that I 
may be allowed to speak here with some frankness of the main 
trend of this argument both on its negative and on its positive, 
or constructive, side.
Perhaps the best key to both'sides of my argument is found
1 See, for example, in vol. ix  of the Annales de la Société Jea n -Jaeques 
Rousseau the bibliography (pp. 87-276) for 1912 —  the year of the bicen- 
tenary.
2 Literature and the American College (1908); The New Laokoon (1910); 
The Masters of Modem French Crüicism (1912).
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in the lines of Emerson I  have taken as epigraph for “ Litera- 
ture and the American College” :
There are two laws discrete 
Not reconciled, —
Law for man, and law for thing;
The last builds town and fleet,
But it runs wild,
And doth the man unking.
On its negative side my argument is directed against this undue 
emphasis on the “ law for thing,” against the attempttoerecton 
naturalistic foundations a complete philosophy of life. I  define 
two main forms of naturalism — on the one hand, utilitarian 
and scientific and, on the other, emotional naturalism. The 
type of romanticism I am studying is inseparably bound up 
with emotional naturalism.
This type of romanticism encouraged by the naturalistic 
movement is only one of three main types I  distinguish and I  
am dealing for the most part with only one aspect of it. But 
even when thus circumscribed the subject can scarcely be said 
to lack importance; for if I am right in my conviction as to the 
unsoundness of a Rousseauistic philosophy of life, it follows 
that the total tendency of the Occident at present is away from 
rather than towards civilization.
On the positive side, my argument aims to reassert the “ law 
for man,” and its special discipline against the various forms 
of naturalistic excess. At the very mention of the word disci­
pline I  shall be set down in certam quarters as reactionary. But 
does it necessarily follow from a plea for the human law that 
one is a reactionary or in general a traditionalist? An American 
writer of distinction was once heard to remark that he saw in 
the world to-day but two classes of persons, — the mossbacks 
and the mountebanks, and that for his part he preferred to be 
a mossback. One should think twice before thus consenting to 
seem a mere relie of the past. The ineffable smartness of our 
young radicals is due to the conviction that, whatever else
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they may be, they are the very pink of modernity. Before 
sharing their conviction it might be well to do a little prelimi- 
nary defining of such terms as modern and the modem spirit. 
I t  may then turn out that the true difficulty with our young 
radicals is not that they are too modern but that they are not 
modern enough. For, though the word modern is often and no 
doubt inevitably used to describe the more recent or the most 
recent thing, this is not its sole use. I t  is not in this sense alone 
that the word is used by writers like Goethe and Sainte-Beuve 
and Renán and Arnold. What ali these writers mean by the 
modern spirit is the positive and critical spirit, the spirit that 
refuses to take things on authority. This is what Renán means, 
for example, when he calls Petrarch the “ founder of the mod­
ern spirit in literature,” or Arnold when he explains why the 
Greeks of the great period seem more modern to us than the 
men of the Middle Ages.1
Now what I  have myself tried to do is to be thoroughly 
modern in this sense. I  hold that one should not only welcome 
the efforts of the man of Science at his best to put the natural 
law on a positive and critical basis, but that one should strive 
to emulate him in one’s dealings with the human law; and so 
become a complete positivist. My main objection to the move­
ment I am studying is that it has failed to produce complete 
positivists. Instead of facing honestly the emergency created 
by its break with the past the leaders of this movement have 
inclined to deny the duality of human nature, and then sought 
to dissimulate this mutilation of man under a mass of intellec- 
tual and emotional sophistry. The proper procedure in refuting 
these incomplete positivists is not to appeal to some dogma or 
outer authority but rather to turn against them their own prin­
cipies. Thus Diderot, a notable example of the incomplete 
positivist and a chief source of naturalistic tendency, says 
that “ everything is experimental in man.” Now the word 
experimental has somewhat narrowed in meaning since the 
1 See his Oxford address on On the Modern Element in Interatur e»
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time of Diderot. If one takes the saying to mean that every- 
thing in man is a matter of experience one should accept it 
unreservedly and then plant oneself firmly on the facts of 
experience that Diderot and other incomplete positivists have 
refused to recognize.
The man who plants himself, not on outer authority but on 
experience, is an individualist. To be modern in the sense I 
have defined is not only to be positive and critical, but also 
— and this from the time of Petrarch — to be individualistic. 
The establishment of a sound type of individualism is indeed 
the specifically modern problem. I t  is right here that the failure 
of the incomplete positivist, the man who is positive only 
according to the natural law, is most conspicuous. What pre- 
vails in the región of the natural law is endless change and 
relativity; therefore the naturalistic positivist attacks all the 
traditional creeds and dogmas for the very reason that they 
aspire to fixity. Now all the ethical valúes of civilization have 
been associated with these fixed beliefs; and so it has come to 
pass that with their undermining by naturalism the ethical 
valúes themselves are in danger of being swept away in the 
everlasting flux. Because the individual who views life posi- 
tively must give up unvarying creeds and dogmas “anterior, 
exterior, and superior ” to himself, it has been assumed that he 
must also give up standards. For standards imply an element 
of oneness somewhere, with reference to which it is possible to 
measure the mere manifoldness and change. The naturalistic 
individualist, however, refuses to recognize any such element of 
oneness. His own private and personal self is to be the measure 
of all things and this measure itself, he adds, is constantly 
changing. But to stop at this stage is to be satisfied with the 
most dangerous of half-truths. Thus Bergson’s assertion that 
hfe is a perpetual gushing forth of novelties” is in itself only 
a dangerous half-truth of this kind. The constant element in life 
is, no less than the element of novelty and change, a matter of 
observation and experience. As the French have it, the more life 
changes the more it is the same thing.
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If, then, one is to be a sound individualist, an individualist 
with human standards — and in an age like this that has cut 
loose from its traditional moorings, the very survival of civili­
zation would seem to hinge on its power to produce such a 
type of individualist — one must grapple with what Plato 
terms the problem of the One and the Many. My own solution 
of this problem, it may be well to point out, is not purely 
Platònic. Because one can perceive immediately an element of 
unity in things, it does not follow that one is justified in estab- 
lishing a world of essences or entities or “ ideas” above the 
flux. To do this is to fall away from a positive and critical into a 
more or less speculative attitude; it is to risk setting up a meta- 
physic of the One. Those who put exclusive emphasis on the 
element of change in things are in no less obvious danger of 
falling away from the positive and critical attitude into a meta- 
physic of the Many.1 This for example is the error one finds 
in the contemporary thinkers who seem to have the cry, think- 
ers like James and Bergson and Dewey and Croce. They are 
very far from satisfying the requirements of a complete positiv- 
ism; they are seeking rather to build up their own intoxication 
with the element of change into a complete view of life, and so 
are turning their backs on one whole side of experience in a way 
that often reminds one of the ancient Greek sophists. The 
history of philosophy since the Greeks is to a great extent the 
history of the clashes of the metaphysicians of the One and the 
metaphysicians of the Many. In the eyes of the complete posi­
tivist this history therefore reduces itself largely to a mon- 
strous logomachy.
Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an 
element of change. I t  gives a oneness that is always changing. 
The oneness and the change are inseparable. Now if what is 
stable and permanent is felt as real, the side of life that is 
always slipping over into something else or vanishing away
1 These two tendeneies in Occidental thought go back respectively at 
least as far as Parmenides and Heraclitus.
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entirely is, as every student of psychology knows, associated 
rather with the feeling of illusion. If a man attends solely to 
this side of life he will finally come, like Leconte de Lisie, 
to look upon it as a “ torrent of mobile chimeras,” as an “ end- 
less whirl of vain appearances.” To admit that the oneness 
of life and the change are inseparable is therefore to admit 
that such reality as man can know positively is inextricably 
mixed up with illusion. Moreover man does not observe the 
oneness that is always changing from the outside; he is a part 
of the process, he is himself a oneness that is always changing. 
Though imperceptible at any particular moment, the continu- 
ous change that is going on leads to differences— those, let us 
say, between a human individual at the age of six weeks and the 
same individual at the age of seventy — which are sufficiently 
striking: and finally this human oneness that is always chang­
ing seems to vanish away entirely. From all this it follows that 
an enormous element of illusion — and this is a truth the East 
has always accepted more readily than the West — enters into 
the idea of personality itself. If the critical spirit is once al- 
lowed to have its way, it will not rest content until it has 
dissolved life into a mist of illusion. Perhaps the most positive 
and critical account of man in modern literature is that of 
Shakespeare:
We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.
But, though strictly considered, life is but a web of illusion 
and a dream within a dream, it is a dream that needs to be 
managed with the utmost discretion, if it is not to turn into 
a nightmare. In other words, however much life may mock the 
metaphysician, the problem of conduct remains. There is al­
ways the unity at the heart of the change; it is possible, how­
ever, to get at this real and abiding element and so at the 
standards with reference to which the dream of life may be 
rightly managed only through a veil of illusion. The problem of
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the One and the Many, the ultímate problem of thought, can 
therefore be solved only by a right use of illusion. In cióse 
relation to illusion and the qüestions that arise in connection 
with it is all that we have come to sum up in the word imagi- 
nation. The use of this word, at least in anything like its present 
extensión, is, one should note, comparatively recent. Whole 
nations and perio'ds of the past can scarcely be said to have 
had any word corresponding to imagination in this extended 
sense. Yet the thinkers of the past have treated, at times pro- 
foundly, under the head of fiction or illusion the qüestions that 
we should treat under the head of imagination.1 In the “ Mas- 
ters of Modern French Criticism” I  was above all preoccupied 
with the problem of the One and the Many and the failure of 
the nineteenth century to deal with it adequately. My effort 
in this present work is to show that this failure can be retrieved 
only by a deeper insight into the imagination and its all-im- 
portant role in both literature and life. Man is cut off from 
immediate contact with anything abiding and therefore worthy 
to be called real, and condemned to live in an element of fiction 
or illusion, but he may, I  have tried to show, lay hold with the 
aid of the imagination on the element of oneness that is inex­
tricably blended with the manifoldness and change and to just 
that extent may build up a sound model for imitation. One tends 
to be an individualist with true standards, to put the matter 
somewhat differently, only in so far as one understands the 
relation between appearance and reality — what the philoso-
1 In his World as Imagination (1916) E . D. Fawcett, though ultra- 
romantic and unoriental in his point of view, deais with a problem that 
has always been the special preoccupation of the Hindú. A Hindú, how­
ever, would have entitled a similar volume The World as Illusion (maya). 
Aristotle has much to say of fiction in his Poetícs but does not even use the 
word imagination (<¡>avra<rlá). In the Psychology, where he discusses the im­
agination, he assigns not to it, but to mind or reason the active and Cre­
ative role (vovs ironiTLKÓs). I t  is especially the notion of the Creative imagi­
nation that is recent. The earliest example of the phrase that I have noted 
in French is in Rousseau’s description of his erotic reveries at the Hermi- 
tage (Confessions, Livre ix).
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phers call the epistemological problem. This problem, though 
it cannot be solved abstractly and metaphysically, can be solved 
practically and in terms of actual conduct. Inasmuch as mod­
ern philosophy has failed to work out any such solution, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusión that modern philosophy is bank- 
rupt, not merely from Kant, but from Descartes.
The supreme maxim of the ethical positivist is: By their 
fruits shall ye know them. If I object to a romàntic philosophy 
it is because I  do not like its fruits. I  infer from its fruits that 
this philosophy has made a wrong use of illusion. “All those 
who took the romàntic promises at their face valué,” says 
Bourget, “ rolledinabysses of despair and ennui.” 1 If any one 
still holds, as many of the older romanticists held, that it is a 
distinguished thing to roll in abysses of despair and ennui, he 
should read me no further. He will have no sympathy with my 
point of view. If any one, on the other hand, accepts my cri- 
terion but denies that Rousseauistic living has such fruits, it has 
been my aim so to accumulate evidence that he will be con- 
fronted with the task of refuting not a set of theories but a body 
of facts. My whole method, let me repeat, is experimental, or 
it might be less ambiguous to say if the word were a fortunate 
one, experiential. The illustrations I have given of any particu­
lar aspect of the movement are usually only a small fraction 
of those I have eollected — themselves no doubt only a fraction 
of the illustrations that might be eollected from printed 
sources. M. Maigron’s investigation2 into the fruits of romàntic 
living suggests the large additions that might be made to these 
printed sources from manuscript material.
My method indeed is open in one respect to grave misunder- 
standing. From the fact that I  am constantly citing passages 
from this or that author and condemning the tendeney for 
which these passages stand, the reader will perhaps be led to 
infer a total condemnation of the authors so quoted. But the
* Essay on Flaubert in Essais de Psychologie contemporaine.
Le Romantisme et les mceurs (1910).
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inference may be very incorrect. I  am not trying to give rounded 
estimates of individuals — delightful and legitímate as that 
type of criticism is— but to trace main currents as a part of my 
search for a set of principies to oppose to naturalism. I cali 
attention for example to the Rousseauistic and primitivistic 
elements in Wordsworth but do not assert that this is the whole 
truth about Wordsworth. One’s views as to the philosophical 
valué of Rousseauism must, however, weigh heavily in a total 
judgment of Wordsworth. Criticism is such a difficult art 
because one must not only have principies but must apply 
them flexibly and intuitively. No one would accuse criticism at 
present of lacking flexibility. I t  has grown so flexible in fact as 
to become invertebrate. One of my reasons for practicing the 
present type of criticism, is the conviction that because of a 
lack of principies the type of criticism that aims at rounded 
estimates of individuals is rapidly ceasing to have any meaning.
I should add that if I  had attempted rounded estimates 
they would often have been more favorable than might be 
gathered from my comments here and elsewhere on the román- 
tic leaders. One is justified in leaning towards severity in the 
laying down of principies, but should nearly always incline to 
indulgence in the application of them. In a sense one may say 
with Goethe that the excellencies are of the individual, the 
defeets of the age. I t  is especially needful to recall distinctions 
of this kind in the case of Rousseau himself and my treatment 
of him. M. Lanson has dwelt on the strange duality of Rous- 
seau’s nature. “The writer,” he says, “ is a poor dreamy crea- 
ture who approaches action only with alarm and with every 
manner of precaution, and who understands the applications 
of his boldest doctrines in a way to reassure conservatives and 
satisfy opportunists. But the work for its part detaches itself 
from the author, lives its independent life, and, heavily charged 
with revolutionary explosives which neutralize the moderate 
and conciliatory elements Rousseau has put into it for his own 
satisfaction, it exasperates and inspires revolt and fires enthu-
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siasms and irritates hatreds; it is the mother of violence, the 
source of all that is uncompromising, it launches the simple 
souls who give themselves up to its strange virtue upon the 
desperate quest of the absolute, an absolute to be realized 
now by anarchy and now by social despotism.” 11 am inclined 
to discoyer in the Rousseau who, according to M. Lanson, is 
merely timorous, a great deal of shrewdness and at times some- 
thing even better than shrewdness. The question is not perhaps 
very important, for M. Lanson is surely right in affirming that 
the Rousseau who has moved the world — and that for reasons 
I  shall try to make plain — is Rousseau the extremist and foe 
of compromise; and so it is to this Rousseau that as a student 
of mam tendencies I devote almost exclusive attention. I am 
not, however, seeking to make a scapegoat even of the radical 
and revolutionary Rousseau. One of my chief objections, indeed, 
to Rousseauism, as will appear in the following pages, is that 
it encourages the making of scapegoats.
If I  am opposed to Rousseauism because of its fruits in 
experience, I try to put what I  have to offer as a substitute on 
the same positive basis. Now experience is of many degrees: 
first of all one’s purely personal experience, an infinitesimal 
fragment; and then the experience of one’s immediate circle, 
of one’s time and country, of the near past and so on in widen- 
íng circles. The past which as dogma the ethical positivist re- 
jects, as experience he not only admits but welcomes. He can 
no more dispense with it indeed than the naturalistic positiv­
ist can dispense with his laboratory. He insists moreover on 
mcluding the remoter past in his survey. Perhaps the most 
pernicious of all the conceits fostered by the type of progress we 
owe to Science is the conceit that we have outgrown this older 
experience. One should endeavor, as Goethe says, to oppose to 
the aberrations of the hour, the masses of universal history. 
There are special reasons just now why this background to 
which one appeals should not be merely Occidental. An increas- 
1 Annales de la Sociélé Jean-Jacques Rousseau, viu, 30-31.
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ing material contact between the Occident and the Far East is 
certain. We should be enlightened by this time as to the perils 
of material contact between men and bodies of men who have 
no deeper understanding. Quite apart from this consideration 
the experience of the Far East completes and confirms in a 
most interesting way that of the Occident. We can scarcely 
afford to neglect it if we hope to work out a truly ecumenical 
wisdom to oppose to the sinister one-sidedness of our current 
naturalism. Now the ethical experience of the Far East may 
be summed up for practical purposes in the teachings and 
influence of two men, Confucius and Buddha.1 To know the 
Buddhistic and Confucian teachings in their true spirit is to 
know what is best and most representative in the ethical experi­
ence of about half the human race for over seventy generations.
A study of Buddha and Confucius suggests, as does a study 
of the great teachers of the Occident, that under its bewilder- 
ing surface variety human experience falls after all into a few 
m nin categories. I  myself am fond of distinguishing three levels 
on which a man may experience life — the naturalistic, the 
humanistic, and the religious. Tested by its fruits Buddhism 
at its best confirms Christianity. Submitted to the same test 
Confucianism falls in with the teaching of Aristotle and in 
general with that of all those who from the Greeks down have 
proclaimed decorum and the law of measure. This is so obvi- 
ously true that Confucius has been called the Aristotle of the 
East. Not only has the Far East had in Buddhism a great 
religious movement and in Confucianism a great humanistic 
movement, it has also had in early Taoism 2 a movement that 
in its attempts to work out naturalistic equivalents of human­
istic or religious insight, offers almost startling analogies to 
the movement I am here studying.
1 I should perhaps say that in the case of Buddha I have been able to 
consuit the original Pàli documents. In the case of Confucius and the 
Chínese I have had to depend on translations.
2 See appendix on Chínese primitivism.
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Thus both East and West have not only had great religious 
and humanístic disciplines which when tested by their fruits 
confirm one another, bearing witness to the element of one- 
ness, the constant element in human experience, but these 
disciplines have at times been conceived in a very positive 
spirit. Confucius indeed, though a moral realist, can scarcely 
be called a positivist; he aimed rather to attach men to the past 
by hnks of steel. He reminds us in this as in some other ways 
of the last of the great Tories in the Occident, Dr. Johnson. 
Buddha on the other hand was an individualist. He wished 
men to rest their belief neither on his authority 1 nor on that 
of tradition.2 No one has ever made a more serious effort to 
put religión on a positive and critical basis. I t  is only proper 
that I acknowledge my indebtedness to the great Hindú pos­
itivist: my treatment of the problem of the One and the Many 
for example, is nearer to Buddha than to Plato. Yet even if the 
general thesis be granted that it is desirable to put the “law 
for man” on a positive and critical basis, the question remains 
whether the more crying need just now is for positive and 
critical humanism or for positive and critical religión. I  have 
discussed this delicate and difficult question more fully in my 
last chapter, but may give at least one reason here for inclining 
to the humanístic solution. I have been struck in my study of 
the past by the endless self-deception to which man is subject 
when he tries to pass too abruptly from the naturalistic to the 
religious level. The world, it is hard to avoid concluding, would 
have been a better place if more persons had made sure they 
were human before setting out to be superhuman; and this 
consideration would seem to apply with special forcé to a gen- 
eration like the present that is wallowing in the trough of 
naturalism. After ali to be a good humanist is merely to be
| See, for example, Majjhima (Pàli Text Soeiety), i, 265. Later Bud- 
dhism espeeially Maháyána Buddhism, feli away from the positive and 
critical spmt of the founder into mythology and metaphysics.
Buddha, expressed on many occasions his disdain for the Vedas the 
great traditional authority of the Hindus. ’
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moderate and sensible and decent. It  is much easier for a man 
to deceive himself and others regarding his supernatural lights 
than it is regarding the degree to which he is moderate and 
sensible and decent.
The past is not without examples of a positive and critical 
humanism. I  have already mentioned Aristotle. If by his 
emphasis on the mediatory virtues he reminds one of Con­
fucius, by his positive method and intensely analytical temper 
he reminds one rather of Buddha. When Aristotle rises to the 
religious level and discourses of the “ life of visión” he is very 
Buddhistic. When Buddha for his part turns from the religious 
life to the duties of the layman he is purely Aristotelian. 
Aristotle also deais positively with the natural law. He is 
indeed a complete positivist, and not, like the man of the 
nineteenth century, positive according to the natural law alone. 
The Aristotle that should speeially concern us, however, is the 
positive and critical humanist — the Aristotle, let us say, of 
the “Ethics” and “Polítics” and “Poètics.” Just as I  have 
called the point of view of the scientific and utilitarian natural- 
ist Baconian,1 and that of the emotional naturalist Rousseau- 
istic, so I would term the point of view that I  am myself seeking 
to develop Aristotelian. Aristotle has laid down once for all the 
principie that should guide the ethical positivist. “Truth,” he 
says, “ in matters of moral action is judged from facts and from 
actual life. . . . So what we should do is to examine the pre- 
ceding statements [of Solon and other wise men] by referring 
them to facts and to actual life, and when they harmonize 
with facts we may accept them, when they are at variance 
with them conceive of them as mere theories.” 2
It is in this sense alone that I  aspire to be called an Aristote­
lian; for one risks certam misunderstandings in using the name 
of Aristotle.3 The authority of this great positivist has been
1 I have explained the reasons for giving this place to Bacon in chapter 
n  of Literature and the American College.
2 Eth. Nic., 1179 a.
3 I  scarcely need remind the reader that the extant Aristotelian writings
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invoked innumerable times throughout the ages as a substitute 
for direct observation. Aristotle was not only the prop and 
mainstay of dogma for centuries during the Middle Ages, but 
dogmàtic Aristotelianism survived to no small extent, espe- 
cially in literature, throughout the neo-classical period. It  was 
no doubt natural enough that the champions of the modern 
spirit should have rejected Aristotle along with the traditional 
order of which he had been made a support. Yet if they had 
been more modern they might have seen in him rather a chief 
precursor. They might have learned from him how to have 
standards and at the same time not be immured in dogma. 
As it is, those who call themselves modern have come to adopt 
a purely exploratory attitude towards life. On desperate seas 
long wont to roam,” they have lost more and more the sense of 
what is normal and central in human experience. But to get 
away from what is normal and central is to get away from wis- 
dom. My whole argument on the negative side, if I may ven­
ture on a final summing up, is that the naturalistic movement 
in the midst of which we are stili living had from the start this 
taint of eccentricity. I  have tried to show in detail the nature 
of the aberration. As for the results, they are being written 
large in disastrous events. On its constructive side, my argu­
ment, if it makes any appeal at all, will be to those for whom 
the symbols through which the past has received its wisdom 
have become incredible, and who, seeing at the same time that 
the break with the past that took place in the eighteenth cen- 
tury was on unsound lines, hold that the remedy for the partial 
positivism that is the source of this unsoundness, is a more 
complete positivism. Nothing is more perilous than to be only
which have repelled so many by their form were almost certainly not 
meant for publication. For the problema raised by these wntings as well 
as for the mystery in the method of their early transmisión seeR.bhute, 
Hisiory of the Aristotelian Writings (1888). The writmgs which Aristotle 
prepared for publication and which Cicero describes as a golden stream 
of speech” (Acad. xi, 38, 119) have, with the possible exception of the 
recently recovered Constitution of Athens, been lost.
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half critical. This is to risk being the wrong type of individual- 
ist— the individualist who has repudiated outer control with- 
out achieving inner control. “ People mean nowadays by a 
philosopher, ” says Rivarol, “not the man who learns the great 
art of mastering his passions or adding to his insight, but the 
man who has cast off prejudices without acquiring virtues.” 
That view of philosophy has not ceased to be popular. The 
whole modern experiment is threatened with breakdown 
simply because it has not been sufñciently modern. One should 
therefore not rest content until one has, with the aid of the 
secular experience of both the East and the West, worked out 
a point of view so modern that, compared with it, that of our 
smart young radicals will seem antediluvian.
■ ■ ■ .......... ;
ROUSSEAU 
AND ROMANTICISM
C H A P T E R  I
THE TERMS CLÀSSIC AND ROMÀNTIC
T h e  words clàssic and romàntic, we are often told, can- 
not be defined at all, and even if they could be defined, 
some would add, we should not be much profited. B u t 
this inability or unwillingness to define may itself turn 
out to be only one aspect of a movement that from Rous­
seau to Bergson has sought to discredit the analytical 
intellect —  what Wordsworth calis “ the false secondary 
power by which we multiply distinctions.” However, 
those who are with Socrates rather than with Rousseau 
or Wordsworth in this m atter, will insist on the impor- 
tance of definition, especially in a chaotic era like the 
present; for nothing is more characteristic of such an 
era than its irresponsible use of general terms.^ Now to 
measure up to the Socràtic standard, a definition must 
not be abstract and metaphysical, but experimental; 
it must not, that is, reflect our opinión of what a word 
should mean, but what it actually has meant. M athe- 
maticians may be free at times to frame their own defi- 
nitions, but in the case of words like clàssic and romàntic, 
that have been used innumerable times, and used not in 
one but in many countries, such a method is inadmissible.
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One must keep one’s eye on actual usage. One should 
indeed allow for a certain amount of freakishness in this 
usage. Beaumarchais, for example, makes classic synony- 
mous with barbarie.1 One may disregard an occasional 
aberration of this kind, but if one can find only confusión 
and inconsistency in all the main uses of words like 
classic and romàntic, the only procedure for those who 
speak or write in order to be understood is to banish the 
words from their vocabulary.
Now to define in a Socràtic way two things are neces- 
sary: one must learn to see a common element in things 
that are apparently different and also to discriminate 
between things that are apparently similar. A Newton, 
to take the familiar instance of the former process, saw 
a common element in the fall of an apple and the motion 
of a planet; and one may perhaps without being a liter- 
ary Newton discover a common element in all the main 
uses of the word romàntic as well as in all the m ain  
uses of the word classic; though some of the things to 
which the word romàntic in particular has been applied 
seem, it must be admitted, at least as far apart as the fall 
of an apple and the motion of a planet. The first step is 
to perceive the something that connects two or more of 
these things apparently so diverse, and then it may be 
found necessary to refer this unifying trait itself back 
to something still more general, and so on until we ar- 
rive, not indeed at anything absolute — the absolute 
will always elude us — but at what Goethe calis the 
original or underlying phenomenon ( Urphanomen). 
A fruitful source of false definition is to take as primary 
in a more or less closely allied group of faets what is 
* See his Essai sur le genre dramatique sérieux.
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actually secondary —  for example, to fix upon the re- 
turn to  the Middle Ages as the central fact m roman- 
ticism, whereas this return is only symptomatic, it is 
very fax from being the original phenomenon. Con- 
fused and incomplete definitions of romanticism have 
indeed just that o r ig in - th e y  seek to put at the cen­
tre something that though romàntic is not central but 
peripheral, and so the whole subject is thrown out of
P6M y plan then is to determine to the best of my abil- 
ity  in connection with a brief historical survey, the com­
mon element in the various uses of the words classic an 
romàntic; and then, having thus disposed of the srnnlar- 
ities, to turn to the second part of the art of defimng a 
deal, also historically, with the differences. For my sub- 
iect is not romanticism in general, but only a particular 
type of romanticism, and this type of romanticism needs 
to be seen as a recoil, not from classicism m general, but 
from a particular type of classicism.
I
The word romàntic when traced historically if  found 
to go back to the oíd French roman  of which still older 
forms are romans and romant. These and srnnlar forma- 
tions derive ultimately from the medieval Latín adverb 
romanice. Roman  and like words meant ongmally 
various vernaculars derived from Latín just as the 
French still speak of these vernaculars as les langues ro­
manes; and then the word roman  carne to be applied to 
tales written in the various verniaculara, <«penajflyrn  
oíd French. Now with what features of th 
were people most struck? The reply to this question
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is found in a passage of a fifteenth-century Latín manu- 
s c r ip t:1 “ From the reading of certain romàntics, that is, 
books of poetry composed in French on military deeds 
which are for the most part fictitious.” 2 Here the term 
romàntic is applied to books that we should still cali 
romàntic and for the very same reason, namely, because 
of the predommance in these books of the element of 
fiction over reaüty.
In  general a  thing is romàntic when, as Aristotle 
would say, it is wonderful rather than probable; in 
other words, when it violates the normal sequence of 
cause and effect in favor of adventure. Here is the fun­
damental contrast between the words clàssic and ro­
màntic which meets us at the outset and in some form 
or other persists in all the uses of the word down to the 
present day. A thing is romàntic when it  is strange, un- 
expected, intense, superlative, extreme, unique,3 etc. A 
thing is classical, on the other hand, when it is not unique, 
but representative of a class. In  this sense medical men 
may speak correctly of a classic case of typhoid fever, or 
a  classic case of hysteria. One is even justified in speak- 
ing of a classic example of romanticism. B y  an easy ex­
tensión of meaning a thing is classical when it belongs 
to a high class or to the best class.
1 Quoted in Grimm’s Dictionary.
2 E x lectione quorundam romanticorum, i.e. librorum compositorum in 
galli co poeticorum de gestis militaribus, in quibus maxima pars fabulosa 
est.
3 Perhaps the most romàntic lines in English are found in one of Ca- 
millo’s speeches in The Winter’s Tale (iv, 4):
a wild dedication of yourselves 
To unpath’d wàters, undream’d shores.
This wild dedication ” is, it should be noted, looked upon by Camillo 
with disfavor.
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The type of romanticism referred to in the fifteenth- 
century manuscript was, it will be observed, the spon- 
taneous product of the popular imagination of the Middle 
Ages. We may go further and say that the uncultivated 
human imagination in all times and places is romàntic in 
the same way. I t  hungers for the thrilling and the marvel- 
lous and is, in short, incurably melodramàtic. All students 
of the past know how, when the popular imagination is 
left free to work on actual historical characters and 
events, it quickly introduces into these characters and 
events the themes of universal folk-lore, and makes a 
ruthless sacrifice of reality to the love of melodramàtic 
surprise. For example, the original nucleus of historical 
fact has almost disappeared in the lurid melodramàtic 
tale “ Les quatre fils Aymon,” which has continued, as 
presented in the “ Bibliothèque Bleue,” to appeal to the 
French peasant down to our own times. Those who look 
with alarm on recent attacks upon romanticism should 
therefore be comforted. All children, nearly all women 
and the vast m ajority of men always have been, are and 
probably always will be romàntic. This is true even of a 
classical period like the second half of the seventeenth 
century in France. Boileau is supposed to have killed the 
vogue of the interminable romances of the early sev­
enteenth century which themselves continue the spirit 
of the mediaeval romances. B u t recent investigations 
have shown that the vogue of these romances continued 
until well on into the eighteenth century. They influ- 
enced the imagination of Rousseau, the great modern 
romancer. #
But to return to the history of the word romàntic. 
The first printed examples of the word in any modern
6
tongue are, it would seem, to be found in English. The 
Oxford Dictionary cites the following from F . Greville’s 
"L ife  of Sidney” (written before 1628, published in 
1652): “ Doe not his Arcadian romàntics live after him ?” 
—  meaning apparently ideas or features suggestive of 
romance. Of extreme interest is the use of the word in 
Evelyn’s "D ia ry ” (3 August, 1654): "W ere Sir Guy’s 
grot improved as it might be, it were capable of being 
m adea most romàntic and pleasant place.” The word is 
not only used in a favorable sense, but it is applied to 
nature; and it is this use of the word in connection with 
outer nature that French and Germán literaturas are 
going to derive later from England. Among the early 
English uses of the word romàntic may be noted: "T here 
happened this extraordinary case —  one of the most 
romantique that ever I  heard in my life and could not 
have believed,” 1 etc. "M o st other authors that I  ever 
read either have wild romàntic tales wherein they strain 
Love and Honor to that ridiculous height that it becomes 
burlesque,” 2 etc. The word becomes fairly common by 
the year 1700 and thousands of examples could be col- 
lected from English writers in the eighteenth century. 
Here are two early eighteenth-century instances:
“ The gentleman I am married to made love to me in rapture but 
it was the rapture of a Christian and a man of Honor, not a romàntic 
hero or a whining eoxcomb.” 3
Whether the charmer sinner it or saint it
If folly grow romantick I must paint it.4
ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM
1 Pepys’s Diary, 13 June, 1666.
2 Thomas Shadwell, Preface to the Sullen Lovers, 1668.
8 Spectator, 142, by Steele.
4 Pope, 2d Epistle, 0 /  the Character of Women.
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The early French and Germán uses of the word román- 
tic seem to derive from England. One important point is 
to be noted as to France. Before using the word roman­
tique the French used the word romanesque in the sense 
of wild, unusual, adventurous —  especially in matters 
of sentiment, and they have continued to employ rom an­
esque alongside romantique, which is now practically used 
only of the romàntic school. A great deal of confusión 
is thus avoided into which we fall in English from having 
only the one word romàntic, which must do duty for both 
romantique and romanesque. An example of romantique 
is found in French as early as 1 6 7 5 ;1 but the word owed 
its vogue practically to the anglomania that set in about 
the middle of the eighteenth century. The first very in- 
fluential French example of the word is appropriately 
found in Rousseau in the Fifth  Promenade (1777): "T h e  
shores of the Lake of Bienne are more wild and romàntic 
than those of the Lake of Geneva.” The word romantique 
was fashionable in France especially as applied to scenery 
from about the year 1785, but without any thought as 
yet of applying it to a literary school.
In  Germany the word romantisch as an equivalent of 
the French romanesque and modern Germán romanhaft, 
appears at the end of the seventeenth century and plainly 
as a borrowing from the French. Heidigger, a Swiss, used 
it several times in his "M ythoscopia romántica,” 2 an 
attack on romances and the wild and vain imaginings 
they engender. According to Heidigger the only resource 
against romanticism in this sense is religión. In  Germany
1 Cf. Revue d’hist. litt., xvm , 440. For the Early French history of the 
word, see also the article Romantique by A. François in Armales de la Soc. 
J .- J . Rousseau, v, 199-236.
2 First edition, 1698; second edition, 1732.
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as in France the association of romàntic with natural 
scenery comes from England, especially from the imita- 
tions and translations of Thomson’s “ Seasons.”
In  the second half of the eighteenth century the in- 
creasingly favorable use of words like Gothic and en- 
thusiastic as well as the emergence of words like senti­
mental and picturesque are among the symptoms of a 
new movement, and the fortunes of the word romàntic 
were more or less bound upw ith this movement. Still, 
apart from its application to natural scenery, the word 
is as yet far from having acquired a favorable connota- 
tion if we are to believe an essay by John Foster on the 
“ Application of the Epithet Rom àntic” (1805). Foster’s 
point of view is not unlike that of Heidigger. Romàntic, 
he says, had come to be used as a term of vague abuse, 
whereas it can be used rightly only of the ascendency of 
imagination over judgment, and is therefore synonymous 
with such words as wild, visionary, extravagant. “ A man 
possessing so strong a judgment and so subordínate a 
fancy as Dean Swift would hardly have been made 
romàntic . . . if he had studied all the books in Don 
Quixote’s library.” I t  is not, Foster admits, a sign of 
high endowment for a youth to be too coldly judicial, too 
deaf to the blandishments of imaginative illusion. Y et 
in general a man should strive to bring his imagination 
under the control of sound reason. But how is it possible 
thus to prevail against the deceits of fancy? Right know- 
ing, he asserts very un-Socratically, is not enough to 
ensure right doing. At this point Foster changes from 
the tone of a literary essay to that of a  sermón, and, 
maintaining a thesis somewhat similar to that of Pascal 
in the seventeenth century and Heidigger in the eight-
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eenth, he concludes that a man’s imagination will run 
away with his judgment or reason unless he have the aid 
of divine grace.
II
When Foster wrote his essay there was no question as 
yet in England of a romàntic school. Before considering 
how the word carne to be applied to a particular move­
ment we need first to bring out more fully certain broad 
conflicts of tendency during the seventeenth and eight­
eenth centuries, conflicts that are not sufficiently revealed 
by the occasional uses during this period of the word 
romàntic. In  the contrast Foster established between 
judgment and imagination he is merely following a long 
series of neo-classical critics and this contrast not only 
seemed to him and these critics, but still seems to many, 
the essential contrast between classicism and romanti- 
cism. We shall be helped in understanding how judgment 
(or reason) and imagination came thus to be sharply con- 
trasted if we consider briefly the changes in the meaning 
of the word wit during the neo-classical period, and also 
if we recollect that the contrast between judgment and 
imagination is closely related to the contrast the French 
are so fond of establishing between the general sense 
(le sens commun) and the private sense or sense of the 
individual (le sens propre).
In  the sixteenth century prime emphasis was put not 
upon common sense, but upon wit or conceit or ingenuity 
(in the sense of quickness of imagination). The typical 
Elizabethan strove to excel less by judgment than by 
invention, by “ high-flying liberty of conceit” ; like Fal- 
staff he would have a brain “ apprehensive, quick, for-
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getive, full of nimble, fiery, and delectable shapes.” W it 
at this time, it should be remembered, was synonymous 
not only with imagination but with intellect (in opposi- 
tion to will). The result of the worship of wit in this 
twofold sense was a sort of intellectual romanticism. 
Though its origins are no doubt medieval, it  differs 
from the ordinary romanticism of the Middle Ages to 
which I  have already referred in being thus concerned 
with thought rather than with action. Towards the end 
of the Renaissance and in the early seventeenth cen- 
tury especially, people were ready to pursue the strange 
and surprising thought even at the risk of getting too 
far away from the workings of the normal mind. Henee 
the points and concebs” that spread, as Lowell put 
it, like a “ cutaneous eruption” over the face of Europe; 
henee the Gongorists, and Cultists, the Marinists and 
Euphuists, the précieux  and the “ metaphysical” poets. 
And then carne the inevitable swing away from all this 
fantasticality towards common sense. A demand aróse 
for something that was less rare and “ precious” and 
more representative.
This struggle between the general sense and the sense 
of the individual stands out with special clearness in 
France. A model was gradually worked out by aid of the 
clàssics, especially the Latín clàssics, as to what man 
should be. Those who were in the main movement of the 
time elaborated a great convention, that is they carne 
together about certain things. They condemned in the 
ñame of their convention those who were too indulgent 
of their private sense, in other words, too eccentric in 
their imaginings. A Théophile, for example, fell into dis- 
esteem for refusing to restrain his imagination, for assert-
ing the type of “ spontaneity” that would have won him
favor in any romàntic period.1
The swing away from intellectual romanticism can 
also be traced in the changes that took place in the mean- 
ing of the word wit in both France and England. One 
of the main tasks of the French critics of the seven­
teenth century and of English critics, largely under the 
lead of the French, was to distinguish between true and 
false wit. The work that would have been complimented 
a little earlier as “ w itty” and “ conceited” is now cen- 
sured as fantastic and far-fetched, as lacking in judicial 
control over the imagination, and therefore in general 
appeal. The movement away from the sense of the indi­
vidual towards common sense goes on steadily from the 
time of Malherbe to that of Boileau. Balzac attacks 
Ronsard for his individualistic excess, especially for his 
audacity in inventing words without reference to usage. 
Balzac himself is attacked by Boileau for his affecta- 
tion, for his straining to say things differently from 
other people. In  so far his wit was not true but false. 
La Bruyére, in substantial accord with Boileau, defines 
false wit as wit which is lacking in good sense and
1 Cf. his Elégie à une dame.
Mon áme, imaginant, n’a point la patience 
De bien polir les vers et ranger la Science.
La régle me déplaít, j’écris confusément:
Jamais un bon esprit ne fait ríen qu’aisément.
Je veux faire des vers qui ne soient pas contraints
...............................................................  . •
Chercher des lieux secrets oh ríen ne me déplaise,
Méditer à loisir, rèver tout à mon aise,
Employer toute une heure à me mirer dans l’eau,
Ouïr, comme en songeant, la course d’un ruisseau,
Ecrire dans un bois, m’interrompre, me taire,
Composer un quatrain sans songer à le faire.
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judgment and “ in which the imagination has too large 
a share.” 1
W hat the metaphysical poets in England understood 
by wit, according to Dr. Johnson, was the pursuit of their 
thoughts to their last ramifications, and in this pursuit 
of the singular and the novel they lost the “ grandeur of 
generality.” This imaginative quest of rarity led to the 
same recoil as in France, to a demand for conunon sense 
and judgment. The opposite extreme from the metaphys­
ical excess is reached when the element of invention is 
eliminated entirely from wit and it is reduced, as it is by 
Pope, to rendering happily the general sense —
What oft was thought but ne’er so well expressed.
D r. Johnson says that the decisive change in the meaning 
of the word wit took place about the time of Cowley. 
Important evidences of this change and also of the new 
tendency to deprecíate the imagination is also found in 
certain passages of Hobbes. Hobbes identifies the imagi­
nation with the memory of outer images and so looks on 
it as “ decaying sense.”2 “ They who observe similitudes,” 
he remarks elsewhere, making a distinction that was to be 
developed by Locke and accepted by Addison, “ in case 
they be such as are but rarely observed by others are said 
to ha ve a good wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a 
good fancy ” (wit has here the older meaning). “ B u t they 
who distinguish and observe differences,” he continues, 
“ are said to have a good judgment. Fancy without 
the help of judgment is not worthy of commendation, 
whereas judgment is commended for itself without the
1 Caractéres, ch. v.
2 His psychology of the memory and imagination is still Aristotelian. 
Cf. E . Wallace, Aristotlc’s Psychology, Intr., lxxxvi-cvii.
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help of fancy. Indeed without steadiness and direction to 
some end, a  great fancy is one kind of madness.” “ Judg­
ment without fancy,” he concludes, “ is w it” (this antici- 
pates the extreme neo-classical use of the word wit), ‘ but 
fancy without judgment, not.”
Dryden betrays the influence of Hobbes when he 
says of the period of incubation of his “ Rival Ladies : 
“ Fancy was yet in its first work, moving the sleeping 
images of things towards the light, there to be distin- 
guished and either chosen or rejected by judgment.” 
Fancy or imagination (the words were still synonymous), 
as conceived by the English neo-classicists, often shows 
a strange vivacity for a faculty that is after all only 
“ decaying sense.” “ Fancy without judgment,” says 
Dryden, “ is a hot-mouthed jade without a curb.” 
“ Fancy,” writes Rymer in a similar vein, “ leaps and 
frisks, and away she’s gone; whilst reason rattles the 
Chain and follows after.” The following^ lines of Mul- 
grave are typical of the neo-classical notion of the rela- 
tion between fancy and judgment:
As all is dullness when the Fancy ’s bad,
So without Judgment, Fancy is but mad.
Reason is that substantial, useful part
Which gnina the Head, while t ’ other wins the Heart.1
The opposition established by the neo-classicist in 
passages of this kind is too mechanical. Fancy and judg­
ment do not seem to cooperate but to war with one an- 
other. In  case of doubt the neo-classicist is always ready 
to sacrifice fancy to the “ substantial, useful part, and 
so he seems too negative and cool and prosaic in his 
reason, and this is because his reason is so largely a pro-
1 A n Essay upon Poetry (1682).
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test against a previous romàntic excess. W hat had been 
considered genius in the time of the “ metaphysicals” 
had too often turned out to be only oddity. With this 
warning before them men kept their eyes íixed very 
closely on the model of normal human nature that had 
been set up, and imitated it very literally and timorously. 
A man was haunted by the fear that he might be “ mon- 
strous,” and so, as Rymer put it, “ satisfy nobody’s mag- 
got but his own.” Correctness thus became a sort of 
tyranny. We suffer to the present day from this neo- 
classical failure to work out a sound conception of the 
imagination in its relation to good sense. Because the 
neo-classicist held the imagination lightly as compared 
with good sense the romàntic rebels were led to hold good 
sense lightly as compared with imagination. The román- 
tic view in short is too much the neo-classical view turned 
upside down; and, as Sainte-Beuve says, nothing resem­
bles a hollow so much as a swelling.
III
Because the classicism against which romanticism re- 
belled was inadequate it does not follow that every type 
of classicism suffers from a similar inadequacy. The great 
movement away from imaginative unrestraint towards 
regularity and good sense took place in the main under 
French auspices. In general the French have been the 
chief exponents of the clàssic spirit in modern times. 
They themselves feel this so strongly that a certain group 
in France has of late years inclined to use interchangeably 
the words classicist and nationalist. B u t this is a grave 
confusión, for if the classic spirit is anything at all it is in 
its essence not local and national, but universal and hu­
man. To be sure, any particular manifestation of clas­
sicism will of necessity contain elements that are less 
universal, elements that reflect merely a certain person or 
persons, or a certain age and country. This is a  truth that 
we scarcely need to have preached to us; for with the 
growth of the historical method we have come to fix our 
attention almost exclusively on these local and relative 
elements. The complete critic will accept the historical 
method but be on his guard against its excess. He will 
see an element in man that is set above the local and 
the relative; he will learn to detect this abiding element 
through all the flux of circumstance; in Platònic language, 
he will perceive the One in the Many.
Formerly, it must be admitted, critics were not histori­
cal enough. They took to be of the essence of classicism 
what was merely its local coloring, especially the coloring 
it received from the French of the seventeenth century. 
I f  we wish to distinguish between essence and accident 
in the classic spirit we must get behind the French of the 
seventeenth century, behind the Italians of the sixteenth 
century who laid the foundations of neo-classical theory, 
behind the Romans who were the immediate models of 
most neo-classicists, to the source of classicism in Greece. 
Even in Greece the classic spirit is very much implicated 
in the local and the relative, yet in the life of no other 
people perhaps does what is universal in man shine forth 
more clearly from what is only local and relative. We 
still need, therefore, to retum  to Greece, not merely for 
the best practice, but for the best theory of classicism; for 
this is still found in spite of all its obscurities and incom- 
pleteness in the Poetics of Aristotle. If  we have recourse 
to this treatise, however, it must be on condition that we
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do not, like the crítics of the Renaissance, deal with it in 
an abstract and dogmàtic way (the form of the treatise it 
must be confessed gave them no slight encouragement), 
but in a spirit akin to Aristotle’s own as revealed in the 
total body of his writings —  a spirit that is at its best 
positive and experimental.
Aristotle not only deais positively and experimentally 
with the natural order and with man so far as he is a part 
of this order, but he deais in a similar fashion with a side 
of man that the modern positivist often overlooks. Like 
all the great Greeks Aristotle recognizes that man is the 
creature of two laws: he has an ordinary or natural self 
of impulse and desire and a human self that is known prac- 
tically as a power of control over impulse and desire. If  
man is to become human he must not let impulse and 
desire run wild, but must oppose to everything excessive 
in his ordinary self, whether in thought or deed or emo- 
tion, the law of measure. This insistence on restraint and 
proportion is rightly taken to be of the essence not merely 
of the Greek spirit but of the classical spirit in general. 
The norm or standard that is to set bounds to the ordi­
nary self is got at by different types of classicists in dif­
ferent ways and described variously: for example, as the 
human law, or the better self, or reason (a word to be dis- 
cussed more fully later), or nature. Thus when Boileau 
says, “ Let nature be your only study,” he does not mean 
outer nature, nor again the nature of this or that individ­
ual, but representative human nature. Having decided 
what is normal either for man or some particular class of 
men the classicist takes this normal “ nature” for his 
model and proceeds to imitate it. Whatever accords with 
the model he has thus set up he pronounces natural or
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probable, whatever on the other hand departs too far 
from what he conceives to be the normal type or the 
normal sequence of cause and effect he holds to be “ im­
probable” and unnatural or even, if it attains an extreme 
of abnormality, “ monstrous.” Whatever in conduct or 
character is duly restrained and proportionate with refer- 
ence to the model is said to observe decorum. Probability 
and decorum are identical in some of their aspects and 
closely related in all.1 T o recapitúlate, a general nature, 
a core of normal experience, is affirmed by all classicists. 
From this central affirmation derives the doctrine of imi- 
tation, and from imitation in turn the doctrines of prob­
ability and decorum.
But though all classicists are alike in insisting on 
nature, imitation, probability and decorum, they differ 
widely, as I  have already intimated, in what they under- 
stand by these terms. Let us consider first what Aristotle 
and the Greeks understand by them. The first point to 
observe is that according to Aristotle one is to get his 
general nature not on authority or second hand, but is 
to disengage it directly for himself from the jumble of 
particulars that he has before his eyes. He is not, says 
Aristotle, to imitate things as they are, but as they ought 
to be. Thus conceived imitation is a Creative act. Through 
all the welter of the actual one penetrates to the real and 
so succeeds without ceasing to be individual in suggesting 
the universal. Poetry that is imitative in this sense is,
1 The French Academy discriminates in its Sentiments sur le Cid 
between two types of probability, “ ordinary” and “ extraordinary.” 
Probability in general is more especially reserved for action. In the domain 
of action “ ordinary” probability and decorum run very cióse together. 
It is, for example, both indecorous and improbable that Chiméne in the 
Cid should marry her father’s murderer.
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according to Aristotle, more “ serious” and “ philosoph- 
ical” than history. History deais merely with what has 
happened, whereas poetry deais with what may happen 
according to probability or necessity. Poetry, that is, does 
not portray life literally but extricates the deeper or ideal 
truth from the flux of circumstance. One may add with 
Sydney that if poetry is thus superior to history in being 
more serious and philosophical it resembles history and is 
superior to philosophy in being concrete.
The One that the great poet or artist perceives in the 
Many and that gives to his work its high seriousness is 
not a fixed absolute. In  general the model that the highly 
serious man (ó cnrovSalos) imitates and that keeps his or- 
dinary self within the bounds of decorum is not to be 
taken as anything finite, as anything that can be formu- 
lated once for ali. This point is important for on it hinges 
every right distinction not merely between the classic 
and the romàntic, but between the classic and the pseudo- 
classic. Romanticism has claimed for itself a monopoly 
of imagination and infinitude, but on closer examination, 
as I  hope to show later, this claim, at least so far as genu­
ine classicism is concerned, will be found to be quite 
unjustified. For the present it is enough to say that true 
classicism does not rest on the observance of rules or the 
imitation of models but on an immediate insight into the 
universal. Aristotle is especially admirable in the account 
he gives of this insight and of the way it may manifest 
itself in art and literature. One may be rightly imitative, 
he says, and so have access to a superior truth and give 
others access to it only by being a master of illusion. 
Though the great poet “ breathes immortal air,” though 
he sees behind the shows of sense a world of more abiding
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relationships, he can convey his visión not directly but 
only imaginatively. Aristotle, one should observe, does 
not establish any hard and fast opposition between judg- 
ment and imagination, an opposition that pervades not 
only the neo-classical movement but also the romàntic 
revolt from it. He simply affirms a supersensuous order 
which one can perceive only with the help of fiction. The 
best art, says Goethe in the true spirit of Aristotle, gives 
us the “ illusion of a higher reality.” This has the advan- 
tage of being experimental. I t  is merely a statement of 
what one feels in the presence of a great painting, let us 
say, or in reading a great poem.
IV
After this attempt to define briefly with the help of the 
Greeks the classical spirit in its essence we should be pre- 
pared to understand more clearly the way in which this 
spirit was modified in neo-classical times, especially in 
France. The first thing that strikes one about the classi­
cism of this period is that it does not rest on immediate 
perception like that of the Greeks but on outer authority. 
The merely dogmàtic and traditional classicist gave a 
somewhat un-Greek meaning to the doctrines of nature 
and imitation. Why imitate nature directly, said Scaliger, 
when we have in Virgil a second nature? Imitation thus 
came to mean the imitation of certain outer models and 
the following of rules based on these models. Now it is 
well that one who aims at excellence in any field should 
begin by a thorough assimilation of the achievements of 
his great predecessors in this field. Unfortunately the neo- 
classical theorist tended to impose a multitude of precepts 
that were based on what was external rather than on what
was vital in the practice of his models. In  so far the lesson 
of form that the great ancients can always teach any one 
who approaches them in the right spirit degenerated into 
formalism. This formalistic turn given to the doctrine of 
imitation was felt from the outset to be a menace to origi- 
nality; to be incompatible, and everything hinges at last 
on this point, with the spontaneity of the imagination. 
There was an important reaction headed by men like 
Boileau, within the neo-classical movement itself, against 
the oppression of the intuitive side of human nature by 
mere dogma and authority, above all against the notion 
that “ regularity” is in itself any guarantee of literary 
excellence. A school of rules was succeeded by a school of 
taste. Y et even to the end the neo-classicist was too prone 
to reject as unnatural or even monstrous everything that 
did not fit into one of the traditional pigeon-holes. One 
must grant, indeed, that much noble work was achieved 
under the neo-classical dispensation, work that shows a 
genuine insight into the universal, but it is none the less 
evident that the view of the imagination held during this 
period has a formalistic taint.
This taint in neo-classicism is due not merely to its dog­
màtic and mechanical way of dealing with the doctrine 
of imitation but also to the fact that it had to reconcile 
classical with Christian dogma; and the two antiqui- 
ties, classical and Christian, if interpreted vitally and in 
the spirit, were in many respects divergent and in some 
respects contradictory. The general outcome of the at- 
tempts at reconciliation made by the literary casuists 
of Italy  and France was that Christiani ty  should ha ve a 
monopoly of truth and classicism a monopoly of fiction. 
For the true classicist, it will be remembered, the two
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things are inseparable —  he gets at his truth through a 
veil of fiction. Many of the neo-classicists carne to con- 
ceive of art as many romanticists were to conceive of it 
later as a sort of irresponsible game or play, but they were, 
it must be confessed, very inferior to the romanticists in 
the spontaneity of their fiction. They went for this fiction 
as for everything else to the models, and this meant in 
practice that they employed the pagan myths, not as 
imaginative symbols of a higher reality —  it is still possi­
ble to employ them in that way —  but merely in Boi- 
leau’s phrase as “ traditional ornaments” (ornements re- 
çus). The neo-classicist to be sure naight so employ his 
“ fiction” as to inculcate a moral; in that case he is only 
too likely to give us instead of the living symbol, dead 
allegory; instead of high seriousness, its caricature, di- 
dacticism. The traditional stock of fiction became at 
last so intolerably trite as to be rejected even by some of 
the late neo-classicists. “ The rejection and contempt of 
fiction,” said Dr. Johnson (who indulged in it himself on 
occasion) “ is rational and manly.” But to reject fiction 
in the larger sense is to miss the true driving power in 
human nature —  the imagination. Before concluding, 
however, that Dr. Johnson had no notion of the róle of 
the imagination one should read his attack on the theory 
of the three unities 1 which was later to be turned to ac- 
count by the romanticists.
Now the three unities may be defended on an entirely 
legitímate ground —  on the ground namely that they 
make for concentration, a prime virtue in the drama; 
but the grounds on which they were actually imposed 
on the drama, especially in connection with the Quarrel
1 In his Preface to Shakespeare.
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of the Cid, illustrate the corruption of another main 
classical doctrine, that of probability or verisimilitude. 
In  his dealings with probability as in his dealings with 
imitation, the neo-classical formalist did not allow suf- 
ficiently for the element of illusion. What he required 
from the drama in the ñame of probability was not the 
“ illusion of a higher reality,” but strict logic or even lit­
eral deception. He was not capable of a poetic faith, not 
willing to suspend his disbelief on passing from the world 
of ordinary fact to the world of artistic creation. Goethe 
was thinking especially of the neo-classical French when 
he said: “ As for the French, they will always be arrested 
by their reason. They do not recognize that the imagina- 
tion has its own laws which are and always must be 
problemàtic for the reason.”
I t  was also largely under French influence that the 
doctrine of decorum, which touches probability at many 
points, was turned aside from its true meaning. Decorum 
is in a way the peculiar doctrine of the classicist, is in 
M ilton’s phrase “ the grand masterpiece to observe.” The 
doctrines of the universal and the imitation of the uni­
versal go deeper indeed than decorum, so much deeper 
that they are shared by classicism with religión. The man 
who aspires to live religiously must no less than the 
humanist look to some model set above his ordinary self 
and imitate it. But though the classicist at his best medi- 
tates, he does not, like the seeker after religious perfec- 
tion, see in meditation an end in itself but rather a sup- 
port for the mediatory virtues, the virtues of the man 
who would live to the best advantage in this world rather 
than renounce it ; and these virtues may be said to be 
summed up in decorum. For the best type of Greek
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humanist, a Sophocles let us say, decorum was a vital 
and immediate thing. But there enters into decorum even 
from the time of the Alexandrian Greeks, and still more 
into French neo-classical decorum, a marked element of 
artificiality. The all-roundness and fine symmetry, the 
poise and dignity that come from working within the 
bounds of the human law, were taken to be the privilege 
not of man in general but of a special social class. Take 
for instance verbal decorum: the French neo-classicists 
assumed that if the speech of poetry is to be noble and 
highly serious it must coincide with the speech of the 
aristocracy. As Nisard puts it, they confused nobility of 
language with the language of the nobility. Decorum 
was thus more or less merged with etiquette, so that the 
standards of the stage and of literature in general carne 
to coincide, as Rousseau complains, with those of the 
drawing-room. More than anything else this narrowing 
of decorum marks the decline from the classic to the 
pseudo-classic, from form to formalism.
While condemning pseudo-decorum one should remem- 
ber that even a Greek would have seen something para- 
doxical in a poem like Goethe’s ‘ ‘ Hermann und Doro- 
thea” and its attempt to invest with epic grandeur the 
affairs of villagers and peasants. After all, dignity and 
elevation and especially the opportunity for important 
action, which is the point on which the classicist puts 
prime emphasis, are normally though not invariably 
associated with a high rather than with a mean social 
estáte. In  general one should insist that the decorum 
worked out under French auspices was far from being 
merely artificial. The French gentleman (honnéte homme) 
of the seventeenth century often showed a moderation
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and freedom from over-emphasis, an exquisite tact and 
urbanity that did not fall too far short of his immediate 
model, Horaee, and related him to the all-round man 
of the Greeks (icaXòs icàyadck). T o be sure an ascetic 
Christian like Pascal sees in decorum a disguise of one’s 
ordinary self rather than a real curb upon it, and feels 
that the gap is not sufficiently wide between even the 
best type of the man of the world and the mere worldling. 
One needs, however, to be very austere to disdain the art 
of living that has been fostered by decorum from the 
Greeks down. Something of this art of living survives 
even in a Chesterfield, who falls far short of the best 
type of French gentleman and reminds one very remotely 
indeed of a Pericles. Chesterfield’s half-jesting definition 
of decorum as the art of combining the useful appearances 
of virtue with the solid satisfactions of vice points the 
way to its ultimate corruption. Talleyrand, who marks 
perhaps this last stage, was defined by Napoleón as “ a 
silk stocking filled with mud.” In  some of its late exem­
plars decorum had actually become, as Rousseau com- 
plains, the “ mask of hypocrisy” and the “ varnish of 
vice.”
One should not however, like Rousseau and the roman- 
ticists, judge of decorum by what it degenerated into. 
Every doctrine of genuine worth is disciplinary and 
men in the mass do not desire discipline. “ Most men,’ 
says Aristotle, “ would rather live in a disorderly than 
in a sober manner.” But most men do not admit any 
such preference —  that would be crude and inartistic. 
They incline rather to substitute for the reality of dis­
cipline some art of going through the motions. Every 
great doctrine is thus in constant perii of passing over
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into some hollow semblance or even, it may be, into some 
mere caricature of itself. When one wishes therefore to 
determine the nature of decorum one should think of a 
Milton, let us say, and not of a  Talleyrand or even of 
a Chesterfield.
Milton imitated the models, like any other neo-classi- 
cist, but his imitation was not, in Joubert’s phrase, that 
of one book by another book, but of one soul by another 
soul. His decorum is therefore imaginati ve; and it is the 
privilege of the imagination to give the sense of spacious- 
ness and infinitude. On the other hand, the unimaginative 
way in which many of the neo-classicists held their main 
tenets —  nature, imitation, probability, decorum —  nar- 
rowed unduly the scope of the human spirit and appeared 
to cióse the gates of the future. “ Art and diligence have 
now done their best,” says Dr. Johnson of the versifica- 
tion of Pope, “ and what shall be added will be the effort 
of tedious toil and needless curiosity.” Nothing is more 
perilous than thus to seem to confine man in some pin- 
fold; there is something in him that refuses to acquiesce 
in any position as final; he is in Nietzsche’s phrase the 
being who must always surpass himself. The attempt to 
oppose external and mechanical barriers to the freedom 
of the spirit will create in the long run an atmosphere of 
stuffiness and smugness, and nothing is more intoler­
able than smugness. Men were guillotined in the French 
Revolution, as Bagehot suggests, simply because either 
they or their ancestors had been smug. Inert acceptance 
of tradition and routine will be met sooner or later by the 
cry of Fau st: H inaus ins F reie!
Before considering the valué of the method chosen 
by Rousseau and the romanticists for breaking up the
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“ tiresome oíd heavens” and escaping from smugness 
and stufñness, one should note that the lack of originality 
and genius which they lamented in the eighteenth cen- 
tury —  especially in that part of it known as the Enlight- 
enment was not due entirely to pseudo-classic formal- 
ism. At least two other main currents entered into the 
Enlightenment: first the empirical and utilitarian current 
that goes back to Francis Bacon, and some would say to 
Roger Bacon; and secondly the rationalistic current that 
goes back to Descartes. English empiricism gained in- 
ternational vogue in the philosophy of Locke, and Locke 
denies any supersensuous element in human nature to 
which one may have access with the aid of the imagina- 
tion or in any other way. Locke’s method of precise natu- 
ralistic observationis in itself legitímate; forman is plainly 
subject to the natural law. What is not truly empirical 
is to bring the whole of human nature under this law. 
One can do this only by piecing out precise observation 
and experiment with dogmàtic rationalism. One side of 
Locke may therefore be properly associated with the 
father of modern rationalists, Descartes. The attempt 
of the rationalist to lock up life in some set of formulae 
produces in the imaginative man a feeling of oppression. 
He gasps for light and air. The very tracing of cause and 
effect and in general the use of the analytical faculties —  
and this is to fly to the opposite extreme —  carne to be 
condemned by the romanticists as inimical to the imagina- 
' tion. Not only do they make endless attacks on Locke, 
but at times they assail even Newton for having mechan- 
ized life, though Newton’s comparison of himself to a 
child picking up pebbles on the seashore would seem to 
k show that he had experienced “ the feeling infinite.”
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The elaboration of Science into a closed system with the 
aid of logic and puré mathematics is as a matter of fact 
to be associated with Descartes rather than with Newton. 
Neither Newton nor Descartes, one scarcely needs add, 
wished to subject man entirely to the natural law and the 
nexus of physical causes; they were not in short deter- 
minists. Y et the superficial rationalism of the Enlighten­
ment was in the main of Cartesian origin. This Cartesian 
influence ramifies in so many directions and is related at 
so many points to the literary movement, and there has 
been so much confusión about this relationship, that we 
need to pause here to make a few distinctions.
Perhaps what most strikes one in the philosophy of 
Descartes is its faith in logic and abstract reasoning and 
the closely allied processes of mathematical demonstra- 
tion. Anything that is not susceptible of clear proof in this 
logical and almost mathematical sense is to be rejected. 
Now this Cartesian no tion of clearness is fatal to a true 
classicism. The higher reality, the true classicist main- 
tains, cannot be thus demonstrated; it can only be 
grasped, and then never completely, through a veil of 
imaginative illusion. Boileau is reported to have said that % 
Descartes had cut the throat of poetry; and this charge I 
is justified in so far as the Cartesian requires from poetry 
a merely logical clearness. This conception of clearness 
was also a menace to the classicism of the seventeenth 
century which rested in the final analysis not on logic 
but on tradition. This appeared very clearly in the early 
phases of the quarrel between ancients and moderns 
when literary Cartesians like Perrault and Fontenelle 
attacked classical dogma in the ñame of reason. In  fact 
one may ask if any doctrine has ever appeared so fatal
THE TERM S CLÀSSIC AND ROMÀNTIC 27
to every form of tradition —  not merely literary but 
also religious and political —  as Cartesianism. The ra- 
tionalist of the eighteenth century was for dismissing 
as “ prejudice” everything that could not give a clear 
, account of itself in the Cartesian sense. This riot of 
abstract reasoning (la raison raisonnante) that prepared 
the way for the Revolution has been identified by Taine 
and others with the classic spirit. A more vicious confu­
sión has seldom gained currency in criticism. I t  is true 
that the French have mixed a great deal of logic with 
their conception of the classic spirit, but that is because 
they have mixed a great deal of logic with everything. 
I  have already mentioned their tendency to substitute 
a logical for an imaginati ve verisimilitude; and strenu- 
ously logical classicists may be found in France from 
Chapelain to Brunetiére. Y et the distinction that should 
keep us from confusing mere logic with the classic spirit 
was made by a Frenchman who was himself violently 
logical and also a great geometrician —  Pascal. One 
should keep distinet, says Pascal, the esprit de géométrie 
and the esprit de finesse. The esprit de finesse is not, like 
the esprit de géométrie, abstract, but very concrete.1 So 
far as a man possesses the esprit de finesse he is enabled 
to judge correctly of the ordinary faets of life and of the 
relationships between man and man. But these judgments 
rest upon such a multitude of delicate perceptions that 
he is frequently unable to account for them logically. 
I t  is to intuitive good sense and not to the esprit de 
géométrie that the gentleman (honnéte homme) of the neo- 
classical period owed his fine tact. Pascal himself finally 
took a stand against reason as understood both by the 
1 For a similar distinction in Aristotle see Eth. Nic., 1143 b.
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m m
Cartesian and by the man of the world. Unaided reason 
he held is unable to prevail against the deceits of the 
imagination; it needs the support of intuition —  an 
intuition that he identifies with grace, thus making it 
inseparable from the most austere form of Christianity. 
The “ heart,” he says, and this is the ñame he gives to 
intuition, “ has reasons of which the reason knows noth- 
ing.” A Plato or an Aristotle would not have understood 
this divorce between reason and intuition.1
Pascal seems to get his insight only by flouting ordi­
nary good sense. He identifies this insight with a type of 
theological dogma of which good sense was determined 
to be rid; and so it tended to get rid of the insight along 
with the dogma. Classical dogma also seemed at times 
to be in opposition to the intuitive good sense of the man 
of the world. The man of the world therefore often in- 
clined to assail both the classical and the Christian tra­
dition in the ñame of good sense, just as the Cartesian 
inclined to assail these traditions in the ñame of abstract 
reason. Perhaps the best exponent of anti-traditional 
good sense in the seventeenth century was Moliére. He 
vindicated nature, and by nature he stili meant in the 
main normal human nature, from arbitrary constraints 
of every kind whether imposed by an ascetic Christianity 
or by a narrow and pedantic classicism. Unfortunately 
Moliére is too much on the side of the opposition. He does 
not seem to put his good sense into the service of some 
positive insight of his own. Good sense may be of many 
degrees according to the order of faets of which it has a 
correct perception. The order of faets in human nature
1 The Platònic and Aristotelian reason or mind (voiis) contains an 
element of intuition.
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that Molière’s good sense perceived is not the highest and 
so this good sense appears at times too ready to justify 
the bourgeois against the man who has less timid and 
conventional views. So at least Rousseau thought when 
he made his famous attack on Moliére.1 Rousseau as- 
sailed Moliére in the ñame of instinct as Pascal would 
have assailed him in the ñame of insight, and fought 
sense with sensibility. The hostility of Rousseau to Mo­
liére, according to M . Faguet, is that of a  romàntic 
Bohemian to a philistine of genius.2 One hesitates to 
cali Moliére a philistine, but one may at least grant M. 
Faguet that Molière’s good sense is not always suffi- 
ciently inspired.
I  have been trying to build up a background that will 
make clear why the reason of the eighteenth century 
(whether we understand by reason logic or good sense) 
had come to be superficial and therefore oppressive to 
theimagination. I t  is only with reference to this “ reason” 
that one can understand the romàntic revolt. But neo- 
classical reason itself can be understood only with refer­
ence to its background —  as a recoil namely from a pre- 
vious romàntic excess. This excess was manifested not 
only in the intellectual romanticism of which I  have al- 
ready spoken, but in the cuit of the romàntic deed that 
had flourished in the Middle Ages. This cult and the liter- 
ature that reflected it continued to appeal, even to the 
cultivated, well on into the neo-classical period. Itw as 
therefore felt necessary to frame a definition of reason 
that should be a rebuke to the extravagance and improb- 
ability of the mediseval romances. When men became
1 In his Letlre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles.
2 Rousseau contre Moliére, 238.
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conscious in the eighteenth century of the neo-classical 
meagerness on the imaginative side they began to look 
back with a certain envy to the free efflorescence of fiction 
in the Middle Ages. They began to ask themselves with 
Hurd whether the reason and correctness they had won 
were worth the sacrifice of a “ world of fine fabling.” 1 
We must not, however, like Heine and many others, 
look on the romàntic movement as merely a return 
to the Middle Ages. We have seen that the men of the 
Middle Ages themselves understood by romance not sim- 
ply their own kind of speech and writing in contrast with 
what was written in Latin, but a kind of writing in 
which the pursuit of strangeness and adventure pre- 
dominated. This pursuit of strangeness and adventure 
will be found to predomínate in all types of roman­
ticism. The type of romanticism, however, which carne 
in towards the end of the eighteenth century did not, 
even when professedly mediseval, simply revert to the 
older types. I t  was primarily not a romanticism of 
thought or of action, the types we have encountered thus 
far, but a romanticism of feeling. The beginnings of this 
emotional romanticism antedate considerably the ap- 
plication of the word romàntic to a particular literary 
school. Before considering how the word carne to be thus 
applied we shall need to take a glance at eighteenth-cen- 
tury sentimentalism, especially at the plea for genius and 
originality that, from about the middle of the century 
on, were opposed to the tameness and servile imitation 
of the neo-classicists.
1 Letters on Ckiválry and Romance.
C H A PTER  I I
ROMÀNTIC GENIUS
R o m a n t ic is m , it has been remarked, is all that is not 
Voltaire. The clash between Rousseau and Voltaire is 
indeed not merely the clash between two men, it is the 
clash between two incompatible views of life. Voltaire 
is the end of the oíd world, as Goethe has put it, Rous­
seau the beginning of the new.
One is not to suppose, however, that Voltaire was a 
consistent Champion of the past. He is indeed with all his 
superficial clearness one of the most incoherent of writers. 
At the same time that he defended classical tradition he 
attacked Christian tradition, spreading abroad a spirit 
of mockery and irreverence that tended to make every 
traditional belief impossible. The “ reason” to which he 
appeals has all the shallowness that I  have noticed in the 
“ reason” of the eighteenth century. Though he does not 
fall into the Cartesian excess of abstract reasoning, and 
though the good sense that he most often understands 
by reason is admirably shrewd within certain bounds, he 
nevertheless falis very far short of the standards of a true 
classicism. He delights in the philosophy of Locke and has 
little sense for Greek philosophy or for the higher aspects 
of Greek literature. He is quite lacking in the quality 
of imagination that is needful if one is to communicate 
with what is above the ordinary rational level. So far from 
being capable of high seriousness, he is scarcely capable 
of ordinary seriousness. And so the nobility, elegance, 
imitation, and decorum that he is constantly preaching
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have about them a taint of formalism. Perhaps this taint 
appears most conspicuously in his conception of decorum. 
A man may be willing to impose restrictions on his ordi­
nary self —  and every type of decorum is restrictive —  if 
he is asked to do so for some adequate end. The end of the 
decorum that an Aristotle, for example, would impose is 
that one may become more human and therefore, as he 
endeavors to show in a highly positive fashion, happier. 
The only art and literature that will please a man who 
has thus become human through the observance of true 
decorum is an art and literature that are themselves 
human and decorous. Voltaire for his part wishes to sub- 
ject art and literature to an elaborate set of restrictions 
in the name of decorum, but these restrictions are not 
joined to any adequate end. The only reward he holds 
out to those who observe all these restrictions is “ the 
inerit of difficulty overeóme.” At bottom, like so many 
of the Jesuits from whom he received his education, he 
looks upon art as a game —  a very ingenious and com- 
plicated game. The French muse he compares to a person 
executing a difficult clog dance on a tight rope, and he 
argues from this comparison, not that the French muse 
should assume a less constrained posture, but that she 
should on the contrary be exemplary to the nations. No 
wonder the romanticists and even Dr. Johnson demurred 
at Voltaire’s condemnation of Shakespeare in the name 
of this type of decorum.
Voltaire is therefore, in spite of all his dazzling gifts, 
one of the most compromising advocates of classicism. 
Pope also had eminent merits, but from the truly classical 
point of view he is about as inadequate as Voltaire; and 
this is important to remember because English roman-
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ticism tends to be all that is not Pope. The English 
romanticists revolted especially from the poetic diction 
of which Pope was one of the chief sources, and poetic 
diction, with its failure to distinguish between nobility 
of language and the language of the nobility, is only an 
aspect of artificial decorum. However, the revolt from 
poetic diction and decorum in general is not the central 
aspect of the great movement that resulted in the eclipse 
of the wit and man of the world and in the emergence of 
the original genius. W hat the genius wanted was spon- 
taneity, and spontaneity, as he understood it, involves 
a denial, not merely of decorum, but of something that, 
as I  have said, goes deeper than decorum —  namely the 
doctrine of imitation. According to Voltaire genius is 
only judicious imitation. According to Rousseau the 
prime mark of genius is refusal to imitate. The move­
ment away from imitation, however, had already got 
well started before it thus carne to a picturesque head 
in the clash between Rousseau and Voltaire, and if we 
wish to understand this movement we need to take a 
glance at its beginnings —  especially in England.
There are reasons why this supposed opposition be­
tween imitation and genius should have been felt in 
England more keenly than elsewhere. The doctrine of 
imitation in its neo-classical form did not get established 
there until about the time of Dryden. In  the meanwhile 
England had had a great Creative literature in which the 
freedom and spontaneity of the imagination had not been 
cramped by a too strict imitation of models. Dryden him- 
self, though he was doing more than any one else to pro­
mote the new correctness that was coming in from France, 
felt that this correctness was no equivalent for the Eliza-
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bethan inspiration. The structure that he and his con- 
temporaries were erecting might be more regular, but 
lacked the boldness and originality of that reared by the 
“ giant race before the flood
Our age was cultivated thus at length;
But what we gained in skill we lost in strength.
Our builders were with want of genius cursed;
The second temple was not like the first.1
This contrast between the imitator and the inspired 
original was developed by Addison in a paper (“ Spec­
tator,” 160) that was destined to be used against the 
very school to which he himself belonged. For Addison 
was in his general outlook a somewhat tame Augustan. 
Nevertheless he exalts the “ natural geniuses” who have 
something “ nobly wild and extravagant” in them above 
the geniuses who have been “ refined by conversation, re- 
flection and the reading of the most polite authors” ; 
who have “ formed themselves by rules and submitted 
the greatness of their natural talents to the corrections 
and restraints of art.” “ The great danger in these latter 
kind of geniuses, is lest they cramp their own abilities 
too much by imitation, and form themselves altogether 
upon models, without giving full play to their own natural 
parts. An imitation of the best authors is not to compare 
with a good original; and I  believe we may observe that 
very few writers make an extraordinary figure in the 
world, who have not something in their way of thinking 
or expressing themselves that is peculiar to them, and 
entirely their own.”
Another main influence that was making against the 
doctrine of imitation was also largely of English origin.
1 See verses prcfixed to Congreve’s Double-Dealer.
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This was the idea of progress through scientific observa- 
tion and experiment. As a resuit of this type of positiv- 
ism, discovery was being added to discovery. Science was 
kindling man’s imagination and opening up before him 
what he really craves, the vista of an endless advance.
\ Why should not literature likewise do something new 
\ and original instead of sticking forever in the same rut of 
i imitation? In  its Greek form the doctrine of imitation 
was, as I  have tried to show, not only flexible and pro­
gressive, but in its own way, positive and experimental. 
But in modern times the two main forms of imitation, 
the classical and the Christian, have worked within the 
limits imposed by tradition and traditional models. The 
imitation of models, the Christian imitation of Christ, 
let us say, or the classical imitation of Horace, may in- 
deed be a very vital thing, the imitation of one soul by 
another soul; but when carried out in this vital way, the 
two main forms of imitation tend to clash, and the com- 
promise between them, as I  have already said, resulted 
in a good deal of formalism. B y  its positive and critical 
method science was undermining every traditional belief. 
Both the Christian and the classical formalista would 
have been the first to deny that the truths of imitation 
for which they stood could be divorced from tradition 
and likewise put on a positive and critical basis. The fact 
is indubitable in any case that the discrediting of tradi­
tion has resulted in a progressive lapse from the religious 
and the humanistic to the naturalistic level. An equally 
indubitable fact is that scientific or rationalistic natural- 
ism tended from the early eighteenth century to produce 
emotional naturalism, and that both forms of naturalism 
were hostile to the doctrine of imitation.
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The trend away from the doctrine of imitation towards 
emotional naturalism finds revolutionary expression in 
the literary field in such a work as Young’s “ Conjectures 
on Original Composition” (1759). Addison had asserted, 
as we have seen, the superiority of what is original in a 
man, of what comes to him spontaneously, over what he 
acquires by conscious effort and culture. Young, a  per­
sonal friend of Addison’s, develops this contrast between 
the “ natural” and the “ artificial” to its extreme conse- 
quences. “ Modern writers,” he says, “ have a choice to 
make. . . . They may soar in the regions of liberty, or 
move in the soft fetters of easy imitation.” “ An original 
may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spon­
taneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is 
not made; imitations are often a sort of manufacture, 
wrought up by those mechanics, art and labor, out of 
preexistent materials not their own.” “ We may as well 
grow good by another’s virtue, or fat by another’s food, 
as famous by another’s thought.” One evidence that we 
are still living in the movement of which Young is one 
of the initiators is that his treatise will not only seem 
to most of us a very spirited piece of writing —  that it 
certainly is —  but doctrinally sound. And yet it is only 
one of those documents very freqüent in literary history 
which lack intrinsic soundness, but which can be ex- 
plained if not justified as a recoil from an opposite 
extreme. The unsoundness of Young’s work comes out 
clearly if one compares it with the treatise on the “ Sub­
lime” attributed to Longinus which is not a mere pro­
test against a previous excess, but a permanently ac­
ceptable treatment of the same problem of genius and 
inspiration. Longinus exalts genius, but is at the same
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time regardful of culture and tradition, and even em- 
phasizes the relation between inspiration and the imi- 
tation of models. Young insinuates, on the contrary, 
that one is aided in becoming a genius by being brain- 
íess and ignorant. “ Some are pupils of nature only, ñor 
go further to school.” “ Many a genius probably there 
has been which could neither write ñor read.” I t  follows 
almost inevitably from these premises that genius flour- 
ishes most in the primitive ages of society before original- 
ity  has been crushed beneath the superincumbent weight 
of culture and critics have begun their pernicious activi- 
ties. Young did not take this step himself, but it was 
promptly taken by others on the publication of the Os- 
sianic poems (1762). Ossian is at once added to the list 
of great originals already enumerated by Addison —  
Homer, Pindar, the patriarchs of the Oíd Testament and 
Shakespeare (whom Young like the later romanticists 
opposes to Pope). “ Poetry,” says Diderot, summing up 
a whole movement, “ calis for something enormous, bar­
barie and savage.”
This exaltation of the virtues of the primitive ages is 
simply the projection into a mythical past of a need that 
the man of the eighteenth century feels in the present — 
the need to let himself go. This is what he understands by 
his “ return to nature.” A whole revolution is implied in 
this reinterpretation of the word nature. To follow nature 
in the classical sense is to imitate what is normal and 
representativo in man and so to become decorous. To be 
natural in the new sense one must begin by getting rid 
of imitation and decorum. Moreover, for the classicist, 
nature and reason are synonymous. The primitivist, on 
the other hand, means by nature the spontaneous play
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of impulse and temperament, and inasmuch as this lib- 
erty is hindered rather than helped by reason, he in­
clines to look on reason, not as the equivalent but as the 
opposite of nature.
If one is to understand this development, one should 
note carefully how certain uses of the word reason, not 
merely by the neo-classicists but by the anti-traditional- 
ists, especially in religión, tended to produce this denial 
of reason. I t  is a curious fact that some of those who were 
attacking the Christian religión in the ñame of reason, 
were themselves aware that mere reason, whether one 
understood by the word abstract reasoning or uninspired 
good sense, does not satisfy, that in the long run man is 
driven either to rise higher or to sink lower than reason. 
St. Evremond, for example, prays nature to deliver man 
from the doubtful middle state in which she has placed 
him —  either to “ lift him up to angelic radiance,” or else 
to “ sink him to the instinct of simple animals.” 1 Since 
the ascending path, the path that led to angelic radiance, 
seemed to involve the acceptance of a mass of obsolete 
dogma, man gradually inclined to sink below the rational 
level and to seek to recover the “ instinct of simple ani­
mals.” Another and still more fundamental fact that 
some of the rationalists perceived and that militated 
against their own position, is that the dominant element 
in man is not reason, but imagination, or if one prefers, 
the element of illusion. “ Illusion,” said Voltaire himself, 
“ is the queen of the human heart.” The great achieve- 
ment of tradition at its best was to be at once a limit and
1 Change l’état douteux dans lequel tu nous ranges,
Nature! élève-nous à la clarté des anges,
Ou nous abaisse au sens des simples animaux.
Sonnet (1657?).
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a support to both reason and imagination and so to unite 
them in a common allegiance. In the new movement, at 
the same time that reason was being encouraged by scien- 
tific method to rise up in revolt against tradition, imagi­
nation was being fascinated and drawn to the naturalistic 
level by scientific discovery and the vista of an endless 
advance that it opened up. A main problem, therefore, 
for the student of this movement is to determine what 
forms of imaginative activity are possible on the natural­
istic level. A sort of understanding was reached on this 
point by different types of naturalists in the course of 
the eighteenth century. One form of imagination, it was 
agreed, should be displayed in Science, another form in 
art and literature.1 The scientific imagination should be 
controlled by judgment and work in strict subordination 
to the facts. In art and literature, on the other hand, the 
imagination should be free. Genius and originality are 
indeed in strict ratio to this freedom. “ In the fairy land 
of fancy,” says Young, “ genius may wander wild; there 
it has a Creative power, and may reign arbitrarily over its 
own empire of chimeras.” (The empire of chimeras was 
later to become the tower of ivory.) This sheer indisci­
pline of the literary imagination might seem in contrast 
with the discipline of the scientific imagination an infe- 
riority; but such was not the view of the partisans of 
original genius. Kant, indeed, who was strongly influ- 
enced in his “ Critique of Aüsthetic Judgment” by these 
English theorists,2 inclined to deny genius to the man of
1 See, for example, A. Gerard’s Essay on Genius (1774), passim.
2 The English translation of this part of the Critique of Judgment, 
edited by J . C. Meredith, is useful for its numerous illustrative passages 
from these theorists (Young, Gerard, Dufí, etc.).
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science for the very reason that his imagination is so 
strictly controlled. The fact would seem to be that a 
great scientist, a Newton let us say, has as much right 
to be accounted a genius as Shakespeare. The inferiority 
of the genius of a Newton compared with that of a 
Shakespeare lies in a certain coldness. Scientific genius is 
thus coid because it operates in a región less relevant 
to man than poetic genius; it is, in Bagehot’s phrase, 
more remote from the “ hearth of the soul.”
The scientific and the literary imagination are indeed 
not quite so sharply contrasted by most of the theorists 
as might be inferred from what I  ha ve said; most of them 
do not admit that the literary imagination should be 
entirely free to wander in its own “ empire of chimeras.” 
Even literary imagination, they maintain, should in some 
measure be under the surveillance of judgment or taste. 
One should observe, however, that the judgment or taste 
that is supposed to control or restrict genius is not asso- 
ciated with the imagination. On the contrary, imagina­
tion is associated entirely with the element of novelty in 
things, which means, in the literary domain, with the 
expansive eagerness of a man to get his own uniqueness 
uttered. The genius for the Greek, let us remind ourselves, * 
was not the man who was in this sense unique, but the man 
who perceived the universal; and as the universal can be 
perceived only with the aid of the imagination, it follows 
that genius may be defined as imaginative perception of I 
the universal. The universal thus conceived not only gives J 
a centre and purpose to the activity of the imagination, 
but sets bounds to the free expansión of temperament 
and impulse, to what carne to be known in the eighteenth 
century as nature.
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Kant, who denies genius to the man of Science on 
grounds I  have already mentioned, is unable to associate 
genius in art or literature with this strict discipline of the 
imagination to a purpose. The imagination must be free 
and must, he holds, show this freedom not by work- 
ing but by playing. At the same time Kant had the 
cool temper of a man of the Enlightenment, and looked 
with the utmost disapproval on the aberrations that had 
marked in Germany the age of original genius {die Genie- 
zeit). He was not in the new sense of the word nor indeed 
in any sense, an enthusiast. And so he wished the reason, 
or judgment, to keep control over the imagination with- 
out disturbing its free play; art is to have a purpose which 
is at the same time not a purpose. The distinctions by 
which he works out the supposed relationship between 
judgment and imagination are at once difficult and un- 
real. One can indeed put one’s finger here more read- 
ily perhaps than elsewhere on the central impotence of 
the whole Kantian system. Once discredit tradition and 
outer authority and then set up as a substitute a reason 
that is divorced from the imagination and so lacks the 
support of supersensuous insight, and reason will prove 
• unable to maintain its hegemony. When the imagination 
has ceased to pull in accord with the reason in the Serv­
ice of a reaüty that is set above them both, it is sure to 
become the accomplice of expansive impulse, and mere 
\ aeason is not strong enough to prevail over this unión of 
^imagination and desire. Reason needs some driving power 
behind it, a driving power that, when working in alliance 
with the imagination, it gets from insight. To suppose 
that man will long rest content with mere naked reason 
as his guide is to forget that “ illusion is the queen of the
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human heart” ; it is to revive the stoical error. Schiller, 
himself a Kantian, felt this rationalistic rigor and coldness 
of his master, and so sought, while retaining the play 
theory of art, to put behind the cold reason of Kant the 
driving power it lacked; for this driving power he looked 
not to a supersensuous reality, not to insight in short, 
but to emotion. He takes appropriately the motto for his 
“ iEsthetic Letters” from Rousseau: S i c’est la raison qui 
fa it  l’homme, c’est le sentiment qui le conduit. He retains 
K ant’s play theory of art without even so much offset 
to this play as is implied in K ant’s “ purposiveness with­
out purpose.” The nobility of Schiller’s intentions is be- 
yond question. At the same time, by encouraging the 
notion that it is possible to escape from neo-classical 
didacticism only by eliminating mascüline purpose from 
art, he opens the way for the worst perversions of the 
sesthete, above all for the divorce of art from ethical 
reality. In art, according to Schiller, both imagination 
and feeling should be free and spontaneous, and the 
result of all this freedom, as he sees it, will be perfectly 
“ ideal.” His suspicion of a purpose is invincible. As soon 
as anything has a purpose it ceases to be sesthetic and 
in the same measure suffers a loss of dignity. Thus the 
sesthetic moment of the lion, he says, is when he roars 
not with any definite design, but out of sheer lustiness, 
and for the pure pleasure of roaring.
One may assume safely the sesthetic attitude, or w hat* 
amounts to the same thing, allow one’s self to be guided 
by feeling, only on the assumption that feeling is worthy of 
trust. As appears in the very motto he took for his “iEs- 
thetic Letters” Schiller was helped to thisfaith in man’s 
native goodness by Rousseau. We need to pause for a
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moment at this point and consider the background of 
this belief which finds not only in Schiller but in Rous­
seau himself, with whom it is usually associated, a rather 
late expression. The movement that took its rise in the 
eighteenth century involves, we should recollect, a break 
not with one but with two traditions —  the classical 
and the Christian. If  the plea for genius and originality 
is to be largely explained as a protest against the me- 
chanical imitation and artificial decorum of a certain 
type of classicist, the assertion of man’s natural goodness 
is to be understood rather as a rebound from the doctrine 
of total depravity that was held by the more austere type 
of Christian. This doctrine had even in the early cen­
turies of the faith awakened certain protests like that of 
Pelagius, but for an understanding of the Rousseauistic 
protest one does not need to go behind the great deistic 
movement of the early eighteenth century. God, instead 
of being opposed to nature, is conceived by the deist as a 
power that expresses his goodness and loveliness through 
nature. The oppressive weight of fear that the older 
theology had laid upon the human spirit is thus gradu- 
ally lifted. Man begins to discover harmonies instead of
I
discords in himself and outer nature. He not only sees 
virtue in instinct but inclines to turn virtue itself into a 
“ sense,” or instinct. And this means in practice to put 
emotional expansión in the place of spiritual concen- 
tration at the basis of life and morals. In studying this 
drift towards an sesthetic or sentimental morality one 
may most conveniently take one’s point of departure 
in certain English writers of deistic tendency, especially 
in Shaftesbury and his disciple Hutcheson. Considered 
purely as an initiator, Shaftesbury is probably more im-
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portant than Rousseau. His influence ramifies out in 
every direction, notably into Germany.
The central achievement of Shaftesbury from a purely 
psychological point of view may be said to be his trans- 
formation of conscience from an inner check into an 
expansive emotion. He is thus enabled to set up an 
sesthetic substitute not merely for traditional religión but 
for traditional humanism. He undermines insidiously 
decorum, the central doctrine of the classicist, at the 
very time that he seems to be defending it. For decorum 
also implies a control upon the expansive instincts of 
human nature, and Shaftesbury is actually engaged in 
rehabilitating “ nature,” and insinuating that it does not 
need any control. He attains this expansiveness by put- 
ting sesthetic in the place of spiritual perception, and so 
merging more or less completely the good and the trae 
with the beautiful. He thus points the way very directly 
to Rousseau’s rejection of both inner and outer control in 
the ñame of man’s natural goodness. Once accept Shaftes- 
bury’s transformation of conscience and one is led almost 
inevitably to look on everything that is expansive as 
natural or vital and on everything that restricts expan­
sión as conventional or artificial. Villers wrote to Madame 
de Staél (4 May, 1803): “ The fundamental and Creative 
idea of all your work has been to show primitive, incor­
ruptible, naüve, passionate nature in conflict with the 
barriers and shackles of conventional life. . . . Note that 
this is also the guiding idea of the author of ‘ Werther.’ ” 
This contrast between nature and convention is indeed 
almost the whole of Rousseauism. In permitting his ex­
pansive impulses to be disciplined by either humanism or , 
religión man has fallen away from nature much as in the
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oíd theology he has fallen away from God, and the fa- 
mous “ return to nature” means in practice the emanci- 
pation of the ordinary or temperamental self that had 
been thus artificially controlled. This throwing off of the 
yoke of both Christian and classical discipline in the 
ñame of temperament is the essential aspect of the move- 
ment in favor of original genius. The genius does not 
look to any pattem  that is set above his ordinary spon- 
taneous ego and imitate it. On the contrary, he attains 
to the self-expression that other men, intimidated by 
convention, weakly forego.
In thus taking a stand for self-expression, the original 
genius is in a sense on firm ground —  at least so far as 
the mere rationalist or the late and degenerate classicist 
is concerned. No conventions are final, no rules can set 
arbitrary limits to creation. Reality cannot be locked up 
in any set of formulae. The element of change and nov- 
elty in things, as the romanticists are never tired of 
repeating, is a t once vital and inexhaustible. Wherever 
we turn, we encounter, as a romàntic authority, Jacob 
Boehme, declares, “ abysmal, unsearchable and infinite 
multiplicity.” Perhaps not since the beginning of the 
world have two men or indeed two leaves or two blades 
of grass been exactly alike. Out of a thousand men shav- 
ing, as Dr. Johnson himself remarked, no two will sha ve 
in just the same way. A person carries his uniqueness 
even into his thumbprint —  as a certain class in the com- 
mnnity has learned to its cost. But though all things are 
ineffably different they are at the same time ineffably 
alike. And this oneness in things is, no less than the other- 
wiseness, a matter of immediate perception. This uni­
versal implication of the one in the many is found even
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more marked than elsewhere in the heart of the individ­
ual. Each man has his idiosyncrasy (literally his “ private 
mixture”). But in addition to his complexión, his tem­
peramental or prívate self, every man has a self that he 
possesses in common with other men. Even the man who 
is most filled with his own uniqueness, or “ genius,” a 
Rousseau, for example, assumes this universal self in 
every word he utters. “ Jove nods to Jove behind us as we 
talk.” The word character, one may note, is ambiguous, 
inasmuch as it may refer either to the idiosyncratic or 
to the universal human element in a man’s dual nature. 
For example, an original genius like William Blake not 
only uses the word character in a different sense from 
Aristotle —  he cannot even understand the Aristotelian 
usage. “ Aristotle,” he complains, “ says characters are 
either good or bad; now Goodness or Badness has noth- 
ing to do with Character. An apple tree, a pear tree, a 
horse, a lion are Characters; but a good apple tree or a 
bad is an apple tree still, etc.” But character as Aristotle 
uses the word implies something that man possesses and 
that a horse or tree does not possess —  the power namely 
to deliberate and choose. A man has a good or bad char­
acter, he is ethical or unethical, as one may say from the 
Greek word for character in this sense (^o?), accord- 
ing to the quality of his choice as it appears in what he 
actually does. This distinction between a man’s prívate, 
peculiar character (xapaKrrjp) and the character he pos­
sesses when judged with reference to something more 
general than his own complexión is very similar to the 
French distinction between the sens propre and the sens 
commun.
The general sense or norm that is opposed to mere
48 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISMO
temperament and impulse may rest upon the ethos of 
a particular time and country —  the traditional habits 
and customs that the Rousseauist is wont to dismiss as 
“ artificial” —  or it may rest in varying degrees upon 
immediate perception. For example, the Ismene and 
Antigone of Sophocles are both ethical; but Ismene would 
abide by the law of the state, whereas Antigone opposes 
to this law something still more universal —  the “ unwrit- 
ten laws of heaven.” This insight of Antigone into a 
moral order that is set not only above her ordinary self 
but above the convention of her time and country is 
something very immediate, something achieved, as I  shall 
try to show more fully later, with the aid of the imag­
ination.
I t  is scarcely necessary to add that such a perfect 
example of the ethical imagination as one finds in Antig­
one—  the imagination that works concèntric with the 
human law — is rare. In actual life for one Antigone 
who obeys the “ unwritten laws of heaven” there will be 
a thousand Ismenes who will be guided in their moral 
' choices by the law of the community. This law, the con­
vention of a particular place and time, is always but a very 
imperfect image, a mere shadow indeed of the unwritten 
law which being above the ordinary rational level is, in a 
sense to be explained later, infinite and incapable of final 
k formulation. And yet men are forced if only on practical 
grounds to work out some approximation to this law as a 
barrier to the unchained appetites of the individual. The 
elements that enter into any particular attempt to cir­
cumscribe the individual in the interests of the com­
munity are very mixed and in no small measure relative. 
Yet the things that any group of men have come together
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about —  their convention s in the literal meaning of the 
word —  even the tabus of a savage tribe, are sure to 
reflect, however inadequately, the element of oneness in 
man, the element which is opposed to expansive impulse, 
and which is no less real, no less a matter of immediate 
experience, than the element of irreducible difference. 
The general sense therefore should never be sacrificed \ 
lightly to the sense of the individual. Tabú, however j 
inferior it may be to insight, deserves to rank higher / 
after all than mere temperament.1
The original genius proceeds upon the opposite assump- 
tion. Everything that limits temperamental expansión is 
dismissed as either artificial or mechanical; everything 
on the contrary that makes for the emancipation of 
temperament, and so for variety and difference, he wel- 
comes as vital, dynamic, Creative. Now, speaking not 
metaphysically but practically and experimentally, man 
may, as I  have said, follow two main paths: he may de- 
velop his ethical self —  the self that lays hold of unity —• 
or he may put his main emphasis on the element within 
him and without him that is associated with novelty and 
change. In direct proportion as he turns his attention to 
the infinite manifoldness of things he experiences wonder; 
if on the other hand he attends to the unity that under- 
lies the manifoldness and that likewise transcends him, 
he experiences awe. As a man grows religious, awe comes i  
more and more to take the place in him of wonder. The 
humanist is less averse from the natural order and its 
perpetual gushing forth of novelties than the man who is 
religious, yet even the humanist refuses to put his final
1 Mrs. Katharine Fullerton Gerould has dealt interestingly with this 
point in an article in the Unpopular Review (October, 1914) entitled Tabú 
and Temperament.
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emphasis on wonder (his motto is rather nil admirari). 
To illustrate concretely, Dr. Johnson can scarcely con- 
ceal his disdain for the wonderful, but being a genuinely 
religious spirit, is very capable of awe. Commenting 
on Yalden’s line
Awhile th’ Almighty wondering stood,
Dr. Johnson remarks: “ He ought to ha ve remembered 
that Infinite Knowledge can never wonder. Ali wonder is 
the effect of novelty upon Ignorance.” Granted the just- 
ness of the remark, Johnson seems inclined at times to 
forget how wide is the gap in this respect between us and 
the Almighty and therefore to be unduly hostile to the 
element of wonder. To take the opposite case, it is not 
easy to discover in either the personality or writings of 
Poe an atom of awe or reverence. On the other hand he 
both experiences wonder and seeks in his art to be a pure 
wondersmith. I t  is especially important to determine a 
man’s attitude towards himself in this matter of awe and 
wonder, in other words to determine whether he is taken 
up first of all with that element in his own nature which 
makes him incomprehensibly like other men or with that 
element which makes him incomprehensibly different 
from them. A man, the wise have always insisted, should 
look with reverence but not with wonder on himself.
» Rousseau boasts that if not better than other men, he is 
at least different. By this gloating sense of his own other- 
wiseness he may be said to have set the tone for a whole 
^epoch. Chateaubriand, for instance, is quite overeóme by 
his own uniqueness and wonderfulness. At the most ordi- 
nary happenings he exclaims, as Sainte-Beuve points out, 
that such things happen only to him. Hugo again is pos-
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itively stupefied at the immensity of his own genius. 
The theatricality that one feels in so much of the art of 
this period arises from the eagerness of the genius to 
communicate to others something of the amazement 
that he feels at himself. René’s first concern is to inspire 
wonder even in the women who love him. “ Céluta felt 
that she was going to fall upon the bosom of this man as 
one falis into an abyss.”
In thus putting such an exclusive emphasis on wonder 
the Rousseauistic movement takes on a regressive char­
acter. For if Ufe begins in wonder it culminates in awe. 
To put “ the budding rose above the rose full-blown” may 
do very well for a mood, but as an habitual attitude it 
implies that one is more interested in origins than in ends; 
and this means in practice to look backward and down- 
ward instead of forward and up. The conscious analysis 
that is needed if one is to establish orderly sequences 
and relationships and so work out a kingdom of ends 
is repudiated by the Rousseauist because it diminishes 
wonder, because it interferes with the Creative impulse of 
genius as it gushes up spontaneously from the depths of 
the unconscious. The whole movement is filled with the 
praise of ignorance and of those who stili enjoy its inap- 
preciable advantages— the savage, the peasant and above 
ali the child. The Rousseauist may indeed be said to have 
discovered the poetry of childhood of which only traces 
can be found in the past, but at what would seem at times 
a rather heavy sacrifice of rationality. Rather than con­
sent to have the bloom taken off things by analysis one 
should, as Coleridge telis us, sink bacJc to the devout state 
of childlike wonder. However, to grow ethically is not 
to sink back but to struggle painfully forward. To affirm
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the contrary is to set up the things that are below the 
ordinary rational level as a substitute for the things that 
are above it, and at the same time to proclaim one’s 
inability to mature. The romanticist, it is true, is wont to 
oppose to the demand for maturity Christ’s praise of the 
child. But Christ evidently praises the child not because 
of his capacity for wonder but because of his freedom 
from sin, and it is of the essence of Rousseauism to deny 
the very existence of sin — at least in the Christian 
sense of the word. One may also read in the New Testa­
ment that when one has ceased to be a child one should 
give up childish things, and this is a saying that no prim- 
itivist, so far as I  am aware, has ever quoted. On the 
contrary, he is ready to assert that what comes to the 
child spontaneously is superior to the deliberate moral 
effort of the mature man. The speeches of all the sages 
are, according to Maeterlinck, outweighed by the un- 
conscious wisdom of the passing child. Wordsworth hails 
a child of six as “ Mighty Prophet! Seer blest!” (It is 
only fair to Coleridge to say that he refused to follow 
Wordsworth into this final abyss of absurdity.1) In 
much the same way Hugo pushes his adoration of the 
child to the verge of what has been termed “ solemn silli- 
ness” (niaiserie solennellé).
To set up the spontaneity of the child as a substitute 
for insight, to identify wonder with awe, romance with 
religión, is to confuse the very planes of being. There 
would appear to be a confusión of this kind in what 
Carlyle takes to be his own chief discovery, in his “ nat­
ural supernaturalism.” 2 The natural order we must grant
1 See Biographia literaria, ch. x x ii .
2 This message came to him in any case straight from Germán romanti- 
cism. See Walzel, Deutsche Romantik, 22,151.
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Carlyle is unfathomable, but it is not therefore awful, 
only wonderful. A movement of charity belongs as Pas­
cal says to an entirely different order.1
The spiritual order to which Pascal refers lifts a man 
so far as he perceives it out of his ordinary self and draws 
him to an ethical centre. But the Rousseauist tends, as 
I  have said, to repudiate the very idea of an ethical centre 
along with the special forms in which it had got itself 
embedded. Every attempt, whether humanístic or reli- 
gious, to set up some such centre, to oppose a unifying 
and centralizing principie to expansive impulse, seems to 
him arbitrary and artificial. He does not discriminate 
between the ethical norm or centre that a Sophocles 
grasps intuitively and the centrality that the pseudo- 
classicist hopes to achieve by mechanical imitation. He 
argues from his underlying assumption that the prin­
cipie of variation is alone vital, that one’s genius and 
originality are in pretty direct ratio to one’s eccentricity 
in the literal meaning of the word; and he is therefore 
ready to affirm his singularity or difference in the face of 
whatever happens to be established. This attitude, it is 
worth noting, is quite unlike that of the humorist in the 
old English sense of the word, who indulges his bent and 
is at the same time quite unconcerned with any central 
model that he should imitate and with reference to which 
he should discipline his oddities. The idiosyncrasy of 
the Rousseauist is not, like that of the humorist, genial, 
but defiant. He is strangely self-conscious in his return 
to the unconscious. In everything, from his vocabulary
1 “ De tous les corps et esprits, on n’en saurait tirer un mouvement de 
vraie charité; cela est impossible, et d’un autre ordre, surnaturel.” 
Pensées, Article xvn. “ Charité,” one should recollect, here has its tradi- 
tional meaning — the love, not of man, but of God.
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to the details of his dress, he is eager to emphasize his 
departure from the norm. Henee the persistent pose and 
theatricality in so many of the leaders of this move- 
ment, in Rousseau himself, for instance, or in Chateau­
briand and Byron. As for the lesser figures in the move- 
ment their “ genius” is oftenchiefly displayed intheir 
devices for calling attention to themselves as the latest 
and most marvellous births of time; it is only one aspect 
in short of an art in which the past century, whatever its 
achievement in the other arts, has easily surpassed all its 
predecessors —  the art of advertising.
One needs always to return, however, if one is to under- 
stand the romàntic notion of genius, to a consideration 
of the pseudo-classic decorum against which it is a pro­
test. The gentleman or man of the world (honnete homme) 
was not, like the original genius, anxious to advertise 
himself, to cali attention to his own special note of origi- 
nality, since his primary concern was with an entirely 
different problem, with the problem, namely, not of 
expressing but of humanizing himself; and he could hu- 
manize himself, he felt, only by constant reference to the 
accepted standard of what the normal man should be. 
He refused to “ pride himself on anything he was fear- 
ful of overemphasis, because the first of virtues in his 
eyes was a sense of proportion. The total symmetry of 
Ufe to which the best type of classicist refers back his 
every impulse, he apprehends intuitively with the aid of 
his imagination. The symmetry to which the pseudo- 
classicist refers back his impulses has ceased to be 
imaginative and has become a mere conformity to an 
outer code or even to the rules of etiquette; and so, instead 
of a deep imaginative insight, he gets mere elegance or
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polish. The unity that a purely external decorum of this 
kind imposes on life degenerates into a tiresome same- 
ness. I t  seems an unwarranted denial of the element of 
wonder and surprise. “ Boredom was born one day of 
uniformity,” said La Motte Houdard, who was himself 
a pseudo-classicist; whereas variety as everybody knows 
is the spice of life. The romanticist would break up the 
smooth and tiresome surface of artificial decorum by the 
pursuit of strangeness. If he can only get his thrill he 
cares little whether it is probable, whether it bears 
any relation, that is, to normal human experience. This 
sacrifice of the probable to the surprising appears, as I  
said at the outset, in all types of romanticism —  whether 
of action or thought or feeling. The genuine classicist 
always puts his main stress on design or structure; 
whereas the main quest of every type of romanticist is 
rather for the intense and vivid and arresting detail. 
Take, for instance, the intellectual romanticism that 
prevailed especially in the late sixteenth and early seven- 
teenth centuries. In the “ witty and conceited” poets of 
this period the intellect is engaged in a more or less 
irresponsible vagabondage with the imagination as its 
free accomplice. The conceits by which a poet of this 
type displays his “ ingenuity” (genius) are not struc- 
tural, are not, that is, referred back to any centre. They 
stand forth each separately and sharply from the surface 
of the style (henee known to the French as “ points”), 
and so arrest the reader by their novelty. Their rareness 
and preciousness, however, are intended to startle the 
intellect alone. They do not have and are not intended to 
have any power of sensuous suggestion. The Rousseauistic 
romanticist, on the other hand, so far from being “ meta-
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physica 1,” strives to be concrete even at the risk of a 
certain materialism of style, of turning his metaphors 
into mere images. Like the intellectual romanticist. 
though in a different way, he wishes to break up the 
smooth and monotonous surface of life and style, and 
so he sets up the cult of the picturesque. To understand 
this cult one needs to remember the opposite extreme of 
artificial symmetry. One needs to recall, for example, the 
neo-classicist who complained of the stars in heaven be- 
cause they were not arranged in symmetrical patterns, 
or various other neo-classicists who attacked mountains 
because of their rough and irregular shapes, because of 
their refusal to submit to the rule and compass. When 
beauty is conceived in so mechanical a fashion some one 
is almost certain to wish to “ add strangeness” to it.
The cult of the picturesque is closely associated with 
the cult of local color. Here as elsewhere romàntic genius 
is, in contradistinction to classical genius which aims at 
the “ grandeur of generality,” the genius of wonder and 
surprise. According to Buffon, who offers the rare spec- 
tacle of a man of science who is at the same time a theo- 
rist of the grand manner, genius is shown in the architec- 
tonic gift —  in the power so to unify a subject as to keep 
its every detail in proper subordination to the whole. 
Any mere wantoning of the imagination in the pursuit of 
either the precious or the picturesque is to be severely 
repressed if one is to attain to the grandeur of general­
ity. Buffon is truly classic in relating genius to design. 
Unfortunately he verges towards the pseudo-classic in 
his distrust of color, of the precise word and the vivid 
descriptive epithet. The growing verbal squeamishness 
that so strikes one towards the end of the neo-classic
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period is one outcome of artificial decorum, of confusing 
nobility of language with the language of the nobility. 
There was an increasing fear of the trivial word that 
might destroy the illusion of the grand manner, and also 
of the technical term that should be too suggestive of 
specialization. All terms were to be avoided that were 
not readily intel·ligible to a lady or gentleman in the 
drawing-room. And so it carne to pass that by the end of 
the eighteenth century the grand manner, or elevated 
style, had come to be largely an art of ingenious circum- 
locution, and Buffon gives some countenance to this con- 
ception of classic dignity and representativeness when he 
declares that one should describe objects “ only by the 
most general terms.” At all events the reply of the román- 
tic genius to this doctrine is the demand for local color, 
for the concrete and picturesque phrase. The general 
truth at which the classicist aims the Rousseauist dis- 
misses as identical with the gray and the acadèmic, and 
bends all his efforts to the rendering of the vivid and 
unique detail. Of the readiness of the romàntic genius to 
show (or one is tempted to say) to advertise his original- 
ity by trampling verbal decorum under foot along with 
every other kind of decorum, I  shall have more to say 
later. He is ready to employ not only the homely and 
familiar word that the pseudo-classicist had eschewed as 
“ lo w ,”  but words so local and technical as to be unin- 
telligible to ordinary readers. Chateaubriand deais so 
specifically with the North American Indian and his 
environment that the result, according to Sainte-Beuve, 
is a sort of “ tattooing” of his style. Hugo bestows a 
whole dictionary of architectural terms upon the reader 
in his “ Notre Dame,” and of nautical terms in his
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“ Toilers of the Sea.” In order to follow some of the pas- 
sages in Balzac’s “ César Birotteau,” one needs to be a 
lawyer or a professional accountant, and it has been said 
that in order to do justice to a certain description in 
Zola one would need to be a pork-butcher. In  this move- 
ment towards a highly specialized vocabulary one should 
note a cooperation, as so often elsewhere, between the 
two wings of the naturalistic movement —  the scientific 
and the emotional. The Rousseauist is, like the scientist, 
a specialist — he specializes in his own sensations. He 
goes in quest of emotional thrills for their own sake, just 
as Napoleon’s generals, according to Sainte-Beuve, waged 
war without any ulterior aim but for the sheer lust of 
conquest. The vivid images and picturesque details are 
therefore not sufficiently structural; each one tends to 
thrust itself forward without reference to the whole and 
to demand attention for its own sake.
The pursuit of the unrelated thrill without reference 
to its motivation or probability leads in the romàntic 
movement to a sort of descent — often, it is trae, a rap- 
turous and lyrical descent —  from the dramatic to the 
melodramàtic. I t  is possible to trace this one-sided em­
phasis on wonder not merely in vocabulary but in the 
increasing resort to the principie of contrast. One sus- 
pects, for example, that Rousseau exaggerates the gro- 
tesqueness of his youthful failure as a musical composer 
at Lausanne in order that his success in the same róle 
before the king and all the ladies of the court at Ver- 
sailles may “ stick more fiery off.” The contrast that 
Chateaubriand establishes between the two banks of the 
Mississippi at the beginning of his “ Atala” is so com­
plete as to put some strain on verisimilitude. One may
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note in this same description, as a somewhat different 
way of sacrificing the probable to the picturesque, the 
bears drunk on wild grapes and reeling on the branches 
of the elms. To prove that it was possible on some par­
ticular occasion to look down the vista of a forest glade 
on the lower Mississippi and see it closed by a drunken 
bear does not meet the difficulty at all. For art has to do, 
as was remarked long ago, not with the possible but the 
probable; and a bear in this posture is a possible but 
scarcely a probable bear.
To return to the principie of contrast: Hugo dilates 
upon his puniness as an infant (“ abandoned by every- 
body, even by his mother”) in order to make his later 
achievement seem still more stupendous.1 The use of the 
antithesis as the auxiliary of surprise, the abrapt and 
thrilling passage from light to shade or the contrary, finds 
perhaps its culminating expression in Hugo. A study of 
this one figure as it appears in his words and ideas, in his 
characters and situations and subjects, would show that 
he is the most melodramàtic genius for whom high rank 
has ever been claimed in literatura. The suddenness of 
Jean Valjean’s transíormation from a convict into a saint 
may serve as a single instance of Hugo’s readiness to 
sacrifice verisimilitude to surprise in his treatment of 
character.
Closely allied to the desire to break up the monotonous 
surface of “ good form” by the pointed and picturesque 
style in writing is the rise of the pointed and pictur­
esque style in dress. A man may advertise his genius 
and originality (in the romàntic sense of these terms) by 
departing from the accepted modes of costume as well as 
1 See poem, Ce siécle avait deux ans in the Feuilles d’AuUmne.
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from the accepted modes of speech. Gautier’s scarlet 
waistcoat at the first performance of Hernani is of the 
same order as his flamboyant epithets, his riot of lo­
cal color, and was at least as effective in achieving the 
main end of his life —  to be, in his own phrase, the “ ter­
ror of the sleek, baldheaded bourgeois.” In  assuming 
the Armenian garb to the astonishment of the rustios 
of Motiers-Travers, Rousseau anticipates not merely 
Gautier but innumerable other violators of conventional 
correctness: here as elsewhere he deserves to rank as 
the clàssic instance, one is tempted to say, of romàntic 
eccentricity. La Bruyère, an exponent of the traditional 
good-breeding against which Rousseauism is a protest, 
says that the gentleman allows himself to be dressed by 
his tailor. He wishes to be neither ahead of the mode ñor 
behind it, being reluctant as he is in all things to oppose 
his private sense to the general sense. His point of view 
in the matter of dress is not so very remote from that of 
a genuine classicism, whereas the enthusiast who recently 
went about the streets of New York (until taken in by 
the pólice) garbed as a contemporary of Pericles is no 
less plainly a product of Rousseauistic revolt.
Chateaubriand’s relation to Rousseauism in this matter 
calis for special comment. He encouraged, and to some 
extent held, the belief that to show genius and originality 
one must be irregular and tempestuous in all things, even 
in the arrangement of one’s hair. At the same time he 
preached reason. His heart, in short, was romàntic, his 
head classical. Both as a classicist and a romanticist 
he was ready to repudiate on the one hand his master 
Rousseau, and on the other his own disciples. As a ro­
màntic genius he wished to regard himself as unique and
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so unrelated to Rousseau. At the same time he also 
looked upon it as a sort of insolence for any of his own 
followers to aspire to such a lonely preéminence in grief 
as René. As a classicist he saw that great art aims at the 
normal and the representativo, and that it is therefore 
absurd for people to pattern themselves on such morbid 
and exceptional characters as René and Childe Harold. 
Most of the romanticists indeed showed themselves very 
imitative even in their attempts at uniqueness, and the 
result was a second or third hand, or as one is tempted to 
say, a stale eccentricity. In their mere following of the 
mode many of the French romanticists of 1830 were ready 
to impose a painful discipline upon themselves 1 in order 
to appear abnormal, in order, for instance, to acquire a 
livid Byronic complexión. Some of those who wished to 
seem elegiae like Lamartine rather than to emulate the 
violent and histrionie revolt of the Conrads and Laras 
actually succeeded, we are told, in giving themselves con- 
sumption (henee the epithet école poitrinaire).
In outer and visible freakishness the French romanti­
cists of 1830 probably bore away the palm, though in 
inner and spiritual remoteness from normal human 
experience they can scarcely vie with the early Germán 
romanticists. And this is doubtless due to the fact that in 
France there was a more definite outer standard from 
which to advertise their departure, and also to the fact 
that the revolt against this standard was so largely 
participated in by the painters and by writers like 
Gautier who were also interested in painting Chateau­
briand writes of the romàntic painters (and the passage
1 For amusing details, see L. Maigron, Le Romantisme el la mode (1911), 
ch. v.
62 ROUSSEAU AND ROM AN TICISM
will also serve to illustrate his attitude towards his own 
disciples): “ [These artists] rig themselves up as comic 
sketches, as grotesques, as caricatures. Some of them 
wear frightful mustaches, one would suppose that they 
are going forth to conquer the world — their brushes are 
halberds, their paint-scratchers sabres; others have 
enormous beards and hair that puffs out or hangs down 
their shoulders; they smoke a cigar volcanically. These 
cousins of the rainbow, to use a phrase of our old Re- 
gnier, have their heads filled with deluges, seas, rivers, 
forests, cataracts, tempests, or it may be with slaughters, 
tortures and scaffolds. One finds among them human 
skulls, foils, mandolins, helmets and dolmans. . . . They 
fl.ím to form a separate species between the ape and 
the satyr; they give you to understand that the secrecy 
of the studio has its dangers and that there is no safety 
for the models.”
These purely personal eccentricities that so marked 
the early stages in the warfare between the Bohemian 
and the philistine have as a matter of fact diminished in 
our own tune. Nowadays a man of the distinction of 
Disraeli or even of Bulwer-Lytton 1 would scarcely affect, 
as they did, the flamboyant style in dress. But the under-
i For Disraeli see Wilfrid Ward, Men and Matters, 54 fi. Of Bulwer- 
Lytton at Niee about 1850 Princess von Racowitza writes as follows m her 
Autobiography (p. 46): “ His fame was at its zenith. He seemed to me 
antediluvian, with his long dyed curis and his old-fashioned dress . . . 
with long coats reaching to the ankles, knee-breeches, and long colored 
waistcoats. Also, he appeared always with a young lady who adored him, 
and who was followed by a man servant carrying a harp. bhe sal; at tus 
feet and appeared as he did in the eostume of 1830, with long fiowing 
curis called Anglaises. . . .  In sooiety, however, people ran after him 
tremendously, and spoilt him in every possible way. He read aloud from 
his own works, and, in espeeially poètic passages, his Alice accompamed 
him with arpeggios on the harp.”
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lying failure to discriminate between the odd and the 
original has persisted and has worked out into even 
extremer consequences. One may note, as I  have said, 
even in the early figures in the movement a tendency 
to play to the gallery, a something that suggests the 
approach of the era of the lime-light and the big head- 
line. Rousseau himself has been called the father of 
yellow journalists. There is an unbroken development 
from the early exponents of original genius down to 
cubists, futurists and post-impressionists and the corres- 
ponding schools in literature. The partisans of expression 
as opposed to form in the eighteenth century led to the 
fanatics of expression in the nineteenth and these have 
led to the maniacs of expression of the twentieth. The 
extremists in painting have got so far beyond Cézanne, 
who was regarded not long ago as one of the wildest of 
innovators, that Cézanne is, we are told, “ in a fair way 
to achieve the unhappy fate of becoming a clàssic.” Poe 
was fond of quoting a saying of Bacon’s that “ there is 
no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in 
the proportion.” This saying became known in France 
through Baudelaire’s rendering of Poe and was often 
ascribed to Poe himself. I t  was taken to mean that the 
stranger one became the nearer one was getting to perfect 
beauty. And if we grant this view of beauty we must 
admit that some of the decadents succeeded in becoming 
very beautiful indeed. But the more the element of pro­
portion in beauty is sacrificed to strangeness the more 
the result will seem to the normal man to be, not beauty 
at all, but rather an esoteric cuit of ugliness. The romàn­
tic genius therefore denounces the normal man as a 
philistine and at the same time, since he cannot please
him, seeks at least to shock him and so capture his 
attention by the very violence of eccentricity.
The saying I  have quoted from Bacon is perhaps an 
early example of the inner alliance between things that 
superficially often seem remote —  the scientific spirit 
and the spirit of romance. Scientific discovery has given 
a tremendous stimulus to wonder and curiosity, has en- 
couraged a purely exploratory attitude towards life and 
raised an overwhelming prepossession in favor of the 
new as compared with the oíd. Baconian and Rousseau- 
ist evidently come together by their primary emphasis 
on novelty. The movement towards a more and more 
eccentric conception of art and litera ture has been closely 
allied in practice with the doctrine of progress — and 
that from the very dawn of the so-called Quarrel of 
Ancients and Moderns. I t  is scarcely possible to exagger­
ate the havoc that has been wrought by the transfer of 
the belief that the latest thing is the best — a belief that 
is approximately true of automobiles — from the material 
order to an entirely different realm .1 The very heart of 
the classical message, one cannot repeat too often, is that 
one should aim first of all not to be original, but to be 
human, and that to be human one needs to look up to a 
sound model and imitate it. The imposition of form and 
proportion upon one’s expansive impulses which results 
from this process of imitation is, in the true sense of that 
much abused word, culture. Genuine culture is difficult 
and disciplinary. The mediation that it involves between 
the conflicting claims of form and expression requires 
the utmost contention of spirit. We have here a clue to
1 See essay by Kenyon Cox on The Illuáon o} Progress, in his Artist and 
Public.
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the boundless success of the Rousseauistic doctrine of 
spontaneity, of the assertion that genius resides in the 
región of the primitive and unconscious and is hindered 
rather than helped by culture. I t  is easier to be a genius 
on Rousseauistic fines than to be a man on the terms 
imposed by the classicist. There is a fatal facility about 
creation when its quality is not tested by some stand­
ard set above the creator’s temperament; and the same 
fatal facility appears in criticism when the critic does 
not test creation by some standard set above both his 
own temperament and that of the creator. The romàntic 
critic as a matter of fact confines his ambition to receiving 
so keen an impression from genius, conceived as some- 
thing purely temperamental, that when this Creative 
expression is passed through his temperament it will issue 
forth as a fresh expression. Taste, he holds, will thus 
tend to become one with genius, and criticism, instead 
of being coid and negative like that of the neo-classicist, 
will itself grow Creative.1 But the critic who does not 
get beyond this stage will have gusto, zest, relish, what 
you will, he will not have taste. For taste involves a 
difficult mediation between the element of uniqueness in 
both critic and creator and that which is representa­
tivo and human. Once eliminate this human standard 
that is set above the temperament of the creator and 
make of the critic in turn a mere pander to “ genius” 
and it is hard to see what measure of a man’s excellence 
is left save his intoxication with himself; and this meas­
ure would scarcely seem to be trustworthy. “ Every ass 
th at’s romàntic,” says Wolseley in his Preface to “ Valen- 
tin ian” (1686) “ believes he’s inspired.”
1 See Creative Criticism by J. E . Spingam, and my article on Genius and 
Taste, reviewing this book, in the Nation (New York), 7 Feb., 1918.
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An important aspect of the romàntic theory of genins 
remains to be considered. This theory is closely associated 
in its rise and growth with the theory of the master 
faculty or ruling passion. A man can do that for which 
he has a genius without effort, whereas no amount of 
effort can avail to give a man that for which he has no 
native aptitude.1 Buffon affirmed in opposition to this 
view that genius is only a capacity for taking pains or, as 
an American recently put it, is ten per cent inspiration 
and ninety per cent perspiration. This notion of genius 
not only risks running counter to the observed facts as 
to the importance of the native gift but it does not bring 
out as clearly as it might the real point at issue. Even 
though genius were shown to be ninety per cent inspira­
tion a man should still, the classicist would insist, fix his 
attention on the fraction that is within his power. Thus 
Boileau says in substance at the outset of his “ Art of 
Poetry” that a poet needs to be born under a propitious 
star. Genius is indispensable, and not merely genius in 
general but genius for the special kind of poetry in which 
he is to excel. Yet granting all this, he says to the poeti- 
cal aspirant, bestir yourself! The mystery of grace will 
always be recognized in any view of life that gets at all 
beneath the surface. Y et it is still the better part to turn 
to the feasibility of works. The view of genius as merely 
a temperamental overflow is as a matter of fact only a 
caricature of the doctrine of grace. I t  suits the spiritual
1 One should note here as elsewhere points of contact between scientific 
and emotional naturalism. Take, for example, the educational theory that 
has led to the setting up of the elective System. The general human disci­
pline embodied in the fixed curriculum is to be discarded in order that the 
individual may be free to work along the lines of his bent or genius. 
In a somewhat similar way scientific naturalism encourages the individual 
to sacrifice the general human discipline to a specialty.
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indolence of the creator who seeks to evade the more 
difficult half of his problem —  which is not merely to 
create but to humanize his creation. Hawthorne, for 
example, is according to Mr. Brownell, too prone (except 
in the “ Scarlet Letter”) to get away from the clear sun- 
light of normal human experience into a región of some­
what crepuscular symbolism, and this is because he 
yielded too complacently and fatalistically to what he 
conceived to be his genius. The theory of genius is per- 
haps the chief inheritance of the New England tran- 
scendentalists from romanticism. Hawthorne was more 
on his guard against the extreme implications of the 
theory than most other members of this group. I t  remains 
to be seen how much the exaltation of genius and depre- 
ciation of culture that marks one whole side of Emerson 
will in the long run tell against his reputation. The lesser 
New England men showed a rare incapacity to distin- 
guish between originality and mere freakishness either 
in themselves or in others.
It  is fair to say that in lieu of the discipline of culture 
the romàntic genius has often insisted on the discipline of 
technique; and this has been especially true in a country 
like France with its persistent tradition of careful work- 
manship. Gautier, for example, would have one’s “ float- 
ing dream sealed ” 1 in the hardest and most resisting 
material, that can only be mastered by the perfect crafts- 
man; and he himself, falling into a confusión of the arts, 
tries to display such a craftsmanship by painting and 
carving with words. Flaubert, again, refines upon the 
technique of writing to a point where it becomes not 
merely a discipline but a torture. But if a man is to be
1 See his poem L ’Art in Emaux et Camées.
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a romàntic genius in the fullest sense he must, it should 
seem, repudiate even the discipline of technique as well 
as the discipline of culture in favor of an artless spon- 
taneity. For after ali the genius is only the man who 
retains the virtues of the child, and technical proficiency 
is scarcely to be numbered among these virtues. The 
Germán romanticists already prefer the early Italian 
painters because of their naïveté and divine awkward- 
ness to the later artists who had a more conscious mastery 
of their material. The whole Pre-Raphaelite movement 
is therefore only one aspect of Rousseau’s return to na­
ture. To later primitivists the early Italians themselves 
seem far too deliberate. They would recover the spon- 
taneity displayed in the markings on Alaskan tótem 
poles or in the scratchings of the caveman on the flint. 
A prerequisite to pure genius, if -we are to judge by 
their own productions, is an inability to draw. The fu- 
turists in their endeavor to convey symbolically their 
own “ soul” or “ visión” —  a visión be it noted of pine 
flux and motion — deny the very conditions of time and 
space that determine the special technique of painting; 
and inasmuch as to express one’s “ soul” means for these 
modems, as it did for the “ genius” of the eighteenth 
century, to express the ineffable difference between 
themselves and others, the symbolizing of this soul to 
which they have sacrificed both culture and technique 
remains a dark mystery.
An eccentricity so extreme as to be almost or quite 
indistinguishable from madness is then the final outcome 
of the revolt of the original genius from the regularity of 
the eighteenth century. The eighteenth century had, 
one must confess, become too much like the Happy
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Valley from which Rasselas, Prince òf Abyssinia, sought 
an egress. I t  was fair to the eye and satisfied all man’s 
ordinary needs, but it seemed at the same time to hem 
him in oppressively, and limit unduly his horizons. 
For the modern man, as for the prince in Johnson’s 
tale, a regular round of assured felicities has counted for 
nought as compared with the passion for the open; though 
now that he has tasted strange adventures, the modern 
man will scarcely decide at the end, like the prince, 
to “ return to Abyssinia.” I  have already spoken of the 
rationalistic and pseudo-classic elements in the eight­
eenth century that the romàntic rebels found so intoler­
able. I t  is impossible to follow “ reason,” they said in sub- 
stance, and also to slake one’s thirst for the “ infinite” ; 
it is impossible to conform and imitate and at the same 
time to be free and original and spontaneous. Above all 
it is impossible to submit to the yoke of either reason 
or imitation and at the same time to be imaginative. This 
last assertion will always be the main point at issue in 
any genuine debate between classicist and romanticist. 
The supreme thing in life, the romanticist declares, is 
the Creative imagination, and it can be restored to its 
rights only by repudiating imitation. The imagination is 
supreme the classicist grants but adds that to imitate 
rightly is to make the highest use of the imagination. 
To understand all that is implied in this central diver- 
gence between classicist and romanticist we shall need 
to study in more detail the kind of imaginative activity 
that has been encouraged in the whole movement ex- 
tending from the rise of the original genius in the eight­
eenth century to the present day.
CH APTER I I I
KOMANTIC IMAGINATION
I  HAVE already spoken of the contrast established by the 
theorists of original genius in the eighteenth century 
between the different types of imagination —  especially 
between the literary and the scientific imagination. Ac- 
cording to these theorists, it will be remembered, the 
scientific imagination should be strictly subordinated to 
judgment, whereas the literary imagination, freed from 
the shackles of imitation, should be at liberty to wander 
wild in its own empire of chimeras, or, at all events, 
should be far less sharply checked by judgment. I t  is 
easy to follow the extensión of these English views of 
genius and imagination into the France of Rousseau and 
Diderot, and then the elaboration of these same views, 
under the combined influence of both France and Eng- 
land, in Germany. I  have tried to show that Kant, 
especially in his “ Critique of Judgment,” and Schiller 
in his “ JSsthetic Letters” (1795) prepare the way for 
the conception of the Creative imagination that is at the 
very heart of the romàntic movement. According to this 
romàntic conception, as we have seen, the imagination is 
to be free, not merely from outer formalistic constraint, 
but from all constraint whatever. This extreme romàntic 
emancipation of the imagination was accompanied by an 
equally extreme emancipation of the emotions. Both kinds 
of emancipation are, as I  have tried to show, a recoil 
partly from neo-classical judgment —  a type of judgment
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which seemed to oppress all that is Creative and spon- 
taneous in man under a weight of outer convention; 
partly, from the reason of the Enlightenment, a type 
of reason that was so logical and abstract that it seemed 
to mechanize the human spirit, and to be a denial of all 
that is immediate and intuiti ve. The neo-classical judg­
ment, with its undue unfriendliness to the imagination, 
is itself a recoil, let us remember, from the imaginative 
extravagance of the “ metaphysicals,” the intellectual ro- 
manticists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
and also, if we take a sufficiently wide view, from the 
Quixotic type of romanticism, the romanticism of action, 
that we associate with the Middle Ages.
Now not only are men governed by their imaginations 
(the imagination, as Pascal says, disposes of everything), 
but the type of imagination by which most men are 
governed may be defined in the widest sense of the word 
as romàntic. Nearly every man cherishes his dream, his 
conceit of himself as he would like to be, a sort of “ ideal” 
projection of his own desires, in comparison with which 
his actual life seems a hard and cramping routine. 
“ Man must conceive himself what he is not,” as Dr. 
Johnson says, “ for who is pleased with what he is?” 
The ampie habitation that a man rears for his fictitious 
or “ ideal” self often has some slight foundation in fact, 
but the higher he rears it the more insecure it becomes, 
until finally, like Perrette in the fable, he brings the whole 
structure down about his ears by the very gesture of his 
dream. “ We all of us,” La Fontaine concludes in perhaps 
the most delightful account of the romàntic imagination 
in literature, “ wise as well as foolish, indulge in day- 
dreams. There is nothing sweeter. A flattering illusion
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carries away our spirits. All the wealth in the world is 
ours, all honors and all women,” 1 etc. When Johnson 
descants on the “ dangerous prevalence of imagination,”2 
and warns us to stick to “ sober probability,” what he 
means is the dangerous prevalence of day-dreaming. 
The retreat of the Rousseauist into some “ land of chime- 
ras” or tower of ivory assumes forms almost incredibly 
complex and subtle, but at bottom the ivory tower is only 
one form of man’s ineradicable longing to escape from 
the oppression of the actual into some land of heart’s 
desire, some golden age of fancy. As a matter of fact, 
Rousseau’s imaginative activity often approaches very 
closely to the delights of day-dreaming as described by 
La Fontaine. He was never more imaginative, he tells us, 
than when on a walking-trip —  especially when the trip 
had no definite goal, or at least when he could talce his 
time in reaching it. The Wanderlust of body and spirit 
could then be satisfied together. Actual vagabondage 
seemed to be an aid to the imagination in its escape from 
verisimilitude. One should note especially Rousseau’s 
account of his early wandering from Lyons to París and
1 Quel esprit ne bat la campagne?
Qui ne fait cháteaux en Espagne?
Picrochole, Pyrrhus, la laitiére, enfin tous;
Autant les sages que les fous 
Chacun songe en veillant; il n’est ríen de plus doux.
Une flatteuse erreur emporte alors nos ámes;
Tout le bien du monde est à nous,
Tous les honneurs, toutes les femmes.
Quand je suis seul, je fais au plus brave un défi,
Je m’écarte, je vais détróner le sophi;
On m’élit roi, mon peuple m’aime;
Les diadémes vont sur ma tete pleuvant:
Quelque accident fait-il que je rentre en moi-méme,
Je suis gros Jean comme devant. 
s Rasselas, ch. xliv.
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the airy structures that he raised on his anticipations of 
what he might find there. Inasmuch as he was to be 
attached at Paris to the Swiss Colonei Godard, he already 
traced for himself in fancy, in spite of his short-sighted- 
ness, a career of military glory. “ I  hadread that Marshal 
Schomberg was short-sighted, why should n’t Marshal 
Rousseau be so too?” In the meanwhile, touched by the 
sight of the groves and brooks, “ I  felt in the midst of my 
glory that my heart was not made for so much turmoil, 
and soon without knowing how, I  found myself once 
more among my beloved pastorals, renouncing forever 
the toils of Mars.”
Thus alongside the real world and in more or less sharp 
opposition to it, Rousseau builds up a fictitious world, 
that pays des chiméres, which is alone, as he tells us, 
worthy of habitation. To study his imaginative activity 
is simply to study the new forms that he gives to what 
I  have called man’s ineradicable longing for some Ar­
cadia, some land of heart’s desire. Goethe compares the 
illusions that man nourishes in his breast to the popu- 
lation of statues in ancient Rome which were almost as 
numerous as the population of living men. The important 
thing from the point of view of sanity is that a man 
should not blur the boundaries between the two popu- 
lations, that he should not cease to discriminate between 
his fact and his fiction. If he confuses what he dreams him­
self to be with what he actually is, he has already entered 
upon the pathway of madness. I t  was, for example, nat­
ural for a youth like Rousseau who was at once romàntic 
and musical, to dream that he was a great composer; but 
actually to set up as a great composer and to give the 
concert at Lausanne, shows an unwillingness to dis-
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criminate between his fictitious and his real world that 
is plainly pathological. If not already a megalomaniac, 
he was even then on the way to megalomania.
To wander through the world as though it were an 
Arcadia or enchanted visión contrived for one’s especial 
benefit is an attitude of childhood — especially of imagi- 
native childhood. “ Wherever children are,” says Novalis, 
“ there is the golden age.” As the child grows and matures 
there is a more or less painful process of adjustment 
between his “ visión” and the particular reality in which 
he is placed. A üttle sense gets knocked into his head, 
and often, it must be confessed, a good deal of the imagi- 
nation gets knocked out. As Wordsworth complains, the 
visión fades into the light of common day. The striking 
fact about Rousseau is that, far more than Wordsworth, 
he held fast to his visión. He refused to adjust it to an 
unpalatable reaüty. During the very years when the 
ordinary youth is forced to subordínate his luxurious 
imaginings to some definite discipline he feli under the 
influence of Madame de Warens who encouraged rather 
than thwarted his Arcadian bent. Later, when almost 
incurably confirmed in his penchant for revery, he carne 
into contact with the refined society of Paris, an environ- 
ment requiring so difficult an adjustment that no one we 
are told could accomplish the feat unless he had been dis- 
ciplined into the appropriate habits from the age of six. 
He is indeed the supreme example of the unadj usted 
man, of the original genius whose imagination has never 
suffered either inner or outer constraint, who is more of 
an Arcadian dreamer at sixty perhaps than he was at 
sixteen. He writes to the Bailli de Mirabeau (31 Jan- 
uary, 1767):
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“The fatigue of thinking becomes every day more painful to me.
I love to dream, but freely, allowing my mind to wançier without 
enslaving myself to any subject. . . . This idle and contemplative 
life which you do not approve and which I do not excuse, becomes to 
me daily more delicious; to wander alone endlessly and ceaselessly 
among the trees and rocks about my dwelling, to muse or rather to 
be as irresponsible as I please, and as you say, to go wool-gathering; 
. . .  finally to give myself up unconstrainedly to my fantasies which, 
thankheaven, are all withinmy power: that, sir, is for me the supreme 
enjoyment, than which I can imagine nothing superior in this world 
for a man at my age and in my condition.”
Rousseau, then, owes his significance not only to the 
fact that he was supremely imaginative in an age that 
was disposed to deny the supremacy of the imagination, 
but to the fact that he was imaginative in a particular 
way. A great multitude since his time must be reckoned 
among his followers, not because they have held certain 
ideas but because they have exhibited a similar quality 
of imagination. In seeking to define this quality of imagi­
nation we are therefore at the very heart of our subject.
I t  is clear from what has already been said that Rous- 
seau’s imagination was in a general way Arcadian, and 
this, if not the highest, is perhaps the most prevalent 
type of imagination. In surveying the literature of the 
world one is struck not only by the universality of the 
pastoral or idyllic element, but by the number of forms 
it has assumed — forms ranging from the extreme of 
artificiality and conventionalism to the purest poetry. 
The very society against the artificiality of which Rous- 
seau’s whole work is a protest is itself in no small degree 
a pastoral creation. Yarious elements indeed entered into 
the life of the drawing-room as it carne to be conceived 
towards the beginning of the seventeenth century. The 
Marquise de Rambouillet and others who set out at this
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time to live in the grand manner were in so far goveraed 
either by genuine or by artificial decorum. But at the same 
time that the creators of le grand monde were aiming to 
be more “ decent” than the men and women of the six- 
teenth century, they were patterning themselves upon the 
shepherds and shepherdesses of D ’Urfé’s interminable 
pastoral “ l’Astrée.” They were seeking to create a sort 
of enchanted world from which the harsh cares of ordi- 
nary life were banished and where they might be free, 
like true Arcadians, to discourse of love. This discourse of 
love was associated with what I  have defined as intel­
ectual romanticism. In spite of the attacks by the expo­
nents of humanistic good sense (Molière, Boileau, etc.) 
on this drawing-room affectation, it lingered on and still 
led in the eighteenth century, as Rousseau complained, 
to “ inconceivable refinements.” 1 At the same time we 
should recollect that there is a secret bond between all 
forms of Arcadian dreaming. Not only was Rousseau 
fascinated, like the early précieux and précieuses, by 
D ’Urfé’s pastoral, but he himself appealed by his re- 
newal of the main pastoral theme of love to the descend- 
ants of these former Arcadians in the polite society of his 
time. The love of Rousseau is associated not like that 
of the précieux, with the intellect, but with the emo- 
tions, and so he substitutes for a “ wire-drawn and super- 
subtilized gallantry,” the ground-swell of elemental 
passion.2 Moreover, the definitely primitivistic coloring 
that he gave to his imaginative renewal of the pastoral 
dream appealed to an age that was reaching the last stages 
of over-refinement. Primitivism is, strictly speaking,
1 Nouvelle Hélmse, Pt. ii, Lettre xvn.
2 Rostand has hit oiï this change in the Balcony Scene of his C yrano 
de Bergerac.
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nothing new in the world. I t  always tends to appear in 
periods of complex civilization. The charms of the simple 
life and of a return to nature were celebrated especially 
during the Alexandrian period of Greek literature for the 
special delectation no doubt of the most sophisticated 
members of this very sophisticated society. “ Nothing,” 
as Dr. Santayana says, “ is farther from the common 
people than the corrupt desire to be primitive.” Prim­
itivistic dreaming was also popular in ancient Rome at 
its most artificial moment. The great ancients, however, 
though enjoying the poetry of the primitivistic dream, 
were not the dupes of this dream. Horace, for example, 
lived at the most artificial moment of Rome when prim­
itivistic dreaming was popular as it had been at Alex­
andria. He descants on the joys of the simple life in a well- 
known ode. One should not therefore hail him, like 
Schiller, as the founder of the sentimental school “ of 
which he has remained the unsurpassed model.” 1 For 
the person who plans to return to nature in Horace’s 
poem is the oíd usurer Alfius, who changes his mind at 
the last moment and puts out his mortgages again. In 
short, the final attitude of the urbane Horace towards 
the primitivistic dream — it could hardly be otherwise — 
is ironical.
Rousseau seems destined to remain the supreme ex­
ample, at least in the Occident, of the man who takes 
the primitivistic dream seriously, who attempts to set 
up primitivism as a philosophy and even as a religión. 
Rousseau’s account of his sudden illumination on the 
road from Paris to Vincennes is famous: the scales, he 
tells us, íell from his eyes even as they had from the eyes
1 Essay on Simple and Sentimental Poetry.
78 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISMO
of Paul on the road to Damascus, and he saw how man 
had fallen from the felicity of his primitive estáte; how 
the blissful ignorance in which he had lived at one with 
himself and harmless to his fellows had been broken by 
the rise of intellectual self-consciousness and the result- 
ing progress in the Sciences and arts. Modern students of 
Rousseau have, under the influence of James, taken this 
experience on the road to Vincennes to be an authentic 
case of conversión,1 but this is merely one instance of 
our modern tendency to confound the subrational with 
the superrational. What one finds in this alleged con­
versión when one looks into it, is a sort of “ subliminal 
uprush” of the Arcadian memòries of his youth, espe- 
c ia.11 y of his Ufe at Annecy and Les Charmettes, and at 
the same time the contrast between these Arcadian 
memòries and the hateful constraints he had suffered 
at Paris in his attempts to adjust himself to an uncon- 
genial environment.
We can trace even more clearly perhaps the process 
by which the Arcadian dreamer comes to set up as a seer, 
in Rousseau’s relation of the circumstances under which 
he carne to compose his “ Discourse on the Origins of 
Inequality.” He goes off on a sort of picnic with Thérése 
into the forest of St. Germain and gives himself up to 
imagining the state of primitive man. “ Plunged in the 
forest,” he says, “ I  sought and found there the image of 
primitive times of which I  proudly drew the history; 
I  swooped down on the little falsehoods of men; I  ven- 
tured to lay bare their nature, to follow the progress of 
time and of circumstances which have disfigured it, and
1 The life of Rousseau by Gerhard Gran is written from this point of 
view.
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comparing artificial man (l’homme de l’homme) with 
natural man, to show in his alleged improvement the trae 
source of his miseries. My soul, exalted by these sublime 
contemplations, rose into the presence of the Divinity. 
Seeing from this vantage point that the blind pathway 
of prejudices followed by my fellows was also that of their 
errors, misfortunes and crimes, I  cried out to them in a 
feeble voice that they could not hear: Madmen, who are 
always complaining of nature, know that all your evils 
come from yourselves alone.”
The golden age for which the human heart has an 
ineradicable longing is here presented not as poetical, 
which it certainly is, but as a “ state of nature” from 
which man has actually fallen. The more or less innocent 
Arcadian dreamer is being transformed into the danger- 
ous Utopist. He puts the blame of the conflict and divi­
sión of which he is conscious in himself upon the social 
conventions that set bounds to his temperament and 
impulses; once get rid of these purely artificial restric- 
tions and he feels that he will again be at one with himself 
and “ nature.” With such a visión of nature as this it is 
not surprising that every constraint is unendurable to 
Rousseau, that he likes, as Berlioz was to say of himself 
later, to “ make all barriers crack.” He is ready to shatter 
all the forms of civilized life in favor of something that 
never existed, of a state of nature that is only the pro- 
jection of his own temperament and its dominant desires 
upon the void. His programme amounts in practice to 
the indulgence of infinite indeterminate desire, to an end- 
less and aimless vagabondage of the emotions with the 
imagination as their free accomplice.
This longing of the highly sophisticated person to get
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back to the primitive and naïve and unconscious, or 
what amounts to the same thing, to shake off the tram- 
mels of tradition and reason in favor of free and passion- 
ate self-expression, underlies, as I  have pointed out, the 
conception of original genius which itself underlies the 
whole modern movement. A book reflecting the primitiv- 
istic trend of the eighteenth century, and at the same time 
pointing the way, as we shall see presently, to the working 
out of the fundamental primitivistic contrast between the 
natural and the artificial in the romanticism of the early 
nineteenth century, is Schiller’s “ Essay on Simple and 
Sentimental Poetry.” The poetry that doesnot “ look be- 
fore or after,” that is free from self-questioning and self- 
consciousness, and has a child-like spontaneity, Schiller 
calis simple or naïve. The poet, on the other hand, who is 
conscious of his fall from nature and who, from the midst 
of his sophistication, longs to be back once more at his 
mother’s bosom, is sentimental. Homer and his heroes, 
for example, are naïve; Werther, who yearns in a draw- 
ing-room for the Homerie simplicity, is sentimental. The 
longing of the modern man for nature, says Schiller, 
is that of the sick man for health. I t  is hard to see in 
Schiller’s “ nature” any thing more than a development 
of Rousseau’s primitivistic Arcadia. To be sure, Schiller 
warns us that, in order to recover the childüke and 
primitive virtues still visible in the man of genius, we 
must not renounee culture. We must not seek to revert 
lazily to an Arcadia, but must struggle forward to an 
Elysium. Unfortunately Schiller’s Elysium has a strange 
likeness to Rousseau’s Arcadia; and that is because 
Schiller’s own conception of life is, in the last analysis, 
overwhelmingly sentimental. His most Elysian concep-
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tion, that of a purely sesthetic Greece, a wonderland of 
unalloyed beauty, is also a bit of Arcadian sentimental- 
izing. Inasmuch as Rousseau’s state of nature never 
existed outside of dreamland, the Greek who is simple 
or naïve in this sense is likewise a myth. He has no real 
counterpart either in the Homerie age or any other age 
of Greece. I t  is hard to say which is more absurd, to 
make the Greeks naïve, or to turn Horace into a senti- 
mentalist. One should note how this romàntic perversión 
of the Greeks for which Schiller is largely responsible 
is related to his general view of the imagination. We 
have seen that in the “ vEsthetic Letters” he main- 
tains that if the imagination is to conceive the ideal it 
must be free; and that to be free it must be emancipated 
from purpose and engage in a sort of play. If  the imagi­
nation has to subordinate itself to a real object it ceases 
in so far to be free. Henee the more ideal the imagination 
the farther it gets away from a real object. By his theory 
of the imagination, Schiller thus encourages that opposi- 
tion between the ideal and the real which figures so 
largely in romàntic psychology. A man may consent to 
adjust a mere dream to the requirements of the real, 
but when his dream is promoted to the dignity of an ideal 
it is plain that he will be less ready to make the sacrifice. 
Schiller’s Greece is very ideal in the sense I  have just 
defined. I t  hovers before the imagination as a sort of 
Golden Age of puré beauty, a land of chimeras that is 
alone worthy of the aesthete’s habitation. As an extreme 
type of the romàntic Hellenist, one may take Holderlin, 
who was a disciple at once of Schiller and of Rousseau. 
He begins by urging emancipation from every form of 
outer and traditional control in the ñame of spontaneity.
82 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISMO
“ Boldly forget,” he cries in the very accents of Rousseau, 
“ what you have inherited and won — all laws and cus- 
toms — and like new-born babes lift up your eyes to 
godlike nature.” Hòlderlin has been called a “ Helleniz- 
ing Werther,” and Werther, one should recollect, is only 
a Germán Saint-Preux, who is in turn, according to Rous- 
seau’s own avowal, only an idealized image of Rousseau. 
The nature that Hòlderlin worships and which is, like 
the nature of Rousseau, only an Arcadian intoxication 
of the imagination, he associates with a Greece which is, 
like the Greece of Schiller, a dreamland of puré beauty. 
He longs to escape into this dreamland from an ac­
tual world that seems to him intolerably artificial. The 
contrast between his “ ideal” Greece and reality is so 
acute as to make all attempt at adjustment out of the 
question. As a result of this maladjustment his whole 
being finally gave way and he lingered on for many years 
in madness.
The acuteness of the opposition between the ideal and 
the real in Hòlderlin recalis Shelley, who was also a 
romàntic Hellenist, and at the same time perhaps the 
most purely Rousseauistic of the English romàntic poets. 
But Shelley was also a political dreamer, and here one 
should note two distinet phases in his dream: a first 
phase that is filled with the hope of transforming the 
real world into an Arcadia 1 through revolutionary re- 
form; and then a phase of elegiae disillusion when the 
gap between reality and his ideal refuses to be bridged.2
1 The world’s great age begins anew,
The golden years return, etc.
Helias, vy . 1060 ff.
1 For an excellent analysis of Shelley’s idealism see Leslie Stephen’s 
Godwin and Shelley in his Hours in a Library.
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Something of the same radiant political hope and the 
same disillusion is found in Wordsworth. In  the first 
flush of his revolutionary enthusiasm, France seemed 
to him to be “ standing on the top of golden hours” and 
pointing the way to a new birth of human nature:
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven! O times,
In which the meagre stale forbidding ways 
Of custom, law and statute, took at once 
The attraction of a country in romance!
When it became evident that the actual world and 
Utopia did not coincide after all, when the hard se- 
quences of cause and effect that bind the present inexor- 
ably to the past refused to yield to the creations of the 
romàntic imagination, what ensued in Wordsworth was 
not so much an awakening to true wisdom as a trans- 
formation of the pastoral dream. The English Lake Coun­
try became for him in some measure as it was later to 
be for Ruskin, the ivory tower into which he retreated 
from the oppression of the real. He still continued to see, 
if not the general order of society, at least the denizens 
of his chosen retreat through the Arcadian mist, and 
contrasted their pastoral felicity with the misery of men 
“ barricadoed in the walls of cities.” I  do not mean to 
disparage the poetry of humble life or to deny that many 
passages may be cited from Wordsworth that justify his 
reputation as an inspired teacher: I  wish merely to point 
out here and elsewhere what is specifically romàntic m 
the quality of his imagination.
After all it is to Rousseau himself even more than to 
his Germán or English followers that one needs to turn 
for the best examples of the all-pervasive conflict be-
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tween the ideal and the actual. The psychology of this 
conflict is revealed with special clearness in the four let- 
ters that he wrote to M. de Malesherbes, and into which 
he has perhaps put more of himself than into any other 
similar amount of his writing. His natural indolence and 
impatience at the obligations and constraints of life were, 
he avows to M. de Malesherbes, increased by his early 
reading. At the age of eight he already knew Plutarch by 
heart and had read “ all novéis” and shed tears over 
them, he adds “ by the pailful.” Henee was formed his 
“ heroic and romàntic taste” which filled him with 
aversión for everything that did not resemble his dreams. 
He had hoped at first to find the equivalent of these 
dreams among actual men, but after painful disillusions 
he had come to look with disdain on his age and his 
contemporaries. “ I  withdrew more and more from hu­
man society and created for myself a society in my 
imagination, a society that charmed me all the more in 
that I  could cultívate it without peril or effort and that 
it was always at my call and such as I  required it.” He 
associated this dream society with the forms of outer 
nature. The long walks in particular that he took during 
his stay at the Hermitage were, he tells us, filled with a 
“ continual delirium” of this kind. “ I  peopled nature 
with beings according to my heart. . . .  I  created for 
myself a golden age to suit my faney.” It  is not unusual 
for a man thus to consolé himself for his poverty in the 
real relations of life by accumulating a huge hoard of 
fairy gold. Where the Rousseauist goes beyond the or- 
dinary dreamer is in his proneness to regard his retire- 
ment into some land of chimeras as a proof of his nobility 
and distinction. Poetry and life he feels are irreconcila-
bly opposed to each other, and he for his part is on the 
side of poetry and the “ ideal.” Goethe symbolized the 
hopelessness of this conflict in the suicide of the young 
Werther. But though Werther died, his creator contin- 
ued to live, and more perhaps than any other figure in 
the whole Rousseauistic movement perceived the peril 
of this conception of poetry and the ideal. He saw phan- 
tasts all about him who refused to be reconciled to the 
gap between the infinitude of their longing and the plati- 
tude of their actual lot. Perhaps no country and time 
ever produced more such phantasts than Germany of 
the Storm and Stress and romàntic periods —  partly no 
doubt because it did not offer any proper outlet for the 
activity of generous youths. Goethe himself had been a 
phantast, and so'it was natural in works like his “ Tasso” 
that he should show himself specially preoccupied with 
the problem of the poet and his adjustment to life. About 
the time that he wrote this play, he was, as he tells us, 
very much taken up with thoughts of “ Rousseau and his 
hypochondriac misery.” Rousseau for his part felt a 
kinship between himself and Tasso, and Goethe’s Tasso 
certainly reminds us very strongly of Rousseau. Carried 
away by his Arcadian imaginings, Tasso violates the de­
corum that separates him from the princess with whom 
he has fallen in love. As a result of the rebuffs that fol- 
low, his dream changes into a nightmare, until he 
finally falls like Rousseau into wild and random sus- 
picion and looks on himself as the victim of a conspiracy. 
In opposition to Tasso is the figure of Antonio, the man 
of the world, whose imagination does not run away with 
his sense of fact, and who is therefore equal to the “ de- 
mands of the day.” The final reconciliation between Tasso
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and Antonio, if not very convincing dramatically, sym- 
bolizes at least what Goethe achieved in some measure 
in his own life. There were moments, he declares, when 
he might properly look upon himself as mad, like Rous­
seau. He escaped from this world of morbid brooding, 
this giddy downward gazing into the bottomless pit of 
the romàntic heart against which he utters a warning 
in Tasso, by his activity at the court of Weimar, by 
classical culture, by scientific research. Goethe carries 
the same problem of reconciling the ideal to the real a 
stage further in his “ Wilhelm Meister.” The more or less 
irresponsible and Bohemian youth that we see at the 
beginning learns by renunciation and self-limitation to 
fit into a life of wholesome activity. Goethe saw that the 
remedy for romàntic dreaming is work, though he is 
open to grave criticism, as I  shall try to show elsewhere, 
for his unduly naturalistic conception of work. But the 
romanticists as a rule did not wish work in any sense 
and so, attracted as they were by the free artistic life 
of Meister at the beginning, they looked upon his final 
adjustment to the real as a base capitulation to philistin- 
ism. Novalis described the book as a “ Candide directed 
against poetry,” and set out to write a counterblast in 
“ Heinrich von Ofterdingen.” This apotheosis of puré 
poetry, as he meant it to be, is above all an apotheosis of 
the wildest vagabondage of the imagination. Novalis 
did not, however, as a result of the conflict between the 
ideal and the real, show any signs of going mad like 
Holderlin, or of simply fading from life like his friend 
Wackenroder. Like E . T . A. Hoffmann and a certain 
number of other phantasts he had a distinet gift for 
leading a dual life —  for dividing himself into
self which went one way, and a poetical self which went 
another.
This necessary and fatal opposition between poetry 
and prose the romanticist saw typified in “ Don Quixote,” 
and of course he sided with the idealism of the knight 
against the philistine good sense of Sancho Panza; and so 
for the early romanticists as well as for those who were 
of their spiritual posterity, — Heine, for example, and 
Flaubert, —  Don Quixote” was a book to evoke not 
laughter but tears.
To the romàntic conception of the ideal can be traced 
the increasing lack of understanding between the poet, 
or in general the creator, and the públic during the past 
century. Many neo-classical writers may, like Boileau, 
have shown an undue reverence for what they conceived 
to be the general sense of their time, but to measure one’s 
inspiration by one’s remoteness from this general sense 
is surely a far more dangerous error; and yet one was 
encouraged to do this very thing by the views of original 
genius that were held in the eighteenth century. Certain 
late neo-classicists lacked imagination and were at the 
same time always harping on good sense. I t  was therefore 
assumed that to insist on good sense was necessarily 
proof of a lack of imagination. Because the attempt to 
achieve the universal had led to a stale and lifeless imi- 
tation it was assumed that a man’s genius consists in his 
uniqueness, in his unlikeness to other men. Now nothing 
is more private and distinctive in a man than his feelings, 
so that to be unique meant practically for Rousseau and 
his followers to be unique in feeling. Feeling alone they 
held was vital and immediate. As a matter of fact the 
element in a man’s nature that he possesses in common
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with other men is also something that he senses, some- 
thing that is in short intuitive and immediate. But good 
sense the genius identifies with lifeless convention and so 
measures his originality by the distance of his emotional 
and imaginative recoil from it. Of this warfare between 
sense and sensibility that begins in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, the romàntic war between the poet and the philis- 
tine is only the continuation. This war has been bad for 
both artist and public. If  the artist has become more and 
more eccentric, it must be confessed that the good sense 
of the public against which he has protested has been 
too flatly utilitarian. The poet who reduces poetry to 
the imaginative quest of strange emotional adventure, 
and the plain Citizen who does not aspire beyond a reality 
that is too literal and prosaic, both suffer; but the sesthete 
suffers the more severely — so much so that I  shall need 
to revert to this conception of poetry in my treatment 
of romàntic melancholy. I t  leads at last to a contrast 
between the ideal and the real such as is described by 
Anatole France in his account of Vilüers de lTsle Adam. 
“ For thirty years,” says M. France, “ Yilliers wandered 
around in cafés at night, fading away like a shadow at 
the first glimmer of dawn. . . .  His poverty, the frightful 
poverty of cities, had so put its stamp on him and fash- 
ioned him so thoroughly that he resembled those vaga- 
bonds, who, dressed in black, sleep on park benches. He 
had the livid complexión with red blotches, the glassy 
eye, the bowed back of the poor; and yet I  am not sure 
we should cali him unhappy, for he lived in a perpetual 
dream and that dream was radiantly golden.. . . His dull 
eyes contemplated within himself dazzling spectacles. 
He passed through the world like a somnambulist seeing
ROMÀNTIC IMAGINATION 89
nothing of what we see and seeing things that it is not 
given us to behold. Out of the commonplace spectacle of 
life he succeeded in creating an ever fresh ecstasy. On 
those ignoble café tables in the midst of the odor of beer 
and tobáceo, he poured forth floods of purple and gold.” 
This notion that literal failure is ideal success, and 
conversely, has been developed in a somewhat different 
form by Rostand in his “ Cyrano de Bergerac.” By his 
refusal to compromise or adjust himself to things as 
they are, Cyrano’s real life has become a series of defeats. 
He is finally forced from life by a league of all the medi- 
ocrities whom his idealism affronts. His discomfiture is 
taken to show, not that he is a Quixotic extremist, but 
that he is the superior of the successful Guise, the man 
who has stooped to compromise, the French equivalent of 
the Antonio whom Goethe finally carne to prefer to Tasso. 
Rostand’s “ Chanticleer ” is also an interesting study 
of romàntic idealism and of the two main stages through 
which it passes — the first stage when one relates one’s 
ideal to the real; the second, when one discovers that the 
ideal and the real are more or less hopelessly dissevered. 
Chanticleer still maintains his idealistic pose even after he 
has discovered that the sun is not actually made to rise 
by his crowing. In this hugging of his illusion in defi- 
ance of reality Chanticleer is at the opposite pole from 
Johnson’s astronomer in “ Rasselas” who thinks that 
he has control of the weather, but when disillusioned is 
humbly thankful at having escaped from this “ danger- 
ous prevalence of imagination,” and entered once more 
into the domain of “ sober probability.”
The problem, then, of the genius or the artist versus 
the philistine has persisted without essential modifica-
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tion from the eighteenth century to the present day —  
from the suicide of Chatterton, let us say, to the suicide 
of John Davidson. The man of imagination spurns in the 
ñame of his “ ideal” the limits imposed upon it by a dull 
respectability, and then his ideal turns out only too often 
to lack positive content and to amount in practice to 
the expansión of infinite indeterminate desire. What the 
idealist opposes to the real is not only something that 
does not exist, but something that never can exist. The 
Arcadian revery which should be allowed at most as 
an occasional solace from the serious business of living 
is set up as a substitute for üving. The imaginative 
and emotional dalliance of the Rousseauistic romanticist 
may assume a bewildering variety of forms. We have 
already seen in the case of Holderlin how easily Rous- 
seau’s dream of a state of nature passes over — and that 
in spite of Rousseau’s attacks on the arts — into the 
dream of a paradise of puré beauty. The momentous 
matter is not that a man’s imagination and emotions go 
out towards this or that particular ha ven of refuge in the 
future or in the past, in the East or in the West, but that 
his primary demand on life is for some ha ven of refuge; 
that he longs to be away from the here and now and their 
positive demands on his character and will. Poe may 
sing of “ the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that 
was Rome,” but he is not therefore a classicist. With the 
same wistfulness innumerable romanticists have looked to­
wards the Middle Ages. So C. E. Norton says that Ruskin 
was a white-winged anachronism,1 that he should have 
been born in the thirteenth century. But one may surmise 
that a man with Ruskin’s special quality of imagination
1 Letlers, zi, 292.
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would have failed to adjust himself to the actual life of 
the thirteenth or any other century. Those who put their 
Arcadia in the Middle Ages or some other period of the 
past have at least this advantage over those who put it 
in the present, they are better protected against disillu- 
sion. The man whose Arcadia is distant from him merely 
in space may decide to go and see for himself, and the 
results of this overtaking of one’s dream are somewhat 
uncertain. The Austrian poet Lenau, for example, actu- 
ally took a trip to his primitive paradise that he had 
imagined somewhere in the neighborhood of Pittsburgh. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that he finally died mad. 
The disenchantment of Chateaubriand in his quest for 
a Rousseauistic Arcadia in America and for Arcadian 
savages I  describe later. In his journey into thewilder- 
ness Chateaubriand reveáis himself as a spiritual lotos- 
eater no less surely than the man who takes flight into 
what is superficially most remote from the virgin for­
est — into some palace of art. His attitude towards 
America does not differ psychically from that of many 
early romanticists towards Italy. Italy was their land 
of heart’s desire, the land that filled them with ineffable 
longing (Sehnsucht nach Italien), a palace of art that, like 
the Latin Quarter of later Bohemians, had some points 
of contact with Mohammed’s paradise. A man may even 
develop a romàntic longing for the very period against 
which romanticism was originally a protest and be 
ready to “ fling his cap for polish and for Pope.” One 
should add that the romàntic Eldorado is not necessarily 
rural. Lamb’s attitude towards London is almost as 
romàntic as that of Wordsworth towards the country. 
Dr. Johnson cherished urban life because of its centrality.
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Lamb’s imaginative dalliance, on the other hand, is stimu- 
lated by the sheer variety and wonder of the London 
streets as another’s might be by the mountains or the 
sea.1 Lamb could also find an Elysium of unmixed ses- 
thetic solace in the literature of the past —  especially in 
Restoration Comedy.
The essence of the mood is always the straining of the 
imagination away from the here and now, from an 
actuality that seems paltry and faded compared to the 
radiant hues of one’s dream. The classicist, according to 
A. W. Schlegel,2 is for making the most of the present, 
whereas the romanticist hovers between recollection 
and hope. In Shelleyan phrase he “ looks before and after 
and pines for what is not.” He inclines like the Byronic 
dandy, Barbey d’Aurevilly, to take for his mottoes the 
words “ Too late” and “ Nevermore.”
Nostalgia, the temí that has come to be applied to the 
infinite indeterminate longing of the romanticist — his 
never-ending quest after the ever-fleeting object of desire 
•— is not, from the point of view of strict etymology, well- 
chosen. Romàntic nostalgia is not “ homesickness,” accu- 
rately speaking, but desire to get away from home. 
Odysseus in Homer suffers from trae nostalgia. The 
Ulysses of Tennyson, on the other hand, is nostàlgic 
in the romàntic sense when he leaves home “ to sail 
beyond the sunset.” Ovid, as Goethe points out, is 
highly classical even in his melancholy. The longing 
from which he suffers in his exile is very determinate: 
he longs to get back to Rome, the centre of the world. 
Ovid indeed sums up the classic point of view when
1 See his letter to Wordsworth, 30 January, 1801.
2 Dramatic Art and Literature, ch. i.
he says that one cannot desire the unknown (ignoti 
nulla cupido). 1 The essence of nostalgia is the desire 
for the unknown. “ I was burning with desire,” says 
Rousseau, “ without any definite object.” One is filled 
with a desire to fly one knows not whither, to be off 
on a journey into the blue distance.2 Music is exalted 
by the romanticists above all other arts because it is the 
most nostàlgic, the art that is most suggestive of the 
hopeless gap between the “ ideal” and the “ real.” “ Mu­
sic,” in Emerson’s phrase, “ pours on mortals its beautiful 
disdain.” “ Away! away!” cries Jean Paul to Music. 
“ Thou speakest of things which throughout my endless 
life I  have found not, and shall not find.” In musical and 
other nostalgia, the feelings receive a sort of infinitude 
from the cooperation of the imagination; and this infini­
tude, this quest of something that must ever elude one, 
is at the same time taken to be the measure of one’s 
idealism. The symmetry and form that the classicist 
gains from working within bounds are no doubt excellent, 
but then the willingness to work within bounds betokens 
a lack of aspiration. If the primitivist is ready, as some 
one has complained, to turn his back on the bright forms 
of Olympus and return to the ancient gods of chaos and 
of night, the explanation is to be sought in this idea of the
1 Cf. Voltaire: On ne peut désirer ce qu’on ne connaít pas. (Zdire.)
2 Cf. Sainte-Beuve, Causeries du lundi. xv, 371: “ Le romantique a la 
nostalgie, comme Hamletj il cherche ce qu’il n’a pas, et jusque par déla les 
nuages; il reve, il vit dans les songes. Au dix-neuviéme siecle, il adore le 
moyen age; au dix-huitième, il est dejà révolutionnaire avec Rousseau, 
etc. Cf. alsoT. Gautier as quoted in the Journal des Goncourt, n, 51:
“ Nous ne sommes pas Français, nous autres, nous tenons à d’autres races. 
Nous sommes pleins de nostàlgies. E t puis quand à la nostalgie d’un pays 
se joint la nostalgie d’un temps . . . comme vous par exemple du dix- 
huitième sièele. .  . comme moi de la Venise de Casanova, avec em- 
branchement sur Chypre, oh! alors, c’est complet.”
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infinite. I t  finally becomes a sort of Moloch to which he 
is prepared to sacrifice most of the valúes of civilized life. 
The chief fear of the classicist is to be thought monstrous. 
The primitivist on the contrary is inclined to see a proof 
of superior amplitude of spirit in mere grotesqueness and 
disproportion. The creation of monsters is, as Hugo says, 
a “ satisfaction due to the infinite.” 1
The breaking down by the emotional romanticist of the 
barriers that separate not merely the different literary 
genres but the different arts is only another aspect of his 
readiness to follow the lure of the infinite. The title of 
a recent bit of French decadent verse —  “ Nostalgia s  
Blue Minor” — would already have been perfectly in- 
telligible to a Tieck or a Novalis. The Rousseauist — 
and that from a very early stage in the movement— does 
not hesitate to pursue his ever receding dream across all 
frontiers, not merely those that separate art from art, 
but those that divide flesh from spirit and even good 
from evil,until finally he arrives like Blake at a sort of 
“ Harriage of Heaven and Hell.” When he is not break­
ing down barriers in the ñame of the freedom of the 
imagination he is doing so in the ñame of what he is 
pleased to term love.
“ The ancient art and poetry,” says A. W. Schlegel, “ ngorously 
separate things which are dissimilar; the romàntic dehghts m indissol­
uble mixtures. All contrarieties: nature and art, poetry and prose, 
seriousness and mirth, recollection and anticipation, spirituality and 
sensuality, terrestrial and celestial, life and death, are by it blended 
together in the most intimate combination. As the oldest lawgiveis 
delivered their mandatory instructions and prescriptions m meas- 
ured melodies; as this is fabulously ascribed to Orpheus, the first 
softener of the yet untamed race of mortals; in like manner the who e
¿  See article Goút in Postscriptum de mame.
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of the ancient poetry and art is, as it were a rhythmical nomos (law), 
an harmonious promulgation of the permanently established legisla- 
tion of a world submitted to a beautiful order, and reflecting in itself 
the eternal images of things. Romàntic poetry, on the other hand, is 
the expression of the secret attraction to a chaos which lies concealed 
in the very bosom of the ordered universe, and is perpetually striving 
after new and marvellous births; the life-giving spirit of primal love 
broods here anew on the face of the waters. The former is more 
simple, ciear, and like to nature in the self-existent perfection of her 
separate works; the latter, notwithstanding its fragmentary appear- 
ance, approaches more to the secret of the universe. For Conception 
can only comprise each object separately, but nothing in truth can 
ever exist separately and by itself; Feeling perceives all in all at one 
and the same time.” 1
Note the assumption here that the clear-cut distinctions 
of classicism are merely abstract and intel·lectual, and 
that the only true unity is the unity of feeling.
In passages of this kind A. W. Schlegel is little more 
than the popularizer of the ideas of his brother Friedrich. 
Perhaps no one in the whole romàntic movement showed 
a greater genius for confusión than Friedrich Schlegel; 
no one, in Nietzsche’s phrase, had a more intimate 
knowledge of all the bypaths to chaos. Now it is from 
the Germán group of which Friedrich Schlegel was the 
chief theorist that romanticism as a distinet and separate 
movement takes its rise. We may therefore pause appro- 
priately at this point to consider briefly how the epithet 
romàntic of which I  have already sketched the early 
history carne to be applied to a distinet school. In the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, it will be remem- 
bered, romàntic had become a fairly freqüent word in 
English and also (under English influence) a less fre­
qüent, though not rare word, in French and Germán; it 
was often used favorably in all these countries as applied 
1 Schlegel’s Dramatie Art and Literature, Lecture xxn.
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to nature, and usually indeed in this sense in France and 
Germany; but in England, when applied to human ña- 
ture and as the equivalent of the French romanesque, it 
had ordinarii y an unfavorable conno tation; it signified 
the “ dangerous prevalence of imagination” over “ sober 
probability,” as may be seen in Foster’s essay “ On the 
Epithet Romàntic.” One may best preface a discussion 
of the next step —  the transference of the word to a 
distinet movement — by a quotation from Goethe’s 
Conversations with Eckermann (21 March, 1830):
“ This división of poetry into clàssic and romàntic,” says Goethe, 
“ which is to-day diffused throughout the whole world and has caused 
so much argument and discord, comes originally from Schiller and 
me. It was my principie in poetry always to work objectively. Schiller 
on the contrary wrote nothing that was not subjective; he thought 
his manner good, and to defend it he wrote his article on naüve and 
sentimental poetry.. . .  The Schlegels got hold of this idea, developed 
it and little by little it has spread throughout the whole world. 
Everybody is talking of romanticism and classicism. Fifty years ago 
nobody gave the matter a thought.”
One statement in this passage of Goethe’s is perhaps 
open to question — that concerning the obligation of 
the Schlegels, or rather Friedrich Schlegel, to Schiller’s 
treatise. A comparison of the date of publication of 
the treatise on “ Naüve and Sentimental Poetry” with the 
date of composition of Schlegel’s early writings would 
seem to show that some of Schlegel’s distinctions, though 
closely related to those of Schiller, do not derive from 
them so immediately as Goethe seems to imply.1 Both 
sets of views grow rather inevitably out of a primitivistic 
or Rousseauistic conception of “ nature” that had been
1 For a discussion of this point see I. Rouge: F. Schlegel et la Genése du 
romantisme aüemand, 48 ff.
ROMÀNTIC IMAGINATION 97
epidemic in Germany ever since the Age of Genius. We 
need also to keep in mind certain personal traits of 
Schlegel if we are to understand the development of his 
theories about literature and art. He was romàntic, not 
only by his genius for confusión, but also one should add, 
by his tendeney to oscillate violently between extremes. 
For him as for Rousseau there was “ no intermediary term 
between everything and nothing.” One should note here 
another meaning that certain romanticists give to the 
word “ ideal” —  Hazlitt, for example, when he says that 
the “ ideal is always to be found in extremes.” Every 
imaginable extreme, the extreme of reaction as well as 
the extreme of radicalism, goes with romanticism; every 
genuine mediation between extremes is just as surely 
unromantic. Schlegel then was very idealistic in the sense 
I  ha ve just defined. Having begun as an extreme partisan 
of the Greeks, conceived in Schiller’s fashion as a people 
that was at once harmonious and instinctive, he passes 
over abruptly to the extreme of revolt against every form 
of classicism, and then after having posed in works like 
his “ Lucinde” as a heaven-storming Titan who does not 
shrink at the wildest excess of emotional unrestraint, he 
passes over no less abruptly to Catholicism and its rigid 
outer discipline. This last phase of Schlegel has at least 
this much in common with his phase of revolt, that it 
carried with it a cult of the Middle Ages. The delicate 
point to determine about Friedrich Schlegel and many 
other romanticists is why they finally carne to place their 
land of heart’s desire in the Middle Ages rather than in 
Greece. In treating this question one needs to take at least 
a glance at the modification that Herder (whose influ- 
ence on Germán romanticism is very great) gave to the
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primitivism of Rousseau. Cultívate your genius, Rous­
seau said in substance, your ineffable difference from 
other men, and look back with longing to the ideal mo­
ment of this genius —  the age of childhood, when your 
spontaneous self was not as yet cramped by conventions 
or “ sicklied o’er by the palé cast of thought.” Cultívate 
your national genius, Herder said in substance, and look 
back wistfully at the golden beginnings of your nation- 
ality when it was still naüve and “ natural,” when poetry 
instead of being concocted painfully by individuals was 
still the unconscious emanation of the folk. Herder m- 
deed expands primitivism along these lines into a whole 
philosophy of history. The romàntic notion of the origm 
of the epic springs out of this soil, a notion that is prob- 
ably at least as remote from the facts as the neo-classical 
notion — and that is saying a great deai. Any Germán 
who followed Herder in the extensión that he gave to 
Rousseau’s views about genius and spontaneity could not 
only see the folk soul mirrored at least as naïvely in the 
“ Nibelungenlied” as in the “ Iliad,” but by becoming 
a medieval enthusiast he could have the superadded 
pleasure of indulging not merely personal but racial 
and national idiosyncrasy. Primitivistic medisevalism is 
therefore an important ingredient, especially in the case 
of Germany, in romàntic nationalism — the type that 
has flourished beyond all measure during the past cen- 
tury. Again, though one might, like Holderlin, cherish an 
infinite longing for the Greeks, the Greeks themselves, 
at least the Greeks of Schiller, did not experience longing; 
but this fact carne to be felt more and more by F. 
Schlegel and other romanticists as an inferiority, showing 
as it did that they were content with the finite. As for
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the neo-classicists who were supposed to be the followers 
of the Greeks, their case was even worse; they not only 
lacked aspiration and infinitude, but were sunk in arti- 
ficiality, and had moreover become so analytical that they 
must perforce see things in “ disconnection dead and 
spiritless.” The men of the Middle Ages, on the other 
hand, as F. Schlegel saw them, were superior to the neo- 
classicists in being naüve; their spontaneity and unity of 
feeling had not yet suffered from artificiality, or been 
disintegrated by analysis.1 At the same time they were 
superior to the Greeks in having aspiration and the 
sense of the infinite. The very irregularity of their art 
testified to this infinitude. I t  is not uncommon in the 
romàntic movement thus to assume that because one has 
very little form one must therefore have a great deal 
of “ soul.” F. Schlegel so extended his definition of the 
mediseval spirit as to make it inelude writers like Shake­
speare and Cervantes, who seemed to him to be vital and 
free from formalism. The new nationalism was also made 
to turn to the profit of the Middle Ages. Each nation in 
shaking off the yoke of classical imitation and getting 
back to its medieval past, was recovering what was 
primitive in its own genius, was substituting what was 
indigenous for what was alien to it.
The person who did more than any one else to give 
international currency to the views of the Schlegels about 
clàssic and romàntic and to their primitivistic mediseval­
ism was Madame de Staél in her book on Germany. It  
was with special reference to Madame de Staél and her 
influence that Daunou wrote the following passage in his
1 For a development of this point of view see the essay of Novalis:
Christianity or Europe.
introduction to La Harpe, a passage that gives curious 
evidence of the early attitude of French literary conserv­
ati ves towards the new school:
“ One of the Services that he [La Harpe] should render nowadays 
is to fortify young people against vain and gothic doctrines which 
would reduce the fine arts to childhood if they could ever gain credit 
in the land of Racine and Voltaire. La Harpe uttered a warning against 
these doctrines when he discovered the first germs of them in the 
books of Diderot, Mercier and some other innovators. Yet these 
writers were far from having professed fully the barbarie or childish 
system which has been taught and developed among us for a few 
years past; it is of foreign origin; it had no ñame in our language and 
the ñame that has been given to it is susceptible in fact of no precise 
meaning. Romanticism, for thus it is ealled, was imported into our 
midst along with Kantism, with mysticism and other doctrines of the 
same stamp which collectively might be named obscurantism. These 
are words which La Harpe was happy enough not to hear. He was 
accustomed to too much clearness in his ideas and expression to use 
such words or even to understand them. He did not distinguish two 
literatures. The literature that nature and society have created for us 
and which for three thousand years past has been established and 
preserved and reproduced by masterpiecés appeared to him alone 
worthy of a Frenchman of the eighteenth century. He did not foresee 
that it would be reduced some day to being only a particular kind of 
literature, tolerated or reproved under the ñame of classic, and that 
its noblest productions would be put on the same level as the formless 
sketches of uncultivated genius and untried talents. Y et more than 
once decadence has thus been taken for an advanee, and a retrograde 
movement for progress. Art is so difficult. I t  is quicker to abandon it 
and to owe everything to your genius.. . . Because perfection calis for 
austere toil you maintain that it is contrary to nature. This is a Sys­
tem that suits at once indolence and vanity. Is anything more needed 
to make it popular, especially when it has as auxiliary an obscure 
philosophy which is termed transcendent or transcendental? That 
is just the way sound literature fell into decline beginning with the 
end of the first century of the Christian era. It became extinct only 
to revive after a long period of darkness and barbarism; and that is 
how it will fall into decline again if great examples and sage lessons 
should ever lose their authority.”
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The general public in England became at least vaguely 
aware of the new movement with the translation of 
Madame de Staél’s “ Germany” (1813) and A. W. 
Schlegel’s “ Dramatic Art and Literature” (1815). 
Byron wrote in his reply to Bowles (1821): “ Schlegel 
and Madame de Staél have endeavored to reduce poetry 
to two systems, classical and romàntic. The effect is only 
beginning.”
The distinction between classic and romàntic worked 
out by the Schlegels and spread abroad by Madame de 
Staél was, then, largely associated with a certain type 
of medisevalism. Nevertheless one cannot insist too 
strongly that the new school deserved to be ealled román- 
tic, not because it was mediaeval, but because it dis- 
played a certain quality of imagination in its mediseval- 
ism. The longing for the Middle Ages is merely a very 
freqüent form of nostalgia, and nostalgia I  have defined as 
the pursuit of puré illusion. No doubt a man may be 
mediseval in his leanings and yet very free from nostalgia. 
He may, for example, prefer St. Thomas Aquinas to any 
modern philosopher on grounds that are the very re­
verse of romàntic; and in the attitude of any particular 
person towards the Middle Ages, romàntic and unroman- 
tic elements may be mingled in almost any conceivable 
proportion; and the same may be said of any past epoch 
that one prefers to the present. Goethe, for instance, as 
has been remarked, took flight from his own reality, 
but he did not, like the romanticists, take flight from all 
reality. The classical world in which Goethe dwelt in 
imagination during his latter years, in the midst of a 
very unclassical environment, was to some extent at least 
real, though one can discern even in the case of Goethe
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the danger of a classicism that is too aloof from the here 
and now. But the medisevalist, in so far as he is romàntic, 
does not turn to a mediseval reality from a real but dis- 
tasteful present. Here as elsewhere his first requirement 
is not that his “ visión” should be trae, but that it should 
be rich and radiant; and the more “ ideal” the visión be- 
comes in this sense, the wider the gap that opens between 
poetry and üfe.
We are thus brought back to the problem of the román- 
tic imagination or, one may term it, the eccentric imagi- 
nation. The classical imagination, I  have said, is not free 
thus to fly off at a tangent, to wander wild in some empire 
of chimeras. I t  has a centre, it is at work in the Service of 
reality. With reference to this real centre, it is seeking to 
disengage what is normal and representative from the 
welter of the actual. I t  does not evade the actual, but 
does select from it and seek to impose upon it something 
of the proportion and symmetry of the model to which 
it is looking up and which it is imitating. To say that the 
classicist (and I  am speaking of the classicist at his best) 
gets at his reality with the aid of the imagination is but 
another way of saying that he perceives his reality only 
through a veil of illusion. The creator of this type 
achieves work in which illusion and reality are insepa- 
rably blended, work which gives the “ illusion of a higher 
reality.”
Proportionate and decorous in this sense sesthetic 
romanticism can in no wise be, but it does not follow that 
the only art of which the Rousseauist is capable is an 
art of idyllic dreaming. Schiller makes a remark about 
Rousseau that goes very nearly to the heart of the matter: 
he is either, says Schiller, dwelling on the delights of
nature or else avenging her. He is either, that is, idyllic 
or satirical. Now Rousseau himself says that he was not 
inclined to satire and in a sense this is trae. He would 
have been incapable of lampooning Voltaire in the same 
way that Voltaire lampooned him, though one might 
indeed wish to be lampooned by Voltaire rather than to 
be presented as Rousseau has presented certain persons 
in his “ Confessions.” In all that large portion of Rous- 
seau’s writing, however, in which he portrays the polite 
society of his time and shows how colorless and corrupt 
it is compared with his pastoral dream (for his “ nature,” 
as I  have said, is only a pastoral dream) he is highly 
satirical. In general, he is not restrained, at least in the 
“ Confessions,” from the trivial and even the ignoble 
detail by any weak regard for decorum. At best deco­
rum seems to him a hollow convention, at worst the 
“ varnish of vice” and the “ mask of hypocrisy.” Every 
reader of the “ Confessions” must be struck by the 
presence, occasionally on the same page, of passages 
that look forward to Lamartine, and of other passages 
that seem an anticipation rather of Zola. The passage 
in which Rousseau relates how he was abruptly brought 
to earth from his “angelic loves” 1 is typical. In short 
Rousseau oscillates between an Arcadian visión that is 
radiant but unreal, and a photographic and literal and 
often sordid reality. He does not so use his imagination 
as to disengage the real from the welter of the actual 
and so achieve something that strikes one stili as nature 
but a selected and ennobled nature.2 “ It  is a very odd 
circumstance,” says Rousseau, “ that my imagination is
1 Confessions, Livre ix (1756).
2 This is Goethe’s very classical definition of genius: Du nur, Genius, 
mehrst in der Natur die Natur.
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never more agreeably active than when my outer condi- 
tions are the least agreeable, and that, on the contrary, 
it is less cheerful when everything is cheerful about me. 
My poor head cannot subordínate itself to things. I t  
cannot embellish, it wishes to create. Real objects are 
reflected in it at best such as they are; it can adorn only 
imaginary objects. If I  wish to paint the springtime I  
must be in winter,” etc.
This passage may be said to foreshadow the two types 
of art and literature that have been prevalent since 
Rousseau —  romàntic art and the so-called realistic 
art that tended to supplant it towards the middle of 
the nineteenth century.1 This so-called realism does not 
represent any fundamental change of direction as com­
pared with the earlier romanticism; it is simply, as some 
one has put it, romanticism going on all fours. The 
extreme of romàntic unreality has always tended to pro­
duce a sharp recoil. As the result of the wandering of 
the imagination in its own realm of chimeras, one finally 
comes to feel the need of refreshing one’s sense of fact; 
and the more trivial the fact, the more certain one is that 
one’s feet are once more planted on térra firma. Don 
Quixote is working for the triumph of Sancho Panza. 
Besides this tendency of one extreme to produce the 
other, there are speciál reasons that I  shall point out more 
fully later for the cióse relationship of the romanticism 
and the so-called realism of the nineteenth century. 
They are both merely different aspects of naturalism.
1 Greek literature, after it liad lost the secret of selection and the 
grand manner, as was the case during the Alexandrian period, also 
tended to oscillate from the pole of romance to the pole of so-called 
realism — from the Argonautica of Apollonius of Rhodes, let us say, to 
the Mimes of Herondas.
What binds together realism and romanticism is their 
common repudiation of decorum as something external 
and artificial. Once get rid of decorum, or what amounts 
to the same thing, the whole body of “artificial” con- 
ventions, and what will result is, according to the roman- 
ticist, Arcadia. But what actually emerges with the pro­
gressive weakening of the principie of restraint is la hete 
humaine. The Rousseauist begins by walking through the 
world as though it were an enchanted garden, and then 
with the inevitable clash between his ideal and the real 
he becomes morose and embittered. Since men have 
turned out not to be indiscriminately good he inclines 
to look upon them as indiscriminately bad and to portray 
them as such. At the bottom of much so-called realism 
therefore is a special type of satire, a satire that is the 
product of violent emotional disillusion. The collapse of 
the Revolution of 1848 produced a plentiful crop of dis­
illusion of this kind. No men had ever been more con- 
vinced of the loftiness of their idealism than the Utopists 
of this period, or failed more ignominiously when put to 
the test. All that remained, many argued, was to tum 
from an ideal that had proved so disappointing to the 
real, and instead of dreaming about human nature to 
observe men as coolly, in Flaubert’s phrase, as though 
they were mastodons or crocodiles. But what lurks most 
often behind this pretence to a coid scientific impassive- 
ness in observing human nature is a soured and cynical 
emotionalism and a distinctly romàntic type of imagi­
nation. The imagination is still idealistic, still straining, 
that is, away from the real, only its idealism has under- 
gone a strange inversión;instead of exaggerating the love- 
liness it exaggera tes the ugliness of human nature; it finds
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a sort of morose satisfaction in building for itself not 
castles but dungeons in Spain. What I  am saying applies 
especially to the French realists who are more logical 
in their disillusion than the men of other nations. They 
often establish the material environment of their heroes 
with photographic literalness, but in their dealings with 
what should be the specifically human side of these 
characters they often resemble Rousseau at his worst: 
they put puré logic into the service of puré emotion, and 
this is a way of achieving, not the real, but a maximum 
of unreality. The so-called realistic writers abound in 
extreme examples of the romàntic imagination. The 
peasants of Zola are not real, they are an hallucination. 
If a man is thus to let his imagination run riot, he might, 
as Lemaítre complains, have imagined something more 
agreeable.
The same kinship between realism and romanticism 
might be brought out in a writer whom Zola claimed as 
his master — Balzac. I  do not refer to the side of Balzac 
that is related to what the French cali le bas romantisme 
—  his lapses into the weird and the melodramàtic, his 
occasional suggestions of the claptrap of Anne Radcliffe 
and the Gothic romance —  but to his general thesis and 
his handling of it. Balzac’s attitude towards the society of 
his time is, like the attitude of Rousseau towards the 
society of his time, satirical, but on entirely different 
grounds: he would show the havoc wrought in this society 
by its revolutionary emancipation from central control 
of the kind that had been provided traditionally by the 
monarchy and the Catholic Church, and the conseqüent 
disruption of the family by the violent and egoistic 
expansión of the individual along the lines of his ruüng
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passion. But Balzac’s imagination is not on the side of 
his thesis; not, that is, on the side of the principie of 
control; on the contrary, it reveis in its visión of a world 
in which men are overstepping all ethical bounds in their 
quest of power and pleasure, of a purely naturalistic 
world that is governed solely by the law of cunning and 
the law of forcé. His imagination is so fascinated by this 
visión that, like the imagination of Rousseau, though in 
an entirely different way, he simply parts company with 
reality. Judged by the ultímate quaüty of his imagina­
tion, and this, let me repeat, is always the chief thing to 
consider in a Creative artist, Balzac is a sort of inverted 
ideaüst. Compared with the black fictions he conjures 
up in his painting of Paris, the actual París seems palé 
and insipid. His Paris is not real inshort, but an hallucina­
tion — a lurid land of heart’s desire. As Leslie Stephen 
puts it, for Balzac Paris is hell, but then hell is the 
only place worth living in. The empire of chimeras over 
which he holds sway is about as far on one side of reality 
as George Sand’s kingdom of dreams is on the other. 
George Sand, more perhaps than any other writer of her 
time, continúes Rousseau in his purely idyllic manner. 
Her idealized peasants are not any further from the truth 
and are certainly more agreeable than the peasants of 
Balzac, who foreshadow the peasants of Zola.
The writer, however, who shows the conflict between 
the romàntic imagination and the real better than either 
Balzac or Zola, better than any other writer perhaps of 
the modern French movement, is Flaubert. The fondness 
of this founder of realism for reality may be inferred 
from a passage in one of his letters to George Sand: “ I  
had in my very youth a complete presentiment of life.
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It  was like a sickly kitchen smell escaping from a base- 
ment window.” In his attitude towards the society of his 
time, he is, in the same sense, but in a far greater degree 
than Rousseau, satirical. The stupidity and mediocrity 
of the bourgeois are his target, just as Rousseau’s target 
is the artificiahty of the drawing-room. At the same time 
that he shrinks back with nausea from this reality, Flau- 
bert is like Gautier “ full of nostalgias,” even the nostalgia 
of the Middle Ages. " I  am a Catholic,” he exclaims, 
“ I  have in my heart something of the green ooze of the 
Norman Cathedrals.” Yet he cannot acquiesce in a medi­
eval or any other dream. Even Rousseau says that he 
was “ tormented at times by the nothingness of his chi- 
meras.” Flaubert was tormented far more by the nothing­
ness of his. Perhaps indeed the predominant flavor in 
Flaubert’s writing as a whole is that of an acrid disillu- 
sion. He portrays satirically the real and at the same time 
mocks at the ideal that he craves emotionally and imagi- 
natively (this is only one of the innumerable forms as- 
sumed by the Rousseauistic warfare between the head 
and the heart). He oscillates rapidly between the pole 
of realism as he conceives it, and the pole of romance, 
and so far as any serious philosophy is concerned, is 
left suspended in the void. Madame Bovary is the very 
type of the Rousseauistic idealist, misunderstood in 
virtue of her exquisite faculty of feeling. She aspires to 
a “ love beyond all loves,” an infinite satisfaction that 
her commonplace husband and environment quite deny 
her. At bottom Flaubert’s heart is with Madame Bo­
vary. “ I  am Madame Bovary,” he exclaims.^ Yet he 
exposes pitilessly the “ nothingness of her chimeras, 
and pursues her to the very dregs of her disillusion.
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I  have already mentioned Flaubert’s cult for “ Don 
Quixote.” His intellectual origins were all there, he 
says; he had known it by heart even when a boy. I t  
has been said that “ Madame Bovary” bears the same 
relationship to sesthetic romanticism that “ Don Quix­
ote” does to the romanticism of actual adventure of 
the Middle Ages. Yet “ Don Quixote” is the most 
genial, “ Madame Bovary” the least genial of master- 
pieces. This difference comes out no less clearly in a 
comparison of M. Homais with Sancho Panza than in 
a comparison of Madame Bovary with the Knight, and 
is so fundamental as to throw doubt on the soundness of 
the whole analogy.
In M. Homais and like figures Flaubert simply means 
to symbolize contemporary life and the immeasurable 
abyss of platitude in which it is losing itself through its 
lack of imagination and ideal. Yet this same platitude 
exercises on him a horrid fascination. For his execration 
of the philistine is the nearest approach in his idealism 
to a positive content, to an escape from sheer emptiness 
and unreality. This execration must therefore be cher- 
ished if he is to remain convinced of his own superiority. 
“ If it were not for my indignation,” he confesses in one 
place, “ I  should fall flat.” Unfortunately we come to 
resemble what we habitually contemplate. “ By dint of 
railing at idiots,” says Flaubert, “ one runs the risk of 
becoming idiotic one’s self.”
In his discourse on the “ Immortality of the Soul” 
(1659) Henry More speaks of “ that imagination which 
is most free, such as we use in romàntic inventions.” 
The price that the romàntic imagination pays for its 
freedom should by this time be obvious: the freer it be-
comes the farther it gets away from reality. We have 
seen that the special form of unreality encouraged by 
the sesthetic romanticism of Rousseau is the dream of the 
simple life, the return to a nature that never existed, and 
that this dream made its special appeal to an age that 
was suffering from an excess of artificiality and conven- 
tionahsm. Before entering upon the next stage of our 
subject it might be well to consider for a moment wherein 
the facts of primitive life, so far as we can ascertain 
them, differ from Rousseau’s dream of primitive life; 
why we are justified in assuming that the noble savage 
of Rousseau, or the Greek of Schiller, or Holderlin, or the 
man of the Middle Ages of Novalis never had any equiva­
lent in reality. More or less primitive men have existed 
and still exist and have been carefully studied. Some of 
them actually recall by various traits, their gentleness, 
for example, Rousseau’s aboriginal man, and the natural 
pity that is supposed to guide him. Why then will any 
one familiar with the facts of aboriginal life smile when 
Rousseau speaks of the savage “ attached to no place, 
having no prescribed task, obeying no one, having no 
other law than his own will,” 1 and therefore displaying 
independence and initiative? The answer is of course that 
genuine savages are, with the possible exception of chil- 
dren, the most conventional and imitative of beings. 
What one takes to be natural in them is often the re­
suit of a long and, in the Rousseauistic sense, artificial 
discipline. The tendency to take for puré and unspoiled 
nature what is in fact a highly modified nature is one that 
assumes many forms. “ When you see,” says Rousseau, 
“ in the happiest people in the world bands of peasants
1 Emile, Livre n.
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regulate the affairs of state under an oak-tree and always 
behave sensibly, can you keep from despising the refine- 
ments of other nations which make themselves illustrious 
and miserable with so much árt and mystery?” Rousseau 
is viewing these peasants through the Arcadian glamour. 
In much the same way Emerson saw a proof of the con- 
sonance of democracy with human nature in the working 
of the New England town-meeting. But both Rousseau’s 
Swiss and Emerson’s New Englanders had been moulded 
by generations of austere religious discipline and so throw 
little light on the relation of democracy to human nature 
in itself.
A somewhat similar illusion is that of the man who 
journeys into a far country and enjoys in the highest 
degree the sense of romàntic strangeness. He has escaped 
from the convention of his own society and is inclined 
to look on the men and women he meets in the foreign 
land as Arcadian apparitions. But these men and women 
have not escaped from their convention. On the con- 
trary, what most delights him in them (for example, 
what most delighted Lafcadio Hearn in the Japanese) 
may be the result of an extraordinarily minute and 
tyrannical discipline imposed in the ñame of the general 
sense upon the impulses of the individual.
The relation of convention to primitive life is so well 
understood nowadays that the Rousseauist has reversed 
his argument. Since primitive folk (let us say the Bush- 
men of Australia) are more conventional than the Pa- 
risian and Londoner we may infer that at some time in 
the future when the ideal is at last achieved upon earth, 
conventions will have disappeared entirely. But this is 
simply to transfer the Golden Age from the past to the
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future, and also to miss the real problem: for there is a 
real problem — perhaps indeed the gravest of all problems 
— involved in the relation of the individual to conven- 
tion. If we are to grasp the nature of this problem we 
should perceive first of all that the significant contrast 
is not that between conditions more or less primitive 
and civilization, but that between a civilization that 
does not question its conventions and a civilization that 
has on the contrary grown self-conscious and critical. 
Thus the Homerie Greeks, set up by Schiller as exem­
plars of the simple life, were plainly subject to the con­
ventions of an advanced civilization. The Periclean Greeks 
were also highly civilized, but unlike the Homerie 
Greeks, were becoming self-conscious and critical. In the 
same way the European thirteenth century, in some 
respeets the most civilized that the world has seen, was 
governed by a great convention that imposed very strict 
limits upon the liberty of the individual. The critical 
spirit was already awake and tugging at the leashes of 
the outer authority that confined it, but it did not actu- 
ally break them. Dante and St. Thomas Aquinas did not, 
for example, inquire into the basis of the mediseval con­
vention in the same way that Socrates and the sophists 
inquired into the traditional opinions of Greece. But in 
the eighteenth century, especially in France, and from 
that time down to the present day, the revolt against con­
vention has assumed proportions quite comparable to 
anythíng that took place in ancient Greece. Perhaps no 
other age has witnessed so many individuals who were, 
like Berlioz, eager to make all traditional barriers crack 
in the interest of their “ genius” and its full expression. 
The state of nature in the ñame of which Rousseau him-
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self assailed convention, though in itself only a chimera, 
a mere Arcadian projection upon the void, did indeed 
tend in a rationalistic pseudo-classic age, to new forms 
of imaginative activity. In the form that concerns us 
especially the imagination is free to give its magic and 
glamour and infinitude to the emancipated emotions. 
This type of romanticism did not result in any recovery 
of the supposed primitive virtues, but it did bring about 
a revaluation of the received notions of morality that 
can scarcely be studied too carefully.
CHAPTER IV
ROMÀNTIC MORALITY: THE IDEAL
T he period that began in the late eighteenth century and 
in the midst of which we are stili living has witnessed an 
almost unparalleled triumph, as I  have just said, of the 
sense of the individual (sens propre) over the general 
sense of mankind (sens commuri). Even the collectivistic 
schemes that have been opposed to individualism during 
this period are themselves, judged by traditional stand- 
ards, violently individualistic. Now the word individual- 
ism needs as much as any other general term to be 
treated Socratically: we need in the interests of our 
present subject to discriminate between different va- 
rieties of individualism. Perhaps as good a working 
classification as any is to distinguish three main varieties: 
a man may wish to act, or think, or feel, differently 
from other men, and those who are individualistic in 
any one of these three main ways may have very little 
in common with one another. To illustrate concretely, 
Milton’s plea in his “ Areopagitica” for freedom of con- 
science makes above all for individualism of action. (La  
fo i  qui n’agit pas est-ce u n efo i sincere ?) Pierre Bayle, on 
the other hand, pleads in his Dictionary and elsewhere 
for tolerance, not so much because he wishes to act or 
feel in his own way as because he wishes to think his own 
thoughts. Rousseau is no less obviously ready to subor­
dínate boththought and action to sensibility. Hismessage 
is summed up once for all in the exclamation of Faust,
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“ Feeling is all.” He urges war on the general sense only 
because of the restrictions it imposes on the free expan­
sión of his emotions and theenhancing of these emotions
by his imagination. . . . .
Now the warfare that Rousseau and the mdmdualists 
of feeling have waged on the general sense has meant in 
practice a warfare on two great traditions, the classical 
and the Christian. I  have already pointed out that these 
two traditions, though both holding the idea of imitation, 
were not entirely in accord with one another, that the 
imitation of Horaee differs widely from the imitation of 
Christ. Yet their diverging from one another is as nothing 
compared with their divergence from the individualism of 
the primitivist. For the man who imitates Christ m any 
traditional sense this world is not an Arcadian dream but 
a place of trial and probation. “ Take up your cross and 
follow me.” The following of this great exemplar required 
that the instinctive self, which Rousseau would indulge, 
should be either sternly rebuked or else mortified utterly. 
So far from Nature and God being one, the natural man 
is so corrupt, according to the more austere Christian, 
that the gap between him and the divine can be traversed 
only by a miracle of grace. He should therefore live m 
fear and trembling as befits a being upon whom rests the 
weight of the divine displeasure. “ It  is an humble thing 
to be a man.” Humility indeed is, in the phrase of Jeremy 
Taylor, the special ornament and jewel of the Christian 
religión, and one is tempted to add, of all religión m so 
far as it is genuine. Genuine religión must always have in 
some form the sense of a deep inner cleft between man’s 
ordinary self and the divine. But some Christians were 
more inclined from the start, as we can see in the extreme
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forms of the doctrine of grace, to push their humility to 
an utter despair of human nature. The historical expla- 
nation of this despair is obvious: it is a sharp rebound 
from the pagan riot; an excessive immersion in this 
world led to an excess of otherworldliness. At the same 
time the conviction as to man’s helplessness was instilled 
into those, who, like St. Augustine, had witnessed in 
some of its phases the slow disintegration of the Roman 
Empire. Human nature had gone bankrupt; and for 
centuries it needed to be administered, if I may continue 
the metaphor, in receivership. The doctrine of grace was 
admirably adapted to this end.
The pagan riot from which the church reacted so 
sharply, was not, however, the whole of the ancient 
civilization. I have already said that there was at the 
heart of this civilization at its best a great idea — the 
idea of proportionateness. The ancients were in short 
not merely naturalistic but humanistic, and the idea of 
proportion is just as fundamental in humanism as is 
humility in religión. Christianity, one scarcely need add, 
incorporated within itself, however disdainfully, many 
humanistic elements from Greek and Roman culture. 
Yet it is none the less true that in his horror at the pagan 
worldliness the Christian tended to fly into the opposite 
extreme of unworldliness, and in this clash between 
naturalism and supernaturalism the purely human 
virtues of mediation were thrust more or less into the 
background. Yet by its very defect on the humanistic 
side the doctrine of grace was perhaps all the better 
fitted for the administration of human nature in receiver­
ship. For thus to malte man entirely distrustful of himself 
and entirely dependent on God, meant in practice to
make him entirely dependent on the Church. Man be- 
came ignorant and fanatical in the early Christian cen­
turies, but he also became humble, and in the situation 
then existing that was after all the main thing. The 
Church as receiver for human nature was thus enabled 
to rescüe civilization from the wreck of pagan antiquity 
and the welter of the barbarían invasions. But by the 
very fact that the bases of life in this world gradually 
grew more secure man became less otherworldly. He 
gradually recovered some degree of confidence in himself. 
He gave increasing attention to that side of himself that 
the ascetic Christian had repressed. The achievements 
of the thirteenth century which mark perhaps the cul- 
mination of Christian civilization were very splendid 
not only from a religious but also from a humanistic 
point of view. But although the critical spirit was al­
ready beginning to awake, it did not at that time, as I 
have already said, actually break away from the tutelage 
of the Church.
This emancipation of human nature from theological 
restraint took place in far greater measure at the Renais- 
sance. Human nature showed itself tired of being treated 
as a bankrupt, of being governed from without and from 
above. I t aspired to become autonomous. There was in 
so far a strong trend in many quarters towards individual- 
ism. This rupture with external authority meant very 
diverse things in practice. For some who, in Lionardo’s 
phrase, had caught a glimpse of the antique symmetry 
it meant a revival of genuine humanism; for others it 
meant rather a revival of the pagan and naturalistic side 
of antiquity. Thus Rabelais, in his extreme opposition 
to the monkish ideal, already proclaims, like Rousseau,
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the intrinsic excellencs of man, while Calvin and others 
attempted to revive the primitive austerity of Christian- 
ity that had been corrupted by the formalism of Rome. 
In short, naturalistic, humanistic, and religious elements 
are mingled in almost every conceivable proportion in 
the vast and complex movement known as the Renais- 
sance; all these elements indeed are often mingled in the 
same individual. The later Renaissance finally arrived 
at what one is tempted to cali the Jesuitical compro- 
mise. There was a general revamping of dogma and 
outer authority, helped forward by a society that had 
taken alarm at the excesses of the emancipated individ­
ual. If the individual consented to surrender his moral 
autonomy, the Church for its part consented to make 
religión comparatively easy and pleasant for him, to 
adapt it by casuistry and other devices to a human ña- 
ture that was determined once for all to take a less severe 
and ascetic view of life. One might thus live inwardly to 
a great extent on the naturalistic level while outwardly 
going through the motions of a profound piety. There is 
an unmistakable analogy between the hollowness of a re­
ligión of this type and the hollowness that one feels in 
so much neo-classical decorum. There is also a formalis- 
tic taint in the educational system worked out by the 
Jesuits — a system in all respects so ingenious and in 
some respects so admirable. The Greek and especially 
the Latín clàssics are taught in such a way as to become 
literary playthings rather than the basis of a philosophy 
of life; a humanism is thus encouraged that is extemal 
and rhetorical rather than vital, and this humanism is 
combined with a religión that tends to stress submission 
to outer authority at the expense of inwardness and in-
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dividuality. The reproach has been brought against this 
system that it is equally unfitted to form a pagan hero 
or a Christian saint. The reply to it was Rousseau’s edu­
cational naturalism —  his exaltation of the spontaneity 
and genius of the child.
Voltaire says that every Protestant is a Pope when he 
has his Bible in his hand. But in practice Protestantism 
has been very far from encouraging so complete a sub- 
ordination of the general sense to the sense of the indi­
vidual. In the period that elapsed between the first 
forward push of individualism in the Renaissance and 
the second forward push in the eighteenth century, each 
important Protestant group worked out its creed or 
convention and knew how to make it very uncomfortable 
for any one of its members who rebelled against its 
authority. Protestant education was also, like that of the 
Jesuits, an attempt to harmonize Christian and class- 
ical elements.
I  ha ve already spoken elsewhere of what was menacing 
all these attempts, Protestant as well as Catholic, to re­
vive the principie of authority, to put the general sense 
once more on a traditional and dogmàtic basis and im­
pose it on the sense of the individual. The spirit of free 
scientific enquiry in the Renaissance had inspired great 
naturalists like Kepler and Galileo, and had had its 
prophet in Bacon. So far from suffering any setback in 
the seventeenth century, Science had been adding con- 
quest to conquest. The inordinate self-conñdence of the 
modern man would seem to be in large measure an out- 
come of this steady advance of scientific discovery, just 
as surely as the opposite, the extreme humility that 
appears in the doctrine of grace, reflects the despair of
those who had witnessed the disintegration of the Roman 
Empire. The word humility, if used at all nowadays, 
means that one has a mean opinión of one’s self in com- 
parison with other men, and not that one perceives the 
weakness and nothingness of human nature in itself in 
comparison with what is above it. But it is not merely 
the self-confidence inspired by Science that has under- 
mined the traditional disciplines, humanistic and reli- 
gious, and the attempts to mediate between them on a 
traditional basis; it is not merely that Science has fasci- 
nated man’s imagination, stimulated his wonder and curi- 
osity beyond all bounds and drawn him away from the 
study of his own nature and its special problems to the 
study of the physical realm. What has been even more 
decisive in the overthrow of the traditional disciplines 
is that Science has won its triumphs not by accepting 
dogma and tradition but by repudiating them, by deal- 
ing with the natural law, not on a traditional but on a 
positive and critical basis. The next step that might 
logically have been taken, one might suppose, would have 
been to put the human law likewise on a positive and 
critical basis. On the contrary the very notion that man 
is subject to two laws has been obscured. The truths of 
humanism and religión, being very much bound up with 
certain traditional forms, have been rejected along with 
these forms as obsolescent prejudice, and the attempt 
has been made to treat man as entirely the creature of 
the natural law. This means in practice that instead of 
dying to his ordinary self, as the austere Christian de- 
mands, or instead of imposing a law of decorum upon 
his ordinary self, as the humanist demands, man has 
only to develop his ordinary self freely.
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At the beginning, then, of the slow process that I  have 
been tracing down in briefest outline from mediseval 
Christianity, we find a puré supernaturalism; at the end, 
a puré naturalism. If we are to understand the relationship 
of this naturalism to the rise of a romàntic morality, we 
need to go back, as we have done in our study of original 
genius, to the England of the early eighteenth century. 
Perhaps the most important intermediary stage in the 
passage from a puré supernaturalism to a puré naturalism 
is the great deistic movement which flourished especially 
in the England of this period. Deism indeed is no new 
thing. Deistic elements may be found even in the philos- 
ophy of the Middle Ages. But for practical purposes one 
does not need in one’s study of deism to go behind Eng- 
lish thinkers like Shaftesbury and his follower Hutche- 
son. Shaftesbury is a singularly significant figure. He is 
not only the authentic precursor of innumerable natural- 
istic moralists in England, France, and Germany, but 
one may also trace in his writings the connection be­
tween modern naturalistic morality and ancient natural- 
istic morality in its two main forms —  Stoic and Epicu­
ream The strict Christian supernaturalist had maintained 
that the divine can be known to man only by the outer 
miracle of revelation, supplemented by the inner miracle 
of grace. The deist maintains, on the contrary, that God 
reveáis himself also through outer nature which he has 
fitted exquisitely to the needs of man, and that inwardly 
man may be guided aright by his unaided thoughts 
and feelings (according to the predominance of thought 
or feeling the deist is rationalistic or sentimental). Man, 
in short, is naturally good and nature herself is beneficent 
and beautiful. The deist finally pushes this harmony in
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God and man and nature so far that the three are prac- 
rically merged. At a still more advanced stage God dis- 
appears, leaving only nature and man as a modification 
of nature, and the deist gives way to the pantheist who 
may also be either rationalistic or emotional. The pan­
theist differs above all from the deist in that he would 
dethrone man from his privileged place in creation, which 
means in practice that he denies final causes. He no 
longer believes, for example, like that sentimental deist 
and disciple of Rousseau, Bernardin de St. Pierre, that 
Providence has arranged everything in nature with an 
immediate eye to man’s welfare; that the markings on 
the melón, for instance, “ seem to show that it is destined 
for the family table.” 1
Rousseau himself, though eschewing this crude appeal 
to final causes, scarcely got in theory at least beyond 
the stage of emotional deism. The process I  have been 
describing is illustrated better in some aspects by 
Diderot who began as a translator of Shaftesbury and 
who later got so far beyond mere deism that he antici- 
pates the main ideas of the modern evolutionist and 
determinist. Diderot is at once an avowed disciple of 
Bacon, a scientific utilitarian in short, and also a believer 
in the emancipation of the emotions. Rousseau’s attack on 
Science is profoundly significant for other reasons, but 
it is unfortunate in that it obscures the connection that 
is so visible in Diderot between the two sides of the natu- 
ralistic movement. If men had not been so heartened 
by scientific progress they would have been less ready, wo 
may be sure, to listen to Rousseau when he affirmed that 
they were naturally good. There was another reason why
1 Etudes de la nalure.
men were eager to be told that they were naturally good 
and that they could therefore trust the spontaneous 
overflow of their emotions. This reason is to be sought in 
the inevitable recoil from the opposite doctrine of total 
depravity and the mortal constraint that it had put on 
the instincts of the natural man. I  have said that many 
churchmen, notably the Jesuits, sought to dissimulate 
the full austerity of Christian doctrine and thus retain 
their authority over a world that was moving away from 
austerity and so threatening to escape them. But other 
Catholics, notably the Jansenists, as well as Protestants 
like the Calvinists, were for insisting to the full on man’s 
corruption and for seeking to maintain on this basis 
what one is tempted to cali a theological reign of terror. 
One whole side of Rousseau’s religión can be understood 
only as a protest against the type of Christianity that is 
found in a Pascal or a Jonathan Edwards. The legend 
of the abyss that Pascal saw always yawning at his side 
has at least a symboücal valué. I t  is the wont of man to 
oscillate violently between extremes, and each extreme 
is not only bad in itself but even worse by the opposite 
extreme that it engenders. From a God who is altogether 
fearful, men are ready to flee to a God who is altogether 
loving, or it might be more correct to say altogether 
lovely. “ Listen, my children,” said Mother Angélique 
of Port-Royal to her nuns a few hours before her death, 
“ listen well to what I  say. Most people do not know 
what death is, and never give the matter a thought. But 
my worst forebodings were as nothing compared with the 
terrors now upon me.” In deliberate opposition to such 
expressions of the theological terror, Rousseau imagined 
the elaborate complacency and self-satisfaction of the
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dying Julie, whose end was not only calm but sesthetic 
(le dernier jour de sa vie en fu t aussi le plus charmant).
A sensible member of Edwards’s congregation at 
Northampton might conceivably ha ve voted with the 
majority to dismiss him, not only because he objected to 
this spiritual terrorism in itself, but also because he saw 
the opposite extreme that it would help to precipítate — 
the boundless sycophancy of human nature from which 
we are now suffering.
The effusiveness, then, that began to appear in the 
eighteenth century is one sign of the progress of natural- 
ism, which is itself due to the new confidence inspired in 
man by scientific discovery coupled with a revulsión 
from the austerity of Christian dogma. This new effusive­
ness is also no less palpably a revulsión from the excess 
of artificial decorum and this revulsión was in turn 
greatly promoted by the rapid increase in power and 
influence at this time of the middle class. Reserve is 
traditionally aristocràtic. The plebeian is no less tradi- 
tionally expansive. I t  cannot be said that the decorous 
reserve of the French aristocracy that had been more 
or less imitated by other European aristocràcies was in 
all respects commendable. According to this decorum 
a man should not love his wife, or if he did, should be 
careful not to betray the fact in public. I t  was also good 
“ form” to Uve apart from one’s children and bad form 
to display one’s affection for them. The protest against 
a decorum that repressed even the domèstic emotions 
may perhaps best be followed in the rise of the middle 
class drama. According to striet neo-classic decorum only 
the aristocracy had the right to appear in tragedy, 
whereas the man of the middle class was relegated to
comedy and the man of the people to farce. The inter­
medíate types of play that multiply in the eighteenth 
century (árame bourgeois, comedie larmoyante, etc.) are 
the reply of the plebeian to this classification. He is be- 
ginning to insist that his emotions too shall be taken 
seriously. But at the same time he is, under the influence 
of the new naturalistic philosophy, so bent on affirming 
his own goodness that in getting rid of artificial decorum 
he gets rid of true decorum likewise and so strikes at the 
very root of the drama. For true drama in contradistinc- 
tion to mere melodrama requires in the background a 
scale of ethical valúes, or what amounts to the same 
thing, a sense of what is normal and representative and 
decorous, and the quaüty of the characters is revealed 
by their responsible choices good or bad with reference 
to some ethical scale, choices that the characters reveal 
by their actions and not by any explicit moralizing. But 
in the middle class drama there is little action in this 
sense: no one wills either his goodness or badness, but 
appears more or less as the creature of accident or fate 
(in a very un-Greek sense), or of a defective social order; 
and so instead of true dramatic conflict and proper moti- 
vation one tends to get domèstic tableaux in which the 
characters weep in unisón. For it is understood not only 
that man (especially the bourgeois) is good but that the 
orthodox way for this goodness to manifest itself is 
to overflow through the eyes. Perhaps never before or 
since have tears been shed with such a strange facility. 
At no other time have there been so many persons who, 
with streaming eyes, called upon heaven and earth to 
bear witness to their innate excellence. A man would be 
ashamed, says La Bruyére, speaking from the point of
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view of l’honnéte homme and his decorum, to display his 
emotions at the theatre. By the time of Diderot he would 
have been ashamed not to display them. I t  had become 
almost a requirement of good manners to weep and sob 
in public. At the performance of the “ Pére de Famille” 
in 1769 we are told that every handkerchief was in use. 
The Revolution seems to have raised doubts as to the 
necessary connection between tearfulness and goodness. 
The “ Pére de Famille” was hissed from the stage in 1811. 
Geoffroy commented in his feuilleton: “ We have learned 
by a fatal experience that forty years of declamation 
and fustian about sensibility, humanity and benevolence 
have served only to prepare men’s hearts for the last 
excesses of barbarism.”
The romanticist indulged in the luxury of grief and 
was not incapable of striking an attitude. But as a rule 
he disdained the facile lachrymosity of the man of feeling 
as still too imitati ve and conventional. For his part, he 
has that within which passes show. To estímate a play 
solely by its power to draw tears is, as Coleridge ob­
serves, to measure it by a virtue that it possesses in 
common with the onion; and Chateaubriand makes a 
similar observation. Y et one should not forget that the 
romàntic emotionalist derives directly from the man of 
feeling. One may indeed study the transition from the 
one to the other in Chateaubriand himself. For example, 
in his early work the “ Natchez” he introduces a tribe 
of Sioux Indians who are still govemed by the natural 
pity of Rousseau, as they prove by weeping on the slight- 
est occasion. Lamartine again is cióse to Rousseau when 
he expatiates on the “ genius” that is to be found in a 
tear; and Musset is not far from Diderot when he
ROMÀNTIC MORALITY: THE IDEAL 127
exclaims, “ Long live the melodrama at which Margot 
wept” (Vive le mélodrame oú Margot a pleuré).
Though it is usual to associate this effusiveness with 
Rousseau it should be clear from my brief sketch of the 
rise of the forces that were destined to overthrow the 
two great traditions — the Christian tradition with its 
prime emphasis on humility and the classical with its 
prime emphasis on decorum — that Rousseau had many 
forerunners. I t  would be easy enough, for example, to 
cite from English literature of the early eighteenth- 
century domèstic tableaux 1 that look forward equally to 
the middle class drama and to Rousseau’s picture of the 
virtues of Julie as wife and mother. Yet Rousseau, after 
all, deserves his preeminent position as the arch-senti- 
mentalist by the very audacity of his revolt in the ñame 
of feeling from both humility and decorum. Never be- 
fore and probably never since has a man of such un- 
doubted genius shown himself so lacking in humility and 
decency (to use the old-fashioned synonym for decorum) 
as Rousseau in the “ Confessions.” Rousseau feels himself 
so good that he is ready as he declares to appear before 
the Almighty at the sound of the trump of the last 
judgment, with the book of his “ Confessions” in his 
hand, and there to issue a challenge to the whole human 
race: “ Let a single one assert to Thee if he dare: I  am 
better than that man.” As Horace Walpole complains 
he meditates a gasconade for the end of the world. I t  is 
possible to maintain with M. Lemaítre that Rousseau’s 
character underwent a certain purification as he grew 
older, but never at any time, either at the beginning or 
at the end, is it possible, as M. Lemaítre admits, to detect 
1 See, for example, Tatler, 17 November, 31 December, 1709 (bySteele).
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an atom of humility — an essential lack that had already 
been noted by Burke.
The affront then that Rousseau puts upon humility 
at the very openingof his “ Confessions” has likesomuch 
else in his life and writings a symbolical valué. He also 
declares war in the same passage in the ñame of what he 
conceives to be his true self — that is his emotional self
—  against decorum or decency. I  ha ve already spoken 
of one of the main objections to decorum: it keeps one 
tame and conventional and interferes with the explosión 
of original genius. Another and closely allied grievance 
against decorum is implied in Rousseau’s opening asser- 
tion in the Confessions that his aim is to show a man in 
all the truth of his nature, and human nature can be 
known in its truth only, it should seem, when stripped of 
its last shred of reticence. Rousseau therefore already 
goes on the principie recently proclaimed by the Irish 
Bohemian George Moore, that the only thing a man 
should be ashamed of is of being ashamed. If the first 
objection to decorum — that it represses original genius
—  was urged especially by the romanticists, the second 
objection —  that decorum interferes with truth to 
nature — was -urged especially by the so-called realists 
of the later nineteenth century (and realism of this type 
is, as has been said, only romanticism going on all fours). 
Between the Rousseauistic conception of nature and that 
of the humanist the gap is especially wide. The humanist 
maintains that man attains to the truth of his nature 
only by imposing decorum upon his ordinary self. The 
Rousseauist maintains that man attains to this truth 
only by the free expansión of his ordinary self. The hu­
manist fears to let his ordinary self unfold freely at the
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expense of decorum lest he merit some such comment 
as that made on the “ Confessions” by Madame de Bouf- 
flers who had been infatuated with Rousseau during his 
lifetime: that it was the work not of a man but of an 
unclean animal.1
The passages of the “ Confessions ” that deserve this ver- 
dict do not, it is hardly necessary to add, reflect directly 
Rousseau’s moral ideal. In his dealings with moraüty as 
elsewhere he is, to come back to Schiller’s distinction, 
partly idyllic and partly satirical. He is satirio in his 
attitude towards the existing forms — forms based upon 
the Christian tradition that man is naturally sinful and 
that he needs therefore the discipline of fear and humil­
ity, or else forms based upon the classical tradition that 
man is naturally one-sided and that he needs therefore 
to be disciplined into decorum and proportionateness. 
He is idyllic in the substitutes that he would offer for 
these traditional forms. The substitutes are particularly 
striking in their refusal to allow any place for fear. 
Fear, according to O vid, created the first Gods, and reli­
gión has been defined by an oíd English poet as the 
“ mother of form and fear.” Rousseau would put in the 
place of form a fluid emotionalism, and as for fear, he 
would simply cast it out entirely, a revulsión, as I  have 
pointed out, from the excessive emphasis on fear in 
the more austere forms of Christianity. Be “ natural,” 
Rousseau says, and eschew priests and doctors, and 
you will be emancipated from fear.
Rousseau’s expedient for getting rid of man’s sense of 
his own sinfulness on which fear and humility ultimately
1 See her letter to Gustavus III, King of Sweden, cited in Gustave III  
et la  cour de Frunce, II, 402, par A. Geflroy.
rest is well known. Evil, says Rousseau, foreign to man’s 
constitution, is introduced into it from without. The bur- 
den of guilt is thus conveniently shifted upon society. 
Instead of the oíd dualism between good and evil in the 
breast of the individual, a new dualism is thus set up 
between an artificial and corrupt society and “ nature.” 
For man, let me repeat, has, according to Rousseau, 
fallen from nature in somewhat the same way as in the 
oíd theology he feli from God, and it is here that the 
idyllic element comes in, for, let us remind ourselves 
once more, Rousseau’s nature from which man has fallen 
is only an Arcadian dream.
The assertion of man’s natural goodness is plainly some- 
thing very fundamental in Rousseau, but there is some- 
thing still more fundamental, and that is the shifting of 
dualism itself, the virtual denial of a struggle between 
good and evil in the breast of the individual. That deep 
inner cleft in man’s being on which religión has always 
put so much emphasis is not genuine. Only get away 
from an artificial society and back to nature and the inner 
conflict which is but a part of the artificiality will give 
way to beauty and harmony. In a passage in his “ Supplé- 
ment au voyage de Bougainville,” Diderot puts the 
underlying thesis of the new morality almost more 
clearly than Rousseau: “ Do you wish to know in brief 
the tale of almost all our woe? There once existed a 
natural man; there has been introduced within this man 
an artificial man and there has arisen in the cave a civil 
war which lasts throughout Ufe.”
The denial of the reality of the “ civil war in the cave” 
involves an entire transformation of the conscience. The 
conscience ceases to be a power that sits in judgment
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on the ordinary self and inhibits its impulses. I t  tends 
so far as it is recognized at all, to become itself an in- 
stinct and an emotion. Students of the history of ethics 
scarcely need to be told that this transformation of the 
conscience was led up to by the English deists, especially 
by Shaftesbury and his disciple Hutcheson.1 Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson are already gesthetic in all senses of the 
word; gesthetic in that they tend to base conduct upon 
feeling, and gesthetic in that they incline to identify the 
good and the beautiful. Conscience is ceasing for both 
of them to be an inner check on the impulses of the in­
dividual and becoming a moral sense, a sort of expansive 
instinct for doing good to others. Altruism, as thus con- 
ceived, is opposed by them to the egoism of Hobbes and 
his followers.
But for the full implications of this transformation of 
conscience and for gesthetic morality in general one 
needs to turn to Rousseau. Most men according to Rous­
seau are perverted by society, but there are a few in 
whom the voice of “ nature” is still strong and who, to be 
good and at the same time beautiful, have only to let 
themselves go. These, to use a term that carne to have 
in the eighteenth century an almost technical meaning, 
are the “ beautiful souls.” The belle ame is practically 
indistinguishable from the ame sensible and has many 
points in common with the original genius. Those whose 
souls are beautiful are a small transfigured band in the 
midst of a philistine multitude. They are not to be 
judged by the same rules as those of less exquisite sensi- 
bility. “ There are unfortunates too privileged to follow
1 See Hastings Rashdall: Is Conscience. an Emotion f (1914), especially 
ch. i. Cf. Nouvelle Hélrñse. (Pt. vi, Lettre vn):_ “Saint-Preux fait de la  
conscience morale un sentiment, et non pas un jugement.”
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the common pathway.” 1 The beautiful soul is unintelli- 
gible to those of coarser feelings. His very superiority, 
his preternatural fineness of sensation, thus predestines 
him to suffering. We are here at the root of romàntic 
melancholy as will appear more fully later.
The most important aspect of the whole conception is, 
however, the strictly ethical —  the notion that the beau­
tiful soul has only to be instinctive and temperamental 
to merit the praise that has in the past been awarded 
only to the purest spirituality. “ As for Julie,” says Rous­
seau, “ who never had any other guide but her heart and 
could have no surer guide, she gives herself up to it with- 
out scruple, and to do right, has only to do all that it 
asks of her.” 2 Virtue indeed, according to Rousseau, is 
not merely an instinct but a passion and even a voluptu- 
ous passion, moving in the same direction as other pas­
sions, only superior to them in vehemence. “ Coid reason 
has never done anything illustrious; and you can triumph 
over the passions only by opposing them to one another. 
When the passion of virtue arises, it dominates every- 
thing and holds everything in equipoise.” 3
This notion of the soul that is spontaneously beautiful 
and therefore good made an especial appeal to the Ger­
mans and indeed is often associated with Germany more 
than with any other land.4 But examples of moral gestheti- 
cism are scarcely less freqüent elsewhere from Rousseau
1 Nouvelle Hélmse, Pt. v, Lettre n. 1 Ibid.
3 Ibid., Pt. iv, Lettre xn.
4 SchiÚer’s definition is well known : “ A beautiful soul we cali a state 
where the moral sentiment has taken possession of all the emotions to 
such a degree that it may unhesitatingly commit the guidance of life to 
instinct,” etc. (On Gráce and Dignity.) Cf. Madame de Stael: “ La vertu 
devient alors une impulsión involontaire, un mouvement qui passe dans 
le sang, et vous entraíne irrésistiblement comme les passions les plus 
impérieuses.” (De la Littérature: Discours préliminaire.)
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to the present. No one, for example, was ever more 
convinced of the beauty of his own soul than Renán. 
“ Morality,” says Renán, “ has been conceived up to the 
present in a very narrow spirit, as obedience to a law, 
as an inner struggle between opposite laws. As for me, 
I  declare that when I  do good I  obey no one, I  fight no 
battle and win no victory. The cultivated man has only 
to follow the delicious incline of his inner impulses.” 1 
Therefore, as he says elsewhere, “ Be beautiful and then 
do at each moment whatever your heart may inspire 
you to do. This is the whole of morality.” 2 
The doctrine of the beautiful soul is at once a denial and 
a parody of the doctrine of grace; a denial because it 
rejects original sin; a parody because it holds that the 
beautiful soul acts aright, not through any effort of its 
own but because nature acts in it and through it even as 
a man in a state of grace acts aright not through any 
merit of his own but because God acts in him and through 
him. The man who saw everything from the angle of 
grace was, like the beautiful soul or the original genius, 
inclined to look upon himself as exceptional and superla­
tive. Bunyan entitles the story of his own inner life 
“ Grace abounding to the chief of sinners.” But Bunyan 
flatters himself. I t  is not easy to be chief in such a lively 
competition. Humility and pride were evidently in a 
sort of grapple with one another in the breast of the 
Jansenist who declared that God had killed three men 
in order to compass his salvation. In the case of the beau­
tiful soul the humility disappears, but the pride remains. 
He still looks upon himself as superlative but superlative 
in goodness. If all men were like himself, Renán declares, 
1 Avenir de la Science, 354. a Ibid., 179-180.
it would be appropriate to say of them: Ye are Gods and 
sons of the most high.1 The partisan of grace holds that 
Works are of no avail compared with the gratuitous and 
unmerited illumination from above. The beautiful soul 
clings to his belief in his own innate excellence, no matter 
how flagrant the contradiction may be between this 
belief and his deeds. One should not fail to note some 
approximation to the point of view of the beautiful soul 
in those forms of Christianity in which the sense of sin 
is somewhat relaxed and the inner light very much 
emphasized —  for example among the Germán pietists 
and the quietists of Catholic countries.2 We even hear 
of persons claiming to be Christians who as the result 
of debauchery have experienced a spiritual awakening 
(Dans la brute assoupie, un ange se réveille). But such doc­
trines are mere excrescences and eccentricities in the 
total history of Christianity. Even in its extreme insist- 
ence on grace, Christianity has always tended to supple- 
ment rather than contradict the supreme maxim of 
humanistic morality as enunciated by Cicero: “ The 
whole praise of virtue is in action.” The usual result of 
the doctrine of grace when sincerely held is to make a 
man feel desperately sinful at the same time that he is 
less open to reproach than other men in his actual be- 
havior. The beautiful soul on the other hand can always 
take refuge in his feelings from his real delinquencies. 
According to Joubert, Chateaubriand was not disturbed 
by actual lapses in his conduct because of his persuasión 
of his own innate rectitude.3 “ Her conduct was reprehen-
1 Avenir de la Science, 476.
2 Madamede Warens felt the influence of Germán pietism in her youth. 
See La Jeunesse de J .- J . Rousseau par E. Ritter; ch. xm.
8 Lettre à M. Molé (21 October, 1803).
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sible,” says Rousseau of Madame de Warens, “ but her 
heart was puré.” I t  does not matter what you do if only 
through it all you preserve the sense of your own loveli- 
ness. Indeed the more dubious the act the more copious 
would seem to be the overflow of fine sentiments to 
which it stimulates the beautiful soul. Rousseau dilates 
on his “ warmth of heart,” his “ keenness of sensibility,” 
his “ innate benevolence for his fellow creatures,” his 
“ ardent love for the great, the trae, the beautiful, the 
just,” on the “ melting feeling, the lively and sweet emo- 
tion that he experiences at the sight of everything that 
is virtuous, generous and lovely,” and concludes: “ And 
so my third child was put into the foundling hospital.”
If we wish to see the psychology of Rousseau writ 
large we should tura to the French Revolution. That 
period abounds in persons whose goodness is in theory 
so superlative that it overflows in a love for all men, but 
who in practice are filled like Rousseau in his later years 
with universal suspicion. There was indeed a moment in 
the Revolution when the madness of Rousseau became 
epidemic, when suspicion was pushed to such a point 
that men became “ suspect of being suspect.” One of 
the last persons to see Rousseau alive at Ermenonville 
was Maximilien Robespierre. He was probably a more 
thoroughgoing Rousseauist than any other of the Revo- 
lutionary leaders. Perhaps no passage that could be cited 
illustrates with more terrible clearness the tendency of 
the new morality to convert righteousness into self- 
righteousness than the following from his last speech 
before the Convention at the very height of the Reign of 
Terror. Himself devoured by suspicion, he is repelling 
the suspicion that he wishes to erect his own power on
the ruins of the monarchy. The idea, he says, that “ he 
can descend to the infamy of the throne will appear 
probable only to those perverse beings who have not 
even the right to believe in virtue. But why speak of 
virtue? Doubtless virtue is a natural passion. But how 
could they be familiar with it, these venal spirits who 
never yielded access to aught save cowardly and ferocious 
passions? . . .  Yet virtue exists as you can testify, feeling 
and puré souls; it exists, that tender, irresistible, imperi- 
ous passion, torment and delight of magnanimous hearts, 
that profound horror of tyranny, that compassionate 
zeal for the oppressed, that sacred love for one’s country, 
that still more sublime and sacred love for humanity, 
without which a great revolution is only a glittering 
crime that destroys another crime; it exists, that gener- 
ous ambition to found on earth the first Republic of the 
world; that egoism of undegenerate men who find a 
celestial voluptuousness in the calm of a puré conscience 
and the ravishing spectacle of public happiness (!). 
You feel it at this moment burning in your souls. I  feel 
it in mine. But how could our vile calumniators have any 
notion of it?” etc.
In Robespierre and other revolutionary leaders one 
may study the implications of the new morality — the 
attempt to transform virtue into a natural passion — 
not merely for the individual but for society. M. Rod 
entitled his play on Rousseau “ The Reformer.” Both 
Rousseau and his disciple Robespierre were reformers in 
the modem sense, — that is they are concerned not with 
reforming themselves, but other men. Inasmuch as there 
is no conflict between good and evil in the breast of the 
beautiful soul he is free to devote all his efforts to the
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improvement of mankind, and he proposes to achieve this 
great end by diffusing the spirit of brotherhood. All the 
traditional forms that stand in the way of this free emo- 
tional expansión he denounces as mere “ prejudices,” 
and inclines to look on those who administer these forms 
as a gang of conspirators who are imposing an arbitrary 
and artificial restraint on the natural goodness of man 
and so keeping it from manifesting itself. With the final 
disappearance of the prejudices of the past and those 
who base their usurped authority upon them, the Golden 
Age will be ushered in at last; everybody will be bound- 
lessly self-assertive and at the same time temper this 
self-assertion by an equally boundless sympathy for 
others, whose sympathy and self-assertion likewise know 
no bounds. The world of Walt Whitman will be realized, 
a world in which there is neither inferior ñor superior but 
only comrades. This visión (such for example as appears 
at the end of Shelley’s “ Prometheus ”) of a humanity re- 
leased from all evil artificially imposed from without, a 
humanity “ where all things flow to all, as rivers to the 
sea ” and “ whose nature is its own divine control,” is the 
true religión of the Rousseauist. I t  is this image of a hu­
manity glorified through love that he sets up for worship 
in the sanctuary left vacant by “ the great absence of 
God.”
This transíormation of the Arcadian dreamer into the 
Utopist is due in part, as I  have already suggested, to 
the intoxication produced in the human spirit by the 
conquests of Science. One can discern the cooperation 
of Baconian and Rousseauist from a very early stage of 
the great humanitarian movement in the midst of which 
we are still living. Both Baconian and Rousseauist are
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interested not in the struggle between good and evil in 
the breast of the individual, but in the progress of man- 
kind as a whole. If the Rousseauist hopes to promote the 
progress of society by diffusing the spirit of brotherhood 
the Baconian or utilitarian hopes to achieve the same end 
by perfecting its machinery. I t  is scarcely necessary to 
add that these two main types of humanitarianism may 
be contained in almost any proportion in any particular 
person. By his worship of man in his future material 
advance, the Baconian betrays no less surely than the 
Rousseauist his faith in man’s natural goodness. This 
lack of humility is especially conspicuous in those who 
have sought to develop the positive observations of 
Science into a closed system with the aid of logic and 
puré mathematics. Pascal already remarked sarcastically 
of Descartes that he had no need of God except to give 
an initial fillip to his mechanism. Later the mechanist no 
longer grants the need of the initial fillip. According to 
the familiar anecdote, La Place when asked by Napoleón 
in the course of an explanation of his “ Celestial Mechan- 
ics ” where God carne in, replied that he had no need of a 
God in his system. As illustrating the extreme of human- 
itarian arrogance one may take the following from the 
physicist and mathematician, W. K. Clifford: “ The 
dim and shadowy outlines of the superhuman deity fade 
slowly from before us; and as the mist of his presence 
floats aside, we perceive with greater and greater clear- 
ness the shape of a yet grander and nobler figure — of 
Him who made all gods and shall unmake them. From 
the dim dawn of history and from the inmost depths of 
every soul the face of our father Man looks out upon 
us with the fire of eternal youth in his eyes and says,
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‘Before Jehovah was, I  am.’ ” The fire, one is tempted to 
say, of eternal lust! Clifford is reported to have once 
hung by his toes from the cross-bar of a weathercock on 
a church-tower. As a bit of intellectual acrobatics the 
passage I  have just quoted has some analogy with this 
posture. Further than this, man’s intoxication with 
himself is not likely to go. The attitude of Clifford is 
even more extreme in its way than that of Jonathan 
Edwards in his. However, there are already signs that 
the man of Science is becoming, if not humble, at least a 
trifle less arrogant.
One can imagine the Rousseauist interrupting at this 
point to remark that one of his chief protests has always 
been against the mechanical and utilitarian and in gen­
eral the scientific attitude towards life. This is true. 
Something has already been said about this protest and 
it will be necessary to say more about it later. Yet 
Rousseauist and Baconian agree, as I  have said, in turn- 
ing away from the “ civil war in the cave” to humanity 
in the lump. They agree in being more or less rebellious 
towards the traditional forms that put prime emphasis 
on the “ civil war in the cave” —  whether the Christian 
tradition with its humility or the classical with its de­
corum. No wonder Prometheus was the great romàntic 
hero. Prometheus was at once a rebel, a lover of man 
and a promoter of man’s material progress. We have 
been living for over a century in what may be termed 
an age of Promethean individualism.
The Rousseauist especially feels an inner kinship with 
Prometheus and other Titans. He is fascinated by every 
form of insurgency. Cain and Satan are both romàntic 
heroes. To meet the full romàntic requirement, however,
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the insurgent must also be tender-hearted. He must 
show an elemental energy in his explosión against the 
established order and at the same time a boundless 
sympathy for the victims of it. One of Hugo’s poems tells 
of a Mexican volcano, that in sheer disgust at the cruelty 
of the members of the Inquisition, spits lava upon them. 
This compassionate volcano symbolizes in both of its main 
aspects the romàntic ideal. Henee the enormous Inter­
national popularity of Schiller’s “ Robbers.” One may 
find innumerable variants of the brigand Karl Moor who 
uses his plunder “ to support meritorious young men at 
college.” The world into which we enter from the very 
dawn of romanticism is one of “ glorious rascáis,” and 
“ beloved vagabonds.”
“ Sublime convicts,” says M. Lasserre, “ idlers of genius, angèlic 
female poisoners, monsters inspired by God, sincere comedians, 
virtuous courtesans, metaphysical mountebanks, faithful adulterers, 
form only one half —  the sympathetic half of humanity according to 
romanticism. The other half, the wicked half, is manufactured by the 
same intel·lectual process under the suggestion of the same revolution- 
ary instinct. I t  comprises all those who hold or stand for a portion of 
any discipline whatsoever, political, religious, moral or intellectual —1 
kings, ministers, priests, judges, soldiers, policemen, husbands and 
critics.”1
The Rousseauist is ever ready to discover beauty of 
soul in any one who is under the reprobation of society. 
The figure of the courtesan rehabilitated through love 
that has enjoyed such popularity during the past 
hundred years goes back to Rousseau himself.2 The 
underlying assumption of romàntic morality is that the 
personal virtues, the virtues that imply self-control, 
count as naught compared with the fraternal spirit and
1 Le romantisme français, 215.
2 See Les Amours de Milord Bomston at the end of La Nouvelle Héldise.
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the readiness to sacrifice one’s self for others. This is the 
ordinary theme of the Russian novel in which one finds, 
as Lemaítre remarks, “ the Kalmuck exaggerations of 
our French romàntic ideas.” For example Sonia in 
“ Crime and Punishment” is glorified because she pros­
titutes herself to procure a livelihood for her family. 
One does not however need to go to Russia for what is 
scarcely less the assumption of contemporary America. 
If it can only be shown that a person is sympathetic we 
are inclined to pardon him his sins of unrestraint, his 
lack, for example, of common honesty. As an offset to 
the damaging faets brought out at the investigation of 
the sugar trust, the defense sought to establish that the 
late H. O. Havemeyer was a beautiful soul. I t  was testi- 
fied that he could never hear little children sing without 
tears coming into his eyes. His favorite song, some one 
was unkind enough to suggest, was “ little drops of water, 
little grains of sand.” The newspapers again reported 
not long ago that a notorious Pittsburg grafter had peti- 
tíored for his release from the penitentiary on the 
greunds that he wished to continue his philanthropio 
activities among the poor. Another paragraph that 
appeared recently in the daily press related that a bur- 
glar while engaged professionally in a house at Los 
Angeles discovered that the lady of the house had a child 
suffering from croup, and at once carne to her aid, ex- 
plaining that he had six children of his own. No one could 
really think amiss of this authentic descendant of 
Schiller’s Karl Moor. For love, according to the Rous­
seauist, is not the fulfillment of the law but a substitute 
for it. In “ Les Misérables” Hugo contrasts Javert who 
stands for the oíd order based on obedience to the la^
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with the convict Jean Valjean who stands for the new 
regeneration of man through love and self-sacrifice. 
When Javert awakens to the full ignominy of his role 
he does the only decent thing — he commits suicide. 
Hugo indeed has perhaps carried the new evangel of 
sympathy as a substitute for all the other virtues further 
than any one else and with fewer weak concessions to 
common sense. Sultán Murad, Hugo narrates, was “ sub­
lime.” He had his eight brothers strangled, caused his 
únele to be sawn in two between two planks, opened one 
after the other twelve children to find a stolen apple, 
shed anoceanof blood and “ sabred the world.” One day 
while passing in front of a buteher-shop he saw a pig 
bleeding to death, tormented by ñies and with the sun 
beating upon its wound. Touched by pity, the Sultán 
pushes the pig into the shade with his foot and with an 
“ enormous and superhuman gesture” drives away the 
flies. When Murad dies the pig appears before the 
Almighty and, pleading for him against the accusing 
host of his victims, wins his pardon. Moral: “ A suc- 
cored pig outweighs a world oppressed” 1 (Un pourceau 
secouru vaut un monde égorgé).
This subordination of all the other valúes of life to 
sympathy is achieved only at the expense of the great 
humanistic virtue — decorum or a sense of proportion. 
Now not to possess a sense of proportion is, however 
this lack may be manifested, to be a pedant; and, if 
there is ever a humanistic reaction, Hugo, one of the 
chief producís of the age of original genius, will scarcely 
escape the charge of pedantry. But true religión also in- 
sists on a hierarchy of the virtues. Burke speaks at least
1 Sultán Mourad in L a  Lugende des Sueles.
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as much from a religious as from a humanistic point of 
view when he writes:
“ The greatest crimes do not arise so much from a want of feeling for 
others as from an over-sensibility for ourselves and an over-indulgence 
to our own desires. . . . They [the ‘philosophes’] explode or render 
odious or contemptible that class of virtues which restrain the appe­
tite. These are at least nine out of ten of the virtues. In the place of 
all this they substitute a virtue which they cali humanity or benevo- 
lence. By these means their morality has no idea in it of restraint or 
indeed of a distinet and settled principie of any kind. When their 
disciples are thus left free and guided only by present feeling, they 
are no longer to be depended on for good and evil. The men who to- 
day snatch the worst criminals from justice will murder the most 
innocent persons to-morrow.” 1
The person who seeks to get rid of ninety per cent of 
the virtues in favor of an indiscriminate sympathy does 
not simply lose his scale of valúes. He arrives at an 
inverted scale of valúes. For the higher the object for 
which one feels sympathy the more the idea of obligation 
is likely to intrude — the very thing the Rousseauist is 
seeking to escape. One is more irresponsible and therefore 
more spontaneous in the Rousseauistic sense in lavishing 
one’s pity on a dying pig. Medical men have given a 
learned ñame to the malady of those who neglect the 
members of their own family and gush over animals 
(zoòphilpsychosis). But Rousseau already exhibits this 
“ psychosis.” He abandoned his five children one after the 
other, but had we are told an unspeakable affection for 
his dog.2
1 Correspondence, ni, 213 (June, 1791). The date of this letter should 
be noted. Several of the worst terrorists of the French Revolution began 
by introducing bilis for the abolition of capital punishment.
2 See Burton’s Hume, II, 309 (note 2).
This sentimental trait did not escape the authors of the A nti-Jacóbin : 
Sweet child of sickly Fancy — Her of yore 
From her lov’d France Rousseau to exile bore;
Rousseau’s contemporary, Steme, is supposed to have 
lavished a somewhat disproportionate emotion upon an 
ass. But the ass does not really come into his own until 
a later stage oí the movement. Nietzsche has depicted 
the leaders of the nineteenth century as engaged in a 
veritable onolatry or ass-worship. The oppositiori be- 
tween neo-classicist and Rousseauist is indeed symbol- 
ized in a fashion by their respective attitude towards the 
ass. Neo-classical decorum was, it should be remembered, 
an all-pervading principie. I t  imposed a severe hierarchy, 
not oiüy upon objects, but upon the words that express 
these objects. The first concern of the decorous person 
was to avoid lowness, and the ass he looked upon as hope- 
lessly low — so low as to be incapable of ennoblement 
even by a resort to periphrasis. Homer therefore was 
deemed by Vida to have been guilty of outrageous inde­
corum in comparing Ajax to an ass. The partisans of 
Homer sought indeed to prove that the ass was in the 
time of Homer a "noble” animal or at least that the word 
ass was “ noble.” But the stigma put upon Homer by 
Vida —  reinforced as it was by the similar attacks of 
Scaliger and others —  remained.
And while midst lakes and mountains wild he ran 
Full of himself and shunn’d the haunts of man,
Taught her o’er each lone vale and Alpine steep 
To lisp the stories of his wrongs and weep;
Taught her to eherish still in either eye 
Of tender tears a plentiful supply,
And pour them in the brooks that babbled by —
Taught her to mete by rule her feelings strong,
False by degrees and delicately wrong,
For the crush’d Beetle, first — the widow’d Dove,
And all the warbled sorrows of the grove,
Nexi for poor suff’ring Guilt — and last of all,
For Parents, Friends, or King and Country’s fall.
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The rehabilitation of the ass by the Rousseauist is at 
once a protest against an unduly squeamish decorum, and 
a way of proclaiming the new principie of unbounded 
expansive sympathy. In dealing with both words and 
what they express, one should show a democràtic in- 
clusiveness. Something has already been said of the war 
the romanticist waged in the ñame of local color against 
the impoverishment of vocabulary by the neo-classicists. 
But the romàntic warfare against the aristocràtic 
squeamishness of the neo-classic vocabulary goes per- 
haps even deeper. Take, for instance, Wordsworth’s view 
asto th e  proper language of poetry. Poetical decorum 
had become by the end of the eighteenth century a 
mere varnish of conventional elegance. Why shoul 
mere polite prejudice, so Wordsworth reasoned, and the 
“ gaudiness and inane phraseology” inwhich itresulted 
be allowed to interfere with the “ spontaneous overñow of 
powerful emotion”? And so he proceeds to set up a view 
of poetry that is only the neo-classical view turned upside 
down. For the proper subjects and speech of poetry he 
would turn from the highest class of society to the lowest, 
from the aristocrat to the peasant. The peasant is more 
poetical than the aristocrat because he is closer to nature, 
for Wordsworth as he himself avows, is less interested 
in the peasant for his own sake than because he sees in 
him a sort of emanation of the landscape.1
One needs to keep all this background in mind if one 
wishes to understand the full significance of a poem like
i Shepherds, dwellers in the valleys,_ men 
Whom I already loved; — not verily 
For their own sakes, but for the fields and huís 
Where was their occupation and abode.
Michael
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“ Peter Bell.” Scaliger blames Homer because he stoops 
to mention in his description of Zeus something so trivial 
as the eyebrows. Wordsworth seeks to bestow poetical 
dignity and seriousness on the “ long left ear ” of an ass.1 
The ass is thus exalted one scarcely need add, because of 
his compassionateness. The hard heart of Peter Bell is at 
last melted by the sight of so much goodness. He aspires 
to be like the ass and finally achieves his wish.
The French romanticists, Hugo, for instance, make an 
attack on decorum somewhat similar to that of Words­
worth. Words formerly lived, says Hugo, divided up 
into castes. Some had the privilege of mounting into the 
king’s coaches at Versailles, whereas others were rele- 
gated to the rabble. I  carne along and clapped a red 
liberty cap on the oíd dictionary. I  brought about a 
literary ’93,2 etc. Hugo’s attack on decorum is also com- 
bined with an even more violent assertion than Words- 
worth’s of the ideal of romàntic morality — the su- 
premacy of pity. He declares in the “ Legend of the 
Ages” that an ass that takes a step aside to avoid 
crushing a toad is “ holier than Socrates and greater 
than Plato.” 3 For this and similar utterances Hugo 
deserves to be placed very nearly if not quite at the 
head of romàntic onolaters.
We ha ve said that the tremendous burden put upon
1 Once more the Ass, with motion dull,
Upon the pivot of his skull 
Turned round his long left ear.
“ The bard who soars to elegize an ass” and the “ laureate of the long- 
eared kind” (English Bards and Scotch Reviewers) is, however, not 
Wordsworth but Coleridge. See his poeta To a Young Áss, ils mother being 
tethered near it.
2 See the poem Acte d’accusation in Les Contemplakions.
3 Le Crapaud in L a  Légende des Siécles.
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sympathy in romàntic morality is a result of the assump- 
tion that the “ civil war in the cave” is artificial and that 
therefore the restraining virtues (according to Burke 
ninety per cent of the virtues) which imply this warfare 
are likewise artificial. If the civil war in the cave should 
turn out to be not artificial but a fact of the gravest im­
port, the whole spiritual landscape would change imme- 
diatély. Romàntic morality would in that case be not a 
reality but a mirage. We need at all events to grasp the 
central issue firmly. Humanismand religión have always 
asserted in some form or other the dualism of the hu­
man spirit. A man’s spirituality is in inverse ratio to his 
immersion in temperament. The whole movement from 
Rousseau to Bergson is, on the other hand, filled with t e 
glorification of instinct. To become spiritual the beautiful 
soul needs only to expand along the lines of temperament 
and with this process the cult of pity or sympathy does not 
interfere. The romàntic moralist tends to favor expansión 
on the ground that it is vital, Creative, infinite, and to dis- 
miss whatever seems to set bounds to expansión as some- 
thing inert, mechanical, finite. In its onslaughte on the 
veto power whether within or without the breast of the 
individual it is plain that no age has ever approached the 
age of original genius in the midst of which we are still 
living. Goethe defines the devil as the spirit that always 
says no, and Carlyle celebrates his passage from darkness 
to light as an escape from the Everlastmg Nay to the 
Everlasting Yea. We rarely pause to consider what a 
reversal of traditional wisdom is implied in such con­
ceptúas. In the past, the spirit that says ™  been 
associated rather with the divine. Socrates telis us that 
the counsels of his “ voice” were always negative, never
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positive.1 Aocording to the ancient Hindú again the di­
vine is the “ inner check.” God, according to Aristotle, is 
pure Form. In opposition to ali this emphasis on the re- 
stricting and limiting power, the naturalist, whether scien- 
tific or emotional, sets up a program of formless, fearless 
expansión; which means in practice that he recognizes 
no bounds either to intellectual or emotional curiosity.
I  have said that it is a part of the psychology of the 
original genius to offer the element of wonder and sur- 
prise awakened by the perpetual novelty, the infinite 
otherwiseness of things, as a substitute for the awe that 
is associated with their infinite oneness; or rather to 
refuse to discriminate between these two infinitudes and 
so to confound the two main directions of the human 
spirit, its religious East, as one may say, with its West 
of wonder and romance. This confusión may be illus- 
trated by the romàntic attitude towards what is perhaps 
the most Eastern of all Eastern lands, — India. The 
materials for the study of India in the Occident were 
accumulated by Englishmen towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, but the actual interpretation of this 
material is due largely to Germán romanticists, notably 
to Friedrich Schlegel.2 Alongside the romàntic Hellenist 
and the romàntic medisevalist we find the romàntic 
Indianist. I t  is to India even more than to Spain that 
one needs to turn, says Friedrich Schlegel, for the 
supremely romàntic 3 — that is, the wildest and most 
unrestrained luxuriance of imagination. Now in a country 
so vast and so ancient as India you can find in some place 
or at some period or other almost anything you like.
1 See Apology 31d.
2 His Language and Wisdom of the Hindus appeared in 1808.
8 See Jugendschriften, ed. by J. Minor, n, 362.
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If, for example, W. B . Yeats waxes enthusiastic over 
Tagore we may be sure that there is in the work of 
Tagore something akin to sesthetic romanticism. But if 
we take India at the top of her achievement in the early 
Buddhistic movement, let us say, we shall find something 
very different. The early Buddhistic movement in its 
essential aspects is at the extreme opposite pole from 
romanticism. The point is worth making because certain 
misinterpretations that still persist both of Buddhism 
and other movements in India can be traced ultimately 
to the bad twist that was given to the whole subject by 
romanticists like the Schlegels. The educated French- 
man, for instance, gets his ideas of India largely from 
certain poems of Leconte de Lisie who reflects the 
Germán influence. But the sense of universal and mean- 
ingless flux that pervades these poems without any 
countervailing sense of a reality behind the shows of 
nature is a product of romanticism, working in coopera- 
tion with Science, and is therefore antipodal to the 
absorption of the true Hindú in the oneness of things. 
We are told, again, that Schopenhauer was a Buddhist. 
Did he not have an image of Buddha in his bedroom? 
But no doctrine perhaps is more remote from the genuine 
doctrine of Buddha than that of this soured and disillu- 
sioned romanticist. The nature of true Buddhism and its 
opposition to all forms of romanticism is worth dwelling 
on for a moment. Buddha not only asserted the human 
law with unusual power but he also did what, in the 
estimation of some, needs doing in our own day he put 
this law, not on a traditional, but on a positive and critical 
basis. This spiritual positivism of Buddha is, reduced to 
its simplest terms, a psychology of desire. Not only is
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the world outside of man in a constant state of flux and 
change, but there is an element within man that is in 
constant flux and change also and makes itself felt 
practically as an element of expansive desire. What is 
unstable in him longs for what is unstable in the outer 
world. But he may escape from the element of flux and 
change, nay he must aspire to do so, if he wishes to be 
released from sorrow. This is to substitute the noble for 
the ignoble craving. The permanent or ethical element 
in himself towards which he should strive to move is 
known to him practically as a power of inhibition or 
inner check upon expansive desire. Vital impulse (élan 
vital) may be subjected to vital control (jrein vital). 
Here is the Buddhist equivalent of the "civil war in the 
cave” that the romanticist denies. Buddha does not 
admit a soul in man in the sense that is often given to 
the word, but on this opposition between vital impulse 
and vital control as a psychological fact he puts his 
supreme emphasis. The man who drifts supinely with the 
current of desire is guilty according to Buddha of the 
gravest of ali vices — spiritual or moral indolence 
(pamáda). He on the contrary who curbs or reins in his 
expansive desires is displaying the chief of all the virtues, 
spiritual vigilance or strenuousness (appamáda). The 
man who is spiritually strenuous has entered upon the 
"p ath .” The end of this path and the goal of being cannot 
be formulated in terms of the finite intellect, any more 
than the ocean can be put into a cup. But progress on 
the path may be known by its fruits — negatively by the 
extinction of the expansive desires (the literal meaning 
of Nirvana), positively by an increase in peace, poise, 
centrality.
A man’s rank in the scale of being is, then, according 
to the Buddhist determined by the quality of his desires; 
and it is within his power to determine whether he shall 
let them run wild or else control them to some worthy end. 
We hear of the fatalistic East, but no doctrine was ever 
less fatalistic than that of Buddha. No one ever put so 
squarely upon the individual what the individual is ever 
seeking to evade — the burden of moral responsibility. 
"  Self is the lord of self. Who else can be the lord? . . .  You 
yourself must make the effort. The Buddhas are only 
teachers.”1 But does not all this emphasis on self, one 
may ask, tend to hardness and indifference towards 
others, towards the undermining of that compassion to 
which the romàntic moralist is ready to sacrifice all the 
other virtues? Buddha may be allowed to speak for 
himself: “ Even as a mother cherishes her child, her only 
child, so let a man cultivate a boundless love towards 
all beings.” 2 Buddha thus seems to fulfil Pascal’s re- 
quirement for a great man: he unites in himself opposite 
virtues and occupies all the space between them.
Enough has been said to make plain that the infinite 
indeterminate desire of the romanticist and the Buddhist 
repression of desire are the most different things con- 
ceivable. Chateaubriand it has been said was an “ invin- 
cibly restless soul,” a soul of desire (une ame de désir), but 
these phrases are scarcely more applicable to him than to 
many other great romanticists. They are fitly symbolized 
by the figures that pace to and fro in the Hall of Eblis 
and whose hearts are seen through their transparent 
bosoms to be lapped in the flames of unquenchable long-
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1 Dhammapada.
2 Sutta-Nipáta, v. 149 (Metta-sutta).
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ing. The romanticist indeed bases, as I  have said, on the 
very intensity of his longing his claims to be an idealist 
and even a mystic. William Blake, for example, has been 
proclaimed a true mystic. The same term has also been 
applied to Buddha. Without pretending to have fath- 
omed completely so unfathomable a being as Buddha or 
even the far less unfathomable William Blake, one may 
nevertheless assert with confidence that Buddha and 
Blake stand for utterly incompatible views of life. If 
Blake is a mystic then Buddha must be something else. 
To be assured on this point one needs only to compare 
the “ Marnage of Heaven and Hell” with the “ Dhamma- 
pada,” an anthology of some of the most authentic and 
authoritative material in early Buddhism. “ He who 
desires but acts not, breeds pestilence. . . . The road of 
excess leads to the palace of wisdom,” says Blake. “ Even 
in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction; the dis- 
ciple who is fully awakened delights only in the destruc- 
tion of all desires. . . . Good is restraint in all things,” 
says Buddha. Buddha would evidently have dismissed 
Blake as a madman, whereas Blake would have looked 
on Buddhism as the ultimate abomination. My own con- 
victíon is that Buddha was a genuine sage well worthy 
of the homage rendered him by multitudes of men for 
more than twenty-four centuries, whereas Blake was 
only a romàntic aesthete who was moving in his imagina- 
tive aetivity towards madness and seems at the end 
actually to have reached the goal.
I  have been going thus far afield to ancient India and 
to Buddha, not that I  might, like a recent student of 
Buddhism, enjoy “ the strangeness of the intellectual 
landscape,” but on the contrary that I  might suggest that
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there is a centre of normal human experience and that 
Buddhism, at least in its ethical aspects, is nearer to this 
centre than gesthetic romanticism. Buddha might perhaps 
marvel with more reason at our strangeness than we at 
his. Buddha’s assertion of man’s innate moral laziness in 
particular accords more closely with what most of us 
have experienced than Rousseau’s assertion of man’s 
natural goodness. This conception of the innate laziness 
of man seems to me indeed so central that I  am going to 
put it at the basis of the point of view I  am myself seek- 
ing to develop, though this point of view is not primarily 
Buddhistic. This conception has the advantage of being 
positive rather than dogmàtic. I t  works out in practice 
very much like the original sin of the Christian theologian. 
The advantage of starting with indolence rather than 
sin is that many men will admit that they are morally 
indolent who will not admit that they are sinful. For 
theological implications still cluster thickly about the word 
sin, and these persons are still engaged more or less con- 
sciously in the great naturalistic revolt against theology.
The spiritual positivist then will start from a fact of 
immediate perception —  from the presence namely in 
the breast of the individual of a principie of vital control 
(frein vital), and he will measure his spiritual strenuous- 
ness or spiritual sloth by the degree to which he exercises 
or fails to exercise this power. In accordance with the 
keenness of a man’s perception of a specially human order 
that is known practically as a curb upon his ordinary self, 
he may be said to possess insight. The important thing is 
that the insight should not be sophisticated, that a man 
should not fall away from it into some phantasmagoria of 
the intellect or emotions. A man sometimes builds up a
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whole system of metaphysics as a sort of screen between 
himself and his obligations either to himself or others. 
Mrs. Barbauld suspected that Coleridge’s philosophy 
was only a mask for indolence. Carlyle’s phrase for Cole- 
ridge was even harsher: "putrescent indolence,” a phrase 
that might be applied with more justice perhaps to 
Rousseau. One may learn from Rousseau the art of sink- 
ing to the región of instinct that is below the rational level 
instead of struggling forward to the región of insight that 
is above it, and at the same time passing for a sublime 
enthusiast; the art of looking backwards and downwards, 
and at the same time enjoying the honor that belongs 
only to those who look forwards and up. We need not 
wonder at the warm welcome that this new art received. 
I have said that that man has always been accounted a 
benefactor who has substituted for the reality of spiritual 
discipline some ingenious art of going through the mo- 
tions and that the decorum of the neo-classical period 
had largely sunk to this level. Even in the most decorous 
of modern ages, that of Louis XIV , it was very common, 
as every student of the period knows, for men to set up as 
personages in the grand manner and at the same time 
behind the façade of conventional dignity to let their 
appetites run riot. I t  would have been perfectly legití­
mate at the end of the eighteenth century to attack in 
the ñame of true decorum a decorum that had become 
the "varnish of vice” and "m ask of hypocrisy.” What 
Rousseau actually opposed to pseudo-decorum was per­
haps the most alluring form of sham spirituality that 
the world has ever seen — a method not merely of mask- 
ing but of glorifying one’s spiritual indolence. "You 
wish to have the pleasures of vice and the honor of vir-
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tue,” wrote Julie to Saint-Preux in a moment of unusual 
candor. The Rousseauist may indulge in the extreme of 
psychic unrestraint and at the same time pose as a perfect 
idealist or even, if one is a Chateaubriand, as a Champion 
of religión. Chateaubriand’s life according to Lemaítre 
was a "magnificent series of attitudes.”
I do not mean to assert that the Rousseauist is always 
guilty of the pose and theatricality of which there is more 
than a suggestion in Chateaubriand. There is, however, 
much in the Rousseauistic view of life that militates 
against a complete moral honesty. "  Of all the men I  have 
known,” says Rousseau, "h e whose character derives 
most completely from his temperament alone is Jean- 
Jacques.” 1 The ugly things that have a way of happen- 
ing when impulse is thus left uncontrolled do not, as we 
have seen, disturb the beautiful soul in his complacency. 
He can always point an accusing finger at something or 
somebody else. The faith in one’s natural goodness is a 
constant encouragement to evade moral responsibility. 
To accept responsibility is to follow the line of maximum 
effort, whereas man’s secret desire is to follow, if not the 
line of least, at all events the line of lesser resistance. The 
endless twisting and dodging and proneness to look for 
scapegoats that results is surely the least reputable aspect 
of human nature. Rousseau writes to Madame de Fran- 
cueil (20 April, 1751) that it was her class, the class of the 
rich, that was responsible for his having had to abandon 
his children. With responsibility thus shifted from one’s 
self to the rich, the next step is inevitable, namely to 
start a crusade against the members of a class which, 
without any warrant from “ Nature,” oppresses its 
1 Second Dialogue.
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brothers, the members of other classes, and forces them 
into transgression. A man may thus dodge his duties as 
a father, and at the same time pose as a paladín of hu- 
manity. Rousseau is very cióse here to our most recent 
agitators. If a working girl falls from chastity, for exam- 
ple, do not blame her, blame her employer. She would 
ha ve remained a model of purity if he had only added a 
dollar or two a week to her wage. With the progress of 
the new morality every one has become familiar with 
the type of the perfect idealist who is ready to pass laws 
for the regulation of everybody and everything except 
himself, and who knows how to envelop in a mist of ra­
diant words schemes the true driving power of which is 
the desire to confiscate property.
The tendency to make of society the universal scape- 
goat is not, one scarcely needs add, to be ascribed entirely 
to the romàntic moralist. I t  is only one aspect of the 
denial of the human law, of the assumption that because 
man is partly subject to the natural law he is entirely 
subject to it; and in this dehumanizing of man the ration- 
alist has been at least as guilty as the emotionalist. If  the 
Rousseauist hopes to find a substitute for all the restrain- 
ing virtues in sympathy, the rationaüstic naturalist, who 
is as a rule utilitarian with a greater or smaller dash of 
pseudo-science, hopes to find a substitute for these same 
virtues in some form of machinery. The legislative mili to 
which our “ uplifters” are so ready to resort, is a familiar 
example. If our modern society continues to listen to 
those who are seeking to persuade it that it is possible to 
find mechanical or emotional equivalents for self-control, 
it is likely, as Rousseau said of himself, to show a “ great 
tendency to degenerate.”
The fact on which the moral positivist would rest his 
effort to rehabilítate self-control is, as I  have said, the 
presence in man of a restraining, informing and central- 
izing power that is anterior to both intellect and emotion. 
Such a power, it must be freely granted, is not present 
equally in all persons; in some it seems scarcely to exist 
at all. When released from outer control, they are simply 
unchained temperaments; whereas in others this super- 
rational perception seems to be singularly vivid and dis­
tinet. This is the psychological fact that underlies what 
the theologian would term the mystery of grace.
Rousseau himself was not quite so temperamental as 
might be inferred from what has been said about his 
evasión of ethical effort. There were moments when the 
dualism of the spirit carne home to him, moments when 
he perceived that the conscience is not itself an expansive 
emotion but rather a judgment and a check upon expan­
sive emotion. Yet his general readinessto subordínate his 
ethical self to his sensibility is indubitable. Henee the 
absence in his personality and writing of the note of 
masculinity. There is indeed much in his make-up that 
reminds one less of a man than of a high-strung impres­
sionable woman. Woman, most observers would agree, is 
more natural in Rousseau’s sense, that is, more tempera­
mental, than man. One should indeed always temper 
these perilous comparisons of the sexes with the remark 
of La Fontaine that in this matter he knew a great 
many men who were women. Now to be temperamental is 
to be extreme, and it is in this sense perhaps that the 
female of the species may be said to be “ fiercer than the 
male.” Rousseau’s failure to find “ any intermediary term 
between everything and nothing” would seem to be a
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feminine rather than a masculine trait. Decorum in the 
case of women, even more perhaps than in the case of 
men, tends to be a mere conformity to what is established 
rather than the immediate perception of a law of meas- 
ure and proportion that sets bounds to the expansive 
desires. “ Women believe innocent everything that they 
daré,” says Joubert, whom no one will accuse of being 
a misogynist. Those who are thus temperamental have 
more need than others of outer guidance. “ His feminine 
nature,” says C. E . Norton of Ruskin, “ needed support 
such as it never got.” 1
If women are more temperamental than men it is only 
fair to add that they have a greater fineness of tempera­
ment. Women, says Joubert again, are richer in native 
virtues, men in acquired virtues. At times when men are 
slack in acquiring virtues in the truly ethical sense — 
and some might maintain that the present is such a time 
— the women may be not only men’s equals but their 
superiors. Rousseau had this feminine fineness of temper­
ament. He speaks rightly of his “ exquisite faculties.” 
He also had no inconsiderable amount of feminine charm. 
The numerous members of the French aristocracy whom 
he fascinated may be accepted as competent witnesses 
on this point. The mingling of sense and spirit that per- 
vades Rousseau, his pseudo-Platonism as I  have called 
it elsewhere, is also a feminine rather than a masculine 
trait.
There is likewise something feminine in Rousseau’s 
preference for illusion. Illusion is the element in which 
woman even more than man would seem to live and move
1 Letters, ii, 298. For Ruskin and Rousseau see Ibid . i, 360: “[Ruskin] 
said that great parts of Les Confessions were so true to himself that he felt 
as if Rousseau must have transmigrated into his body.”
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and have her being. I t  is feminine and also romàntic to 
prefer to a world of sharp definition a world of magic and 
suggestiveness. W. Bagehot (it will be observed that in 
discussing this delicate topic I  am prone to take refuge 
behind authorities) attributes the triumph of an art of 
shifting illusion over an art of clear and firm outlines to 
the growing influence of women.1 Woman’s being is to 
that of man, we are told, as is moonlight unto sunlight — 
and the moon is the romàntic orb. The whole of Germán 
romance in particular is bathed in moonshine.2
The objection of the classicist to the so-called enlight- 
enment of the eighteenth century is that it did not have 
in it sufficient light. The primitivists on the contrary 
felt that it had too much light —  that the light needed to 
be tempered by darkness. Even the moon is too effulgent 
fortheauthor of “ Hymns to the Night.” No movement 
has ever avowed more openly its partiality for the dim 
and the crepuscular. The Germán romanticists have 
been termed “ twilight men.” What many of them ad­
mire in woman as in children and plants, is her un- 
consciousness and freedom from analysis — an admira-
1 “ If a poet wishes an atmosphere of indistinct illusion and of moving 
shadow, he must use the romàntic style.. . .  Women, such as we know 
them, such as they are likely to be, ever prefer a delicate unreality to 
a true or firm art.” Essay on Puré, Ornate, and Grotesque Art in English 
Poetry (1864).
2 “ Die Romanze auf einem Pierde” utters the following lines in the 
Prologue to Tieck’s K aiser Octavianus:
Mondbeglànzte Zaubernacht,
Die den Sinn gefangen halt,
Wundervolle Márchenwelt 
Steig’ auf in der alten Pracht.
A special study might be made of the róle of the moon in Chateaubriand 
and Coleridge — even if one is not prepared like Carlyle to dismiss 
Coleridge’s philosophy as “ bottled moonshine.”
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tion that is also a tribute in its way to the “ night side” 
of nature.1
Discussions of the kind in which I  have been indulging 
regarding the unlikeness of woman and man are very 
dreary unless one puts at least equal emphasis on their 
fundamental likeness. Woman, before being woman, is a 
human being and so subject to the same law as man. So 
far as men and women both take on the yoke of this law, 
they move towards a common centre. So far as they throw 
it off and live temperamentally, there tends to arise 
the most odious of all forms of warfare — that between 
the sexes. The dictates of the human law are only too 
likely to yield in the case of both men and women to the 
rush of outer impressions and the tumult of the desires 
within. This is what La Rochefoucauld means when he 
says that “ the head is always the dupe of the heart.” 
Nevertheless feeling is even more likely to prevail over 
judgment in woman than it is in man. To be judicial 
indeed to the point of hardness and sternness has always 
been held to be unfeminine. I t  is almost woman’s pre- 
rogative to err on the side of sympathy. But even woman 
cannot be allowed to substitute sympathy for true con- 
science —  that is for the principie of control. In basing 
conduct on feeling Rousseau may be said to have founded 
a new sophistry. The ancient sophist at least made man 
the measure of all things. By subordinating judgment to 
sensibility Rousseau may be said to have made woman 
the measure of all things.
The affirmation of a human law must ultimately rest 
on the perception of a something that is set above the
1 O. Walzel points out that as soon as the women in H. von Kleist’s 
plays become conscious they fall into error (Deutsche Romantik, 3. Auf- 
lage, 147).
ROMÀNTIC MORALITY: THE IDEAL 161
flux upon which the flux itself depends —  on what Aris- 
totle terms an unmoved mover. Otherwise conscience 
becomes a part of the very flux and element of change it 
is supposed to control. In proportion as he escapes from 
outer control man must be conscious of some such un­
moved mover if he is to oppose a definite aim or pur- 
pose to the indefinite expansión of his desires. Having 
some such firm centre he may hope to carry through to a 
fortunate conclusión the “ civil war in the cave.” He may, 
as the wise are wont to express it, build himself an island 
in the midst of the flood. The romàntic moralist, on the 
other hand, instead of building himself an island is sim- 
ply drifting with the stream. For feeling not only shifts 
from man to man, it is continually shifting in the same 
man; so that morality becomes a matter of mood, and 
romanticism here as elsewhere might be defined as the 
despotism of mood. At the time of doing anything, says 
Mrs. Shelley, Shelley deemed himself right; and Rous­
seau says that in the act of abandoning his own children 
he felt “ like a member of Plato’s republic.”
The man who makes self-expression and not self- 
control his primary endeavor becomes subject to every 
influence, “ the very slave of circumstance and impulse 
borne by every breath.” 1 This is what it means in prac- 
tice no longer to keep a firm hand on the rudder of one’s 
personality, but to turn one’s self over to “ nature.” The
1 Byron, Sardanapalus, rv, 5. Cf. Rousseau, Neuvibne Promenade: 
“ Dominé par mes sens, quoi que je puisse faire, je n’ai jamais pu résister 
à leurs impressions, et, tant que l’objet agit sur eux, mon cceur ne cesse 
d’en étre affecté.” Cf. also Musset, Rolla :
Ce n’était pas Rolla qui gouvernait sa vie,
C’étaient ses passions; il les laissait aller 
Comme un pátre assoupi regarde l’eau couler.
162 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM
partisan of expression becomes the thrall of his impres­
sions so that the whole Rousseauistic conception may be 
termed indifferently impressionistic or expressionistic. 
For the beautiful soul in order to express himself has to 
indulge his emotions instead of hardening and bracing 
them against the shock of circumstance. The very refine- 
ment of sensibility which constitutes in his own eyes his 
superiority to the philistine makes him quiver responsive 
to every outer influence; he finally becomes subject to 
changes in the weather, or in Rousseau’s own phrase, the 
“ vile plaything of the atmosphere and seasons.”
This rapid shifting of mood in the romanticist, in re­
sponse to inner impulse or outer impression, is almost 
too familiar to need illustration. Here is an example that 
may serve for a thousand from that life-long devotee of 
the great god Whim — Hector Berlioz. When at Florence, 
Berlioz relates in his Memoirs, he received a letter from 
the mother of Camille, thewoman he loved, informing him 
of Camille’s marriage toanother. “ In two minutes my 
plans were laid. I  must hurry to Paris to kill two guilty 
women and one innocent man; for, this act of justice done, 
I  too must die.” Accordingly he loads his pistols, supplies 
himself with a disguise as a lady’s maid, so as to be able 
to penetrate into the guilty household, and puts into his 
pockets “ two little bottles, one of strychnine, the other 
of laudanum.” While awaiting the departure of the 
diligence he “ rages up and down the streets of Florence 
like a mad dog.” Later, as the diligence is traversing a 
wild mountain road, he suddenly lets out a “ ‘Ha’ ! so 
hoarse, so savage, so diabòlic that the startled driver 
bounded aside as if he had indeed a demon for his fellow- 
traveller.” But on reaching Nice he is so enchanted by
I
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the climate and environment that he not only forgets his 
errand, but spends there “ the twenty happiest days” of 
his life! There are times, one must admit, when it is an 
advantage to be temperamental.
In this exaltation of environmental influences one 
should note again the cooperation of Rousseauist and 
Baconian, of emotional and scientific naturalist. Both 
are prone to look upon man as being made by natural 
forces and not as making himself. To deal with the sub­
stitutes that Rousseauist and Baconian have proposed 
for traditional morality, is in fact to make a study of the 
varieties — and they are numerous — of naturalistic fatal- 
ism. The upshot of the whole movement is to discredit 
moral effort on the part of the individual. Why should 
a man believe in the efficacy of this effort, why should 
he struggle to acquire character if he is convinced that 
he is being moulded like putty by influences beyond his 
control — the influence of climate, for example? Both 
Science and romanticism have vied with one another in 
making of man a mere stop on which Nature may play 
what tune she will. The iEolian harp enjoyed an extraor- 
dinary popularity as a romàntic symbol. The man of Sci­
ence for his part is ready to drawr up statistical tables 
showing what season of the year is most productive of 
suicide and what type of weather impels bank-cashiers 
most irresistibly to embezzlement. A man on a moun­
tain top, according to Rousseau, enjoys not only physical 
but spiritual elevation, and when he descends to the plain 
the altitude of his mind declines with that of his body. 
Ruskin’s soul, says C. E . Norton, “ was like an fo lia n  
harp, its strings quivering musically in serene days under 
the touch of the soft air, but as the clouds gathered and
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the winds aróse, vibrating in the blast with a tensión that 
might break the sounding board itself.” I t  is not surpris- 
ing Ruskin makes other men as subject to “ skyey influ­
ences” as himself. “ The mountains of the earth are,” he 
says, “ its natural cathedrals. True religión can scarcely 
be achieved away from them. The curate or hermit of the 
field and fen, however simple his life or painful his lodg- 
ing, does not often attain the spirit of the hill pastor or 
recluse: we may find in him á decent virtue or a con- 
tented ignorance, rarely the prophetic visión or the mar­
tyr’ s passion.” The corruptions of Romanism “ are trace- 
able for the most part to lowland prelacy.” 1 
Is then the Rousseauist totally unable to regulate his 
impressions? I t  is plain that he cannot control them from 
within because the whole idea of a vital control of this 
kind is, as we have seen, foreign to the psychology of the 
beautiful soul. Yet it is, according to Rousseau, possible 
to base morality on the senses — on outer perception that 
is — and at the same time get the equivalent of a free- 
will based on inner perception. He was so much interested 
in this subject that he had planned to devote to it a 
whole treatise to be entitled “ Sensitive morality or the 
materialism of the sage.” A man cannot resist an outer 
impression but he may at least get out of its way and put 
himself in the way of another impression that will impel 
him to the desired course of conduct. “ The soul may then 
be put or maintained in the state most favorable to 
virtue.” “ Climates, seasons, sounds, colors, darkness, 
light, the elements, food, noise, silence, movement, rest, 
everything, acts on our physical frame.” By a proper 
adjustment of all these outer elements we may govern 
1 Modem Painters, Part v, ch. xx.
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in their origins the feelings by which we allow ourselves 
to be dominated.1
Rousseau’s ideas about sensitive morality are at once 
highly chimen'cal and highly significant. Here as else- 
where one may say with Amiel that nothing of Rousseau 
has been lost. His point of view has an inner kinship with 
that of the man of Science who asserts that man is neces- 
sarily the product of natural forces, but that one may 
at least modify the natural forces. For example, moral 
effort on the part of the individual cannot overeóme 
heredity. I t  is possible, however, by schemes of eugenics 
to regulate heredity. The uneasy burden of moral re- 
sponsibiüty is thus lifted from the individual, and the 
moralist in the old-fashioned sense is invited to abdi­
cate in favor of the biologist. I t  would be easy enough to 
trace similar assumptions in the various forms of socialism 
and other “ isms” almost innumerable of the present hour.
Perhaps the problem to which I  have already alluded 
may as well be faced here. How does it happen that 
Rousseau who attacked both Science and literature as 
the chief sources of human degeneracy should be an arch- 
gesthete, the authentic ancestor of the school of art for 
art’s sake and at the same time by his sensitive (or ses- 
thetic) morality play into the hands of the scientific 
determinist? If one is to enter deeply into the modera 
movement one needs to consider both wherein scientific 
and emotional naturalists clash and wherein they agree. 
The two types of naturalists agree in their virtual denial 
of a superrational realm. They clash above all in their 
attitude towards what is on the rational level. The scien­
tific naturalist is assiduously analytical. Rousseau, on the 
1 Confessions, Pt. II, Livre ix (1756).
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other hand, or rather one whole side of Rousseau, is 
hostile to analysis. The arts and Sciences are attacked 
because they are the product of reflection. “ The man 
who reflects is a depraved animal,” because he has fallen 
away from the primitive spontaneous unity of his being. 
Rousseau is the first of the great anti-intellectualists. 
By assailing both rationalism and pseudo-classic decorum 
in the ñame of instinct and emotion he appealed to men’s 
longing to get away from the secondary and the deriva­
tive to the immediate. Trae decoram satisfies the craving 
for immediacy because it contains within itself an element 
of superrational perception. The “ reason” of a Plato or 
an Aristotle also satisfies the craving for immediacy be- 
cause it likewise contains within itself an element of 
superrational perception. A reason or a decoram of this 
kind ministers to another deep need of human nature — 
the need to lose itself in a larger whole. Once eliminate 
the superrational perception and reason sinks to the level 
of rationalism, consciousness becomes mere self-con- 
sciousness. I t  is difficult, as St. Evremond said, for man 
to remain in the long run' in this doubtful middle state.
JHaving lost the unity of insight, he will long for the unity of instinct. Henee the paradox that this most self-con- 
scious of all movements is filled with the praise of the 
unconscious. I t  abounds in persons who, like Walt Whit- 
man, would tura and live with the animals, or who, like 
Novalis, would fain strike root into the earth with the 
plant. Animals 1 and plants are not engaged in any
1 With nature never do they wage 
A foolish strife; they see 
A happy youth and their oíd age 
Is beautiful and free.
Wordsworth: The Fountain.
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moral straggle, they are not inwardly divided against 
themselves.
Here is the source of the opposition between the ab- 
stract and analytical head, deadly to the sense of unity, 
and the warm immediate heart that unifies life with the 
aid of the imagination —  an opposition that assumes so 
many forms from Rousseau to Bergson. The Rousseau- 
ist always betrays himself by arraigning in some form or 
other, “ the false secondary power by which wemultiply 
distinctions.” One should indeed remember that there 
were obscurantists before Rousseau. Pascal also arrays 
the heart against the head; but his heart is at the farthest 
remove from that of Rousseau; itstands for a superrat­
ional perception. Christians like Pascal may indulge with 
comparative impunity ina certain amount of obscurant- 
ism. For theyhave submitted to a tradition that supplies 
them with distinctions between good and evil and at the 
same time controls their imagination. But for the indi- 
vidualist who has broken with tradition to deny his head 
in the ñame of his heart is a deadly peril. He above all 
persons should insist that the power by which we mul- 
tiply distinctions, though secondary, is not false that 
the intellect, of however little avail in itself, is invaluable 
when working in cooperation with the imagination in the 
Service of either inner or outer perception. I t  is only 
through the analytical head and its keen discrimmations 
that the individualist can determine whether the unity 
and infinitude towards which his imagination is reaching 
(and it is only through the imagination that one can have 
the sense of unity and infinitude) is real or merely chi- 
merical. Need I  add that in making these distinctions 
between imagination, intellect, feeling, etc., I  am not
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attempting to divide man up into more or less water- 
tight compartments, into hard and fast “ faculties,” but 
merely to express, however imperfectly, certain obscure 
and profound facts of experience?
The varieties of what one may term the rationalistic 
error, of the endeavor of the intellect to emancipate itself 
from perception and set up as an independent power, 
are numerous. The variety that was perhaps formerly 
most familiar was that of the theologian who sought to 
formúlate intellectually what must ever transcend for- 
mulation. The forms of the rationalistic error that con­
cern our present subject can be traced back for the 
most part to Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, 
and are indeed implicit in his famous identification of 
thought and being ( Je  pense, done je  suis). The dogmàtic 
and arrogant rationalism that denies both what is above 
and what is below itself, both the realm of awe and the 
realm of wonder, which prevailed among the Cartesians 
of the Enlightenment, combined, as I  have said, with 
pseudo-classic decorum to produce that sense of confine- 
ment and smugness against which the original genius 
protested. Man will always crave a view of life to which 
perception lends immediacy and the imagination infini- 
tude. A view of life like that of the eighteenth century 
that reduces unduly the role of both imagination and 
perception will always seem to him unvital and mechani- 
cal. “ The Bounded,” says Blake, “ is loathed by its pos­
sessor. The same dull round even of a Universe would 
soon become a Mili with complicated wheels.”
The mechanizing of life against which the romanticist 
protested may as I  said be largely associated with the 
influence of Descartes. It  is not however the whole truth
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about Descartes to say that he forgot the purely instru­
mental role of the intellect and encouraged it to set up 
as an independent power. As a matter of fact he also 
used the intellect as an instrument in the Service of outer 
perception. Taking as his point of departure the precise 
observations that Science was accumulating, he sought 
to formúlate mathematically the natural law. Now the 
more one reduces nature to a problem of space and 
movement, the more one is enabled to measure nature; 
and the method of exact measurement may be justi- 
fied, if not on metaphysical, at least on practical grounds. 
I t  helps one, if not to understand natural forces, at 
least to control them. I t  thereby increases man’s power 
and ministers to utility. In a word, the intellect when 
thus pressed into the Service of outer perception makes 
for material efficiency. In a sense Science becomes sci- 
entific only in proportion as it neglects the qualita­
tive differences between phenomena, e.g. between light 
and sound, and treats them solely from the point of view 
of quantity. But the penalty that science pays for this 
quantitative method is a heavy one. The farther it gets 
away from the warm immediacy of perception the less 
real it becomes; for that only is real to a man that he 
immediately perceives. Perfectly puré science tends to 
become a series of abstract mathematical formulae with- 
out any real content. By his resort to such a method, the 
man of science is in constant danger of becoming a mere 
rationalist. At bottom he is ignorant of the reality that 
lies behind natural phenomena; he must ever be ignorant 
of it, for it lays hold upon the infinite, and so must elude 
a finite being like man. But the desire to conceal his own 
ignorance from himself and others, the secret push for
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power and prestige that lies deep down in the breast of 
the man of science as in that of every other man, impels 
him to attach an independent valué to the operations of 
the intellect that have only an instrumental valué in the 
Service of outer perception and to conceive that he has 
locked up physical nature in his formulae. The man of 
Science thus falls victim to a special form of metaphysical 
illusion. The gravity of the error of the scientific intel- 
lectualist is multiplied tenfold when he conceives that his 
formulae cover not merely the natural law but the human 
law as well, when he strives, like Taine, to convert man 
himself into a “ walking theorem,” a “ living geometry.” 
This denial of every form of spontaneity was rightly felt 
by the romanticists to be intolerable.
Goethe contrasts the smug satisfaction of Wagner in 
his dead formulae that give only what is external and 
secondary, with Faust’s fierce craving for immediacy and 
therefore his impatience with an analysis that gives only 
the dry bones from which the vital breath has departed. 
Wagner is a philistine because he is not tormented by the 
thirst for the infinite. Faust, on the other hand, reaches 
out beyond the mere intellect towards the spirit that is 
behind the shows of nature, but this spirit appears to 
him and reduces him to despair by declaring that he is 
trying to grasp something that is not only infinite but 
alien to him. Instead of turning from this alien spirit 
to the spirit that is relevant to man, a spirit that sets 
bounds to every inordinate craving, including the inor­
dinate craving for knowledge (libido sciendi), Faust gives 
himself to the devil in what was, in the time of the 
youthful Goethe, the newest fashion: he becomes a 
Rousseauist. Instead of striking into the ascending path
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of insight, he descends to the level of impulse. Seen from 
this level the power by which we multiply distinctions 
seems to him, as it was toseem later to Wordsworth, not 
merely secondary but false, and so definition yields to 
indiscriminate feeling (Gefühl ist alies). In general the 
Rousseauistic reply to the Cartesian attempt to identify 
thought and being is the identification of being with emo- 
tion (je sens done je  suis).
The Mephistopheles of Goethe has often been taken as 
a symbol of the iconoclastic and Voltairian side of the 
eighteenth century. The rationalists assailed the tradi- 
tional forms that imply a superrational realm as mere 
“ prejudice,” and, failing to find in insight a substitute 
for these discarded forms, they succumbed in turn to the 
emotionalists. A “ reason” that is not groundedin insight 
will always seem to men intolerably coid and negative and 
will prove unable to withstand the assault of the pri- 
marv passions. The reason of a Plato or an Aristotle 
:s on a different footing altogether because, as I  have 
said, it includes an element of inner perception. One may 
note here that the difíiculties of the present subject anse 
in no small degree from the ambiguities that cluster about 
the word reason. I t  may not only mean the imagina- 
tive insight1 of a Plato and the abstract reasoning oí a
1 vbe phrase imaginative insight is, I believe, true to the spirit of Plato 
at his best, but it is certainly not true to his terminology. Plato puts the 
imagination feomria) not only below intuitive reason H  and discur­
ra reason or understanding (Siái/oio), but even below outer perception 
M m ,). He recognizes indeed that it may reflect the operations of the 
understanding and even the higher reason as well as the impressions of 
sense. This notion of a superior intel·lectual imagination was carried much 
further by Plotinus and the neo-Platonists. Even the intellectual ímagi- 
nation is, however, conceived of as passive. Perhaps no Greek thinker, no. 
even Plato, makes as clear as he might that reason gets its mtuition o 
reality and the One with the aid of the imagination and, as it were, through
Descartes but is often employed by the classicist himself 
as a synonym of good sense. Good sense may be defined 
as a correct perception of the ordinary facts of life and 
of their relation to one another. I t  may be of very many 
grades, corresponding to the infinite diversity of the facts 
to be perceived. A man may evidently have good sense 
in dealing with one order of facts, and quite lack it in deal- 
ing with some different order of facts. As the result of long 
observation and experience of a multitude of minute rela- 
tionships, of the facts that ordinarily follow one another 
or coexist in some particular field, a man’s knowledge of 
this field becomes at last, as it were, automatic and un- 
conscious. A sea captain for example acquires at last an 
intuitive knowledge of the weather, the broker, an in- 
tuitive knowledge of stocks. The good sense or practical 
judgment of the sea captain in his particular calling and 
of the broker in his is likely to be greater than that of less 
experienced persons. One cannot, however, assert that a 
man’s good sense is always in striet ratio to his experi­
ence. Some persons seem to have an innate gift for seeing 
things as they are, others a gift equally innate for seeing 
things as they are not.
Again the field in which one displays one’s good sense 
or practical judgment may fall primarily under either the 
human law or the natural law, may belong in Aristotelian 
phrase to the domain either of the probable or of the
a veil of illusion, that, in Joubert’s phrase, “ l’illusion est une partie inté- 
grante de la réalité ” (Pensées, Titre xi, xxxix). Joubert again distin- 
guishes (ibid., Titre ni, x lv ii, l i) between “ l’imaginative” which is passive 
and “l’imagination” which is active and Creative (“ l’oeil de l’áme”). In 
its .failure to bring out with sufficient explicitness this Creative róle of the 
imagination and in the stubborn intellectualism that this failure implies 
is to be found, if anywhere, the weak point in the cuirass of Greek phi- 
losophy.
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necessary. To take a homely illustration, a man is free 
to choose the temperature of his bath, but only within 
the limits of natural necessity — in this case the temper­
ature at which water freezes and that at which water 
boils. He will show his practical judgment by choosing 
water that is neither too hot ñor too coid and this so far 
as he is concerned will be the golden mean. Here as else- 
where the golden mean is nothing mechanical, but may 
vary not only from individual to individual but in the 
same individual according to his age, the state of his 
health, etc. In determining what conforms to the golden 
mean or law of measure there must always be a mediation 
between the particular instance and the general principie, 
and it is here that intuition is indispensable. But even 
so there is a centre of normal human experience, and the 
person who is too far removed from it ceases to be prob­
able. Aged persons may exist who find bathing in ice- 
water beneficial, but they are not representative. Now 
Creative art, in distinet ratio to its dignity, deais not with 
what may happen in isolated cases but with what hap- 
pens according to probability or necessity. I t  is this pre- 
occupation with the universal that as Aristotle says 
makes poetry a more serious and philosophical thing than 
history. There enters indeed into true art an element of 
vital novelty and surprise. But the more cultivated the 
audience to which the creator addresses himself the more 
will it insist that the surprise be not won at the expense 
of motivation. I t  will demand that characters and inci­
dents be not freakish, not too remote from the facts that 
normally follow one another or coexist, whether in ña- 
ture or human nature. One needs, in short, to deal with 
both art and life from some ethical centre. The centre
with reference to which one has good sense may be only 
the ethos of one’s time and country, but if one’s good 
sense has, as in the case of the great poets, the support of 
the imagination, it may pass beyond to something more 
abiding. “ Of Pope’s intellectual character,” says Dr. 
Johnson, “ the constituent and fundamental principie was 
good sense, a prompt and intuitive perception of con- 
sonance and propriety. He saw immediately of his own 
conceptions what was to be chosen, and what to be re- 
jected.” One may grant all this and at the same time feel 
the difference between the “ reason” of a Pope and the 
reason of a Sophocles.
Good sense of the kind Dr. Johnson describes and de­
corum are not strictly speaking synonymous. To be 
decorous not only must one have a correct perception of 
what to do, but one must actually be able to do it; and 
this often requires a long and difficult training. We have 
seen that Rousseau’s spite against eighteenth-century 
Paris was largely due to the fact that he had not ac- 
quired young enough the habits that would have made 
it  possible for him to conform to its convention. “ I  
affected,” says Rousseau with singular candor, “ to de­
spise the politeness I  did not know how to practice. 
As a matter of fact he had never adj usted himself to the 
decorum and good sense of any community. His attitude 
towards life was fundamentally Bohemian. But a person 
who was sensible and decorous according to the standards 
of some other country might have emphasized the differ- 
ences between his good sense and decorum and the good 
sense and decorum of eighteenth-century Paris. The op- 
ponents of the traditional order in the eighteenth cen- 
tury were fond of introducing some Persian or Chinese
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to whom this order seemed no true order at all but only 
“ prejudice” or “ abuse.” The conclusión would seemto be 
that because the good sense and decorum of one time and 
country do not coincide exactly with those of another 
time and country, therefore good sense and decorum 
themselves have in them no universal element, and are 
entirely implicated in the shifting circumstances of time 
and place. But behind the ethos of any particular coun­
try, that of Greece, for instance, there are, as Antigone 
perceived, the “ unwritten laws of heaven,” and some­
thing of this permanent order is sure to shine through 
even the most imperfect convention. Though no con­
vention is final, though man and all he establishes are 
subject to the law of change, it is therefore an infinitely 
delicate and perilous task to break with convention. One 
can make this break only in favor of insight; which is 
much as if one should say that the only thing that may 
safely be opposed to common sense is a commoner sense, or 
if one prefers, a common sense that is becoming more and 
more imaginative. Even so, the wiser the man, one may 
surmise, the less likely he will be to indulge in a violent 
and theatrical rupture with his age, after the fashion of 
Rousseau. He will like Socrates remember the counsel 
of the Delphian oracle to follow the “ usage of the city,” 1 
and while striving to gain a firmer hold upon the human 
law and to impose a more strenuous discipline upon his 
ordinary self, he will so far as possible conform to what 
he finds established. A student of the past cannot help 
being struck by the fact that men are found scattered 
through different times and countries and living under 
very different conventions who are nevertheless in vir- 
1 See Xenophon, Memorabilia, iv, 16, 3.
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tue of their insight plainly moving towards a common 
centre. So much so that the best books of the world seem 
to have been written, as Emerson puts it, by one all-wise, 
all-seeing gentleman. A curious circumstance is that the 
writers who are most universal in virtue of their imagi- 
native reason or inspired good sense, are likewise as a rule 
the writers who realized most intensely the life of their 
own age. No other Spanish writer, for example, has so 
much human appeal as Cervantes, and at the same time 
no other brings us so cióse to the heart of sixteenth- 
century Spain. In the writings attributed to Confucius 
one encounters, mixed up with much that is almost in- 
conceivably remote from us, maxims that have not lost 
their validity to-day; maxims that are sure to be reaf- 
firmed wherever and whenever men attain to the level of 
humanístic insight. In the oldest Buddhist documents 
again one finds along with a great deal that is very ex­
pressive of ancient India, and thus quite foreign to our 
idiosyncrasy, a good sense which is even more imaginative 
and inspired, and therefore more universal, than that of 
Confucius, and which is manifested, moreover, on the 
religious rather than on the humanistic level. We are 
dealing here with indubitable facts, and should plant 
ourselves firmly upon them as against those who would 
exaggerate either the constant or the variable elements 
in human nature.
Enough has been said to show the ambiguities involved 
in the word reason. Reason may mean the abstract and 
geometrical reason of a Descartes, it may mean simply 
good sense, which may itself exist in very many grades 
ranging from an intuitive mastery of some particular 
field to the intuitive mastery of the ethos of a whole age,
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like the reason of a Pope. Finally reason may be imagi­
native and be thereby enabled to go beyond the conven- 
tion of a particular time and country, and lay hold in vary- 
ing degrees on “ the unwritten laws of heaven.” I  have 
already traced in some measure the process by which 
reason in the eighteenth century had come to mean 
abstract and geometrical (or as one may say Cartesian) 
reason or else unimaginative good sense. Cartesian 
reason was on the one hand being pressed into the Service 
of Science and its special order of perceptions; on the 
other hand it was being used frequently in cooperation 
with an unimaginative good sense to attack the tradi- 
tional forms that imply a realm of insight which is above 
both abstract reason and ordinary good sense. Men were 
emboldened to use reason in this way because they were 
flushed not only by the increasing mastery of man over 
nature through Science, but by the positive and anti- 
traditional method through which this mastery had been 
won. Both those who proclaimed and those who denied 
a superrational realm were at least agreed in holding that 
the faith in any such realm was inseparable from certain 
traditional forms. Pascal, for example, held not only that 
insight in religión is annexed to the acceptance of certain 
dogmas — and this offended the new critical spirit — but 
furthermore that insight could exist even in the orthodox 
only by a special divine gift or grace, and this offended 
man’s reviving confidence in himself. People were ready 
to applaud when a Voltaire declared it was time to “ take 
the side of human nature against this sublime misan- 
thropist.” The insight into the law of decorum on which 
classicism must ultimately rest was in much the same 
way held to be inseparable from the Grceco-Roman tradi-
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tion; and so the nature of classical insight as a thing 
apart from any tradition tended to be obscured in the 
endless bickerings of ancients and moderns. The classical 
traditionalists, however, were less prone than the Chris- 
tian traditionalists (Jansenists, Jesuits and Protestants) 
to weaken their cause still further by wrangling among 
themselves.
Inasmuch as both Christians and humanists failed to 
plant themselves on the fact of insight, the insight carne 
more and more to be rejected along with the special forros 
from which it was deemed to be inseparable. As a result 
of this rejection “ reason” was left to cope unaidedwith 
man’s impulses and expansive desires. Now Pascal saw 
rightly that the balance of power in such a conñict be- 
tween reason and impulse was held by the imagination, 
and that if reason lacked the support of insight the imagi­
nation would side with the expansive desires and reason 
would succumb. Moreover the superrational insight, or 
“ heart ” as Pascal calis it, that can alone keep man from 
being thus overwhelmed, comes, as he holds, not through 
reason but through grace and is at times actually opposed 
to reason. (“ Theheart,” he says, “ has reasons of which 
the reason knows nothing. ”) Instead of protesting against 
the asceticism of thisviewas the true positivist would 
do, instead of insisting that reason and imagination may 
pulí together harmoniously in the Service of insight, the 
romàntic moralist opposed to the superrational “ heart” 
of the austere Christian a subrational “ heart,” and this 
involved an attempt to base morality on the very element 
in human nature it is designed to restrain. The positivist 
will plant himself first of all on the fact of insight and will 
define it as the immediate perception of a something
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anterior to both thought and feeling, that is known prac- 
tically as a power of control over both. The beautiful 
soul, as we have seen, has no place for any such power m 
his scheme of things, but hopes to satisfy all ethical ele­
ments simply by letting himself go. Rousseau (following 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson) transforms conscience ítself 
from an inner check into an expansive emotion. While 
thus corrupting conscience in its very essence he does 
not deny conscience. On the contrary he grows positively 
rhapsodic over conscience and other similar words. 
“ Rousseau tookwisdom from men’s souls,” says Joubert, 
“ by talking tothem of virtue.” In short, Rousseau dis- 
plays the usual dexterity of the sophist in juggling with 
ill-defined general terms. If one calis for sharp definition 
one is at once dismissed as a mere rationalist who is re- 
treating into a false secondary power from a warm im- 
mediacy. The traditional distinctions regarding good and 
bad were thus discarded at the same time that discredit 
was cast on the keen analysis with which it would have 
been possible to build up new distinctions — all m favor 
of an indiscriminate emotionalism. This discomfiture of 
both tradition and analysis in the field of the human law 
would not have been so easy if at the same time mans 
active attention and effort had not been concentrated 
more and more on the field of the natural law. In that 
field imagination and the analytical intellect were actu­
ally pulling together in the Service of perception with the 
result that man was constantly gaining m power and 
utility. Emotional romanticists and scientific utilitarians 
have thus, in spite of their surface clashes, cooperated 
during the past century in the dehumanizmg of man.
I t  is not enough to say of the representatives of bot
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sides of this great naturalistic movement that they elim­
inate the veto power from human nature while continuing 
to use the oíd words, like virtue and conscience, that imply 
a veto power. We have seen that they actually attack the 
veto power as synonymous with evil. The devil is con- 
ceived as the spirit that always says no. A purely affirma­
tive morality is almost necessarily an emotional morality. 
If  there is no región of insight above the reason which is 
felt by the natural man as an element of vital control, 
and if coid reason, reason unsupported by insight, never 
has done anything illustrious, as Rousseau truly says, it 
follows that the only way to put driving power behind 
reason is to turn virtue into a passion, — a passion that 
differs from other passions merely in its greater imperi- 
ousness. For the beautiful soul virtue, as we have seen 
in the case of Robespierre, is not only a tender, imperious 
and voluptuous passion but even an intoxication. “ I  was, 
if not virtuous,” says Rousseau, “ at least intoxicated 
with virtue.” In its extreme manifestations romàntic 
morality is indeed only one aspect, and surely the most 
singular aspect, of the romàntic cult of intoxication. No 
student of romanticism can fail to be struck by its 
pursuit of delirium, vertigo and intoxication for their 
own sake. I t  is important to see how all these things are 
closely related to one another and how they all derive 
from the attempt to put life on an emotional basis. To 
rest conscience, for example, on emotion is to rest it on 
what is always changing, not only from man to man but 
from moment to moment in the same man. “ If,” as 
Shelley says, “ nought is, but that it feels itself to be,” it 
will feel itself to be very different things at different times. 
No part of man is exempt from the región of flux and
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change. There is, as James himself points out, a kinship 
between such a philosophy of pure motion and vertigo. 
Faust after all is only consistent when having identified 
the spirit that says no, which is the true voice of con­
science, with the devil, he proceeds to dedicate himself 
to vertigo (dem Taumel weih’ ich mich). Rousseau also, 
asreaders of the “Confessions” will remember, deliberately 
courted giddiness by gazing down on a waterfall from the 
brink of a precipice (making sure first that the railing on 
which he leaned was good and strong). This naturalistic 
dizziness became epidemic among the Greeks at the criti- 
cal moment of their break with traditional standards. 
“ Whirl is King,” cried Aristophanes, “ having chiven out 
Zeus.” The modern sophist is even more a votary of the 
god Whirl than the Greek, for he has added to the mobil- 
ity of an intellect that has no support in either tradition or 
insight the mobility of feeling. Many Rousseauists were, 
like Hazlitt, attracted to the French Revolution by its 
“ grand whirling movements.”
Even more significant than the cult of vertigo is the 
closely allied cult of intoxication. “ Man being reason- 
able,” says Byron, with true Rousseauistic logic, “ must 
therefore get drunk. The best of life is but intoxication.” 
The subrational and impulsive self of the man who has 
got drunk is not only released from the surveillance of 
reason in any sense of the word, but his imagination is 
at the same time set free from the limitations of the real. 
If many Rousseauists have been rightly accused of be­
ing “ lovers of delirium,” that is because in delirium the 
fancy is especially free to wander wild in its own empire 
of chimeras. To compose a poem, as Coleridge is sup- 
posed to have composed “ Kubla Khan,” in an opium
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dream without any participation of his rational self is a 
triumph of romàntic art. “ I  should have taken more 
opium when I  wrote it,” said Friedrich Schlegel in ex- 
planation of the failure of his play “ Atareos.” What more 
specially concems our present topic is the carrying over of 
this subrational “ enthusiasm” into the field of ethical 
valúes, and this calis for certain careful distinctions. 
Genuine religión — whether genuine Christianity or 
genuine Buddhism — is plainly unfriendly in the highest 
degree to every form of intoxication. Buddhism, for 
example, not only prohibits the actual use of intoxicants 
but it pursues implacably all the subtler intoxications of 
the spirit. The attitude of the humanist towards intoxi­
cation is somewhat more complex. He recognizes how 
deep in man’s nature is the craving for some blunting of 
the sharp edge of his consciousness and at least a partial 
escape from reason and reality; and so he often makes a 
place on the recreative side of life for such moments of 
escape even if attained with the aid of wine. Dulce est 
desipere in loco. Pindar, who displays so often in his verse 
the high seriousness of the ethical imagination, is simply 
observing the decorum of the occasion when he celebrates 
in a song for the end of a feast “ the time when the weari- 
some cares of men have vanished from their reasons and 
on a wide sea of golden wealth we are all alike voyaging 
to some visionary shore. He that is penniless is then rich, 
and even they that are wealthy find their hearts expand- 
ing, when they are smitten by the arrows of the vine.” 
The true Greek, one scarcely needs add, put his final em­
phasis, as befitted a child of Apollo, not on intoxication 
but on the law of measure and sobriety — on preserving 
the integrity of his mind, to render literally the Greek
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word for the virtue that he perhaps prized the most.1 One 
must indeed remember that alongside the Apollonian 
element in Greek life is the orgiastic or Dyonisiac ele­
ment. But when Euripides sides imaginatively with the 
frenzy of Dionysus, as he does in his “ Bacchae,” though 
ostensibly preaching moderation, we may affirm that he 
is falling away from what is best in the spirit of Helias and 
revealing a kinship with the votaries of the god Whirl. 
The cult of intoxication has as a matter of fact appeared 
in all times and places where men have sought to get the 
equivalent of religious visión and the sense of oneness that 
it brings without rising above the naturalistic level. True 
religious visión is a process of concentration, the result of 
the imposition of the veto power upon the expansive 
desires of the ordinary self. The various naturalistic 
simulations of this visión are, on the contrary, expansive, 
the result of a more or less complete escape from the veto 
power, whether won with the aid of intoxicants or not. 
The emotional romanticists from Rousseau down have 
left no doubt as to the type of visión they represented. 
Rousseau dilates with a sort of fellow feeling on the deep 
potations that went on in the taverns of patriarchal 
Geneva.2 Renán looks with disfavor on those who are 
trying to diminish drunkenness among the common 
people. He merely asks that this drunkenness “ be 
gentle, amiable, accompanied by moral sentiments.” 
Perhaps this side of the movement is best summed up 
in the following passage of William James: “ The sway 
of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its 
power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human ña- 
ture, usually crushed to earth by the coid faets and dry 
i 2u<ppoaími. 2 See his Lettre à d’Alembert.
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criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, dis- 
criminates and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and 
says yes. I t  is, in fact, the great exciter of the Yes func- 
tion in man. I t  brings its votary from the chill periphery 
of things to the radiant core. I t  makes him for the mo­
ment one with truth.” 1
The American distiller who named one of his brands 
“ Golden Dream Whiskey” was evidently too modest. 
If an adept in the new psychology he might have set up 
as a puré idealist, as the opener up of an especially radi­
ant pathway to the “ truth.”
The primitivist then attacks sober discrimination as 
an obstacle both to warm immediacy of feeling and to 
unity. He tends to associate the emotional unity that 
he gains through intoxication with the unity of instinct 
which he so admires in the world of the subrational. “ The 
romàntic character,” says Ricarda Huch, “ is more ex- 
posed to waste itself in debaucheries than any other; for 
only in intoxication, whether of love or wine, when the 
one half of its being, consciousness, is lulled to sleep, can 
it enjoy the büss for which it envies every beast — the 
bliss of feeling itself one.” 2 The desires of the animal, 
however, work within certain definite limits. They are 
not, like those of the primitivist, inordinate, the expla- 
nation being that they are less stimulated than the desires 
of the primitivist by the imagination. Even if he gets rid 
of intellect and moral effort, the primitivist cannot attain 
the unity of instinct because he remains too imaginative; 
at the same time he proclaims and proclaims rightly that 
the imagination is the great unifying power — the power 
that can alone save us from viewing things in “ discon- 
1 Varieties of Religious Experience, 387. 2 Blütezeit der Romantík, 126.
nection dead and spiritless.” We should attend carefully 
at this point for we are coming to the heart of the great 
romàntic sophism. The Rousseauist does not attain to 
the unity of the man whose impulses and desires are con- 
trolled and disciplined to some ethical centre. He does not, 
in spite of all his praise of the unconscious and of the 
“ sublime animals,” attain to the unity of instinct. In 
what sense then may he be said to attain unity? The 
obvious replyis that he attains unity onlyin dreamland. 
For the nature to which he would return, one cannot 
repeat too often, is nothing real, but a mere nostàlgic 
straining of the imagination away from the real. I t  is 
only in dreamland that one can rest unity on the ex­
pansi ve forces of personality that actually divide not only 
one individual from another but the same individual 
from himself. I t  is only in dreamland that, in the absence 
of both inner and outer control, “ all things” will “ flow 
to all, as rivers to the sea.” Such a unity will be no more 
f.hfl.n a dream unity, even though one term it the ideal 
and sophisticate in its favor all the traditional terms of 
religión and morality. A question that forces itself at 
every stage upon the student of this movement is: What 
is the valué of unity without reality f  For two things are 
equally indubitable: first, that romanticism on the philo- 
sophical side, is a protest in the ñame of unity against the 
disintegrating analysis of the eighteenth-century ration- 
alist; second, that what the primitivist wants in exchange 
for analysis is not reality but illusion. Rousseau who in­
clines like other sesthetes to identify the true with the 
beautiful was, we are told, wont to exclaim: “ There is 
nothing beautiful save that which is not” ; a saying to 
be matched with that of “ La Nouvelle Hélo'ise” : “ The
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land of chimeras is alone worthy of habitation.” Similar 
utterances might bemultiplied from French, English,and 
Germán romanticists.1 To be sure, the word “ reality” is 
perhaps the most slippery of all general terms. Certain 
recent votaries of the god Whirl, notably Bergson, have 
promise d us that if we surrender to the flux we shall have 
a “ visión” not only of unity but also of reality; and so 
they have transíerred to the cult of their divinity all 
the traditional language of religión.
We do not, however, need for the present to enter into 
a discussion as to the nature of reality, but simply to stick 
to striet psychological observation. From this point of 
view it is not hard to see that the primitivist makes his 
primary appeal not to man’s need for unity and reality 
but to a very different need. Byron has told us what this 
need is in his tale (“ The Island”) of a ship’s crew that 
overpowered its offleers and then set sail for Otaheite; 
what impelled these Arcadian mutineers was not the 
desire for a genuine return to aboriginal life with its rigid 
conventions, but
The wish — which ages have not yet subdued
In man — to have no master save his mood.
Now to have no master save one’s mood is to be wholly 
temperamental. In Arcadia — the ideal of romàntic mo- 
rality —  those who are wholly temperamental unite in 
sympathy and brotherly love. I t  remains to consider 
more fully what this triumph of temperament means in 
the real world.
1 “ Parfaite illusion, réalité parfaite” (Alfred de Vigny). “ Die Welt 
wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt” (Novalis). “ This sort of dreaming 
existence is the best; he who quits it to go in seareh of realities generally 
barters repose for repeated disappointments and vain regrets ” (Hazlitt).
CHAPTER V
EOMANTIC MORALITY t THE REAL
T h e  fundamental thing in Rousseauistic morality is not, 
as we have seen, the assertion that man is naturally 
good, but the denial of the “ civil war in the cave.” 
Though this denial is not complete in Rousseau himself, 
nothing is more certain than that his whole tendency is 
away from this form of dualism. The beautiful soul does 
the right thing not as a resuit of efiort, but spontaneously, 
unconsciously and almost inevitably. In fact the beauti­
ful soul can scarcely be said to be a voluntary agent at all. 
“ Nature” acts in him and for him. This minimizing of 
moral struggle and deliberation and choice, this drift to- 
wards a naturalistic fatalism, as it may be termed, is a 
far more significant thing in Rousseau than his optimism. 
One may as a matter of fact eliminate dualism in favor of 
nature and at the same time look on nature as evil. This 
is precisely what one is likely to do if one sees no alterna- 
tive to temperamental living, while judging those who 
live temperamentally not by their “ ideal,” that is by 
their feeling of their own loveliness, but by what they 
actually do. One will become a realist in the sense that 
came to be attached to this word during the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. Rousseau himself is often 
realistic in this sense when he interrupts his Arcadian 
visions to teli us what actually occurred. In the “ Con­
fessions,” as I  have said, passages that recall Lamartine 
alternate with passages that recall Zola, and the transi-
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tion from one type of passage to the other is often dis- 
concertingly sudden. In reading these realistic passages 
of Rousseau we are led to reflect that his “ nature” is 
not, in practice, so remote from Taine’s nature as might 
at first appear. “ What we cali nature,” says Taine, “ is 
this brood of secret passions, often maleñcent, generally 
vulgar, always blind, which tremble and fret within us, ill- 
covered by the cloak of decency and reason under which 
we try to disgmse them; we think we lead them and they 
lead us; we think our actions our own, they are theirs.” 1 
The transition from an optimistic to a pessimistic 
naturalism can be followed with special clearness in the 
stages by which the sentimental drama of the eighteenth 
century passes over into the realistic drama of a later 
period. Petit de Julleville contrasts the beginning and 
the end of this development as follows: “ [In the eight­
eenth century] to please the public you had to say to it:
‘ You are all at least at bottom good, virtuous, full of 
feeling. Let yourselves go, follow your instincts; listen 
to nature and you will do the right thing spontaneously.’ 
How changed times are! Nowadays 2 any one who wishes 
to please, to be read and petted and admired, to pass for 
great and become very rich, should address men as fol­
lows: 'You are a vile pack of rogues, and profligates, you 
ha ve neither faith ñor law; you are impelled by your 
instincts alone and these instincts are ignoble. Do not try 
though to mend matters, that would be of no use at all.’ ” 3 
The connecting link between these different forms of 
the drama is naturalistic fatalism, the suppression of 
moral responsibility for either man’s goodness or bad- 
ness. Strictly speaking, the intrusión of the naturalistic 
1 Lit. Ang., iv, 130. 2 About 1885. 3 Le Théàlre en France, 304.
element into the realm of ethical valúes and the sub­
versión by it of deliberation and choice and of the normal 
sequence of moral cause and effect is felt from the human 
point of view not as fate at all, but as chance. Emotional 
romanticism joins at this point with other forms of 
romanticism, which all show a proclivity to prefer to 
striet motivation, to probability in the Aristotelian sense, 
what is fortuitous and therefore wonderful. This is only 
another way of saying that the romanticist is moving 
away from the genuinely dramatic towards melodrama. 
Nothing is easier than to establish the connection be­
tween emotional romanticism and the prodigious efflores- 
cence of melodrama, the irresponsible quest for thrills, 
that has marked the past century. What perhaps dis- 
tinguishes this movement from any previous one is the 
attempt to invest what is at bottom a melodramàtic 
view of life with philosophic and even religious signifi­
c a r e .  By suppressing the “ civil war in the cave” one 
strikes at the very root of true drama. I t  does not then 
much matter from the dramatic point of view whether the 
burden of responsibility for good or evil of which you 
have relieved the individual is shifted upon “ nature” 
or society. Shelley, for example, puts the blame for evil 
on society. “ Prometheus Unbound,” in which he has 
developed his conception, is, judged as a play, only an 
ethereal melodrama. The unaccountable collapse of 
Zeus, a monster of unalloyed and unmotivated badness, 
is followed by the gushing forth in man of an equally 
unalloyed and unmotivated goodness. The whole genius 
of Hugo, again, as I  have said in speaking of his use of 
antithesis, is melodramàtic. His plays may be described 
as parvenú melodramas. They abound in every variety
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of startling contrast and strange happening, the whole 
pressed into the Service of “ problems” manifold and 
even of a philosophy of history. At the same time the 
poverty of ethical insight and true dramatic motivation 
is dissimulated under profuse lyrical outpourings and 
purple patches of local color. His Hernani actually glories 
in not being a responsible agent, but an “ unchained and 
fatal forcé,” 1 and so more capable of striking astonish- 
ment into himself and others. Y et the admirers of Hugo 
would not only promote him to the first rank of poets, 
but would have us share his own belief that he is a seer 
and a prophet.
I t  may be objected that the great dramatists of the 
past exalt this power of fate and thus diminish moral 
responsibility. But the very sharpest distinction must 
be drawn between the subrational fate of the emotional 
romanticist and the superrational fate of Greek tragedy. 
The fate of JSschylean tragedy, for instance, so far from 
undermining moral responsibility rather reinforces it. 
I t  is felt to be the revelation of a moral order of which 
man’s experience at any particular moment is only an 
infinitesimal fragment. I t  does not seem, like the sub­
rational fate of the emotional romanticist, the intrusión 
into the human realm of an alien power whether friendly 
or unfriendly. This point might be established by a study 
of the so-called fate drama in Germany (Schicksaliragódie) , 
which, though blackly pessimistic, is closely related to 
the optimistic sentimental drama of the eighteenth cen- 
tury.2 The Germán fate drama is in its essence ignoble
1 Je suis une forcé qui va!
Agent aveugle et sourd de mystères funébres.
2 E.g., Lillo’s Falál Curiosüy (1736) had a marked influence on the rise 
of the Germán fate tragedy.
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because its characters are specimens of sensitive morality 
— incapable, that is, of opposing a firm human purpose 
to inner impulse or outer impression. The fate that thus 
wells up from the depths of nature and overwhelms their 
wills is not only malign and ironical, but as Grillparzer 
says, makes human deeds seem only “ throws of the dice 
in the blind night of chance.” 1 I t  would be easy to follow 
similar conceptions of fate down through later literature 
at least to the novéis of Thomas Hardy.
Some of the earlier exponents of the sentimental 
drama, like Diderot, were not so certain as one might 
expect that the discarding of traditional decorum in 
favor of “ nature” would result practically in a reign of 
puré loveliness. At one moment Diderot urges men to get 
rid of the civil war in the cave in order that they may be 
Arcadian, like the savages of the South Sea, but at other 
moments — as in “ Rameau’s Nephew” —  he shows a 
somewhat closer grip on the problem of what will actually 
come to pass when a man throws off the conventions of 
a highly organized civilization and sets out to live tem- 
peramentally. Diderot sees clearly that he will be that 
least primitive of all beings, the Bohemian. Rameau’s 
nephew, in his irresponsibility and emotional instability, 
in the kaleidoscopic shiftings of his mood, anticipates 
all the romàntic Bohemians and persons of “ artistic 
temperament” who were to afflict the nineteenth century. 
But he is more than a mere aesthete. At moments we can 
discern in him the first lineaments of the superman, who
1 Wo ist der, der sagen dürfe,
So will ich’s, so sei’s gemacht,
Unsre Taten sind nur Würfe 
In des Zufalls blinde Nacht.
Die Ahnfrau.
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knows no law save the law of might. One should recollect 
that the actual influence of Diderot in France fell in the 
second rather than in the first half of the nineteenth 
century — was upon the realists rather than upon the 
romanticists. The same men that had a cult for Dide­
rot admired the Vautrins and the Rastignacs of Balzac 
and the Julien Sorel of Stendhal. These characters are 
little Napoleons. They live temperamentally in the midst 
of a highly organized society, but they set aside its con- 
ventions of right and wrong in favor, not of sesthetic 
^  enjoyment, but of power.
T  The ideal of romàntic morality, as was seen in the last 
/  chapter, is altruism. The real, it should be clear from the 
examples I  have been citing, is always egoism. But ego- 
v ism may assume very different forms. As to the main 
forms of egoism in men who have repudiated outer control 
without acquiring self-control we may perhaps revive 
profitably the oíd Christian classification of the three 
lusts — the lust of knowledge, the lust of sensation, and 
the lust of power. Goethe indeed may be said to have 
treated these three main ways of being temperamental 
in three of his early characters —  the lust of knowledge in 
“ Faust,” the lust of sensation in “ Werther,” and the lust 
of power in “ Gotz.” If we view life solely from the natu- 
ralistic level and concern ourselves solely with the world 
of action, we are justified in neglecting, like Hobbes, the 
other lusts and putting supreme emphasis on the lust 
for power.1 Professor F. J .  Mather, Jr., has distinguished 
between“ hard” and “ soft” sentimentalists.2 His distinc-
1 “ So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all man- 
kind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth 
only in Death.” Leviathan, Part i, ch. xi.
1 See Unpopular Review, October, 1915.
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tion might perhaps be brought more closely into line with 
my own distinctions if I  ventured to coin a word and to 
speak of hard and soft temperamentalists. The soft tem- 
peramentalist will prove unable to cope in the actual world 
with the hard temperamentalist, and is very likely to be- 
come his tool. Balzac has very appropriately made Luden 
de Rubempré, the romàntic poet and a perfect type of a 
soft temperamentaüsm, the tool of Yautrin, the superman.
Here indeed is the supreme opposition between the 
ideal and the real in romàntic morality. The ideal to which 
Rousseau invites us is either the primitivistic anarchy of 
the “ Second Discourse,” in which egoism is temperedby 
“ natural pity,” or else a state such as is depicted in the 
“ Social Contract,” in which egoism is held in check by 
a disinterested “ general will.” The preliminary to achiev- 
ing either of these ideals is that the traditional checks on 
human nature should be removed. But in exact propor- 
tion as this programme of emancipation is carried out 
what emerges in the real world is not the mythical will 
to brotherhood, but the ego and its fundamental will to 
power. Give a bootblack half the universe, according to j 
Carlyle, and he will soon be quarreling with the owner ' 
of the other half. He will if he is a very temperamental j 
bootblack. Perhaps indeed all other evils in life may be 
reduced to the failure to check that something in man 
that is reaching out for more and ever for more. In a 
society in which the traditional inhibitions are constantly 
growing weaker, the conflict I  have just sketched be­
tween the ideal and the real is becoming more and more 
acute. The soft temperamentalists are overflowing with 
beautiful professions of brotherly love, and at the same 
time the hard temperamentalists are reaching out for
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everything in sight; and inasmuch as the hard tempera- 
mentalists operate not in dreamland, but in the real 
world, they are only too plainly setting the tone. Very 
often, of course, the same temperamentalist has his hard 
and his soft side. The triumph of egoism over altruism 
in the relations between man and man is even more 
evident in the relations between nation and nation. The 
egoism that results from the inbreeding of temperament 
on a national scale runs in the case of the strong nations 
into imperialism.1 We have not reflected sufficiently on 
the fact that the soft temperamentalist Rousseau is more 
than any other one person the father of K u ltur;2 and 
that the exponents of Kultur in our own day have been 
revealed as the hardest of hard temperamentalists.
To understand the particular craving that is met by 
Rousseauistic idealism one would need to go with some 
care into the psychology of the half-educated man. The 
half-educated man may be defined as the man who has 
acquired a degree of critical self-consciousness sufficient 
to detach him from the standards of his time and place, 
but not sufficient to acquire the new standards that come 
with a more thorough cultivation. I t  was pointed out long 
ago that the characteristic of the half-educated man is
1 E. Seillière has been tracing, in Le M al romantique and other volumes, 
the relation between Rousseauism and what he terms an “ irrational im­
perialism.” His point of view is on the constructive side very different 
from mine.
2 The best account of Rousseau’s Germán influence is stili that of 
H. Hettner in his Literaturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts. Compared with 
Rousseau’s Germán influence, says Professor Paul Hensel in his Rousseau  
(1907), “ his influence in France seems almost trifling.” In Germany 
“ Rousseau became the basis not of a guillotine but of a new culture 
(Kultur).. . .  We have drawn his spirit over to us, we have made it our 
own.” (121.) See also Professor Eugen Kühnemann, Vom Weltreich des 
deutschen Geistes (1914), 54-62, and passim. Germán idealism is, according 
to Kühnemann, the monument that does the greatest honor to Rousseau.
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that he is incurably restless; that he is filled with every 
manner of desire. In contrast with him the uncultivated 
man, the peasant, let us say, and the man of high culti­
vation have few and simple desires. Thus Socrates had 
fewer and simpler desires than the average Athenian. But 
what is most noteworthy about the half-educated man 
is not simply that he harbors many desires and is there- 
fore incurably restless, but that these desires are so often 
incompatible. He craves various good things, but is not 
willing to pay the price — not willing to make the neces- 
sary renunciations. He pushes to an extreme what is after 
all a universal human proclivity — the wish to have 
one’s cake and eat it too. Thus, while remaining on the 
naturalistic level, he wishes to have blessings that accrue 
only to those who rise to the humanistic or religious levels. 
He wishes to live in “ a universe with the lid off,” to 
borrow a happy phrase from the pragmatist, and at the 
same time to enjoy the peace and brotherhood that are 
the fruits of restraint. The moral indolence of the Rous- 
seauist is such that he is unwilling to adjust himself to the 
truth of the human law; and though living naturalisti- 
cally, he is loath to recognize that what actually prevails 
on the naturalistic level is the law of cunning and the law 
of forcé. He thus misses the reality of both the human 
and the natural law and in the pursuit of a vague Arcadian 
longing falis into sheer unreality. I  am indeed overstating 
the case so far as Rousseau is concerned. He makes plain 
in the “ Emile” that the true law of nature is not the law 
of love but the law of forcé. Emile is to be released from 
the discipline of the human law and given over to the 
discipline of nature; and this means in practice that he 
will have “ to bow his neck beneath the hard yoke of
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physical necessity.” In so far the “ nature” of Emile is 
no Arcadian dream. Where the Arcadian dreaming be- 
gins is when Rousseau assumes that an Emile who has 
learned the lesson of forcé from Nature herself, will not 
pass along this lesson to others, whether citizens of his 
own or some other country, but will rather display in his 
j dealings with them an ideal fraternity. In the early stages 
of the naturalistic movement, in Hobbes and Shaftes- 
bury, for example, egoism and altruism, the idea of power 
and the idea of sympathy, are more sharply contrasted 
than they are in Rousseau and the later romanticists. 
Shaftesbury assumes in human nature an altruistic im­
pulse or will to brotherhood that will be able to cope 
successfully with the will to power that Hobbes declares 
to be fundamental. Many of the romanticists, as we have 
seen, combine the cult of power with the cult of brother­
hood. Hercules, as in Shelley’s poem, is to bow down 
before Prometheus, the lover of mankind. The extreme 
example, however, is probably William Blake. He pro- 
claims himself of the devil’s party, he glorifies a free 
expansión of energy, he looks upon everything that re- 
stricts this expansión as synonymous with evil. At the 
same time he pushes his exaltation of sympathy to the 
verge of the grotesque.1
1 A robín redbreast in a cage 
Puts all Heaven in a rage.
He who shall hurt the little wren 
Shall never be belov’d by men.
He who the ox to wrath has mov’d 
Shall never be by woman lov’d.
Kill not the moth ñor butterfly,
For the Last Judgment draweth nigh.
Auguries o f Innocence.
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Such indeed is the jumble of incompatibles in Blake 
that he would rest an inimitable compassion on the psy- 
chology of the superarían. For nothing is more certain 
than that the “ Marriageof Heaven and Hell” is among 
other things a fairly complete anticipation of Nietzsche. 
The reasons are worth considering why the idea of power 
and the idea of sympathy which Blake and so many other 
romanticists hoped to unite have once more come to seem 
antipodal, why in the late stages of the movement one 
fimls a Nietzsche and a Tolstoy, just as in its early stages 
one finds a Hobbes and a Shaftesbury. I t  is plata, first of 
all, that what brought the two cults together for a time 
was their common hatred of the past. With the triumph 
over the past fairly complete, the incompatibility of 
power and sympathy became increasingly manifest. 
Nietzsche’s attitude is that of a Prometheus whose sym­
pathy for mankind has changed to disgust on seeing the 
use that they are actually making of their emancipation. 
Humanitarian sympathy seemed to him to be tending > 
not merely to a subversión, but to an inversión of valúes, 
to a positive preference for the trivial and the ignoble. 
He looked with special loathing on that side of the move­
ment that is symbolized in its homage to the ass. The 
inevitable flying apart of power and sympathy was fur- 
ther hastened in Nietzsche and others by the progresa 
of evolution. Darwinism was dissipating the Arcadian 
mist through which nature had been viewed by Rousseau 
and his early followers. The gap is wide between Tenny- 
son’s nature “ red in tooth and claw and the tender 
and pitiful nature of Wordsworth.1 Nietzsche’s preaching 
of ruthlessness is therefore a protest against the sheer 
1 See Hart-Leap WeU.
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unreality of those who wish to be natural and at the same 
time sympathetic. But how are we to get a real scale of 
valúes to oppose to an indiscriminate sympathy? I t  is 
here that Nietzsche shows that he is caught in the same 
fatal coil of naturalism as the humanitarian. He accepts 
the naturalistic corruption of conscience which under- 
lies all other naturalistic corruptions. “ The will to over­
eóme an emotion,” he says, “ is ultimately only the will 
of another or of several other emotions.” 1 All he can do 
with this conception of conscience is to set over against 
the humanitarian suppression of valúes a scale of valúes 
based on forcé and not a true scale of valúes based on the 
degree to which one imposes or fails to impose on one’s 
temperamental self a human law of vital control. The 
opposition between a Nietzsche and a Tolstoy is therefore 
not specially significant; it is only that between the hard 
and the soft temperamentalist. To be sure Nietzsche can 
on occasion speak very shrewdly about the evils that 
have resulted from temperamentalism — especially from 
the passion for an untrammeled self-expression. But the 
superman himself is a most authentic descendant of the 
original genius in whom we first saw this passion domi­
nant. The imagination of the superman, spurning every 
centre of control, traditional or otherwise, so cooperates 
with his impulses and desires as to give them “ infini- 
tude,” that is so as to make them reach out for more and 
ever for more. The result is a frenzied romanticism.2 
“ Proportionateness is strange to us, let us confesa it
1 Beyond Good and Evil, ch. iv.
2 Out into distant futures, which no dream hath yet seen, into warmer 
souths than ever sculptor conceived . . .  Let this love be your new nobil- 
ityi — the undiscovered in the remotest seas,” etc. (Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra, translated by Thomas Common, 240, 248.)
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to ourselves,” says Nietzsche. “ Our itching is really the 
itching for the infinite, the immeasurable.” How the 
humanitarian loses proportionateness is plain; it is by his 
readiness to sacrifice to sympathy the ninety per cent or 
so of the virtues that imply self-control. The superman 
would scarcely seem to redress the balance by getting rid 
of the same restraining virtues in favor of power. He 
simply oscillates wildly from the excess of which he is 
conscious in others or in himself into the opposite excess, 
at imminent perii in either case to the ethical basis of 
civilization. The patterns or models that the past had set 
up for imitation and with reference to which one might 
rein in his lusts and impose upon them proportionate­
ness are rejected by every type of romàntic expansionist, 
not only as Nietzsche says, because they do not satisfy 
the yearning for the infinite, but also, as we have seen, 
because they do not satisfy the yearning for unity and 
immediacy. Now so far as the forms of the eighteenth 
century were concerned the romàntic expansionist had 
legitímate grounds for protest. But because the ration- 
alism and artificial decorum of that period failed to 
satisfy, he goes on to attack the analytical intellect and 
decorum in general and this attack is entirely illegitimate. 
I t  may be affirmed on the contrary that the power by 
which we multiply distinctions is never so necessary as 
in an individualistic age, an age that has broken with 
tradition on the ground that it wishes to be more imagi- 
native and immediate. There are various ways of being 
imaginative and immediate, and analysis is needed, not 
to build up some abstract system but to discriminate 
between the actual data of experience and so to deter­
mine which one of these ways it is expedient to follow if
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one wishes to become wise and happy. I t  is precisely at 
such moments of individualistic break with the past that 
the sophist stands ready to juggle with general terms, 
and the only protection against such juggling is to define 
these terms with the aid of the most unflinching analy- 
sis. Thus Bergson would have us believe that there are 
in France two main types of philosophy, a rationalistic 
type that goes back to Descartes and an intuitive type 
that goes back to Pascal,1 and gives us to understand 
that, inasmuch as he is an intuitionist, he is in the line of 
descent from Pascal. Monstrous sophistries lurk in this 
simple assertion, sophistries which if they go uncorrected 
are enough to wreck civilization. The only remedy is to 
define the word intuition, to discriminate practically and 
by their fruits between subrational and superrational 
intuition. When analyzed and defined in this way subra­
tional intuition will be found to be associated with vital 
impulse (élan vital) and superrational intuition with a 
power of vital control (frein  vital) over this impulse; and 
furthermore it will be clear that this control must be 
exercised if men are to be drawn towards a common 
centre, not in dreamland, but in the real world. So far 
then from its being true that the man who analyzes must 
needs see things in disconnection dead and spiritless, it is 
only by analysis that he is, in an individualistic age, put 
on the pathway of true unity, and also of the role of the 
imagination in achieving this unity. For there is need to 
discriminate between the different types of imagination 
no less than between the different types of intuition. One
1 “ On trouverait, en rétablissant les anneaux intermédiaires de la chaíne, 
qu’á Pascal se rattachent les doctrines modernes qui font passer en 
première ligne la connaissance immédiate, l’intuition, la vie intérieure, 
comme à Descartes . . .  se rattachent plus particulièrement les philoso- 
phies de la raison pure.” La Science française (1915), i, 17.
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will find through such analysis that the centre of normal 
human experience that is to serve as a check on impulse 
(so far at least as it is something distinet from the mere 
convention of one’s age and time) can be apprehended 
only with the aid of the imagination. This is only another 
way of saying that the reaüty that is set above one’s 
ordinary self is not a fixed absolute but can be glimpsed, 
if at all, only through a veil of illusion and is indeed insep­
arable from the illusion. This realm of insight cannot be 
finally formulated for the simple reason that it is anterior 
to formulae. I t  must therefore from the point of view of 
an intellect it transcends seem infinite though in a very 
different sense from the outer infinite of expansive desire.
This inner or human infinite, so far from being incom- ' 
patible with decorum, is the source of true decorum. 
True decorum is only the pulling back and disciplining of 
impulse to the proportionateness that has been perceived 
with the aid of what one may term the ethical or gener- 
alizing imagination. To dismiss like the romàntic ex- * 
pansionist everything that limits or restriets the lust of 
knowledge or of power or of sensation as arbitrary and 
artificial is to miss true decorum and at the same time to 
sink, as a Greek would say, from ethos to pathos. If one is 
to avoid this error one must, as Hamlet counsels, “ in the ' 
very torrent, tempest, and (as I  may say) whirlwind of 
passion, acquire and beget a temperance that may give it 
smoothness.” This is probably the best of all modern \ 
definitions of decorum simply because it is the most ex­
perimental. In general all that has been said about the 
ethical imagination is not to be taken as a fine-spun 
theory, but as an attempt however imperfect to give an 
account of actual experience.
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One may report from observation another trait of 
truly ethical art, art which is at once imaginative and 
decorous. I t  is not merely intense, as art that is imagina­
tive at the expense of decorum may very well be,1 it has 
a restrained and humanized intensity — intensity on a 
background of calm. The presence of the ethical imagina- 
tion whether in art or life2 is always known as an element 
of calm.
In art that has the ethical quality, and I  am again not 
setting up a metaphysical theory but reporting from 
observation, the calm that comes from imaginative in- 
sight into the universal is inextricably blended with an 
element of uniqueness —  with a something that belongs 
to a particular time and place and individual. The truth 
to the universal, as Aristotle would say, gives the work 
verisimilitude and the truth to the particular satisfies 
man’s deep-seated craving for novelty; so that the best 
art unites the probable with the wonderful. But the 
probable, one cannot insist too often, is won no less than 
the wonderful with the aid of the imagination and so is 
of the very soul of art. The romanticist who is ready to 
sacrifice the probable to the wonderful and to look on the 
whole demand for verisimilitude as an acadèmic super-
1 Cf. Tennyson:
Fantastic beauty, such as lurks 
In some wild poet when he works 
Without a conscienee or an aim —
* Addison writes:
’T was then great Marlbro’s mighty soul was proved,
That, in the shock of changing hosts unmoved,
Amidst confusión, horror, and despair,
Examin’d all the dreadfui scenes of war;
In peaceful thought the field of death survey’d.
So far as Marlborough deserved this praise he was a general in the 
grand manner.
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stition is prone to assume that he has a monopoly of 
soul and imagination. But the word soul is at least in as 
much need of Socràtic definition as the word intuition. 
I t  is possible, for example, with the aid of the ethical 
imagination so to partake of the ultimate element of calm 
as to rise to the religious level. The man who has risen 
to this level has a soul, but it is a soul of peace. Both soul 
and imagination are also needed to achieve the fine ad- 
justment and mediation of the humanist. It  is not enough, 
however, to have a religious or a humanístic soul if one 
is to be a creator or even a fully equipped critic of art. 
For art rests primarily not on ethical but sesthetic per- 
ception. This perception itself varies widely according to 
the art involved. One may, for instance, be musically 
perceptive and at the same time lack poetic perception. 
To be a creator in any art one must possess furthermore 
the technique of this art — something that is more or less 
separable from its “ soul” in any sense of the word. I t  is 
possible to put a wildly romàntic soul into art, as has of­
ten been done in the Far East, and at the same time to 
be highly conventional or traditional in one’s technique. 
Writers like Mérimée, Renán, and Maupassant again are 
faithful in the main to the technique of French prose 
that was worked out during the classical period, but com­
bine with this technique an utterly unclassical “ soul.” 
Rules, especially perhaps rules as to what to avoid, 
may be of aid in acquiring technique, but are out of place 
in dealing with the soul of art. There one passes from 
rules to principies. The only rule, if we are to achieve art 
that has an ethical soul, is to view life with some degree 
of imaginative wholeness. Art that has technique without 
soul in either the classical or romàntic sense, and so fails
either to inspire elevation or awaken wonder, is likely 
to be felt as a barren virtuosity. The pseudo-classicist was 
often unduly minute in the rules he laid down for tech- 
nique or outer form, as one may say, and then ignored 
the ethical imagination or inner form entirely, or else set 
up as a substitute mere didacticism. Since pseudo-classic 
work of this type plainly lacked soul and imagination, 
and since the romanticist felt and felt rightly that he him- 
self had a soul and imagination, he concluded wrongly 
that soul and imagination are romàntic monopolies. 
Like the pseudo-classicist, he inclines to identify high 
seriousness in art, something that can only come from 
the exercise of the ethical imagination at its best, with 
mere preaching, only he differs from the pseudo-classicist 
in insisting that preaching should be left to divines. One 
should insist, on the contrary, that the mark of genuinely 
ethical art, art that is highly serious, is that it is free from 
preaching. Sophocles is more ethical than Euripides for 
the simple reason that he views life with more imagina- 
tive wholeness. At the same time he is much less given 
to preaching than Euripides. He does not, as FitzGerald 
says, interrupt the action and the exhibition of character 
through action in order to “ jaw philosophy.” 
r I t  is not unusual for the modern artist to seek, like 
Euripides, to dissimulate the lack of true ethical purpose 
in his work by agitating various problems. But problems 
come and go, whereas human nature abides. One may agi­
tate problems without number, and yet lack imaginative 
insight into the abiding element in human nature. More- 
over, not being of the soul of art, the problem that one 
agitates is in danger of being a clogging intellectualism. 
Furthermore to seek in problems an equivalent for the
204 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISMO ROMÀNTIC MORALITY: THE REAL 205
definition and purpose that the ethical imagination alone 
can give is to renew, often in an aggravated form, the 
neo-classical error. The moralizing of the pseudo-classic 
dramatist, even though dull and misplaced, was usually 
sound enough in itself; whereas the moralizing of those 
who seek nowadays to use the stage as a pulpit, resting 
as it does on false humanitarian postulates, is in itself 
dubious. The problem play succeeds not infrequently in 
being at once dull and indecent.
The problem play is often very superior in technique 
or outer form to the earlier romàntic drama, but it still 
suffers from the same lack of inner form, inasmuch as its 
social purpose cannot take the place of true human 
purpose based on imaginative insight into the universal. 
The lack of inner form in so much modern drama and art 
in general can be traced to the original unsoundness of 
the break with pseudo-classic formalism. To a pseudo- 
classic art that lacked every kind of perceptiveness the 
Rousseauist opposed sesthetic perceptiveness, and it is 
something, one must admit, thus to have discovered the 
senses. But to his resthetic perceptiveness he failed, as I  
have already said, to add ethical perceptiveness because 
of his inability to distinguish between ethical perceptive­
ness and mere didacticism, and so when asked to put ethi­
cal purpose into art he replied that art should be pursued 
for its own sake (l’art pour l’art) and that “ beauty is its 
own excuse for being.” One should note here the trans- 
formation that this puré sestheticism brought about 
in the meaning of the word beauty itself. For the Greek 
beauty resided in proportion,1 and proportion can be
1 “Beauty resides in due proportion and order,” says Aristotle (Poetics, 
ch. vn).
<r
attained only with the aid of the ethical imagination. 
With the elimination of the ethical element from the soul 
of art the result is an imagination that is free to wander 
wild with the emancipated emotions. The result is likely 
to be art in which a lively sesthetic perceptiveness is 
not subordinated to any whole, art that is unstructural, 
however it may abound in vivid and picturesque details; 
and a one-sided art of this kind the romanticist does not 
hesitate to cali beautiful. “ If we let the reason sleep and 
are content to watch a succession of dissolving views,” 
says Mr. Elton of Shelley’s “ Revolt of Islam,” “ the 
poem is seen at once to overflow with beauty.” 1 Mere 
reason is not strictly speaking a sufficient remedy for this 
unstructural type of “ beauty.” Thus Chateaubriand’s 
reason is on the side of proportion and all the classical 
virtues but his imagination is not (and we cannot repeat 
too often that it is what a man is imaginatively and not 
what he preaches that really counts). Instead of siding 
with his reason and aiding it to ethical perception Cha­
teaubriand’s imagination is the free playmate of his emo­
tions. “What did I  care for all these futilities” (i.e. his 
functions as cabinet minister), he exclaims, “ I who never 
cared for anything except for my dreams, and even then 
on condition that they should last only for a night.” When 
a man has once spoken in that vein sensible people will 
pay little heed to what he preaches; for they will be cer- 
tain that the driving power of his work and personality 
is elsewhere. The imagination holds the balance of power 
between the reason and the perceptions of sense, and 
Chateaubriand’s imagination is plainly on the side of 
sensuous adventure. This vagabondage of the imagina- 
1 A Survey oj English Liter ature, 1780-1830 (1912), n, 191.
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tion appears especially in his imagistic trend, in his pur- 
suit of the descriptive detail for its own sake. To set out 
like Chateaubriand to restore the monarchy and the Chris- 
tian religión and instead to become the founder of “ l’école 
des images à tout prix” is an especially striking form of the 
contrast in romàntic morality between the ideal and the 
real.
The attempt that we have been studying to divorce 
beauty from ethics led in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century to the rise of a nightmare subject, — sesthetics. 
Shaftesbury indeed, as we have seen already, anticipates 
the favorite romàntic doctrine that beauty is truth and 
truth beauty, which means in practice to rest both truth 
and beauty upon a fluid emotionalism. Thus to deal 
sesthetically with truth is an error of the first magnitude, 
but it is also an error, though a less serious one, to see only 
the sesthetic element in beauty. For beauty to be com­
plete must have not only sesthetic perceptiveness but 
order and proportion; and this brings us back again to 
the problem of the ethical imagination and the permanent 
model or pattern with reference to which it seeks to im­
pose measure and proportion upon sensuous perception 
and expansive desire. We should not hesitate to say that  ^
beauty loses most of its meaning when divorced from 
ethics even though every sesthete in the world should 
arise and denounce us as philistines. To rest beauty upon 
feeling as the very ñame sesthetics implies, is to rest it 
upon what is ever shifting. Ñor can we escape from this 
endless mobility with the aid of physical Science^ for 
physical Science does not itself rise above the naturalistic 
flux. After eliminating from beauty the permanent pattern 
and the ethical imagination with the aid of which it is
perceived, a man will be ready to term beautiful anything 
that reflects his ordinary or temperamental self. Diderot 
is a sentimentalist and so he sees as much beauty in the 
sentimentalist Richardson as in Homer. If a man is 
psychically restless he will see beauty only in motion. 
The Italian futurist Marinetti says that for him a rushing 
motor car is more beautiful than the Victory of Samo­
thrace. A complete sacrifice of the principie of repose in 
beauty (which itself arises from the presence of the ethical 
imagination) to the suggesting of motion such as has been 
seen in certain recent schools, runs practically into a mix­
ture of charlatanism and madness. “ He that is giddy 
thinks the world goes round,” says Shakespeare, and the 
exponents of certain ultra-modern movements in paint- 
ing are simply trying to paint their inner giddiness. As 
a matter of fact the pretensión of the sesthete to have 
a purely personal visión of beauty and then treat as a 
philistine every one who does not accept it, is intolerable. 
Either beauty cannot be defined at all or we must say that 
only is beautiful which seems so to the right kind of 
man, and the right kind of man is plainly he whose total 
attitude towards life is correct, who views life with some 
degree of imaginative wholeness, which is only another 
way of saying that the problem of beauty is inseparable 
from the ethical problem. In an absolute sense nobody 
can see life steadily and see it whole; but we may at least 
move towards steadiness and wholeness. The sesthete is 
plainly moving in an opposite direction; he is becoming 
more and more openly a votary of the god Whirl. His 
lack of inner form is an error not of sesthetics but of 
general philosophy.
The romàntic imagination, the imagination that is not
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drawn back to any ethical centre and so is free to wander 
wild in its own empire of chimeras, has indeed a place in 
life. To understand what this place is one needs to em- 
phasize the distinction between art that has high seri- 
ousness and art that is merely recreative. The serious 
moments of life are moments of tensión, of concentra- 
tion on either the natural or the human law. But Apollo 
cannot always be bending the bow. Man needs at times 
to relax, and one way of relaxing is to take refuge for 
a time in some land of chimeras, to follow the Arcadian 
gleam. He may then come back to the real world, the 
world of active effort, solaced and refreshed. But it is 
only with reference to some ethical centre that we may 
determine what art is soundly recreative, in what forms 
of adventure the imagination may innocently indulge. 
The romanticist should recollect that among other forms 
of adventure is what Ben Jonson terms “ a bold adven- 
ture for hell” ; and that a not uncommon nostalgia is 
what the French call lo nostàlgic de lo, boue man s 
nostalgia for his native mud. Because we are justified at 
times, as Lamb ingés, in wandering imaginatively be- 
yond “ the diocese of strict conscience,” it does not follow 
that we may, üke him, treat Restoration Comed y as a 
sort of fairyland; for Restoration Comedy is a world not 
of pure but of impure imagination.
Lamb’s paradox, however, is harmless compared with 
what we have just been seeing in Chateaubriand. AV ith 
a dalliant imagination that entitles him at best to play 
a recreative role, he sets up as a religious teacher. 
Michelet again has been described as an “ entertainer 
who believes himself a prophet,” and this description fits 
many other Rousseauists. The sesthete who assumes an
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apocalyptic pose is an especially flagrant instance of the 
huddling together of incompatible desires. He wishes 
to sport with Amaryllis in the shade and at the same 
time enjoy the honors that belong only to the man who 
scorns delights and lives laborious days. For the exercise 
of the ethical imagination, it is hardly necessary to say, 
involves effort. Perhaps no one has ever surpassed Rous­
seau himself in the art of which I  have already spoken, — 
that of giving to moral indolence a semblance of pro- 
found philosophy.
One cannot indeed always afflrm that the Rousseauist 
is by the quality of his imagination an entertainer puré 
and simple. His breaking down of barriers and running 
together of the planes of being results at times in ambigu- 
ous mixtures — gleams of insight that actually seem to 
minister to fleshliness. One may cite as an example the 
"voluptuous religiosity” that certain critics have dis- 
covered in Wagner.
The romanticist will at once protest against the appli- 
cation of ethical standards to Wagner or any other musi- 
cian. Music, he holds, is the most soulful of the arts and 
so the least subject to ethics. For the same reason it is the 
chief of arts and also —  in view of the fact that roman- 
ticists have a monopoly of soul — the most romàntic. 
One should not allow to pass unchallenged this notion that 
because music is filled with soul it is therefore subject to 
no ethical centre, but should be treated as a puré en- 
chantment. The Greeks were as a matter of fact much 
concerned with the ethical quality of music. Certain 
musical modes, the Doric for example, had as they 
believed a virile "soul,” other modes like the Lydian had 
the contrary ("Lap me in soft Lydian aire”). For the very
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reason that music is the most appealing of the arts (song, . 
says°Aristotle, is the sweetest of all things) they were 
especially anxious that this art should be guarded from 
perversión.1 Without attemptmg a full discussion of a 
difñcult subject for which I  have no competency, it will be 
enough to point out that the plain song that prevailed 
in Christian churches for over a thousand years evident y 
had a very different "soul,” a soul that mspired to 
prayer and peace, from much specifically romàntic music 
that has a soul of restlessness, of infinite mdetenmnate 
desire. The result of the failure to recogmze this distinc- 
tion is very often a hybrid art. Berlioz showed a rathe 
peculiar conception of religión when he took pnde i 
the fact that his Réquiem (!) Mass fnghtened one of the
listeners into a fit. , ^-mentir*
The ethical confusión that anses from the romàntic
cult of "soul” and the closely allied tendency towards a 
hybrid art -  art that lacks high senousness without be­
ing frankly recreative — may also be illustrated from the » 
field of poetry. Many volumes have been pubhshed and 1 
are still being published on Browning as a philosophic and 
religious teacher. But Brownmg can pass as a prophet t 
only with the half-educated person, the person who 
has lost traditional standards and has at the same time 
failed to work out with the aid of the ethical imagination , 
some fresh scale of valúes and in the meanwhfie hyes 
impulsively and glorifies impulse. Like the half-educated 
person, Browning is capable of almost any am ounto 
intellectual and emotional subtlety, and h k eth e 1 -
educated person he is deficient in inner form: that is he \
i Confucius and the Chínese sages were if anythingevenmore con­
cerned than Plato or Aristotle with the ethical quality of music.
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deais with experience impressionistically without refer- 
ence to any central pattern or purpose.1 I t  is enough that 
the separate moments of this experience should each 
stand forth like
The quick sharp scratch 
And blue spurt of a lighted match.
One may take as an illustration of this drift towards the 
melodramàtic the “ Ring and the Book.” The method of 
this poem is peripheral, that is, the action is viewed not 
from any centre but as refracted through the tempera­
ments of the actors. The twelve monologues of which the 
poem is composed illustrate the tendency of romàntic 
writing to run into some “ song of myself” or “ tale of 
my heart.” The “ Ring and the Book” is not only off the 
centre, but is designed to raise a positive prejudice against 
everything that is central. Guido, for example, had ob- 
served decorum, had done all the conventional things and 
is horrible. Pompilia, the beautiful soul, had the great 
advantage of having had an indecorous start. Being the 
daughter of a drab, she is not kept from heeding the voice 
of nature. Caponsacchi again shows the beauty of his soul 
by violating the decorum of the priesthood. This least 
representative of priests wins our sympathy, not by his 
Christianity, but by his lyrical intensity:
O lyric love, half ángel and half bird,
And all a wonder and a wild desire!
Browning here escapes for once from the clogging intel- 
lectualism that makes nearly all the “ Ring and the 
Book” an indeterminate blend of verse and prose, and
1 Like Bishop Blougram’s his “ interest’s on the dangerous edge of 
things.”
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achieves true poetry though not of the highest type. 
The hybrid character of his art, due partly to a lack of 
outer form, to a defective poetical technique, arises even 
more from a lack of inner form — from an attempt to 
give a semblance of seriousness to what is at bottom 
unethical. The aged Pope may well meditate on the 
revolution that is implied in the sübstitution of the 
morality of the beautiful soul for that of St. Augustine.1 
In seeming to accept this revolution Browning’s Pope 
comes near to breaking all records, even in the romàntic 
movement, for paradox and indecorum.
At bottom the war between humanist and romanticist 
is so irreconcilable because the one is a mediator and the 
other an extremist. Browning would have us admire his 
Pompilia because'her love knows no lim it;2 but a secu­
lar love like hers must know a limit, must be decorous in 
short, if it is to be distinguished from mere emotional 
intensity. I t  is evident that the romàntic ideal of art for 
art’s sake meant in the real world art for sensation’s 
sake. The glorification of a love knowing no limit, that a 
Browning or a Hugo sets up as a substitute for philosophy 
and even for religión, is therefore closely affiliated in 
practice with the libido sentiendi. “ I t  is hard,” wrote 
Stendhal, in 1817, “ not to see what the nineteenth cen- 
tury desires. A love of strong emotions is its true char­
acter.” The romàntic tendency to push every emotion
1 Does he take inspiration from the church,
Directly make her rule his law of life?
Not he: his own mere impulse guides the man.
Sueh is, for the Augustine that was once,
This Canon Caponsacchi we see now.
x, 1911-28.
a See x, 1367-68.
to an extreme, regardless of decorum, is not much affected 
by what the romanticist preaches or by the problems he 
agitates. Doudan remarks of a mother who loses her child 
in Hugo’s “ NotreDame de Paris,” that “ her rage after 
this loss has nothing to equal it in the roarings of a lioness 
or tigress who has been robbed of her young. She be- 
comes vulgar by excess of despair. I t  is the saturnalia of 
maternal grief. You see that this woman belongs to a 
world in which neither the instincts ñor the passions have 
that divine aroma which imposes on them some kind of 
measure — the dignity or decorum that contains a moral 
principie;. . . When the passions no longer have this 
check, they should be relegated to the menagerie along 
with leopards and rhinoceroses, and, strange circum- 
stance, when the passions do recognize this check they 
produce more effect on the spectators than unregulated 
outbursts; they give evidence of more depth.” This su- 
perlativeness, as one may say, that Hugo displays in his 
picture of maternal grief is not confined to the emotional 
romanticist. I t  appears, for example, among the intel­
ectual romanticists of the seventeenth century and 
affected the very forms of language. Moliére and others 
ridiculed the adjectives and adverbs with which the 
précieuses sought to express their special type of superla- 
tiveness and intensity (extrèmement, furieusement, ter­
riblement, etc.). Alfred de Musset’s assertion that the 
chief difference between classicist and romanticist is 
found in the latter’s greater proneness to adjectives is not 
altogether a jest. I t has been said that the pessimist uses 
few, the optimist many adjectives; but the use of adjec­
tives and above all of superlatives would rather seem to 
grow with one’s expansiveness, and no movement was
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ever more expansive than that we are studying. Dante, 
according to Rivarol, is very sparing of adjectives. His 
sentence tends to maintain itself by the verb and sub­
stantive alone. In this as in other respects Dante is at 
the opposite pole from the expansionist.
The romàntic violence of expression is at once a proof 
of “ soul” and a protest against the tameness and smug- 
ness of the pseudo-classicist. The human volcano must 
overflow at times in a lava of molten words. “ Damna­
tioni” cries Berlioz, “ I could crush a red-hot iron be­
tween my teeth.” 1 The disproportion between the outer 
incident and the emotion that the Rousseauist expends 
on it is often ludicrous.2 The kind of forcé that the man 
attains who sees in emotional intensity a mark of spiritual 
distinction, and deems moderation identical with medioc- 
rity, is likely to be the forcé of delirium or fever. What 
one sees in “ Werther,” says Goethe himself, is weakness 
seeking to give itself the prestige of strength; and this 
remark goes far. There is in some of the romanticists 
a suggestion not merely of spiritual but of physical 
anaemia.3 Stili the intensity is often that of a strong but 
unbridled spirit. Pleasure is pushed to the point where it
1 Letter to Joseph d’Ortigue, January 19, 1833.
2 Here is an extreme example from Maigron’s manuscript collection 
(Le Romanlisme et les mceurs, 153). A youth forced to be absent three 
weeks from the woman he loves writes toher as follows: “ Trois semaines, 
mon amour, trois semaines loin de to i! . . .  Oh! Dieu m’a m audit!. . .  
Hier j’ai erré toute l’aprés-midi eomme une béte fauve, une béte traquée. 
. . .  Dans la forét, j’ai hurlé, hurlé comme un démon . . .  je me suis roulé 
par terre . . .  j’ai broyé sous mes dents des branches que mes mains 
avaient arrachées.. . .  Alors, de rage, j’ai pris ma main entre mes dents; 
j’ai serré, serré convulsivement; le sang a jailli et j’ai craché au ciel le 
morceau de chair vive . .  . j’aurais voulu lui cracher mon coeur.”
3 Maxime Du Camp asserts in his Souvenirs littéraires (i, 118) that this 
anajmia was due in part to the copious blood-letting to which the physi- 
cians of the time, disciples of Broussais, were addicted.
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runs over into pain, and pain to the point where it be- 
comes an auxiliary oí pleasure. The acre baiser of the 
“ Nouvelle Héloïse ” that so scandalized Yoltaire presaged 
even more than a literary revolution. The poems of A. de 
Musset in particular contain an extraordinary perversión 
of the Christian doctrine of purification through suffering. 
There is something repellent to the genuine Christian as 
well as to the worldling in what one is tempted to cali 
Musset’s Epicurean cult of pain.1
Moments of superlative intensity whether of pleasure 
or pain must in the nature of the case be brief —  mere 
spasms or paroxysms; and one might apply to the whole 
school the term paroxyst and spasmodist assumed by 
certain minor groups during the past century. The Rous- 
seauist is in general loath to rein in his emotional vehe- 
mence, to impair the zest with which he responds to the 
solicitations of sense, by any reference to the “ future and 
sum of time,” by any reference, that is, to an ethical 
purpose. He would enjoy his thrill puré and unalloyed, 
and this amounts in practice to the pursuit of the beauti- 
ful or sensation-crowded moment. Saint-Preux says of 
the days spent with Juüe that a “ sweet ecstasy” ab­
sorbed “ their whole duration and gathered it together in 
a point like that of eternity. There was for me neither 
past nor future, and I  enjoyed at one and the same time 
the delights of a thousand centuries.” 2 The superlativist 
one might suppose could go no further. But in the delib­
erate sacrifice of all ethical valúes to the beautiful mo­
ment Browning has perhaps improved even on Rousseau:
1 This perversión was not unknown to classical antiquity. Cf. Seneca, To 
Lucilius, xcix : “ Quid turpius quam captare in ipso luctu voluptatem; et 
inter lacrymas quoque, quod juvet, quaerere?”
2 Nouvelle Hélolse, Pt. in, Lettre vi.
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Truth, that’s brighter than gem,
Trust, that ’s purer than pearl, —
Brightest truth, purest trust in the universe — ali were for me 
In the kiss of one girl.
Browning entitles the poem from which I  am quoting 
Summum Bonum. The supreme good it would appear is 
identical with the supreme thrill. _
I  have already said enough to make ciear that the title 
of this chapter and the last is in a way a misnomer. There 
is no such thing as romàntic morality. Theinnovations in 
ethics that are due to romanticism reduce themselves on 
cióse scrutiny to a vast system of naturalistic camouflage. 
To understand how this camouflage has been so successful 
one needs to connect Rousseauism with the Bacoman 
movement. Scientific progress had inspired man with a 
new confidence in himself at the same time that the positive 
and critical method by which it had been achieved de- 
tached him from the past and its traditional standards of 
good and evil. To break with tradition on sound lines one 
needs to apply the utmost keenness of analysis not merely 
to the natural but to the human law. But man’s analytical 
powers were very much taken up with the new task of 
mastering the natural law, so much so that he seemed 
incapable of further analytical effort, but longed rather 
for relaxation from his sustained concentration of intel- 
lect and imagination on the physical order. At the same 
time he was so elated by the progress he was making m 
this order that he was inclined to assume a similar ad- 
vance on the moral plane and to believe that this advance 
could also be achieved collectively. A collective salvation 
of this kind without any need of a concentration of the 
intellect and imagination is precisely what wasopened
up to him by the Rousseauistic “ ideal” of brotherhood. 
This “ ideal,” as I  have tried to show, was only a pro- 
jection of the Arcadian imagination on the void. But in 
the abdication of analysis and critical judgment, which 
would have reduced it to a purely recreative role, this 
Arcadian dreaming was enabled to set up as a serious 
philosophy, and to expand into innumerable Utopias. 
Many who might have taken alarm at the humanitarian 
revolution in ethics were reassured by the very fervor 
with which its promoters continued to utter the oíd words 
— conscience, virtue, etc. No one puts more stress t.han 
Rousseau himself on conscience, while in the very act of 
transforming conscience from an inner check into an 
expansive emotion.
We have seen that as a result of this transformation of 
conscience, temperament is emancipated from both inner 
and outer control and that this emancipation tends in the 
real world to the rise of two main types — the Bohemian 
and the superman, both unprimitive, inasmuch as primi­
tive man is governed not by temperament but by con- 
vention; and that what actually tends to prevail in such 
a temperamental world in view of the superior “ hard- 
ness” of the superman, is the law of cunning and the law 
of forcé. So far as the Rousseauists set up the mere eman­
cipation of temperament as a serious philosophy, they 
are to be held responsible for the results of this emancipa­
tion whether displayed in the lust of power or the lust of 
sensation. But the lust of power and the lust of sensation, 
such as they appear, for example, in the so-called realism 
of the later nineteenth century, are not in themselves 
identical with romanticism. Many of the realists, like 
Flaubert, as I  have already pointed out, are simply bitter
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and disillusioned Rousseauists who are expressing their 
nausea at the society that has actually arisen from the 
emancipation of temperament in themselves and others. 
The essence of Rousseauistic as of other romance, I  may 
repeat, is to be found not in any mere fact, not even in the 
fact of sensation, but in a certain quality of the imagina­
tion. Rousseauism is, it is true, an emancipation of im­
pulse, especially of the impulse of sex. Practically all the 
examples I  have chosen of the tense and beautiful mo­
ment are erotic. But what one has even here, as the imagi­
nation grows increasingly romàntic, is less the reality than 
the dream of the beautiful moment, an intensity that is 
achieved only in the tower of ivory. This point can be 
made clear only by a fuller study of the romàntic con-, 
ception of love.
CHAPTER VI
ROMÀNTIC LO VE
W h a t  first strikes one in Rousseau’s attitude towards 
love is the separation, even wider here perhaps than else- 
where, between the ideal and the real. He dilates in the 
“ Confessions ” on the difference of the attachment that 
he felt when scarcely more than a boy for two young 
women of Geneva, Mademoiselle Vulson and Mademoi- 
selle Goton. His attachment for the latter was real in a 
sense that Zola would have understood. His attachment 
for Mademoiselle Vulson reminds one rather of that of a 
mediseval knight for his lady. The same contrast runs 
through Rousseau’s life. “ Seamstresses, chambermaids, 
shop-girls,” he says, “ attracted me very little. I  had to 
have fine ladies.” 1 So much for the ideal; the real was 
Thérése Levasseur.
We are not to suppose that Rousseau’s love even when 
most ideal is really exalted above the fleshly level. Byron 
indeed says of Rousseau that “ his was not the love of 
living dame but of ideal beauty,” and if this were strictly 
true Rousseau might be accounted a Platonist. But 
any particular beautiful object is for Plato only a symbol 
or adumbration of a supersensuous beauty; so that an 
earthly love can be at best only a stepping-stone to the 
Uranian Aphrodite. The terrestrial and the heavenly loves 
are not in short run together, whereas the essence of 
Rousseauistic love is this very blending. “ Rousseau,”
1 Confessions, Livre iv.
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says Joubert, “ had a voluptuous mind. In his writings 
the soul is always mingled with the body and never dis­
tinet from it. No one has ever rendered more vividly the 
impression of the flesh touching the spirit and the de- 
lights of their marriage.” I  need not, however, repeat here 
what I  have said elsewhere 1 about this confusión of the 
planes of being, perhaps the most important aspect of 
romàntic love.
Though Rousseau is not a true Platonist in his treat- 
ment of love, he does, as I  have said, recall at times the 
cult of the mediseval knight for his lady. One may even 
find in mediseval love something that is remotely related 
to Rousseau’s contrast between the ideal and the actual; 
for in its attitude towards woman as in other respeets the 
Middle Ages tended to be extreme. Woman is either de- 
pressed below the human level as the favorite instrument 
of the devil in man’s temptation (mulier hominis con­
fusio), or else exalted above this level as the mother of 
God. The figure of Mary blends sense and spirit in a way y 
that is foreign to Plato and the ancients. As Heine says 
very profanely, the Virgin was a sort of heavenly dame 
du comptoir whose celestial smile drew the northern bar- 
barians into the Church. Sense was thus pressed into the 
Service of spirit at the risk of a perilous confusión. The 
chivalric cuit of the lady has obvious points of contact 
with the worship of the Madonna. The knight who is 
raised from one height of perfection to another by the 
light of his lady’s eyes is also pressing sense into the Serv­
ice of spirit with the same risk that the process may be 
reversed. The reversal actually takes place in Rousseau 
and his followers: spirit is pressed into the Service of 
1 The New Laokoon, ch. v.
sense in such wise as to give to sense a sort of infinitude. 
Baudelaire pays his homage to a Parisian grisette in 
the form of a Latín canticle to the Virgin.1 The perver­
sión of medieval love is equally though not quite so 
obviously present in many other Rousseauists.
I  have said that the Middle Ages incüned to the ex­
treme; medieval writers are, however, fond of insisting 
on “ measure” ; and this is almost inevitable in view of the 
large amount of classical, especially Aristotelian, survival 
throughout this period. But the two distinctively medi­
eval types, the saint and the knight, are neither of them 
mediators. They stand, however, on an entirely different 
footing as regards the law of measure. Not even Aristotle 
Ihimself would maintain that the law of measure applies 
f to saintliness, and in general to the religious realm. The 
saint in so far as he is saintly has undergone conversión,
, has in the literal sense of the word faced around and is 
looking in an entirely different direction from that to 
which the warnings ‘ ‘ nothing too much” and “ think as 
1 a mortal” apply. Very different psychic elements may 
indeed appear in any particular saint. A book has been 
published recently on the “ Romanticism of St. Francis.” 
The truth seems to be that though St. Francis had his 
romàntic side, he was even more religious than romàntic. 
One may affirm with some confidence of another medi­
eval figure, Peter the Hermit, that he was, on the other 
hand, much more romàntic than religious. For all the 
information we have tends to show that he was a very 
restless person and a man’s restlessness is ordinarily in 
inverse ratio to his religión.
If the saint transcends in a way the law of measure,
1 Franciscae meae laudes, in Les Fleurs du mal.
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the knight on the other hand should be subject to it. For 
courage and the love of woman —  his main interests in 
life — belong not to the religious but to the secular 
realm. But in his conception of love and measure the 
knight was plainly not a mediator but an extremist: he 
was haunted by the idea of adventure, of a love and 
courage that transcend the bounds not merely of the 
probable but of the possible. His imagination is romàntic 
in the sense I  have tried to define — it is straining, that is, 
beyond the confines of the real. Ruskin’s violent diatribe 
against Cervantes 1 for having killed “ idealism” by his 
ridicule of these knightly exaggerations, is in itself absurd, 
but interesting as evidence of the quality of Ruskin’s own 
imagination. Like other romanticists I  have cited, he 
seems to have been not unaware of his own kinship to 
Don Quixote. The very truth about either the medieval 
or modern forms of romàntic love —  love which is on the 
secular level and at the same time sets itself above the 
law of measure— was uttered by Dr. Johnson in his com- 
ment on the heroic plays of Dryden: “ By admitting the 
romàntic omnipotence of love he has recommended as 
laudable and worthy of imitation that conduct which 
through all ages the good have censured as vicious and the 
bad have despised as foolish.”
The man of the Middle Ages, however extravagant in 
his imaginings, was often no doubt terrestrial enough in 
his practice. The troubadour who addressed his high- 
flown fancies to some fair chátelaine (usually a married
lArchilecture and Painting, Lecture ii. This diatribe may have been 
suggested by Byron’s Don Juan, Canto xra, ix- x i :
Cervantes smiled Spain’s chivairy away:
A single laugh demolished the right arm 
Of his own country, etc.
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woman) often had relations in real life not unlike those of 
Rousseau with Thérèse Levasseur. Some such contrast 
indeed between the “ ideal” and the “ real” existed in the 
life of one of Rousseau’s favorite poets, Petrarch. The 
lover may, however, run together the ideal and the 
real. He may glorify some comparatively commonplace 
person, crown as queen of his heart some Dulcinea del 
Toboso. Hazlitt employs appropriately in describing his 
own passion for the vulgar daughter of a London board- 
ing-house keeper the very words of Cervantes: “ He had 
eourted a statue, hunted the wind, cried aloud to the 
desert.” Hazütt like other lovers of this type is in love not 
with a particular person but with his own dream. He 
is as one may say in love with love. No subject indeed 
illustrates like this of love the nostalgia, the infinite in­
determinate desire of the romàntic imagination. Some- 
thing of this diffusive longing no doubt carne into the 
world with Christianity. There is a wide gap between the 
sentence of St. Augustine that Shelley has taken as epi- 
graph for his “ Alastor” 1 and the spirit of the great 
Greek and Roman clàssics. Yet such is the abiding vital- 
ity of Greek mythology that one finds in Greece perhaps 
the best symbol of the romàntic lover. Rousseau could 
not fail to be attracted by the story of Pygmalion and 
Galatea. His lyrical “ monodrama” in poetical prose, 
“ Pygmalion,” is important not only for its literary but 
for its musical influence. The Germans in particular 
(including the youthful Goethe) were fascinated. To the 
mature Goethe Rousseau’s account of the sculptor who 
became enamored of his own creation and breathed into
1 “ Nondum amabam, et amare amabam, quaerebam quid amarem, 
amans amare.”
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it actual life by the sheer intensity of his desire seemed a 
delirious confusión of the planes of being, an attempt to 
drag ideal beauty down to the level of sensuous realiza- 
tion. But a passion thus conceived exactly satisfies the 
romàntic requirement. For though the romanticist wishes 
to abandon himself to the rapture of love, he does not 
wish to transcend his own ego. The object with which 
Pygmalion is in love is after all only a projection of his 
own “ genius.” But such an object is not in any proper 
sense an object at all. There is in fact no object in the 
romàntic universe — only subject. This subjective love 
amounts in practice to a use of the imagination to en- 
hance emotional intoxication, or if one prefers, to the 
pursuit of illusion for its own sake.
This lack of definite object appears just as clearly in 
the Germán symbol of romàntic love — the blue flower. 
The blue flower resolves itself at last, it will be remem- 
bered, into a fair feminine face1 — a face that cannot, 
however, be overtaken. The color typifies the blue dis- 
tance in which it always loses itself, “ the never-ending 
quest after the ever-fleeting object of desire.” The object 
is thus elusive because, as I  have said, it is not, properly 
speaking, an object at all but only a dalliance of the 
imagination with its own dream. Cats, says Rivarol, do 
not caress us, they caress themselves upon us. But though 
cats may suffer from what the new realist calls the ego­
cèntric predicament, they can scarcely vie in the subtle 
involutions of their egoism with the romàntic lover.
1 Cf. Shelley’s Alastor:
Two eyes,
Two starry eyes, hung in the gloom of thought 
And seemed with their serene and azure smiles 
To beckon.
Besides creating the symbol of the blue flower, Novalis 
treats romàntic love in his unfinished tale “ The Disciples 
at Sais.” He contemplated two endings to this tale — in 
the one, when the disciple hits the veil of the inmost 
sanctuary of the temple at Sais, Rosenblütchen (the 
equivalent of the blue flower) falls into his arms. In the 
second versión what he sees when he lifts the mysterious 
veil is — “ wonder of wonders —  himself.” The two end­
ings are in substance the same.
The story of Novalis’s attachment for a fourteen-year- 
old giri, Sophie von Kühn, and of his plans on her death 
for a truly romàntic suicide — a swooning away into the 
night — and then of the suddenness with which he trans- 
ferred his dream to another maiden, Julie von Charpen- 
tier, is familiar. If Sophie had lived and Novalis had lived 
and they had wedded, he might conceivably have made 
her a faithful husband, but she would no longer have 
been the blue flower, the ideal. For one’s love is for 
something infinitely remote; it is as Shelley says, in 
what is perhaps the most perfect expression of romàntic 
longing:
The desire of the moth for the star,
Of the night for the morrow,
The devotion to something afar 
From the sphere of our sorrow.
The sphere of Shelley’s sorrow at the time he wrote these 
lines to Mrs. Williams was Mary Godwin. In the time of 
Harriet Westbrook, Mary had been the “ star.”
The romàntic lover often feigns in explanation of his 
nostalgia that in some previous existence he had been 
enamored of a nymph — an Egeria — or a woman tran- 
scending the ordinary mould — “ some Liüth or Helen or
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Antigone.” 1 Shelley inquires eagerly in one of his letters 
about the new poem by Horace Smith, “ The Nympho- 
lept.” In the somewhat unclassical sense that the term 
carne to have in the romàntic movement, Shelley is him­
self the perfect example of the nympholept. In this ré­
sp ed  as in others, however, he merely continues Rousseau. 
“ If it had not been for some memòries of my youth and 
Madame d’Houdetot,” says Jean-Jacques, “ the loves 
that I  have felt and described would have been only with 
sylphids.” 2
Chateaubriand speaks with aristocràtic disdain of 
Rousseau’s Venetian amours, but on the “ ideal” side he 
is not only his follower but perhaps the supreme French 
example of nympholepsy. He describes his lady of dreams 
sometimes like Rousseau as the “ sylphid,” sometimes as 
his “ phantom of love.” He had been haunted by this 
phantom almost from his childhood. “ Even then I 
glimpsed that to love and be loved in a way that was 
unknown to me was destined to be my supreme felicity. 
. . .  As a result of the ardor of my imagination, my timid- 
ity and solitude, I  did not turn to the outer world, but 
was thrown back upon myself. In the absence of a real 
object, I  evoked by the power of my vague desires a 
phantom that was never to leave me.” To those who 
remember the closely parallel passages in Rousseau, 
Chateaubriand will seem to exaggerate the privilege of 
the original genius to look on himself as unique when he 
adds: “ I  do not know whether the history of the human 
heart offers another example of this nature.” 3 The pur-
1 “ Some of us have in a prior existence been in love with an Antigone, 
and that malees us find no full content in any mortal tie.” Shelley to John 
Gisborne, October 22, 1821.
2 Confessions, Livre xi (1761).
3 Mémoires d ’Outrc-Tombe, November, 1817.
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suit of this phantom of love gives the secret key to 
Chateaubriand’s life. He takes refuge in the American 
wilderness in order that he may have in this primitive 
Arcadia a more spacious setting for his dream.1
If one wishes to see how very similar these nympho- 
leptic experiences are not only from individual to indi­
vidual, but from country to country, one has only to 
compare the passages I  have just been quoting from 
Chateaubriand with Shelley’s “ Epipsychidion.” Shelley 
writes of his own youth:
There was a Being whom my spirit oft 
Met on its visioned wanderings, far aloft,
In the clear golden prime of my youth’s dawn,
Upon the fairy isles of sunny lawn,
Amid the enchanted mountains, and the caves 
Of divine sleep, and on the air-like waves 
Of wonder-level dream, whose tremnlous floor 
Paved her light steps; on an imagined shore,
Under the gray beak of some promontory 
She met me, robed in such exceeding glory,
That I beheld her not, etc.
At the time of writing “ Epipsychidion” the magic visión 
happened to have coalesced for the moment with Emilia 
Viviani, though destined soon to Hit elsewhere. Shelley 
invites his “ soul’s sister,” the idyllic “ she,” who is at 
bottom only a projection of his own imagination, to set 
salí with him for Arcady. “Epipsychidion,” indeed, might 
be used as a manual to illustrate the difference between 
mere Arcadian dreaming and a true Platonism.
Chateaubriand is ordinarily and rightly compared with 
Byron rather than with Shelley. He is plainly, however, 
far more of a nympholept than Byron. Mr. Hilary, in-
1 “ Je me faisais une félieité de réaliser avec ma sylphide mes courses 
fantàstiques dans les foréts du Nouveau Monde.”
Mémoires d’Outre-Tombe, December, 1821.
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deed, in Peacock’s “ Nightmare Abbey ” says to Mr. 
Cypress (Byron): “ Youtalklike a Rosicrucian, who will 
love nothing but a sylph, who does not believe in the exist- 
ence of a sylph, and who yet quarrels with the whole uni­
verse for not containing a sylph.” 1 Certain distinctions 
would have to be made if one were attempting a complete 
studyof love in Byron; yetafter allthe love of D onjuán 
and Haidée is one that Sappho or Catullus or Burns would 
have understood; and these poets were not nympholepts. 
They were capable of burning with love, but not, as 
Rousseau says of himself, “ without any definite ob- 
ject.” 2 Where Chateaubriand has some resemblance to 
Byron is in his actual libertinism. He is however nearer 
than Byron to the übertine of the eighteenth century — 
to the Lovelace who pushes the pursuit of pleasure to its 
final exasperation where it becomes associated with the 
infliction of pain. Few things are stranger than the blend 
in Chateaubriand of this Sadic fury3 with the new 
romàntic revery. Indeed almost every type of egotism 
that may manifest itself in the relations of the sexes and 
that pushed to the superlative pitch, will be found in this 
theoretical classicist and Champion of Christianity. Per- 
haps no more frenzied cry has ever issued from human 
lips t.hfl.n that uttered by A tala4 in describing her emo-
1 Peacock has in miad Ckilde Harold, canto rv, cxxi ff.
2 Rousseau plans to make a nympholept of his ideal pupil, Emile: 
“ II faut que je sois le plus maladroit des hommes si je ne le rends d’avanee 
passionné sans savoir de quoi,” etc. Emile, Liv. iv.
3 Cf. René’s letter to Céluta in Les Natchez: “ Jevous ai tenue sur ma 
poitrine au milieu du désert, dans les vents de l’orage, lorsque, après vous 
avoir portée de l’autre cóté d’un torrent, j’aurais voulu vous poignarder 
pour fixer le bonheur dans votre sein, et pour me punir de vous avoir 
donné ce bonheur.”
4 The romàntic lover, it should be observed, creates his dream compan- 
ion even less that he may adore her than that she may adore him.
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tions when tom between her religious vow and her Iove for 
Chactas: “ What dreana did not arise in this heart over- 
whelmed with sorrow. At times in fixing my eyes upon 
you, I  went so far as to form desires as insensate as they 
were guilty; at one moment I  seemed to wish that you 
and Iwere the only living creatures upon the earthjand 
then again, feeling a divinity that held me back in my 
horrible transports, I  seemed to want this divinity to 
be annihilated provided that clasped in your arms I  
should roll from abyss to abyss with theruins of God and 
the world.” Longing is here pushed to a pitch where it 
passes over, as in Wagner’s “ Tristan and Isolde,” into the 
desire for annihilation.
Actual libertinism is no necessary concomitant of 
nympholeptic longing. There is a striking difference in 
this respect between Poe, for example, and his translator 
and disciple, Baudelaire. Nothing could be less sugges- 
tive of voluptuousness than Poe’s nostalgia. “ His ec- 
stasy,” says Stedman, “ is that of the nympholept seeking 
an evasive being of whom he has glimpses by moonlight, 
starlight, even fenlight, but never by noonday.” The 
embodiments of his dream that flit through his tales and 
poems, enhanced his popularity with the ultra-romantic 
public in France. These strange apparitions nearly all 
of whom are epileptic, catalèptic, or consumptive made a 
natural appeal to a school that was known among its 
detractors as l’école poitrinaire. “ Tender souls,” says 
Gautier, “ were specially touched by Poe’s feminine fig­
ures, so vaporous, so transparent and of an almost spectral 
beauty.” Perhaps the nympholepsy of Gérard de Nerval 
is almost equally vaporous and ethereal. He pursued 
through various earthly forms the queen of Sheba whom
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he had loved in a previous existence and hanged himself at 
last with what he believed to be her garter: an interesting 
example of the relation between the extreme forms of the 
romàntic imagination and madness.1
The pursuit of a phantom of love through various 
earthly forms led in the course of the romàntic movement 
to certain modifications in a famous legend —  that of 
Don Juan. What is emphasized in the older Don Juan is 
not merely his libertinism but his impiety — the gratifica- 
tion of his appetite in deliberate defiance of God. He is 
animated by Satanic pride, by the lust of power as well 
as by the lust of sensation. In Moliére’s treatment of the 
legend we can also see the beginnings of the philanthropio 
pose.2 With the progress of Rousseauism Don Juan tends 
to become an “ idealist,” to seek to satisfy in his amorous 
adventures not merely his senses but his “ soul” and his 
thirst for the “ infinite.” 3 Along with this idealistic Don 
Juan we also see appearing at a very early stage in the 
movement the exotic Don Juan who wishes to have a 
great deal of strangeness added to his beauty. In his
1 Walter Bagehot has made an interesting study of the romàntic imag- 
ination in his essay on a figure who reminds one in some respects of Gérard 
de Nerval — Hartley Coleridge.
2 Don Juan bids his servant give a coin to the beggar not for the love of 
God but for the love of humanity.
3 Demandant aux forèts, à la mer, à la plaine,
Aux brises du matin, à toute heure, à tout lieu,
La femme de son áme et de son premier voeu!
Prenant pour fiancée un réve, une ombre vaine,
E t fouillant dans le cceur d’une hécatombe humaine,
Prétre désespéré, pour y trouver son Dieu.
A. de Musset, Namouna.
“ Don Juan avait en lui cet amour pour la femme idéale; il a couru le 
monde serrant et brisant de dépit dans ses bras toutes les imparfaites 
images qu’il croyait un moment aimer; et il est mort épuisé de fatigue, con­
sumé de son insatiable amour.” Prévost-Paradol, Lettres, 149.
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affair with the “ Floridiennes,” Chateaubriand shows the 
way to a long series of exotic lovers.
I said to my heart between sleeping and waking,
Thou wild thing that always art leaping or aching,
What blaek, brown or fair, in what clime, in what nation,
By turns has not taught thee a pit-a-pat-ation?
These lines are so plainly meant for Pierre Loti that one 
learns with surprise that they were written about 1724 
by the Earl of Peterborough.1
Byron’s Don Juan is at times exotic in his tastes, but, 
as I  have said, he is not on the whole very nympholeptic 
— much less so than the Don Juan of Alfred de Musset, 
for example. Musset indeed suggests in many respects a 
less masculine Byron — Mademoiselle Byron as he has 
been called. In one whole side of his art as well as his 
treatment of love he simply continues like Byron the 
eighteenth century. But far more than Byron he aspires 
to ideal and absolute passion; so that the Musset of the 
“ Nuits” is rightly regarded as one of the supreme em- 
bodiments, and at the same time the chief martyr, of the 
romàntic religión of love. The outcome of his affair with 
George Sand may symbolize fitly the wrecking of thou- 
sands of more obscure lives by this mortal chimera. 
Musset and George Sand sought to come together, yet 
what they each sought in love is what the original gen­
ius seeks in all things — self-expression. What Musset 
saw in George Sand was not the real woman but only his 
own dream. But George Sand was not content thus to 
reflect back passively to Musset his ideal. She was rather 
a Galatea whose ambition it was to create her own 
Pygmalion. “ Your chimera is between us,” Musset 
1 See Scott's (2d) edition of Swift, xm , 310.
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exclaims; but his chimera was between them too. The 
more Titan and Titaness try to meet, the more each is 
driven back into the solitude of his own ego. They were 
in love with love rather than with one another: and to be 
thus in love with love means on the last analysis to be in 
love with one’s own emotions. “ To love,” says Musset, 
“ is the great point. What matters the mistress? What 
matters the flagon provided one have theintoxication?” 1 
He then proceeds to carry a love of this quaüty up into 
the presence of God and to present it to him as his justi- 
fication for having üved. The art of speaking in tones of 
religious consecration of what is in its essence egoistic has 
never been carried further than by the Rousseauistic 
romanticist. God is always appearing at the most unex- \ 
pected moments.2 The highest of which man is capable J 
apparently is to put an uncurbed imagination into the 
Service of an emancipated temperament. The credo that 
Perdican recites at the end of the second act of “ On ne 
badine pas avec l’Amour” 3 throws light on this point. 
Men and women according to this credo are filled with
1 Aimer c’est le grand point. Qu’importe la maitresse?
Qu’importe le flacón pourvu qu’on ait l’ivresse?
2 It has been said that in the novéis of George Sand when a lady wishes 
to ehange her lover God is always there to facilitate the transfer.
3 “ Tous les hommes sont menteurs, inconstants, faux, bavards, hypo­
crites, orgueilleux ou láches, méprisables et sensuels; toutes les femmes 
sont perfides, artificieuses, vaniteuses, curieuseset dépravées; le monde 
n’est qu’un égout sans fond oü les phoques les plus informes rampent et se 
tordent sur des montagnes de fange; mais il y a au monde une chose sainte 
et sublime, e’est l’union de deux de ces ètres si imparfaits et si affreux. 
On est souvent trompé en amour; souvent blessé et souvent malheureux; 
mais on aime et quand on est sur le bord de sa tombe, on se retourne pour 
regarder en arrière, et on se dit: J ’ai soufiert souvent, je me suis trompé 
quelquefois, mais j’ai aimé. C’est moi qui ai vécu, et non pas un etre 
factice créé par mon orgueil et mon ennui.” (The last sentence is taken 
from a letter of George Sand to Musset.) On ne badine pas avec l’Amour, 
li, 5.
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every manner of vileness, yet there is something “ sacred 
and sublime,” and that is the unión of two of these des- 
picable beings.
The confusión of ethical valúes here is so palpable as 
scarcely to cali for comment. I t  is precisely when men 
and women set out to love with this degree of imaginative 
and emotional unrestraint that they come to deserve all 
the opprobrious epithets Musset heaps upon them. This 
radiant apotheosis of love and the quagmire in which it 
actually lands one is, as I  have said, the whole subject of 
“ Madame Bovary.” I  shall need to return to this par­
ticular disproportion between the ideal and the real when 
I  take up the subject of romàntic melancholy.
The romàntic lover who identifies the ideal with the 
superlative thrill is turning the ideal into something very 
transitory. If the summum bonum is as Browning avers 
the “ kiss of one girl,” the summum bonum is lost almost 
as soon as found. The beautiful moment may however be 
prolonged in revery. The romanticist may brood over it 
in the tower of ivory, and when thus enriched by being 
steeped in his temperament it may become more truly his 
own than it was in reality. “ Objects make less impression 
upon me than my memory of them,” says Rousseau. He 
is indeed the great master of what has been termed the 
art of impassioned recollection. This art is far from being 
confined in its application to love, though it may perhaps 
be studied here to the best advantage. Rousseau, one 
should note, had very little intellectual memory, but an 
extraordinarily keen memory of images and sensations. 
He could not, as he telis us in the “ Confessions,” learn 
anything by heart, but he could recall with perfect dis- 
tinctness what he had eaten for breakfast about thirty
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years before. In general he recalis his past feelings with a 
clearness and detail that are perhaps more feminine than 
masculine. “ He seems,” saysHazlitt, one of his chief dis- 
ciples in the art of impassioned recollection, “ to gather 
up the past moments of his being like drops of honey-dew 
to distil a precious liquor from them; his alternate pleas- 
ures and pains are the bead-roll that he tells over and 
piously worships; he makes a rosary of the flowers of hope 
and fancy that strewed hisearüest years.” 1 This highly 
developed emotional memory is closely associated with 
the special quality of the romàntic imagination — its 
cult of Arcadian illusion and the wistful backward glance 
to the vanished paradise of childhood and youth when 
illusion was most spontaneous. “Let me still recall [these 
memòries],” says Hazlitt, “ that they may breathe fresh 
life into me, and that I  may live that birthday of thought 
and romàntic pleasure over again! Talk of the ideal! This 
is the only true ideal —  the heavenly tints of Fancy re- 
flected in the bubbles that float upon the spring-tide of 
human life.” 2 Hazlitt converts criticism itself into an art 
of impassioned recollection. He loves to linger over the 
beautiful moments of his own literary life. The passing 
years have increased the richness of their temperamental 
refraction and bestowed upon them the “ pathos of dis- 
tance.” A good example is his account of the two years of 
his youth he spent in reading the “ Confessions” and the 
“ Nouvelle Héloïse,” and in shedding tears over them. 
“ They were the happiest years of our life. We may well 
say of them, sweet is the dew of their memory and pleas- 
ant the balm of their recollection.’13
1 Table-Talk. On the Past and Future.
2 The Plain Speaker. On Reading Oíd Books.
3 The Round Table. On the Character of Rousseau.
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Rousseau’s own Arcadian memòries are usually not of 
reading, like Hazlitt’s, but of actual incidents, though he 
does not hesitateto alter these incidents freely, as m his 
account of his stay at Les Charmettes, and to accommo­
date them to his dream. He neglected the real Madame de 
Warens at the very time that he cherished his recollection 
of her because this recollection was the idealized image 
of his own youth. The yearning that he expresses at the 
beginning of his fragmentary Tenth Promenade, written 
only a few weeks before his death, is for this idyllic penod 
rather than for an actual woman.1 A happy memory, says 
Musset, repeating Rousseau, is perhaps more genuine 
than happiness itself. Possibly the three best known love 
poems of Lamartine, Musset, and Hugo respectively — 
« Le Lac,” “ Souvenir,” and “ La Tristesse d’Olympio, 
ah hinge upon impassioned recollection and derive very 
directly from Rousseau. Lamartine in particular has 
caught in the “ Le Lac” the very cadenee of Rousseau’s 
reveries.2
, Impassioned recollection may evidently be an abun-
1 dant source of genuine poetry, though not, ít must be
I insisted, of the highest poetry. The predominant róle that 
it plays in Rousseau and many of his followers is simp y 
a sign of an unduly dalliant imagination. Experience after 
all has other uses than to supply furnishings for the tower
1 “ Aujourd’hui, jour de Páques fleuries, ¡1 y a précisément cinquantè
ans de ma premiére connaissance avec Madame de Warens. .
2 Even on his death-bed the hero of Browning’s Confessions gives him-
self up to impassionated recollection:
How sad and bad and mad it was —
But then, how it was sweet.
In his Stances d Madame Lullin Voltaire is at least as poetical and
nearer to normal experience: _ . ,
Quel mortel s’est jamais natte 
D’un rendez-vous à l’agonie?
ROMÀNTIC LOVE 237
of ivory; it should control the judgment and guide the 
will; it is in short the necessary basis of conduct. The 
greater a man’s moral seriousness, the more he will be 
concerned with doing rather than dreaming (and I in­
elude right meditation among the forms of doing). He 
will also demand an art and literature that reflect this 
his main preoccupation. Between Wordsworth’s defini- 
tion of poetry as “ emotion recollected in tranquillity,” 
and Aristotle’s definition of poetry as the imitation of 
human action according to probability or necessity, a wide 
gap plainly opens. One may prefer Aristotle’s definition 
to that of Wordsworth and yet do justice to the merits of 
Wordsworth’s actual poetical performance. Nevertheless 
the tendeney to put prime emphasis on feeling instead of 
action shown in the definition is closely related to Words­
worth’s failure not only in dramatic but in epic poetry, in 
all poetry in short that depends for its success on an ele- 
ment of plot and sustained narrative.
A curious extensión of the art of impassioned recollec­
tion should receive at least passing mention. I t  has been 
so extended as to lead to what one may term an unethical 
use of literature and history. What men have done in the 
past and the consequences of this doing should surely 
serve to throw some light on what men should do under 
similar circumstances in the present. But the man who 
turns his own personal experience into mere dalliance 
may very well assume a like dalliant attitude towards the 
larger experience of the race. This experience may merely 
provide him with pretexts for revery. This narcòtic use of 
literature and history, this art of creating for one’s self an 
alibi as Taine calls it, is nearly as oíd as the romàntic 
movement. The record of the past becomes a gorgeous
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pageant that lures one to endless imaginative exploration 
and lulls one to oblivion of everything except its variety 
and picturesqueness. I t  becomes everything in fact ex­
cept a school of judgment. One may note in connection 
with this use of history the usual interplay between 
scientific and emotional naturalism. Both forms of natu- 
\ ralism tend to turn man into the mere product and play- 
thing of physical forces — climate, heredity, and the like, 
over which his will has no control. Since literature and 
history have no meaning from the point of view of moral 
choice they may at least be made to yield the maximum 
of sesthetic satisfaction. Oscar Wilde argues in this wise 
for example in his dialogue “ The Critic as Artist, and 
concludes that since man has no moral freedom or re- 
sponsibility, and cannot therefore be guided in his con- 
duct by the past experience of the race, he may at least 
turn this experience into an incomparable “ bower of 
dreams.” “ The pain of Leopardi crying out against life 
becomes our pain. Theocritus blows on his pipe and we 
laugh with the lips of nymph and shepherd. In the wolf- 
skin of Pierre Vidal we flee before the hounds, and in the 
armor of Lancelot we ride from the bower of the queen. 
We have whispered the secret of our love beneath the 
cowl of Abelard, and in the stained raiment of Villon have 
put our shame into song,” etc.
The assumption that runs through this passage that 
the mere sesthetic contemplation of past experience gives 
the equivalent of actual experience is found in writers of 
far higher standing than Wilde — in Renán, for instance. 
The sesthete would look on his dream as a substitute for 
the actual, and at the same time convert the actual into 
a dream. (Die Welt wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt.)
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I t  is not easy to take such a programme of universal 
dreaming seriously. In the long run the dreamer himself 
does not find it easy to take it seriously. For his attempts 
to live his chimera result, as we have seen in the case of 
romàntic love, in more or less disastrous defeat and dis- 
illusion. The disillusioned romanticist continues to cling 
to his dream, but intellectually, at least, he often comes at 
the same time to stand aloof from it. This subject of 
disillusion may best be considered, along with certain 
other important aspects of the movement, in connection 
with the singular phenomenon known as romàntic irony.
CHAPTER V II
ROMÀNTIC IRONY
T he first romanticist who worked out a theory of irony 
was Friedrich Schlegel.1 The attempt to put this theory 
into practice, after the fashion of Tieck’s plays, seemed 
and seemed rightly even to later representatives of the 
movement to be extravagant. Thus Hegel, who in his 
ideas on art continues in so many respects the Schlegels, 
repudiates irony. Formerly, says Heine, who is himself in 
any larger survey, the chief of Germán romàntic ironists, 
when a man had said a stupid thing he had said it; now 
he can explain it away as “ irony.” Nevertheless one can- 
not afford to neglect this early Germán theory. I t  derives 
in an interesting way from the views that the partisans of 
original genius had put forth regarding the róle of the Crea­
tive imagination. The imagination as we have seen is to 
be free to wander wild in its own empire of chimeras. 
Rousseau showed the possibilities of an imagination that 
is at once extraordinarily rich and also perfectly free in 
this sense. I  have said that Kant believed Iike the original 
genius that the nobility of art depends on the free “ play” 
of the imagination; though he adds that art should at the 
same time submit to a purpose that is not a purpose — 
whatever that may mean. Schiller in his “ JEsthetic Let- 
ters” relaxed the rationalistic rigor of Kant in favor of 
feeling and associated even more emphatically the ideal- 
ity and creativeness of art with its free imaginative play, 
1 See especially Lyceumfragment, no. 108.
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its emancipation from specific aim. The personal friction 
that aróse between the Schlegels and Schiller has perhaps 
obscured somewhat their general indebtedness to him. 
The Schlegelian irony in particular merely pushes to an 
extreme the doctrine that nothing must interfere with 
the imagination in its Creative play. “ The caprice of the 
poet,” as Friedrich Schlegel says, “ suffers no law above 
itself.” Why indeed should the poet allow any restriction 
to be placed upon his caprice in a universe that is after 
all only a projection of himself? The play theory of art is 
here supplemented by the philosophy of Fichte.1 In jus- 
tice to him it should be said that though his philosophy 
may not rise above the level of temperament, he at least 
had a severe and stoical temperament, and if only for this 
reason his “ transcendental ego” is far less obviously 
ego than that which appears in the irony of his romàntic 
followers. When a man has taken possession of his tran­
scendental ego, according to the Schlegels and Novalis, 
he looks down on his ordinary ego and stands aloof from 
it. His ordinary ego may achieve poetry but his tran­
scendental ego must achieve the poetry of poetry. But 
there is in him something that may stand aloof even from 
this aloofness and so on indefinitely. Romàntic irony joins 
here with what is perhaps the chief preoccupation of the 
Germán romanticists, the idea of the infinite or, as they 
term it, the striving for endlessness (Unendlichkeitstreben).
1 A well-known example of the extreme to which the romanticists 
pushed their Fichtean solipsism is the following from the William Lovell 
of the youthful Tieck: “ Having gladly escaped from anxious fetters, 
I now advance boldly through life, absolved from those irksome duties 
which were the inventions of cowardly fools. Virtue is, only because I am; 
it is but a reflection of my inner self. What care I for forms whose dim 
lustre I have myself brought forth? Let vice and virtue wed. They are only 
shadows in the mist,” etc.
Now, according to the romanticist, a man can show that 
he lays hold imaginatively upon the infinite only by 
expanding beyond what his age holds to be normal and 
central — its conventions in short; nay more, he must 
expand away from any centre he has himself achieved. 
For to hold fast to a centre of any kind implies the accept- 
ance of limitations and to accept limitations is to be finite, 
and to be finite is, as Blake says, to become mechanical; 
and the whole of romanticism is a protest against the 
mechánizing of life. No man therefore deserves to rank as 
a transcendental egotist unless he has learned to mock not 
merely at the convictions of others but at his own, unless 
he has become capable of self-parody. “ Objection,” says 
Nietzsche, “ evasión, joyous distrust, and lo ve of irony 
are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to 
pathology.” 1
One cannot repeat too often that what the romanticist 
always sees at the centre is either the mere rationalist or 
else the philistine; and he therefore inclines to measure 
his own distinction by his remoteness from any possible 
centre. Now thus to be always moving away from cen- 
trality is to be paradoxical, and romàntic irony is, as 
Friedrich Schlegel says, identical with paradox. Irony, 
Paradox and the idea of the infinite ha ve as a matter of 
fact so many points of contact in romanticism that they 
may profitably be treated together.
Friedrich Schlegel sought illustrious sponsors in the 
past for his theory of irony. Among others he invoked the 
Greeks and put himself in particular under the patron- 
age of Socrates. But Greek irony always had a centre. 
The ironical contrast is between this centre and something 
1 Beyond Good and Evil, ch. iv.
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that is less central. Take for example the so-called irony 
of Greek tragedy. The tragic character speaks and acts 
in darkness as to his impending doom, regarding which 
the spectator is comparatively enlightened. To take an- 
other example, the Germán romanticists were especially 
absurd in their attempts to set up Tieck as a new Aris­
tophanes. For Aristophanes, however wild and irrespon- 
sible he may seem in the play of his imagination, never 
quite loses sight of his centre, a centre from which the 
comic spirit proceeds and to which it returns. Above all, 
however far he may push his mockery, he never mocks at 
his own convictions; he never, like Tieck, indulges in 
self-parody. A glance at the parabasis of almost any one 
of his plays will suffice to show that he was willing to lay 
himself open to the charge of being unduly didàctic 
rather than to the charge of being aimless. The universe 
of Tieck, on the other hand, is a truly romàntic universe: 
it has no centre, or what amounts to the same thing, it 
has at its centre that symbol of spiritual stagnation, the 
philistine, and his inability to rise above a dull didacti- 
cism. The romanticist cherishes the illusion that to be a 
spiritual vagrant is to be exalted on a pinnacle above the 
plain citizen. According to Professor Stuart P. Sherman, 
the Irish dramatist Synge indulges in gypsy laughter 
from the bushes,1 a good description of romàntic irony 
in general.
The irony of Socrates, to take the most important 
example of Greek irony, is not of the centrifugal charac­
ter. Socrates professes ignorance, and this profession 
seems very ironical, for it turns out that his ignorance is 
more enlightened, that is, more central than other men s 
1 On Contemporary Literature, 206. The whole passage is excellent.
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swelling conceit of knowledge. I t  does not follow that 
Socrates is insincere in his profession of ignorance; for 
though his knowledge may be as light in comparison 
with that of the ordinary Athenian, he sees that in com­
parison with true and perfect knowledge it is only dark- 
ness. For Socrates was no mere rationalist; he was a man 
of insight, one would even be tempted to say a mystic 
were it not for the corruption of the term mystic by the 
romanticists. This being the case he saw that man is by 
his very nature precluded from true and perfect knowl­
edge. A path, however, opens up before him towards 
this knowledge, and this path he should seek to follow 
even though it is in a sense endless, even though beyond 
any centre he can attain within the bounds of his finite 
experience there is destined always to be something still 
more central. Towards the mere dogmatist, the man who 
thinks he has achieved some fixed and final centre, the 
attitude of Socrates is that of scepticism. This attitude 
implies a certain degree of detachment from the received 
beliefs and conventions of his time, and it is all the more 
important to distinguish here between Socrates and the 
romanticists because of the superficial likeness; and also 
because there is between the Rousseauists and some of 
the Greeks who lived about the time of Socrates a real 
likeness. Promethean individualism was already rife at 
that time, and on the negative side it resulted then as 
since in a break with tradition, and on the positive side 
in an oscillation between the cult of forcé and the exalta- 
tion of sympathy, between admiration for the strong man 
and compassion for the weak. It  is hardly possible to 
overlook these Promethean elements in the plays of 
Euripides. Antisthenes and the cynics, again, who pro-
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fessed to derive from Socrates, established an opposition 
between “ nature” and convention even more radical in 
some respects than that established by Rousseau. More- 
over Socrates himself was perhaps needlessly unconven- 
tional and also unduly inclined to paradox — as when 
he suggested to the jury who tried him that as an appro- 
priate punishment he should be supported at the public 
expense in the prytaneum. Yet in his inner spirit and in 
spite of certain minor eccentricities, Socrates was neither 
a superman ñor a Bohemian, but a humanist. Now that 
the critical spirit was abroad and the traditional basis 
for conduct was failing, he was chiefly concerned with 
putting conduct on a positive and critical basis. In estab- 
lishing this basis his constant appeal is to actual experi­
ence and the more homely this experience the more it 
seems to please him. While working out the new basis for 
conduct he continues to observe the existing laws and 
customs; or if he gets away from the traditional discipline 
it is towards a stricter discipline; if he repudiates in aught 
the common sense of his day, it is in favor of a commoner 
sense. One may say indeed that Socrates and the Rous­
seauists (who are in this respect like some of the sophists) 
are both moving away from convention but in opposite 
directions. What the romanticist opposes to convention 
is his “ genius,” that is his unique and prívate self. What 
Socrates opposes to convention is his universal and ethical 
self. According to Friedrich Schlegel, a man can never 
be a philosopher but only become one; if at any time he 
thinks that he is a philosopher he ceases to become one. 
The romanticist is right in thus thinking that to remain 
fixed at any particular point is to stagnate. Man is, as 
Nietzsche says, the being who must always surpass him-
self, but he has — and this is a point that Nietzsche did 
not sufficiently consider — a choice of direction in his 
everlasting pilgrimage. The man who is moving away 
from some particular centre will always seem paradoxical 
to the man who remains at it, but he may be moving 
away from it in either the romàntic or the ethical direc­
tion. In the first case he is moving from a more normal 
to a less normal experience, in the second case he is mov­
ing towards an experience that is more profoundly repre- 
sentative. The New Testament abounds in examples of 
the ethical paradox — what one may term the paradox of 
humility. (A man must lose his Ufe to find it, etc.) It  is 
possible, however, to push even this type of paradox too 
far, to push it to a point where it affronts not merely some 
particular convention but the good sense of mankind 
itself, and this is a far graver matter. Pascal falls into this 
excess when he says that sickness is the natural state of 
the Christian. As a resuit of its supreme emphasis on 
humility Christianity from the start inclined unduly per- 
haps towards this type of paradox. I t  is hardly worth 
while, as Goethe said, to live seventy years in this world 
if all that one learn here below is only folly in the sight of 
God.
One of the most delicate of tasks is to determine 
whether a paradox occupies a position more or less central 
than the convention to which it is opposed. A somewhat 
similar problem is to determine which of two differing 
conventions has the greater degree of centrality. For one 
convention may as compared with another seem highly 
paradoxical. In 1870, it was announced at Peking that his 
Majesty the Emperor had had the good fortune to catch 
the small-pox. The auspiciousness of small-pox was part
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of the Chínese convention at this time, but to those of us 
who live under another convention it is a blessing we 
would willingly forego. But much in the Chínese con­
vention, so far from being absurd, reflects the Confucian 
good sense, and if the Chínese decide to break with their 
convention, they should evidently consider long and 
carefully in which direction they are going to move — 
whether towards something more central, or something 
more eccentric.
As to the direction in which Rousseau is moving and 
therefore as to the quality of his paradoxes there can be 
little question. His paradoxes — and he is perhaps the 
most paradoxical of writers — reduce themselves on 
analysis to the notion that man has suffered a lose of 
goodness by being civilized, by having had imposed on 
his unconscious and instinctive self some humanístic or 
religious discipline — e.g., “ The man who reflects is a 
depraved animal” ; “ True Christians are meant to be 
slaves” ; decorum is only the “ varnish of vice” or the 
“ mask of hypocrisy.” Innumerable paradoxes of this 
kind will immediately occur to one as characteristic of 
Rousseau and his followers. These paradoxes may be 
termed in opposition to those of humility, the paradoxes 
of spontaneity. The man who holds them is plainly mov­
ing in an opposite direction not merely from the Christian 
but from the Socràtic individualist. He is moving from 
the more representative to the less representative and not 
towards some deeper centre of experience, as would be the 
case if he were tending towards either humanism or re­
ligión. Wordsworth has been widely accepted not merely 
as a poet but as a religious teacher, and it is therefore 
important to note that his paradoxes are prevailingly of
the Rousseauistic type. His verse is never more spon- 
taneous or, as he would say, inevitable, than when it is 
celebrating the gospel of spontaneity. I  have already 
pointed out some of the paradoxes that he opposes to 
pseudo-classic decorum: e.g., his attempt to bestow 
poetical dignity and importance upon the ass, and to 
make of it a model of moral excellence, also to find poetry 
in an idiot boy and to associate sublimity with a pedlar in 
defiance of the ordinary character of pedlars. In general 
Wordsworth indulges in Rousseauistic paradoxes when 
he urges us to look to peasants for the trae language 
of poetry and would have us believe that man is taught 
by “ woods and rills” and not by contact with his fellow 
men. He pushes this latter paradox to a point that would 
have made even Rousseau “ stare and gasp” when he 
asserts that
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man 
Of moral evil and of good 
Than all the sages can.
Another form of this same paradox that what comes 
from nature spontaneously is better than what can be 
acquired by conscious effort is found in his poem “ Lucy 
G ray” :
No mate, no comrade Lucy knew;
She dwelt on a wide moor,
The sweetest thing that ever grew 
Beside a human door!
Trae maidenhood is made up of a thousand decoraros; 
but this Rousseauistic maiden would have seemed too 
artificial if she had been reared in a house instead of 
“ growing” out of doors; she might in that case have been
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a human being and not a “ thing” and this would plainly 
have detracted from her spontaneity. Wordsworth’s 
paradoxes about children have a similar origin. A child 
who at the age of six is a “ mighty prophet, seer blest,” 
is a highly improbable not to say impossible child. The 
“ Nature” again of “ Heart-Leap Well” which both feels 
and inspires pity is more remote from normal experience 
than the Nature “ red in tooth and claw” of Tennyson. 
Wordsworth indeed would seem to have a penchant for 
paradox even when he is less obviously inspired by his 
naturalistic thesis.
A study of Wordsworth’s life shows that he became 
progressively disillusioned regarding Rousseauistic spon­
taneity. He became less paradoxical as he grew older and 
in almost the same measure, one is tempted to say, less 
poetical. He returns gradually to the traditional forms 
until radicals come to look upon him as the “ lost leader.” 
He finds it hard, however, to wean his imagination from 
its primitivistic Arcadias; so that what one finds, in 
writing like the “ Ecclesiastica! Sonnets,” is not imagina- 
tive fire but at best a sober intellectual conviction, an 
opposition between the head and the heart in short that 
suggests somewhat Chateaubriand and the Genius of 
Christianity.” 1 If Wordsworth had lost faith in his revo- 
lutionary and naturalistic ideal, and had at the same time 
refused to return to the traditional forms, one might then 
have seen in his work something of the homeless hovering 
of the romàntic ironist. If, on the other hand, he had 
worked away from the centre that the traditional forms 
give to life towards a more positive and critical centre, if,
i M. Legouis malees a similar remark in the Cambridge History o f Eng- 
lish lÁterature xi, 108.
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in other words, he had broken with the past not on Rous- 
seauistic, but on Socràtic lines, he would have needed 
an imaginat,ion of different quality, an imagination less 
idyllic and pastoral and more ethical than that he usually 
displays.1 For the ethical imagination alone can guide 
one not indeed to any fixed centre but to an ever increas- 
ing centrality. We are here confronted once more with the 
question of the infinite which comes very cióse to the 
ni ti mate ground of difference between classicist and ro- 
manticist. The centre that one perceives with the aid of 
the classical imagination and that sets bounds to impulse 
and desire may, as I  have already said, be defined in 
opposition to the outer infinite of expansión as the inner 
or human infinite. If we moderns, to repeat Nietzsche, are 
unable to attain proportionateness it is because “ our 
itching is really the itching for the infinite, the immeas- 
urable.” Thus to associate the infinite only with the im- 
measurable, to fail to perceive that the element of form 
and the curb it puts on the imagination are not external 
and artificial, but come from the very depths, is to betray 
the fact that one is a barbarían. Nietzsche and many 
other romanticists are capable on occasion of admiring 
the proportionateness that comes from allegiance to some 
centre. But after all the human spirit must be ever ad- 
vancing, and its only motive powers, according to romàntic 
logic, are wonder and curiosity; and so from the perfectly 
sound premise that man is the being who must always 
surpass himself, Nietzsche draws the perfectly unsound 
conclusión that the only way for man thus constantly to 
surpass himself and so show his infinitude is to spurn all
1 I scarcely need say that Wordsworth is at times genuinely ethical, 
but he is even more frequently only didàctic. The Excursión, as M. Legouis 
says, is a “ long sermón against pessimism.”
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limits and “ Uve dangerously.” The Greeks themselves, 
according to Renán, will some day seem the “ apostles of 
ennui,” for the very perfection of their form shows a lack 
of aspiration. To submit to form is to be static, whereas 
“ romàntic poetry,” says Friedrich Schlegel magnifi- 
cently, is “ universal progressive poetry.” Now the only 
effective counterpoise to the endless expansiveness that 
is implied in such a programme is the inner or human 
infinite of concentration. For it is perfectly true that 
there is something in man that is not satisfied with the 
finite and that, if he becomes stationary, he is at once 
haunted by the spectre of ennui. Man may indeed be 
defined as the insatiable animal; and the more imagina- 
tive he is the more insatiable he is likely to become, for it is 
the imagination that gives him access to the infinite in 
every sense of the word. In a way Baudelaire is right when 
he describes ennui as a “ delicate monster” that selects 
as his prey the most highly gifted natures. Marguerite 
d’Angouleme already speaks of the “ ennui proper to 
well-born spirits.” Now religión seeks no less than 
romance an escape from ennui. Bossuet is at one with 
Baudelaire when he dilates on that “ inexorable ennui 
which is the very substance of human Ufe.” But Bossuet 
and Baudelaire differ utterly in the remedies they propose 
for ennui. Baudelaire hopes to escape from ennui by 
dreaming of the superlative emotional adventure, by 
indulging in infinite, indeterminate desire, and becomes 
more and more restless in his quest for a something that 
at the end always eludes him. This infinite of nostalgia 
has nothing in common with the infinite of reUgion. No 
distinction is more important than that between the man 
who feels the divine discontent of reUgion, and the man
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who is suffering from mere romàntic restlessness. Accord- 
ing to religión man must seek the satisfaction that the 
finite fails to give by looking not without but within; 
and to look within he must in the üteral sense of the word 
undergo conversión. A path will then be found to open up 
before him, a path of which he cannot see the end. He 
merely knows that to advance on this path is to increase 
inpeace, poise, centrality; though beyond any calm he 
can attain is always a deeper centre of calm. The goal is 
at an infinite remove. This is the truth that St. Augus­
tine puts theologically when he exclaims: “ For thou hast 
made us for thyself and our heart is restless until it 
findeth peace in thee.” 1 One should insist that this 
question of the two infinites is not abstract and meta- 
physical but bears on what is most concrete and imme­
diate in experience. If the inner and human infinite 
cannot be formulated intellectually, it can be known prac- 
tically in its effect on life and conduct. Goethe says of 
Werther that he “ treated his heart like a sick child; its 
every wish was granted it.” “ M y restless heart asked me 
for something else,” says Rousseau. “ René,” says Cha­
teaubriand, “ was enchanted, tormented and, as itwere, 
possessed by the demon of his heart.” Mr. Galsworthy 
speaks in a similar vein of “ the aching for the wild, the 
passionate, the new, that never quite dies in a man’s 
heart.” But is there not deep down in the human breast 
another heart that is felt as a power of control over this 
romàntic heart and can keep within due bounds “ its 
aching for the wild, the passionate, the new.” This is the 
heart, it would seem, to which a man must hearken if he
1 “ Quia fecisti nos ad teet inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat 
in te.”
is not for a “ little honey of romance” to abandon his 
“ ancient wisdom and austere control.”
The romàntic corruption of the infinite here joins with 
the romàntic corruption of conscience, the transíormation 
of conscience from an inner check into an expansive emo- 
tion that I  have already traced in Shaftesbury and Rous­
seau. But one should add that in some of its aspects this 
corruption of the idea of the infinite antedates the whole 
modern movement. At least the beginnings of it can be 
found in ancient Greece, — especially in that “ delirious 
and diseased Greece” of which Joubert speaks — the 
Greece of the neo-Platonists. There is already in the neo- 
Platonic notion of the infinite a strong element of expan- 
siveness. Aristotle and the older Greeks conceived of the 
infinite in this sense as bad. That something in human 
nature which is always reaching out for more — whether 
the more of sensation or of power or of knowledge — was, 
they held, to be strictly reined in and disciplined to the 
law of measure. All the furies lie in wait for the man who 
overextends himself. He is ripening for Nemesis. “ Noth- 
ing too much.” “ Think as a mortal.” “ The half is better 
than the whole.” In his attitude towards man’s expansive 
self the Greek as a rule stands for mediation, and not 
like the more austere Christian, for renunciation. Yet 
Plato frequently and Aristotle at times mount from 
the humanistic to the religious level. One of the most 
impressive passages in philosophy is that in which Aris­
totle, perhaps the chief exponent of the law of measure, 
affirms that one who has really faced about and is moving 
towards the inner infinite needs no warning against excess: 
“ We should not give heed,” he says, “ to those who bid 
one think as a mortal, but so far as we can we should make
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ourselves immortal and do all with a view to a Ufe in 
accord with the best Principie in us.” 1 (This Principie 
Aristotle goes on to say is a man’s true self.)
The earlier Greek distinction between an outer and 
evil infinite of expansive desire and an inner infinite that 
is raised above the flux and yet rules it, is, in the Aristote- 
lian phrase, its “ unmoved mover,” became blurred, as 
I  have said, during the Alexandrian period. The Alexan- 
drian influence entered to some extent into Christian- 
ity itself and filtered through various channels down to 
modern times. Some of the romanticists went directly to 
the neo-Platonists, especially Plotinus. Still more were 
affected by Jacob Boehme, who himself had no direct 
knowledge of the Alexandrian theosophy. This theosophy 
appears nevertheless in combination with other elements 
in his writings. He appealed to the new school by his in- 
sistence on the element of appetency or desire, by his uni­
versal symbolizing, above all by his tendency to make of 
the divine an affirmative instead of a restrictive forcé— a 
something that pushes forward instead of holding back. 
The expansive elements are moderated in Boehme himself 
and in disciples like Law by genuinely religious elements
— e.g., humility and the idea of conversión. What hap- 
pens when the expansiveness is divorced from these ele­
ments, one may see in another English follower of Boehme
—  William Blake. To be both beautiful and wise one 
needs, according to Blake, only to be exuberant. The in­
fluence of Boehme blends in Blake with the new sestheti- 
cism. Jesús himself, he says, so far from being restrained 
“ was all virtue, and acted from impulse not from rules.” 
This purely sesthetic and impulsi ve Jesús has been cruelly
1 Eth. Nic., 1177 b.
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maligned, as we Iearn from thepoem entitled the “ Eternal 
Gospel,” by being represented as humble and chaste. 
Religión itself thus becomes in Blake the mere sport of a 
powerful and uncontrolled imagination, and this we are 
told is mysticism. I  have already contrasted with this 
type of mysticism something that goes under the same 
ñame and is yet utterly different — the mysticism of 
ancient India. Instead of conceiving of the divine in 
terms of expansión the Oriental sage defines it experi- 
mentally as the “ inner check.” No more fundamental 
distinction perhaps can be made than that between those 
who associate the good with the yes-principie and those 
who associate it rather with the no-principle. But I  need 
not repeat what I  have said elsewhere on the romàntic 
attempt to discredit the veto power. Let no one think 
that this contrast is merely metaphysical. The whole 
problem of evil is involved in it and all the innumerable 
practical consequences that follow from one’s attitude 
towards this problem. The passage in which Faust defines 
the devil as the “ spirit that always says no” would seem 
to derive directly or indirectly from Boehme. According 
to Boehme good can be known only through evil. God 
therefore divides his will into two, the “ yes” and the 
“ no,” and so founds an eternal contrast to himself in order 
to enter into a struggle with it, and finally to discipline 
and assimilate it. The object of all manifested nature is 
the transforming of the will which says “ no ” into the will 
which says “ yes.” 1 The opposition between good and 
evil tends to lose its reality when it thus becomes a sort 
of sham battle that God gets up with himself (without
1 Cf. the chapter on William Law and the Mystics in Cambridge His- 
tory of English Literature, ix, 341-67; also the bibliography of Boehme, 
ünd., 560-74.
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contraries is no progression, says Blake), or when, to 
take the form that the doctrine assumes in “ Faust,” the 
devil appears as the necessary though unwilling instru­
ment of man’s betterment. The recoil from the doctrine 
of total depravity was perhaps inevitable. What is sinister 
is that advantage has been taken of this recoil to tamper 
with the problem of evil itself. Partial evil we are told is 
universal good; or else evil is only good in the making. 
For a Rousseau or a Shelley it is something mysteriously 
imposed from without on a spotless human nature; for 
a Wordsworth it is something one may escape by con- 
templating the speargrass on the wall.1 For a Novalis 
sin is a mere illusion of which a man should rid his mind 
if he aspires to become a “magic idealist.” 2 In spite of his 
quaint Tory prejudices Dr. Johnson is one of the few 
persons in recent times that one may term wise without 
serious qualiñcation because he never dodges or equivo- 
cates in dealing with the problem of evil; he never fades 
away from the fact of evil into some theosophic or senti­
mental dream.
The rise of a purely expansive view of life in the eight- 
eenth century was marked by a great revival of enthusi- 
asm. The chief grievance of the expansionist indeed 
against the no-principle is that it kills enthusiasm. But 
concentration no less than expansión may have its own 
type of enthusiasm. It  is therefore imperative in an age 
that has repudiated the traditional sanctions and set out 
to walk by the inner light that all general terms and in 
particular the term enthusiasm should be protected by a 
powerful dialèctic. Nothing is more perilous than an
1 See Excursión, i, vv. 943 ff.
2 In his attitude towards sin Novalis continues Rousseau and antici- 
pates the main positions of the Christian Scientist.
ROMÀNTIC IRONY 257
uncritical enthusiasm, since it is only by criticism that 
one may determine whether the enthusiast is a man who 
is moving towards wisdom or is a candidate for Bedlam. 
The Rousseauist, however, exalts enthusiasm at the same 
time that he depreciates discrimination. “ Enthusiasm,” 
says Emerson, “ is the height of man. I t  is the passage 
from the human to the divine.” I t  is only too character- 
istic of Emerson and of the whole school to which he 
belongs, to put forth statements of this kind without any 
dialectical protection. The type of enthusiasm to which 
E m erso n ’s praise might be properly applied, the type 
that has been defined as exalted peace, though extremely 
rare, actually exists. A commoner type of enthusiasm 
during the past century is that which has been defined as 
“ therapturous disintegration of civilized human nature.” 
When we have got our fingers well burned as a result of 
our failure to make the necessary discriminations, we 
may fly to the opposite extreme like the men of the early 
eighteenth century among whom, as is well known, enthu­
siasm had become a term of vituperation. This dislike of 
enthusiasm was the natural recoil from the uncritical fol- 
lowing of the inner light by the fanatics of the seventeenth 
century. Shaftesbury attacks this older type of enthusi­
asm and at the same time prepares the way for the new 
emotional enthusiasm. One cannot say, however, that 
any such sharp separation of types appears in the revival 
of enthusiasm that begins about the middle of the eight­
eenth century, though some of those who were working 
for this revival felt the need of discriminating:
That which concerns us therefore is to see
What Species of Enthusiasts we be —
says John Byrom in his poem on Enthusiasm. The differ-
ent species, however, — the enthusiasm of the Evangeli- 
cals and Wesleyans, the enthusiasm of those who like 
Law and his disciple Byrom hearken back to Boehme, 
the enthusiasm of Rousseau and the sentimentalists, 
tend to run together. To “ let one’s feelings run in soft 
luxurious flow,”1 is, as Newman says, at the opposite pole 
from spirituality. Yet much of this mere emotional facil- 
ity appears alongside of genuinely religious elements in 
the enthusiasm of the Methodist. One may get a notion 
of the jumble to which I  refer by reading a book like 
Henry Brooke’s "Fool of Quality.” Brooke is at one and 
the same time a disciple of Boehme and Rousseau 
while being more or less affiliated with the Methodistic 
movement. The book indeed was revised and abridged 
by John Wesley himself and in this form had a wide cir- 
culation among his followers.2
The enthusiasm that has marked the modern move­
ment has plainly not been sufficiently critical. Perhaps 
the first discovery that any one will make who wishes 
to be at once critical and enthusiastic is that in a genu­
inely spiritual enthusiasm the inner light and the inner 
check are practically identical. He will find that if he is 
to rise above the naturalistic level he must curb con- 
stantly his expansive desires with reference to some centre
tPrune thou thy words,
The thoughts control 
That o’er thee swell and throng.
They will condense within the soul 
And change to purpose strong.
But he who lets his feelings run 
In soft, luxurious flow,
Shrinks when hard Service must be done 
And faints at every foe.
* Wesley had no liking for Boehme and cut out from Brooke’s book the 
theosophy that had this origin.
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that is set above the flux. Here let me repeat is the supreme 
role of the imagination. The man who has ceased to lean 
on outer standards can perceive his new standards or 
centre of control only through its aid. I  have tried to 
show that to aim at such a centre is not to be stagnant 
and stationary but on the contrary to be at once pur- 
poseful and progressive. To assert that the creativeness 
of the imagination is incompatible with centrality or, 
what amounts to the same thing, with purpose, is to 
assert that the creativeness of the imagination is in­
compatible with reality or at least such reality as man 
may attain. Life is at best a series of illusions; the whole 
office of philosophy is to keep it from degenerating into 
a series of delusions. If we are to keep it from thus de- J 
generating we need to grasp above all the difference 
between the eccentric and the concèntric imagination. 
To look for serious guidance to an imagination that owes 
allegiance to nothing above itself, is to run the risk of 
taking some cloud bank for terra firma. The eccentric 
imagination may give access to the "infinite,” but it is 
an infinite empty of content and therefore an infinite not 
of peace but of restlessness. Can any one maintain seri- 
ously that there is aught in common between the “ striv- 
ing for endlessness” of the Germán romanticists and the 
supreme and perfect Centre that Dante glimpses at the 
end of the "Divine Comedy” and in the presence of 
which he becomes dumb?
We are told to follow the gleam, but the counsel is 
somewhat ambiguous. The gleam that one follows may be 
that which is associated with the concèntric imagination 
and which gives steadiness and informing purpose, or it 
may be the romàntic will o’ the wisp. One may, as I  have
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said, in recreative moments allow one’s imagination to 
wander without control, but to take these wanderings 
seriously is to engage in a sort of endless pilgrimage in 
the void. The romanticist is constantly yielding to the 
“ spell” of this or the “ lure” of that, or the “ cali” of 
some other thing. But when the wonder and strangeness 
that he is chasing are overtaken, they at once cease to 
be wondrous and strange, while the gleam is already 
dancing over some other object on the distant horizon. 
For nothing is in itself romàntic, it is only imagining that 
makes it so. Romanticism is the pursuit of the element of 
illusion in things for its own sake; it is in short the cher- 
ishing of glamour. The word glamour introduced into 
literary usage from popular Scotch usage by Walter 
Scott itself illustrates this tendency. Traced etymologi- 
cally, it turns out to be the same word as grammar. In 
an illiterate age to know how to write at all was a weird 
and magical accomplishment,1 but in an educated age, 
nothing is so drearily unromantic, so lacking in glamour 
as grammar.
The final question that arises in connection with this 
eubject is whether one may quell the mere restlessness of 
one’s spirit and impose upon it an ethical purpose. “ The 
man who has no definite end is lost,” says Montaigne. 
The upshot of the romàntic supposition that purpose 
is incompatible with the freedom of the imagination is 
a philosophy like that of Nietzsche. He can conceive of 
nothing beyond whirling forever on the wheel of change 
(“ the eternal recurrence”) without any goal or firm 
refuge that is set above the flux. He could not help doubt-
1 Writing was often associated with magic formula}. Henee ypi/i/ui also 
gave Fr. “ grimoire.”
ing at times whether happiness was to be found after all 
in mere endless, purposeless mutation.
Have 1 stili a goal? A haven towards which my sail is set? A good 
wind? Ah, he only who knoweth whither he saileth, knoweth what wind 
is good, and a fair wind for him.
What stili remaineth to me? A heart weary and flippant; an un- 
stable will; fluttering wings; a broken backbone.
Where is my home? For it do I ask and seek, and have sought, but 
have not found it. 0  eternal everywhere, 0  eternal nowhere, 0  eternal 
— in vain.1
To allow one’s self to revolve passively on the wheel of 
change (samsara) seemed to the Oriental sage the acme 
of evil. An oíd Hindú writer compares the man who does 
not impose a firm purpose upon the manifold solicitations 
of sense to a charioteer who fails to rein in his restless 
steeds 2 — a comparison suggested independently to 
Ricarda Huch by the lives of the Germán romanticists. 
In the absence of central control, the parts of the self 
tend to pulí each in a different way. I t  is not surprising
» Thus Spake Zarathustra, lxix  (The Shadow to Zarathustra).
2 Katha- Upanishad. The passage is paraphrased as follows by P. E . 
More in his Century of Indian Epigrams:
Seated within this body’s car 
The silent Self is driven afar,
And the five senses at the pole 
Like steeds are tugging restive of control.
And if the driver lose his way,
Or the reins sunder, who can say 
In what blind paths, what pits of fear 
Will plunge the chargers in their mad career?
Drive well, O mind, use all thy art,
Thou charioteer! — O feeling Heart,
Be thou a bridle firm and strong!
For the Lord rideth and the way is long.
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that in so centrifugal a movement, at Ieast on the human 
and spiritual level, one should find so many instances of 
disintegrated and multiple personality. The fascination 
that the phenomenon of the double (Doppelgangerei) had 
for Hoffmann and other Germán romanticists is well 
known.1 It  may well be that some such disintegration of 
the self takes place under extreme emotional stress.2 
We should not fail to note here the usual cooperation 
between the emotional and the scientific naturalist. Like 
the romanticist, the scientific psychologist is more inter- 
ested in the abnormal than in the normal. According to 
the Freudians, the personality that has become incapable 
of any conscious aim is not left entirely rudderless. The 
guidance that it is unable to give itself is supplied to it 
by some “ wish,” usually obscene, from the sub-conscious 
realm of dreams. The Freudian then proceeds to develop 
what may be true of the hysterical degenerate into a com­
plete view of life.
Man is in danger of being deprived of every last scrap 
and vestige of his humanity by this working together of 
romanticism and Science. For man becomes human only 
in so far as he exercises moral choice. He must also enter 
upon the pathway of ethical purpose if he is to achieve 
happiness. “ Moods,” says Novalis, “ undefined emo tions, 
not defined emotions and feelings, give happiness.” The 
experience of life shows so plainly that this is not so that 
the romanticist is tempted to seek shelter once more from 
his mere vagrancy of spirit in the outer discipline he has
1 See Brandes: The Romàntic School in  Germany, ch. xi. 
s Alfred de Musset saw his double in the stress of his affair with George 
Sand (see Nuit de Décembre), Jean Valjean (Les Misérables) sees his double 
in the stress oí his conversión. Peter Bell also sees his double at the emo­
tional crisis in Wordsworth’s poem of that ñame.
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abandoned. “ To such unsettled ones as thou, seemeth at 
last even a prisoner blessed. Didst thou ever see how 
captured criminals sleep? They sleep quietly, they enjoy 
their new security. . . . Beware in the end lest a narrow 
faith capture thee, a hard rigorous delusion! For now 
everything that is narrow and fixed seduceth and tempt- 
eth thee.” 1
Various reasons have been given for romàntic conver­
sions to Catholicism — for example, the desire for con- 
fession (though the Catholic does not, like the Rousseau- 
ist, confess himself from the housetops), the sesthetic 
appeal of Catholic rites and ceremonies, etc. The sentence 
of Nietzsche puts us on the track of still another reason. 
The affinity of certain romàntic converts for the Church\ 
is that of the jelly-fish for the rock. I t  is appropriate that J 
Friedrich Schlegel, the great apostle of irony, should 
after a career as a heaven-storming Titan end by sub- 
mitting to this most rigid of all forms of outer authority.
For it should now be possible to return after our digres- 
sion on paradox and the idea of the infinite and the perils 
of aimlessness, to romàntic irony with a truer understand- 
ing of its significance. Like so much else in this movement \ 
it is an attempt to give to a grave psychic weakness the ' 
prestige of strength — unless indeed one conceives the 
superior personality to be the one that lacks a centre and 
principie of control. Man it has usually been held should 
think lightly of himself but should have some conviction 
for which he is ready to die. The romàntic ironist, on the 
other hand, is often morbidly sensitive about himself, but 
is ready to mock at his own convictions. Rousseau was 
no romàntic ironist, but the root of self-parody is found
1 Thus Spalce Zarathustra, lxix .
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nevertheless in his saying that his heart and his head did 
not seem to belong to the same individual. Everything of 
course is a matter of degree. What poor mortal can say 
that he is perfectly at one with himself? Friedrich 
Schlegel is not entirely wrong when he discovers elements 
of irony based on an opposition between the head and the 
heart in writers like Ariosto and Cervantes, who love the 
very medieval tales that they are treating in a spirit of 
mockery. Yet the laughter of Cervantes is not gypsy 
laughter. He is one of those who next to Shakespeare 
deserve the praise of having dwelt cióse to the centre 
of human nature and so can in only a minor degree be 
ranked with the romàntic ironists.
In the extreme type of romàntic ironist not only are 
intellect and emotion at loggerheads but action often 
belies both: he thinks one thing and feels another and 
does still a third. The most ironical contrast of all is that 
between the romàntic “ ideal” and the actual event. The 
whole of romàntic morality is from this point of view, as 
I  have tried to show, a monstrous series of ironies. The 
pacifist, for example, has been disillusioned so often that 
he should by this time be able to qualify as a romàntic 
ironist, to look, that is, with a certain aloofness on his own 
dream. The crumbling of the ideal is often so complete 
indeed when put to the test that irony is at times, we 
may suppose, a merciful alternative to madness. When 
disillusion overtakes the uncritical enthusiast, when he 
finds that he has taken some cloud bank for terra firma, 
he continues to cling to his dream, but at the same time 
wishes to show that he is no longer the dupe of it; and so 
“ hot baths of sentiment,” as Jean Paul says of his novéis, 
“ are followed by coid douches of irony.” The true Ger-
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man master of the genre is, however, Heine. Every one 
knows with what coldness his head carne to survey the 
enthusiasms of his heart, whether in love or politics. One 
may again measure the havoc that life had wrought with 
Renan’s ideals if one compares the tone of his youthful 
“ Future of Science” with the irony of his later writings. 
He compliments Jesús by ascribing to him an ironical 
detachment similar to his own. Jesús, he says, has that 
mark of the superior nature — the power to rise above 
his own dream and to smile down upon it. Anatole France, 
who is even more completely detached from his own 
dreams than his master Renán, sums up the romàntic 
emancipation of imagination and sensibility from any 
definite centre when he says that life should have as its 
supreme witnesses irony and pity.
Irony is on the negative side, it should be remembered, 
a way of affirming one’s escape from traditional and con- 
ventional control, of showing the supremacy of mood over 
decorum. “ There are poems oíd and new which through- 
out breathe the divine breath of irony. . . . Within Uves 
the poet’s mood that surveys all, rising infinitely above 
everything finite, even above his own art, virtue or 
genius.” 1 Decorum is for the classicist the grand master- 
piece to observe because it is only thus he can show that 
he has a genuine centre set above his own ego; it is only 
by the allegiance of his imagination to this centre that 
he can give the illusion of a higher reality. The romàntic 
ironist shatters the illusion wantonly. I t  is as though he 
would inflict upon the reader the disillusion from which 
he has himself suffered. By his swift passage from one 
mood to another (Stimmungsbrechung) he shows that he
1 F. Schlegel: Lyceumfragmenl, no. 42.
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is subject to no centre. The effect is often that of a suel­
den breaking of the spell of poetry by an intrusión of the 
poet’s ego. Some of the best examples are found in that 
masterpiece of romàntic irony, “ Don Juan.” 1 
Closely allied to the irony of emotional disillusion is a 
j  certain type of misanthropy. You form an ideal of man 
that is only an Arcadian dream and then shrink back from 
man when you find that he does not correspond to your 
ideal. I  have said that the romàntic lover does not love a 
real person but only a projection of his mood. This substi- 
tution of illusion for reality often appears in the relations 
of the romanticist with other persons. Shelley, for ex- 
ample, begins by seeing in Elizabeth Hitchener an ángel 
of light and then discovers that she is instead a “ brown 
demon.” He did not at any time see the real Elizabeth 
Hitchener. She merely refleets back to him two of his own 
moods. The tender misanthropy of the Rousseauist is at 
the opposite pole from that of a Swift, which is the misan­
thropy of naked intellect. Instead of seeing human nature 
through an Arcadian haze he saw it without any illusion 
at all. His irony is like that of Socrates, the irony of intel­
lect. Its bittemess and cruelty arise from the fact that his 
intellect does not, like the intellect of Socrates, have the 
support of insight. Pascal would have said that Swift saw 
man’s misery without at the same time seeing his gran­
dem. For man’s grandeur is due to his infinitude and this 
infinitude cannot be perceived directly, but only through 
a veil of illusion; only, that is, through a right use of the 
imagination. Literary distinctions of this kind must of 
course be used cautiously. Byron’s irony is prevailingly 
I sentimental, but along with this romàntic element he has
1 E .g ., canto in, cvii- cxi.
much irony and satire that Swift would have understood 
perfectly.
The misanthropist of the Rousseauistic or Byronic 
type has a resource that was denied to Swift. Having 
failed to find companionship among men he can flee to 
nature. Rousseau relates how when he had taken refuge 
on St. Peter’s Island he “ exclaimed at times with deep 
emotion: Oh nature, oh my mother, here I  am under your 
protection alone. Here is no adroit and rascally man to 
interpose between you and me.” 1 Few aspeets of roman- 
ticism are more important than this attempt to find com­
panionship and consolation in nature.
1 Confessions, Livre xn (1765).
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ICHAPTER V III
ROMANTICISMO AND NATURE
O n e  of the most disquieting features of the modern move- 
ment is the vagueness and ambiguity of its use of the 
word nature and the innumerable sophistries that have 
resulted. One can sympathize at times with Sir Leslie 
Stephen’s wish that the word might be suppressed en- 
tirely. This looseness of definition may be said to begin 
with the very rise of naturalism in the Renaissance, and 
indeed to go back to the naturalists of Greek and Roman 
antiquity.1 Evenwriters like Rabelais and Molière are not 
free from the suspicion of juggling dangerously on occar 
sion with the different meanings of the word nature. But 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not merely 
naturalistic, they were also humanistic, and what they 
usually meant by nature, as I  have pointed out, was the 
conception of normal, representative human nature that 
they had worked out with the aid of the ancients. There 
is undeniably an element of narrowness and artificiality 
in this conception of nature, and a resulting unfriendli- 
ness, as appears in Pope’s definition of wit, towards origi- 
nality and invention. In his “ Art of Poetry ” Boileau says, 
“ Let nature be your sole study.” What he means by 
nature appears a few lines later: “ Study the court and 
become familiar with the town.” To this somewhat con- 
ventionalized human nature the original genius opposed,
1 Cf. Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i, 402.
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as we have seen, the cult of primitive nature. A whole 
revolution is implied in Byron’s line:
I love not man the less, but nature more.
Any study of this topic must evidently turn on the ques- 
tion how far at different times and by different schools of 
thought the realm of man and the realm of nature (as 
Byron uses the word) have been separated and in what 
way, and also how far they have been run together and 
in what way. For there may be different ways of running 
together man and nature. Ruskin’s phrase the “pathetic 
fallacy ” is unsatisfactory because it fails to recognize this 
fact. The man who is guilty of the pathetic fallacy sees 
in nature emotions that are not really there but only in 
himself. Extreme examples of this confusión abound in 
Ruskin’s own writings. Now the ancients also ran man 
and nature together, but in an entirely different way. 
The Greek we are told never saw the qak tree without 
at the same time seeing the dryad. There is in this and 
similar associations a sort of overflow of the human realm 
upon the forms ofouter nature; whereas the Rousseauist 
instead of bestowing imaginatively upon the oak tree a 
conscious life and an image akin to his own and so lifting 
it up to his level, would, if he could, become an oak tree 
and so enjoy its unconscious and vegetative felicity. The 
Greek, one may say, humanized nature; the Rousseauist 
naturalizes man. Rousseau’s great discovery was revery; 
and revery is just this imaginative melting of man into 
outer nature. If the ancients failed to develop in a marked 
degree this art of revery, it was not because they lacked 
naturalists. Both Stoics and Epicureans, the two main 
varieties of naturalists with which classical antiquity was
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familiar, inclined to afñrm the ultímate identity of the 
human and the natural order. But both Stoics and Epi- 
cureans would have found it hard to understand the 
indifference to the intellect and its activities that Rous- 
seauistic revery implies. The Stoics to be sure employed 
the intellect on an impossible and disheartening task 
—  that of founding on the natural order virtues that 
the natural order does not give. The Epicureans remind 
one rather in much of their intellectual activity of the 
modern man of science. But the Epicureanwas less prone 
than the man of science to look on man as the mere pas­
sive creature of environment. The views of the man of 
Science about the springs of conduct often seem to coin­
cide rather closely with those of Rousseau about “ sensi­
tive morality.” Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire says that when 
reclining on the banks of the Nile he felt awakening 
within himself the instincts of the crocodile. The point 
of view is Rousseauistic perhaps rather than genuinely 
scientific. An Epicurus or a Lucretius would, we are prob- 
ably safe in assuming, have been disquieted by any such 
surrender to the sub-rational, by any such encroachment 
of the powers of the unconscious upon conscious control.
I t  is hard as a matter of fact to find in the ancients 
anything resembling Rousseauistic revery, even when 
they yield to the pastoral mood. Nature interests them as 
a rule less for its own sake than as a background for 
human action; and when they are concerned primarily 
with nature, it is a nature that has been acted upon by 
man. They have a positive shrinking from wild and un- 
cultivated nature. “ The green pastures and golden slopes 
of England,” says Lowell, “ are sweeter both to the out- 
ward and to the inward eye that the hand of man has
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immemorially cared for and caressed them.” This is an 
attitude towards nature that an ancient would have 
understood perfectly. One may indeed cali it the Virgilian 
attitude from the ancient who has perhaps expressed it 
most happily. The man who lives in the grand manner 
may indeed wish to impose on nature some of the fine 
proportion and symmetry of which he is conscious in 
himself and he may then from our modem point of view 
carrythe humanizing of nature too far. “ Let us singof 
woods,” says Virgil, “ but let the woods be worthy of 
a consul.” This line has sometimes been taken to be a 
prophecy of the Park of Versailles. We may sympathize 
up to a certain point with the desire to introduce a human 
symmetry into nature (such as appears, for instance, in 
the Italian garden), but the perii is even greater here 
than elsewhere of confounding the requirements of a real 
with those of an artificial decorum. I  have already men-' 
tioned the neo-classicist who complained that the stars 
in heaven were not arranged in sufficiently symmetrical 
patterns.
What has been said should make clear that though 
bothhumanist and Rousseauist associate man with nature 
it is in very different ways, and that there is therefore 
an ambiguity in the expression “pathetic fallacy.” It  re- 
mains to show that men may not only associate them- 
selves with nature in different ways but that they may 
likewise differ in their ways of asserting man’s separate- 
ness from nature. The chief distinction to be made here 
is that between the humanist and the supernaturalist. 
Some sense of the gap between man and the “ outworld” 
is almost inevitable and forces itself at times even upon 
those most naturalistically inclined:
272 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM
Nor will I  praise a cloud however bright,
Disparaging Man’s gifts and proper food —
Grove, isle, with every shape of sky-built dome,
Though ciad in colors beautiful and puré,
Find in the heart of man no natural home.1
The W ordsworth who speaks here is scarcely the Words­
worth of Tintern Abbey or the Wordsworth whose “ daily 
teachers had been woods and rills.” He reminds us rather 
of Socrates who gave as his reason for going so rarely 
into the country, delightful as he found it when once 
there, that he did not learn from woods and rills but 
from the “ men in the cities.” This sense of the separate- 
ness of the human and the natural realm may be carried 
much further — to a point where an ascetic distrust of 
nature begins to appear. Something of this ascetic distrust 
is seen for example in the following lines from Cardinal 
Newman:
There strayed awhile amid the woods of Dart 
One who could love them, but who durst not love;
A vow had bound him ne’er to give his heart 
To streamlet bright or soft secluded grove.2
The origins of this latter attitude towards nature are to 
be sought in medisevalChristianity rather than in classical 
antiquity. No man who knows the facts would assert for 
a moment that the man of the Middle Ages was incapable 
of looking on nature with other feelings than those of 
ascetic distrust. I t  is none the less true that the man of 
the Middle Ages often saw in nature not merely something 
alien but a positive temptation and peril of the spirit. In
1 Wordsworth: Miscellaneous Sonnets, x ii.
2 In much the same spirit the Japanese hermit, Kamo Chómei fthir- 
teenth century), expresses the fear that he may forget Buddha because 
of his fondness for the mountains and the moon. — See article on nature 
in Japan by M. Revon in Encyclopedia of Religión and Ethics.
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his attitude towards nature as in other respects Petrarch 
is usually accounted the first modern. He did what no 
man of the mediseval period is supposed to have done 
before him, or indeed what scarcely any man of classical 
antiquity did: he ascended a mountain out of sheer curi- 
osity and simply to enjoy the prospect. But those who 
tell of his ascent of Mt. Ventoux sometimes forget to 
add that the passage of Saint Augustine 1 that occurred to 
him at the top reflects the distrust of the more austere 
Christian towards the whole natural order. Petrarch is 
at once more ascetic and more romàntic in his attitude 
towards nature than the Greek or Roman.
Traces of Petrarch’s taste for solitary and even for wild 
nature are to be found throughout the Renaissance and 
the seventeenth century. But the recoil from supernat- 
uralism that took place at this time led rather, as I  have 
remarked, to a revival of the Grseco-Roman humanism 
with something more of artifice and convention, and to an 
even more marked preference2 of the town to the coun­
try. An age that aims first of all at urbanity must neces- 
sarily be more urban than rural in its predilections. I t  was 
a sort of eondescension for the neo-classical humanist to 
turn from the central model he was imitating to mere 
unadorned nature, and even then he felt that he must 
be careful not to condescend too far. Even when writing 
pastorals he was warned by Scaliger to avoid details 
that are too redolent of the real country; he should in­
dulge at most in an “ urbane rusticity.” Wild nature the 
neo-classicist finds simply repellent. Mountains he looks 
upon as “ earth’s dishonor and encumbering load.” The
1 Confessions, Bk. x , ch. ix. .
2 Cf. Cicero: “ Urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive.’ {Ad
Fam., i i , 2 2 .)
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Alps were regarded as the place where Nature swept up 
the rubbish of the earth to olear the plains of Lombardy. 
“ At last,” says a Germán traveller of the seventeenth 
century, “ we left the horrible and wearisome mountains 
and the beautiful fíat landscape was joyfully welcomed.” 
The taste for mountain scenery is associated no doubt to 
some extent, as has been suggested, with the increasing 
ease and comfort of travel that has come with the prog- 
ress of the utilitarian movement. I t  is scarcely necessary 
to point the contrast between the Switzerland of which 
Evelyn tells in his diary 1 and the Switzerland in which 
one may go by funicular to the top of the Jungfrau.
Those who in the eighteenth century began to feel the 
need of less trimness in both nature and human nature 
were not it is true entirely without neo-classic predeces­
sors. They turned at tunes to painting — as the very 
word picturesque testifies — for the encouragement they 
failed to find in literature. A landscape was picturesque 
when it seemed like a picture2 and it might be not merely 
irregular but savage if it were to seem like some of the 
pictures of Salvator Rosa. This association of even wild-
1 March 23, 1646.
* was especially easy for the poets to go for their landscapes to the 
pamters because according to the current theory poetry was itself a form 
of painting (ut pictura poesis). Thus Thomson writes in The Castle oj 
Indolence:
Sometimes the pencil, in cool airy halls,
Bade the gay bloom of vernal landskips rise,
Or autumn’s varied shades embrown the walls:
Now the black tempest strikes the astonish’d eyes;
Now down the steep the flashing torrent flies;
The trembling sun now plays o’er ocean blue,
And now rude mountains frown amid the skies;
Whate’er Lorrain light touch’d with softening hue,
Or savage Rosa dash’d, or learned Poussin drew.
(C. i, st. 38.)
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nesswith art isvery characteristic of eighteenth-century 
sentimentalism. I t  is a particular case of that curious 
blending in this period of the oíd principie of the ímita- 
tion of models with the new principie of spontaneity. 
There was a moment when a man needed to show a 
certain taste for wildness if he was to be conventionally 
correct. “ The fops,” says Taine, describing Rousseau s 
inñuence on the drawing-rooms, “ dreamt between two 
madrigals of the happiness of sleeping naked in the Vir­
gin forest.” The prince in Goethe’s “ Triumph of Sen- 
sibility” has carried with him on his travels canvas 
screens so painted that when placed in position they 
give him the illusion of being in the midst of a wild 
landscape. This taste for artificial wildness can how- 
ever best be studied in connection with the increasing 
vogue in the eighteenth century of the English garden as 
compared either with the Italian garden or the French 
garden in the style of Le Nótre.1 As a relief from the 
neo-classical symmetry, nature was broken up, often at 
great expense, into irregular and unexpected aspects. 
Some of the EngÜsh gardens in France and Germany 
were imitated directly from Rousseau’s famous descnp- 
tion of this method of dealing with the landscape m the 
“ Nouvelle Héloïse.” 2 Artificial ruins were often placed 
in the English garden as a further aid to those who 
wished to wander imaginatively from the beaten path,
i Disparaissez, monuments du génie.
Parcs, jardins immortels, que Le Nótre a plantés,
De vos dehors pompeux l’exacte symmétrie,
Etonne vainement mes regards attnstés.
J ’aime bien mieux ce désordre bizarre,
E t la variété de ces riches tableaux _
a Pt. iv, Lettre xi.
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and also as a provocative of the melancholy that was 
already held to be distinguished. Towards the end of the 
century this cuit of ruins was widespread. The veritable 
obsession with ruins that one finds in Chateaubriand 
is not unrelated to this sentimental fashion, though it 
arises even more perhaps from the real ruins that had 
been so plentifully supplied by the Revolution.
Rousseau himself, it should hardly be necessary to say, 
stands for far more than an artificial wildness. Instead 
of imposing decorum on nature like the neo-classicist, 
he preached constantly the elimination of decorum from 
man. Man should flee from that “ false taste for grandeur 
which is not made for him” and which “poisons his pleas- 
ures,” 1 to nature. Now “it is on the summits of moun- 
tains, in the depths of forests, on deserted islands that 
nature reveáis her most potent charms.” 2 The man of 
feeling finds the savage and deserted nook filled with 
beauties that seem horrible to the mere worldling.3 Rous­
seau indeed did not crave the ultimate degree of wildness 
even in the Alps. He did not get beyond what one may 
term the middle zone of Alpine scenery — scenery that 
may be found around the shores of Lake Leman. He was 
inclined to find the most appropriate setting for the earthly 
paradise in the neighborhood of Yevey. Moreover, others 
about the same time and more or less independently of 
his influence were opposing an even more primitive na­
ture to the artificialities of civilization. The mountains of 
“ Ossian” are, as has been said, mere blurs, yet the new 
delight in mountains is due in no small measure through- 
out Europe to the Ossianic influence.
1 Nouvelle Héloïse, Pt. iv, Lettre xi. 
8 Ibid., Pt. iv, Lettre x v i i .
2 Ibid.
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The instinct for getting away from the beaten track, for 
exploration and discovery, has of course been highly de- 
veloped at other epochs, notably at the Renaissance. 
Much of the romàntic interest in the wild and waste 
places of the earth did not go much beyond what might 
have been felt in Elizabethan England. Many of the 
Rousseauists, Wordsworth and Chateaubriand for exam- 
ple, not only read eagerly the older books of travel but 
often the same books. The fascination of penetrating to 
regions “ where foot of man hath ne’erorrarelybeen,” is 
perennial. It  was my privilege a few years ago to listen 
to Sir Ernest Shackleton speak of his expedition across 
the Antarctic continent and of the thrill that he and the 
members of his party felt when they saw rising before them 
day after day mountain peaks that no human eye had 
ever gazed upon. The emotion was no doubt very similar 
to that of “ stout Cortez” when he first “ stared at 
the Pacific.” Chateaubriand must have looked forward 
to similar emotions when he planned his trip to North 
America in search of the North West Passage. But the 
passion for actual exploration which is a form of the 
romanticism of action is very subordinate in the case of 
Chateaubriand to emotional romanticism. He went into 
the wilderness first of all not to make actual discoveries but 
to affirm his freedom from conventional restraint, and at 
the same time to practice the new art of revery. His sen­
timents on getting into what was then the virgin forest 
to the west of Albany were very different we may assume 
from those of the early pioneers of America. “ When,” he 
says, “ after passing the Mohawk I  entered woods which 
had never felt the axe, I  was seized by a sort of intoxica- 
tion of independence: I  went from tree to tree, to right
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and left, saying to myself, ‘Here are no more roads or 
cities or monarchy or republic or presidents or kings or 
men.’ And in order to find out if I  was restored to my 
original rights I  did various wilful things that made my 
guide fnrious. In his heart he believed me mad.” The 
disillusion that followed is also one that the early pion- 
eers would have had some difficulty in understanding. 
For he goes on to relate that while he was thusrejoicing 
in his escape from conventional life to pure nature he 
suddenly bumped up against a shed, and under the shed 
he saw his first savages —  a score of them both men and 
women. A little Frenchman named M. Violet, “ bepow- 
dered and befrizzled, with an apple-green coat, drugget 
waistcoat and muslin frill and cuffs, was scraping on a 
pocket fiddle” and teaching the Indians to dance to 
the tune of Madelon Friquet. M. Violet, it seemed, had 
remained behind on the departure from New York of 
Rochambeau’s forces at the time of the American Revo- 
lution, and had set up as dancing-master among the 
savages. He was very proud of the nimbleness of his 
pupils and always referred to them as “ ces messieurs 
sauvages et ces dames sauvagesses.” “ Was it not a crush- 
ing circumstance for a disciple of Rousseau,” Chateau­
briand concludes, “ this introduction to savage life by a 
ball that the ex-scullion of General Rochambeau was 
giving to Iroquois? I  felt very much like laughing, but 
I  was at the same time cruelly humiliated.”
In America, as elsewhere, Chateaubriand’s chief con­
cern is not with any outer fact or activity, but with his 
own emotions and the enhancement of tfiese emotions by 
his imagination. In him as in many other romanticists 
the different elements of Rousseauism —  Arcadian long-
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ing, the pursuit of the dream woman, the aspiration to- 
wards the “ infinite” (often identified with God) — appear 
at times more or less separately and then again almost 
inextricably blended with one another and with the cult 
of nature. I t  may be well to consider more in detall these 
various elements of Rousseauism and their relation to 
nature in about the order I  have mentioned. The associa- 
tion of Arcadian longing with nature is in part an out- 
come of the conflict between the ideal and the real. The 
romàntic idealist finds that men do not understand him: 
his “ visión” is mocked and his “ genius” is unrecognized. 
The resuit is the type of sentimental misanthropy of 
which I  spoke at the end of the last chapter. He feels, 
as Lamartine says, that there is nothing in common 
between the world and him. Lamartine adds, however, 
“ But nature is there who invites you and loves you.” You 
will find in her the comprehension and companionship 
that you have failed to find in society. And nature will 
seem a perfect companion to the Rousseauist in direct 
proportion as she is uncontaminated by the presence of 
man. Wordsworth has described the misanthropy that 
supervened in many people on the collapse of the revolu- 
tionary idealism. He himself overcame it, though there 
is more than a suggestion in the manner of his own retire- 
ment into the hills of a man who retreats into an Arca­
dian dream from actual defeat. The suggestion of defeat 
is much stronger in Ruskin’s similar retirement. Ruskin 
doubtless felt in later life, like Rousseau, that if he had 
failed to get on with men “ it was less his fault than 
theirs.” 1 Perhaps emotional misanthropy and the worship 
of wild nature are nowhere more fully combined than in 
1 Confessions, Livre v (1732).
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Byron. He gives magnificent expression to the most un- 
tenable of paradoxes — that one escapes from solitude by 
eschewing human haunts in favor of some wilderness.1 
In these haunts, he says, he became like a “ falcon with 
clipped wing,” but found in nature the kindest of mothers.
Oh! she is fairest in her features wild,Where nothing polished dare pollute her path:To me by day or night she ever smiled Though I have marked her when none other hath And sought her more and more, and loved her best in wrath.2
He not only finds companionship in nature but at the 
same time partakes of her infinitude — an infinitude, one 
should note, of feeling:
I live not in myself, but I become Portion of that around me; and to me High mountains are a feeling, but the hum Of human cities torture. 3
In his less misanthropic moods the Rousseauist sees in 
wild nature not only a refuge from society, but also a 
suitable setting for his companionship with the ideal 
mate, for what the French term la solitude à  deux.
Oh! that the Desert were my dwelling-place With one fair Spirit for my minister,That I might all forget the human race And, hating no one, love but only her! 4
The almost innumerable passages in the romàntic 
movement that celebrate this Arcadian companionship 
in the wilderness merely continue in a sense the pastoral 
mood that must be as oíd as human nature itself. But in 
the past the pastoral mood has been comparatively placid.
1 See especially Childe Harold, canto ii, xxv ff.
2 Ib-id., canto n, x x x v i i .  3 Ibid., canto ni, T.xxrr,
4 Ibid., c a n to  iv , c l x x v i i .
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I t  has not been associated in any such degree with mis- 
anthropy and wildness, with nympholeptic longing and 
the thirst for the infinite. The scene that Chateaubriand 
has imagined between Chactas and Atala in the primeval 
forest, is surely the stormiest of Arcadias; so stormy in- 
deed that it would have been unintelligible to Theocritus. 
It  is not certain that it would have been intel·ligible to 
Shakespeare, who like the other Eüzabethans felt at times 
that he too had been born in Arcadia. The Arcadian of 
the past was much less inclined to sink down to the sub- 
rational and to merge his personality in the landscape. 
Rousseau describes with a charm that has scarcely been 
surpassed by any of his disciples, the revenes in which he 
thus descends below the level of his rational self. Time, 
no longer broken up by the importúnate intellect and 
its analysis, is then felt by him in its unbroken flow; 
the result is a sort of “ eternal present that leaves no 
sense of emptiness.” Of such a moment of revery Rous­
seau says, anticipating Faust, that he “ would like it 
to last forever.” Bergson in his conception of the sum­
mum bonum as a state in which time is no longer cut up 
into artificial segments but is perceived in its continuous 
stream as a “ present that endures,” 1 has done little more 
than repeat Rousseau. The sight and sound of water 
seem to have been a special aid to revery in Rousseau s 
case. His accounts of the semi-dissolution of his conscious 
self that he enjoyed while drifting idly on the Lake of 
Bienne are justly celebrated. Lamartine’s soul was, like 
that of Rousseau, lulled by “ the murmur of waters.” 
Nothing again is more Rousseauistic than the desire 
Arnold attributes to Maurice de Guérin the desire
1 See L a  Perception du changement, 30.
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“ to be borne on forever down an enchanted stream.” 
That^ too is why certain passages of Shelley are so near 
in spirit to Rousseau — for example, the boat revery in 
Piometheus Unbound” in which an Arcadian nature 
and the dream companion mingle to the strains of music 
in a way that is supremely romàntic.1
The association of nature with Arcadian longing and 
the pursuit of the dream woman is even less significant 
than its association with the idea of the infinite. For as 
a result of this latter association the nature cult often 
assumes the aspect of a religión. The various associa- 
tions may indeed as I  have said be very much blended 
or else may run into one another almost insensibly. No 
better illustration of this blending can be found perhaps
1 Asia
My soul is an enchanted boat,
Which like a sleeping swan, doth float 
Upon the silver waves of thy sweet singing;
And thine doth like an ángel sit 
Beside a helm conducting it,
Whilst all the wmds with melody are ringing.
It seems to float ever, for ever 
Upon that many-winding river,
Between mountains, woods, abysses,
A paradise of wildernesses!
Meanwhile thy spirit lifts its pinions 
In music’s most serene dominions;
Catching the winds that fan that happy heaven.
And we sail on away, afar,
Without a course, without a star,
But by the instinct of sweet music driven;
Till through Elysian garden islets 
By thee, most beautiful of pilots,
Where never mortal pinnace glided 
The boat of my desire is guided;
Realms where the air we breathe is love —
Prometheus Unbound, Act n, Se. v.
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than in Chateaubriand — especially in that compendium 
of Rousseauistic psychology, his “ René.” The soul of 
René, one learns, was too great to adjust itself to the 
society of men. He found that he would have to contract 
his life if he put himself on their level. Men, for their part, 
treated him as a dreamer, and so he is forced more and 
more by his increasing disgust for them into solitude. Now 
René rests the sense of his superiority over other men on 
two things: first, on his superlative capacity to feel 
grief;1 secondly, on his thirst for the infinite. “ What is 
finite,” he says, “ has no valué for me.” What is thus 
pushing him beyond all bounds is “ an unknown good of 
which the instinct pursues me.” “ I  began to ask myself 
what I  desired. I  did not know but I  thought all of a 
sudden that the woods would be delicious to me!” What 
he found in this quest for the mystical something that 
was to fill the abyss of his existence was the dream 
woman. “ I  went down into the valley, I  strode upon the 
mountain, summoning with all the forcé of my desire the 
ideal object of a future ñame; I  embraced this object in 
the winds; I  thought that I  heard it in the moanings of 
the river. All was this phantom of the imagination — 
both the stars in heaven and the very principie of life in 
the universe.” I  have already quoted a very similar pas- 
sage and pointed out the equivalent in Shelley. No such 
cióse equivalent could be found in Byron, and Words- 
worth, it is scarcely necessary to say, offers no equivalent 
at all. If one reads on, however, one finds passages that 
are Byronic and others that are Wordsworthian. Pagan- 
ism, Chateaubriand complains, by seeing in nature only
1 “  Si tu souffres plus qu’un autre des dioses de la vie, il ne faut pas t’en 
étonner; une grande áme doit contenir plus de douleurs qu’une petite.”
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certain definite forms — fauns and satyrs and nymphs — 
had banished from it both God and the infinite. But 
Christianity expelled these thronging figures in turn 
and restored to the grottoes their silence and to the woods 
their revery. The true God thus became visible in his 
works and bestowed upon them his own immensity. 
What Chateaubriand understands by God and the infi­
nite appears in the following descriptionof the región near 
Niagara seen by moonlight. The passage is Byronic as 
a whole with a Wordsworthian touch at the end. “ The 
grandeur, the amazing melancholy of this picture cannot 
be expressed in human language; the fairest night of 
Europe can give no conception of it. In vain in our culti- 
vated fields does the imagination seek to extend itself. 
I t  encounters on every hand the habitations of men; but 
in these savage regions the soul takes delight in plunging 
into an ocean of forests, in hovering over the gulf of cata- 
racts, in meditating on the shores of lakes and rivers and, 
so to speak, in finding itself alone in the presence of God.” 
The relation between wild and solitary nature and the 
romàntic idea of the infinite is here obvious. I t  is an aid 
to the spirit in throwing off its limitations and so in feel- 
ing itself “ free.” 1
A greater spiritual elevation it is sometimes asserted 
is found in Wordsworth’s communings with nature than 
in those of Rousseau and Chateaubriand. The difference 
perhaps is less one of spirit than of temperament. In its 
abdication of the intellectual and critical faculties, in
1 Cf. Shelley, Ju lián  and M addalo :
I love all waste 
And solitary places; where we taste 
The pleasure of believing what we see 
Is boundless, as we wish our souls to be.
\
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its semi-dissolution of the conscious self, the revery of 
Wordsworth does not differ from that of Rousseau 1 and 
Chateaubriand, but the erotic element is absent. In the 
“ Genius of Christianity” Chateaubriand gives a mag­
nificent description of sunset at sea and turns the whole 
picture into a proof of God. Elsewhere he tells us that it 
was “ not God alone that I  contemplated on the waters 
in the splendor of his works. I  saw an unknown woman 
and the miracle of her smile. . . .  I  should have sold eter- 
nity for one of her caresses. I  imagined that she was 
palpitating behind that veil of the universe that hid her 
from my eyes,” etc. Wordsworth was at least consistently 
religious in his attitude towards the landscape: he did not 
see in it at one moment God, and at another an unknown 
woman and the miracle of her smile. At the same time his 
idea of spirituality is very remote from the traditional 
conception. Formerly spirituality was held to be a 
process of recollection, of gathering one’s self in, that is, 
towards the centre and not of diffusive emotion; so that 
when a man wished to pray he retired into his closet, and 
did not, like a Wordsworth or a Rousseau, fall into an 
inarticulate ecstasy before the wonders of nature. As for 
the poets of the past, they inclined as a rule to look on 
nature as an incentive not to religión but to love. Keble, 
following Wordsworth, protests on this ground against 
Aristophanes, and Catullus and Horaee and Theocritus. 
He might have lengthened the list almost indefinitely. 
Chateaubriand bids us in our devotional moods to betake 
ourselves “ to the religious forest.” La Fontaine is at least
1 Cf. for example, the passage of Rousseau in the seventh Promenade 
(“ Je sens des extases, des ravissements inexprimables à me fondre pour 
ainsi dire dans le systéme des étres,” etc.) with the revery described by 
Wordsworth in The Excursión, i, 200-218.
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as near to normal human experience and also at least as 
poetical when he warns “ fair ones” to “ fear the depths of 
the woods and their vast silence.” 1
No one would question that Wordsworth has passages 
of great ethical elevation. But in some of these passages 
he simply renews the error of the Stoics who also display 
at times great ethical elevation; he ascribes to the natural 
order virtues that the natural order does not give. This 
error persists to some extent even when he is turning 
away, as in the “ Ode to Duty,” from the moral spon- 
taneity of the Rousseauist. I t  is not quite clear that the 
law of duty in the breast of man is the same law that pre­
serves “ the stars from wrong.” His earlier assertion that 
the light of setting suns and the mind of man are identi- 
cal in their essence is at best highly speculative, at least 
as speculative as the counter assertion of Sir Thomas 
Browne that “ there is surely a piece of divinity in us; 
something that was before the elements, and owes no 
homage unto the sun.” Furthermore this latter sense of 
the gap between man and nature seems to be more fully 
justified by its fruits in life and conduct, and this is after 
all the only test that counts in the long run.
One of the reasons why pantheistic revery has been so 
popular is that it seems to offer a painless substitute for 
genuine spiritual effort. In its extreme exponents, a 
Rousseau or a Walt Whitman, it amounts to a sort of 
ecstatic animality that sets up as a divine illumination. 
Even in its milder forms it encourages one to assume a 
tone of consecration in speaking of experiences that are 
sesthetic rather than truly religious. “ ’T  is only heaven 
that’s given away,” sings Lowell; “ T  is only God may
1 O belles, craignez le fond des bois, et leur vaste silence.
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be had for the asking.” God and heaven are accorded 
by Lowell with such strange facility because he identifies 
them with the luxurious enjoyment of a “ day in June.” 
When pushed to a certain point the nature cult always 
tends towards sham spirituality.
Oh World as God has made it — All is beauty,And knowing this is love, and Love is duty.
I t  seems to follow from these verses of Browning, per- 
haps the most flaccid spiritually in the English language, 
that to go out and mix one’s self up with the landscape 
is the same as doing one’s duty. As a method of salva- 
tion this is even easier and more sesthetic than that of the 
Ancient Mariner, who, it will be remembered, is relieved 
of the burden of his transgression by admiring the color 
of water-snakes!
The nature cult aróse at a time when the traditional 
religious symbols were becoming incredible. Instead of 
working out new and firm distinctions between good 
and evil, the Rousseauist seeks to discredit all precise 
distinctions whether new or old, in favor of mere emo- 
tional intoxication. The passage to which I  have already 
alluded, in which Faust breaks down the scruples of 
Marguerite by proclaiming the supremacy of feeling, 
surpasses even the lines I have cited from Browning as 
an example of sham spirituality:
M arguerite: Dost thou believe in God?
Faust: My darling, who dares say,Yes, I in God believe?Question or priest or sage, and they Seem, in the answer you receive,To mock the questioner.
M argum te: Then thou dost not believe?
F au st: Sweet one! my meaning do not misconceive!Him who daré ñame And who proclaim,Him I believe?Who that can feel,His heart can steel,To say: I believe him not?The All-embracer,All-sustainer,Holds and sustains he not Thee, me, himself?
Lifts not the Heaven its dome above?Doth not the firm-set earth beneath us lie?And beaming tenderly with looks of love Climb not the everlasting stars on high?Do I not gaze into thine eyes?Nature’s impenetrable agencies,Are they not thronging on thy heart and brain, Yiewless, or visible to mortal ken,
Around thee weaving their mysterious chain?Fill thence thy heart, how large soe’er it be;And in the feeling when thou utterly art blest,Then cali it what thou wilt —Cali it Bliss! Heart! Love! God!I have no ñame for it!Feeling is all;
Ñame is but sound and smoke Shrouding the glow of heaven.1
The upshot of this enthusiasm that overflows all bound- 
aries and spurns definition as mere smoke that veils its 
heavenly glow is the seduction of a poor peasant girl. 
Such is the romàntic contrast between the “ ideal” and 
the “ real.”
Those to whom I  may seem to be treating the nature 
cuit with undue severity should remember that I  am 
treating it only in its pseudo-religious aspect. In its
1 Faust (Miss Swanwick’s translation).
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proper place all this refining on man’s relation to the 
“ outworld” may be legitímate and delightful; but that 
place is secondary. My quarrel is only with the sesthete 
who assumes an apocalyptic pose and gives forth as a 
profound philosophy what is at best only a holiday or 
week-end view of existence. No distinction is more im­
portant for any one who wishes to maintain a correct 
scale of valúes than that between what is merely recrea- 
tive and what ministers to leisure. There are times when 
we may properly seek solace and renewal in nature, when 
we may invite both our souls and our bodies to loaf. The 
error is to look on these moments of recreation and re- 
lief from concentration on some definite end as in them- 
selves the consummation of wisdom. Rousseau indeed as- 
sumes that his art of mixing himself up with the land- 
scape is idéntica! with leisure; like innumerable disci- 
ples he confuses revery with meditation — a confusión 
so grave that I  shall need to revert to it later. He paro­
dies subtly what is above the ordinary rational level in 
terms of what is below it. He thus brings under suspicion 
the most necessary of all truths — that the kingdom of 
heaven is within us.
The first place always belongs to action and purpose 
and not to mere idling, even if it be like that of the Rous- 
seauist transcendental idling. The man who makes a 
deliberate choice and then plans his Ufe with reference 
to it is less likely than the aimless man to be swayed bv 
every impulse and impression. The figures of Raphael 
according to Hazlitt have always “ a set, determined, 
voluntary character,” they “ want that wild uncertainty 
of expression which is connected with the accidents of 
nature and the changes of the elements.” And Hazlitt
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therefore concludes rightly that Raphael has “ nothing 
romàntic about him.” The distinction is so important 
that it might be made the basis for a comparison between 
the painting of the Renaissance and some of the im­
portant schools of the nineteenth century. Here again no 
sensible person would maintain that the advantage is all 
on one side. Romanticism gave a great impulse to land- 
scape painting and to the painting of man in the land- 
scape. Few romàntic gains are more indubitable. One 
may prefer the best work of the Barbizon school for 
example to the contemporary product in French litera- 
ture. But even here it must be insisted that painting from 
which man is absent or in which he is more or less subor- 
dinated to the landscape is not the highest type of paint­
ing. Turner, one of the greatest masters of landscape, was 
almost incapable of painting the human figure. Ruskin is 
therefore indulging in romàntic paradox when he puts 
Turner in the same class as Shakespeare. Turner’s visión 
of life as compared with that of Shakespeare is not central 
but peripheral.
The revolution that has resulted from the triumph of 
naturalistic over humanistic tendencies in painting ex- 
tends down to the minutest details of technique; it has 
meant the subordination of design — the imposition, that 
is, on one’s material of a firm central purpose — to light 
and color; and this in painting corresponds to the literary 
pursuit of glamour and illusion for their own sake. I t  has 
meant in general a tendency to sacrifice all the other 
elements of painting to the capture of the vivid and im­
mediate impression. And this corresponds to the readiness 
of the writer to forego decorum in favor of intensity. 
The choice that is involved, including a choice of tech-
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ñique, according as one is a naturalist or a humanist, is 
brought out by Mr. Kenyon Cox in his comparison of 
two paintings of hermits,1 one by Titian and one by John 
Sargent: the impressionistic and pantheistic hermit of 
Sargent is almost entirely merged in the landscape; he is 
little more than a pretext for a study of the accidents 
of light. The conception of Titian’s St. Jerome in the 
Desert is perhaps even more humanistic than religious. 
The figure of the saint on which everything converges is 
not merely robust, it is even a bit robustious. The picture 
fl.ffirms in its every detail the superior importance of man 
and his purposes to his natural environment. So far as 
their inner life is concerned the two hermits are plainly 
moving in opposite directions. An appropriate motto for 
Sargent’s hermit would be the following lines that I  take 
from a French symbolist, but the equivalent of which 
can be found in innumerable other Rousseauists:
Je  voudrais me confondre avec les choses, tordre 
Mes bras contre la pierre et les fratches écorces,
Etre l’arbre, le mur, le pollen et le sel,
Et me dissoudre aufond de l’étre universel.
This is to push the reciprocity between man and nature 
to a point where the landscape is not only a state of the 
soul but the soul is a state of the landscape; just as in 
Shelley’s Ode, Shelley becomes the West Wind and the 
West Wind becomes Shelley.2 The changes in the roman-
1 Artist and Public, 134 ff.
2 Make me thy lyre, even as the forest is:
What if my leaves are falling like its own!
The tumult of thy mighty harmonies
Will take from both a deep, autumnal tone,
Sweet though in sadness. Be thou, Spirit fierce,
My spirit! Be thou me, impetuous one!
tic soul are appropriately mirrored in the changes of the 
seasons. In Tieck’s “Genoveva/’ for example, Golo’s love 
blossoms in the springtime, the sultry summer impels 
him to sinful passion, the autumn brings grief and repent- 
ance, and in winter avenging judgment overtakes the 
offender and casts him into the grave.1 Autumn is per- 
haps even more than springtime the favorite season of 
the Rousseauist. The movement is filled with souls who 
like the hero of Poe’s “ Ulalume” have reached the Octo­
ber of their sensations. Some traces of this sympathetic 
relation between man and nature may indeed be found 
in the literature of the past. The appropriateness of the 
setting in the “Prometheus Bound” of iEschylus would 
scarcely seem to be an accident. The storm in “ Lear ” may 
also be instanced. But as I  have already said occidental 
man did not before Rousseau show much inclination to 
mingle with the landscape. The parallelism that Pater 
establishes in “ Marius the Epicurean” between the 
moods of the hero and the shifting aspects of nature is felt 
as a distinet anachronism. If we wish to find any early 
approximations to the subtleties and refinements of the 
Rousseauist in his dealings with nature we need to turn 
to the Far East — especially to the Taoist movement in 
China.2 As a result of the Taoist influence China had
Drive my dead thoughts over the universe
Like withered leaves, etc.
Cf. Lamartine:
Quand la feuille des bois tombe dans la prairie,
Le vent du soir s’éléve et 1’arrache aux vallons;
E t moi, je suis semblable à la feuille flétrie;
Emportez-moi comme elle, orageux aquilons.
L’Isokment.
1 Cf. Hettner, Romantische Schule, 156.
2 See appendix on Chínese primitivism.
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from a very early period poets and painters for whom the 
landscape is very plainly a state of the soul.
Pantheistic revery of the kind I  have been describing 
leads inevitably to a special type of symboljism. The 
Rousseauist reads into nature unutterable love. He sees 
shining through its finite forms the light of the infinite. 
The Germans especially set out to express symbolically 
the relationship between the love and infinitude that they 
saw in nature and the kindred elements in themselves. 
Any one who has attempted to thread his way through 
the Germán theories of the symbol will feel that he has, 
like Wordsworth’s shepherd, “ been in the heart of many 
thousand mists.” But in view of the importance of the 
subject it is necessary to venture for a moment into this 
metaphysical murk. Schelling’s “ Nature Philosophy” is 
perhaps the most ambitious of all the Germán attempts 
to run together symbolically the human spirit and phe- 
nomenal nature. “ What we cali nature,” says Schelling, 
“ is a poem that lies hidden in a secret wondrous writing ” ; 
if the riddle could be revealed we should recognize in 
nature “ the Odyssey of the Spirit.” “ There looks out 
through sensuous objeets as through a half-transparent 
mist the world of phantasy for which we long.” “ All 
things are only a garment of the world of spirit.” “ To 
be romàntic,” says Uhland, “ is to have an inkling of the 
infinite in appearances.” “ Beauty,” says Schelling in 
similar vein, “ is a finite rendering of the infinite.” Now 
the infinite and the finite can only be thus brought to­
gether through the medium of the symbol. Therefore, as 
A. W. Schlegel says, “ beauty is a symbolical represen- 
tation of the infinite. All poetry is an everlasting sym- 
bolizing.”
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This assertion is in an important sense true. Unfortu- 
nately there remains the ambiguity that I  have already 
pointed out in the word “ infinite.” No one would give a 
high rating to a certain type of allegory that flourished 
in neo-classical times as also in a somewhat different 
form during the Middle Ages. I t  is a coid intellectual 
contrivance in which the imagination has little part and 
which therefore fails to suggest the infinite in any sense. 
But to universalize the particular in the classical sense is 
to give access imaginatively to the human infinite that is 
set above nature. Every successful humanístic creation 
is more or less symbolical. Othello is not merely a jealous 
man; he is also a symbol of jealousy. Some of the myths of 
Plato again are imaginative renderings of a supersensu- 
ous realm to which man has no direct access. They are 
symbolical representations of an infinite that the roman- 
ticist leaves out of his reckoning. The humanístic and 
spiritual symbols that abound in the religión and poetry 
of the past, are then, it would seem, very different from 
the merely sesthetic symbolizing of a Schelling. For 
Schelling is one of the chief of those who from Shaftes- 
bury down have tended to identify beauty and truth 
and to make both purely sesthetic. But a symbol that 
is purely sesthetic, that is in other words purely a mat- 
ter of feeling, rests on what is constantly changing not 
only from man to man but in the same man. Romàntic 
symbolism, therefore, though it claims at one moment to 
be scientific (especially in Germany) and at another mo­
ment to have a religious valué, is at bottom the symbol­
izing of mood. Both the imagination and the emotion that 
enter into the romàntic symbol are undisciplined. The 
results of such a symbolism do not meet the demand of
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the genuine man of Science for experimental proof, they 
do not again satisfy the test of universality imposed by 
those who believe in a distinctively human realm that is 
set above nature. The nature philosophy of a Schelling 
leads therefore on the one hand to sham Science and on 
the other to sham philosophy and religión.
The genuine man of Science has as a matter of fact 
repudiated the speculations of Schelling and other ro­
màntic physicists as fantastic. He may also be counted 
on to look with suspicion on the speculations of a Berg- 
son who, more perhaps than any living Rousseauist, 
reminds one of the Germán romàntic philosophers. One 
idea has however lingered in the mind even of the genuine 
man of Science as a result of all this romàntic theoriz- 
ing — namely that man has access to the infinite only 
through nature. Thus Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn 
said in a recent address to the students of Colúmbia 
University:
I would not for a moment take advantage of the present opportun- 
ity to discourage the study of human nature and of the humanities, 
but for what is called the best opening for a constructive career give 
me nature. The ground for my preference is that human nature is an 
exhaustible fountain of research; Homer understood it well; Solomon 
fathomed it; Shakespeare divined it, both normal and abnormal; the 
modernists have been squeezing out the last drops of abnormality. 
Nature, studied since Aristotle’s time, is still full to the brim; no 
perceptible falling of its tides is evident from any point at which it is 
attacked, from nebuke to protoplasm; it is always wholesome, re- 
freshing and invigorating. Of the two most Creative literary artists of 
our time, Maeterlinck, jaded with human abnormality, comes back 
to the bee and the flowers and the “blue bird,” with a delicious re- 
newal of youth, while Rostand tums to the barnyard.
The romanticists acted from the start, following here 
in the wake of the pseudo-classicists, on Professor Os-
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bom’s assumption that normal human nature is some- 
thing that may be bottled up once for all and put by on a 
shelf, though they would have been pained to learn from 
him that even abnormal human nature may also be bot­
tled up and put by in the same fashion. Sophistries of 
this kind should perhaps be pardoned in the man of 
Science when so many men who are supposed to stand 
for letters have shown him the way. Great literature is 
an imaginative and symbolical interpretation of an infi­
nite that is accessible only to those who possess in some de- 
gree the same type of imagination. A writer like Maeter- 
linck, whom Professor Osborn takes to be representative 
of literature in general, is merely a late exponent of a 
movement that from the start turned away from this 
human infinite towards pantheistic revery.
The imagination is, as Coleridge says, the great unify- 
ing power; it draws together things that are apparently 
remote. But its analogies to be of valué should surely have 
validity apart from the mere shifting mood of the man 
who perceives them. Otherwise he simply wrests some 
outer object from the chain of cause and effect of which 
it is actually a part, and incorporates it arbitrarily into 
his own prívate dream. Wordsworth is not sparing of 
homely detail in his account of his leech-gatherer; but at 
a given moment in this poem the leech-gatherer under- 
goes a strange transformation; he loses all verisimilitude 
as a leech-gatherer and becomes a romàntic Symbol, a 
mere projection, that is, of the poet’s own broodings. 
Topush this symbolizing of mood beyond a certain point 
is incipient hallucination. We are told that when the 
asylum at Charenton was shelled in the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870, the lunatics saw reflected in the bursting
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bombs, each in a different way, his own madness. One 
took the bombs to be a link in the plot of his enemies 
against him, etc. I t  is hard to consider the symbolizing 
and visions of the extreme romanticist, such as those of 
William Blake, without thinking at times of Charenton.
What I  have said of the romàntic symbol is true in 
some degree of the romàntic metaphor, for the Symbol 
and even the myth are often only a developed metaphor. 
The first part of the romàntic metaphor, the image or 
impression that has been received from the outer world, is 
often admirably fresh and vivid.1 But the second part of 
the metaphor when the analogy involved is that between 
some fact of outer perception and the inner life of man is 
often vague and misty; for the inner life in which the 
romanticist takes interest is not the life he possesses in 
common with other men but what is most unique in his 
own emotions — his mood in short. That is why the 
metaphor and still more the symbol in so far as they are 
romàntic are always in danger of becoming unintelligible, 
since it is not easy for one man to enter into another’s 
mood. Men accord a ready welcome to metaphors and 
symbols that instead of expressing something more or 
less individual have a real relevancy to their common 
nature. Tribulation, for example, means literally the 
beating out of grain on the threshing floor. The man who 
first saw the analogy between this process and certain 
spiritual experiences established a legitímate link be­
tween nature and human nature, between sense and the 
supersensuous. Language is filled with words and ex-
1 G. Duval has written a Dictionnaire des métaphores de Víctor Hugo, 
and G. Lucchetti a work on Les Images dans les ceuvres de Víctor Hugo. 
So far as the ethical valúes are concerned, the latter title is alone justified. 
Hugo is, next to Chateaubriand, the great imagist.
pressions of this kind which have become so current that 
their metaphorical and symbolical character has been 
forgotten and which have at the same time ceased to be 
vivid and concrete and become abstract.
The primitivistic fallacies of the Germán romanticists 
in their dealings with the symbol and metaphor appear 
in various forms in French romanticism and even more 
markedly in its continuation known as the symbolistic 
movement. What is exasperating in many of the poets 
of this school is that they combine the pretence to a vast 
illumination with the utmost degree of spiritual and intel­
ectual emptiness and vagueness. Like the early Germán 
romanticists they mix up flesh and spirit in nympholeptic 
longing and break down and blur all the boundaries of 
being in the ñame of the infinite. Of this inner formless- 
ness and anarchy the chaos of the vers libre (in which they 
were also anticipated by the Germans) is only an outer 
symptom.1
If the Rousseauistic primitivist recognizes the futility 
of his symbolizing, and consents to become a passive 
register of outer perception, if for example he proclaims 
himself an imagist, he at least has the merit of frankness, 
but in that case he advertises by the very ñame he has 
assumed the bankruptcy of all that is most worth while 
in poetry.
But to return to romanticism and nature. It  should be 
plain from what has already been said that the romanti-
1 The French like to think of the symbolists as having rendered certain 
Services to their versification. Let us hope that they did, though few things 
are more perilous than this transfer of the idea of progress to the literary 
and artístic domain. Decadent Rome, as we learn from the younger Pliny 
and others, simply swarmed with poets who also no doubt indulged in 
many strange experiments. All this poetical activity, as we can see only too 
plainly at this distance, led nowhere.
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cist tends to make of nature the mere plaything of his 
mood. When Werther’s mood is cheerful, nature smiles 
at him benignly. When his mood darkens she becomes for 
him “ a devouring monster.” When it grows evident to 
the romanticist that nature does not alter with his altera- 
tion, he chides her at times for her impassibility; or again 
he seeks to be impassible like her, even if he can be so 
only at the expense of his humanity. This latter attitude 
is closely connected with the dehumanizing of man by 
Science that is reflected in a whole literature during the 
last half of the nineteenth century — for instance, in so- 
called “ impassive” writers like Flaubert and Leconte 
de Lisie.
The causal sequences that had been observed in the 
physical realm were developed more and more during 
this period with the aid of puré mathematics and the 
mathematical reason (esprit de géométrie) into an all- 
embracing system. For the earlier romanticists nature 
had at least been a living presence whether benign or 
sinister. For the mathematical determinist she tends to 
become a soulless, pitiless mechanism against which man 
is helpless.1 This conception of nature is so important 
that I shall need to revert to it in my treatment of melan- 
choly.
The man who has accepted the universe of the mechan-
1 Grant Alien writes of the laws of nature in Magdalen Tower:
They care not any whit for pain or pleasure,
That seems to us the sum and end of all,
Dumb forcé and barren number are their measure,
What shall be shall be, tho’ the great earth fall,
They take no heed of man or man’s deserving,
Reck not what happy lives they make or mar,
Work out their fatal will unswerv’d, unswerving,
And know not that they are!
ist or determinist is not always gloomy. But men in 
general felt the need of some relief from the determin- 
istic obsession. Henee the success of the philosophy of 
Bergson and similar philosophies. The glorification of 
impulse (élan vital) that Bergson opposes to the mechan- 
izing of life is in its main aspeets, as I  have already in- 
dicated, simply a retum to the spontaneity of Rousseau. 
His plan of escape from deterministic Science is at bottom 
very much like Rousseau’s plan of escape from the undue 
rationalism of the Enlightenment. As a result of these 
eighteenth-century influences, nature had, according to 
Carlyle, become a mere engine, a System of cogs and 
pulleys. He therefore hails Novalis as an “ anti-mechan- 
ist,” a “ deep man,” because of the way of deliverance 
that he teaches from this nightmare. “ I  owe him some- 
what.” What Carlyle owed to Novalis many moderns 
have owed to Bergson, but it is not yet clear that either 
Novalis or Bergson are “ deep men.”
The mechanistic view of nature, whether held pessi- 
mistically or optimistically, involving as it does factors 
that are infinite and therefore beyond calculation, cannot 
furnish proofs that will satisfy the true positivist: he is 
inclined to dismiss it as a mere phantasmagoria of the 
intellect. The Rousseauistic view of nature, on the other 
hand, whether held optimistically or pessimistically, is 
even less capable of satisfying the standards of the posi­
tivist and must be dismissed as a mere phantasmagoria 
of the emotions. The fact is that we do not know and can 
never know what nature is in herself. The mysterious 
mother has shrouded herself from us in an impenetrable 
veil of illusion. But though we cannot know nature abso- 
lutely we can pick up a practical and piecemeal knowl-
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edge of nature not by dreaming but by doing. The man 
of action can within certain limits have his way with 
nature. Now the men who have acted during the past 
century have been the men of Science and the utilitarians 
who have been turning to account the discoveries of 
Science. The utilitarians have indeed derived such potent1 
aid from Science that they have been able to stamp their 
efforts on the very face of the landscape. The romanti- 
cists have not ceased to protest against this scientific 
utilizing of nature as a profanation. But inasmuch as 
these protests have come from men who have stood not 
for work but for revery they have for the most part been 
futile. This is not the least of the irònic contrasts that 
abound in this movement between the ideal and the real. 
No age ever grew so ecstatic over natural beauty as the 
nineteenth century, at the same time no age ever did so 
much to deface nature. No age ever so exalted the coun- 
try over the town, and no age ever witnessed such a 
crowding into urban centres.
A curious study might be made of this irònic contrast 
as it appears in the early romàntic crusade against rail- 
ways. One of the romàntic grie vanees against the rail way 
is that it does not encourage vagabondage: it has a defi­
nite goal and gets to it so far as possible in a straight line. 
Yet in spite of Wordsworth’s protesting sonnet the Win- 
dermere railway was built. Ruskin’s wrath at railways 
was equally vain. In general, sentiment is not of much 
avail when pitted against industrial advance. The papers 
announced recently that one of the loveliest cascades in 
the California Sierras had suddenly disappeared as a re­
sult of the diversión of its water to a neighboring power- 
plant. The same fate is overtaking Niagara itself. I t  is
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perhaps symbolic that a quarry has made a hideous gash 
in the hillside on the shores of Rydal Mere right opposite 
Wordsworth’s house.
If the man of Science and the utilitarian do not learn 
what nature is in herself they learn at least to adjust 
' themselves to forces outside themselves. The Rousseau- 
ist, on the other hand, does not in his “ communion” 
with nature adjust himself to anything. He is simply com- 
muning with his own mood. Rousseau chose appropri- 
ately as title for the comedy that was his first literary 
effort “ Narcissus or the Lover of Himself.” The nature 
over which the Rousseauist is bent in such rapt contem- 
plation plays the part of the pool in the legend of Narcis­
sus. I t  renders back to him his own image. He sees in 
nature what he himself has put there. The Rousseauist 
transfuses himself into nature in much the same way 
that Pygmalion transfuses himself into his statue. Nature 
is dead, as Rousseau says, unless animated by the fires 
of love. “ Make no mistake,” says M. Masson, “ the 
nature that Jean-Jacques worships is only a projection 
of Jean-Jacques. He has poured himself forth so com- 
placently upon it that he can always find himself and 
cherish himself in it.” And M. Masson goes on and quotes 
from a curious and little-known fragment of Rousseau: 
“ Beloved solitude,” Rousseau sighs, “ beloved solitude, 
where I  still pass with pleasure the remains of a life given 
over to suffering. Forest with stunted trees, marshes 
without water, broom, reeds, melancholy heather, inani­
mate objects, you who can neither speak to me ñor hear 
me, what secret charm brings me back constantly into 
your midst? Unfeeling and dead things, this charm is not 
in you; it could not be there. I t  is in my own heart which
wishes to refer back everything to itself.” 1 Coleridge 
plainly only continues Rousseau when he writes:
O Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live:2 
Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud!
And would we aught behold, of higher worth,
Than that inanimate coid world allow’d 
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,
Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud 
Enveloping the Earth.
The fair luminous cloud is no other than the Arcadian 
imagination. “ The light that never was on sea or land, 
the consecration and the poet’s dream” of which Words- 
worth speaks, is likewise as appears very plainly from 
the context,3 Arcadian. He should once, Wordsworth 
writes, have wished to see Peele Castle bathed in the 
Arcadian light, but now that he has escaped by sympathy 
for his fellow-men from the Arcadian aloofness, he is willing 
that it should be painted in storm. Mere storminess, one
1 Fragment de 1 ’Art de jouir, quoted by P.-M. Masson in La Religión 
de J .- J .  Rousseau, n, 228.
2 If nature merely reflects back to a man his own image, it follows that 
Coleridge’s celebrated distinction between fancy and imagination has 
little valué, inasmuch as he rests his proof of the unifying power of the 
imagination, in itself a sound idea, on the unión the imagination effects 
between man and outer nature — and this unión is on his own showing 
fanciful.
3 If I had had this consecration Wordsworth says, addressing Peele 
Castle,
I would have planted thee, thou hoary Pile,
Amid a world how different from this!
Beside a sea that could not cease to smile;
On tranquil land, beneath a sky of bliss.
A Picture had it been of lasting ease,
Elysian quiet, without toil or strife, etc.
Elegiae Stanzas suggested by a picture of Peele Castle in a stmn.
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should recollect, is not in itself an assurance that one has 
turned from the romàntic dream to reality. One finds in 
this movement, if nowhere else, as I  remarked apropos 
of Chateaubriand, the stormy Arcadia.
It  is not through the Arcadian imagination that one 
moves towards reality. This does not much matter if 
what one seeks in a “ retum to nature” is merely recrea- 
tion. I  cannot repeat too often that I  have no quarrel 
with the nature cult when it remains recreative but only 
when it sets up as a substitute for philosophy and reli­
gión. This involves a confusión between the two main 
directions of the human spirit, a confusión as I  have said 
in a previous chapter between the realm of awe and the 
región of wonder. Pascal exaggerates somewhat when he 
says the Bible never seeks to prove religión from the 
“ wonders” of nature. But this remark is true to the total 
spirit of the Bible. A knowledge of the flowers of the Holy 
Land is less necessary for an understanding of the gospel 
narrative than one might suppose from Renán.1 Renán 
is simply seeking to envelop Jesús so far as possible in an 
Arcadian atmosphere. In so doing he is following in the 
footsteps of the great father of sentimentalists. According 
to M. Masson, Jesús, as depicted by Jean-Jacques, be- 
comes “ a sort of grand master of the Golden Age.”
Here as elsewhere the Rousseauist is seeking to identify 
the Arcadian view of life with wisdom. The result is a 
series of extraordinarily subtle disguises for egoism. We 
t.hink we see the Rousseauist prostrate before the ideal
1 Cf. Doudan, Lettres, iv, 216: “ J ’ai parcouru le Saint-Paul de Renán. 
Je n’ai jamaís vu dans un théologien une si grande connaissance de la flore 
orientale. C’est un paysagiste bien supérieur à Saint-Augustin et à Bos- 
suet. II séme des résédas, des anémones, des páquerettes pour recueillir 
l’incrédulité.”
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woman or before nature or before God himself, but when 
we look more closely we see that he is only (as Sainte- 
Beuve said of Alfred de Vigny) “ in perpetual adoration 
before the holy sacrament of himself.” The fact that he 
finds in nature only what he has put there seems to be 
for Rousseau himself a source of satisfaction. But the 
poem of Coleridge I  have just quoted, in which he pro­
clamas that so far as nature is concerned “ we receive but 
what we give,” is entitled “ Ode to Dejection.” One of 
man’s deepest needs would seem to be for genuine com- 
munion, for a genuine escape, that is, from his ordinary 
self. The hollowness of the Rousseauistic communion with 
nature as well as other Rousseauistic substitutes for 
genuine communion is indissolubly bound up with the 
subject of romàntic melancholy.
CHAPTER IX
ROMÀNTIC MELANCHOLY
R o u s s e a u  and his early followers — especially perhaps 
his early French followers — were very much preoccupied 
with the problem of happiness. Now in a sense all men — 
even those who renounce the world and mortify the flesh 
— aim at happiness. The important point to determine is 
what any particular person means by happiness and how 
he hopes to attain it. I t  should be plain from all that 
has been said that the Rousseauist seeks happiness in 
the free play of the emotions. The “ Influence of the 
Passions on Happiness” is the significant title of one of 
Madame de Staèl’s early treatises. The happiness that 
the Rousseauist seeks involves not merely a free play of 
feeling but — what is even more important — a free 
play of the imagination. Feeling acquires a sort of infini- 
tude as a resuit of this cooperation of the imagination, 
and so the romanticist goes, as we have seen, in quest of 
the thrill superlative, as appears so clearly in his nymph- 
olepsy, his pursuit of the “ impossible she.” But the more 
imaginative this quest for emotional happiness grows the 
more it tends to become a mere nostalgia. Happiness is 
achieved so far as it is achieved at all in dreamland. Rous­
seau says of himself: Mon plus constant bonheur fut en 
songe. Every finite satisfaction by the very fact that it is 
finite leaves him unsatisfied. René says that he had ex- 
hausted solitude as he had exhausted society: they had 
both failed to satisfy his insatiable desires. René plainly
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takes his insatiableness to be the badge of his spiritual 
distinction. To submit to any circumscribing of one’s de­
sires is to show that one has no sense of infinitude and 
so to sink to the level of the philistine.
But does one become happy by being nostàlgic and 
hypersesthetic, by burning with infinite indeterminate 
desire? We have here perhaps the chief irony and con- 
tradiction in the whole movement. The Rousseauist seeks 
happiness and yet on his own showing, his mode of seek- 
ing it results, not in happiness but in wretchedness. One 
finds indeed figures in the nineteenth century, a Brown- 
ing, for example, who see in life first of all an emotional 
adventure and then carry this adventure through to the 
end with an apparently unflagging gusto. One may 
affirm nevertheless that a movement which began by 
asserting the goodness of man and the loveliness of nature 
ended by producing the greatest literatee of despair the 
world has ever seen. No movement has perhaps been so 
prolific of melancholy as emotional romanticisim To 
follow it from Rousseau down to the present day is to 
run through the whole gamut of gloom.1
Infections of unutterable sadness,
Infections of incalculable madness,
Infections of incurable despair.
According to a somewhat doubtful authority, Ninon 
de Léñelos, “ the joy of the spirit measures íts forcé.”
i In his Mal romantique (1908) E. Seillière labeis the generations that 
have elapsed since the rise of Rousseauism as follows:
1. Sensibility (Nouvelle Hélmse, 1761).
2. Weltschmerz (Schiller’s ¿Esthetic Letters, 1795).
3. Mal du siècle (Hugo’s Hemani, 1830).
4. Pessimism (vogue of Schopenhauer and Stendhal, 1865).
5. Neurasthenia (cuhnination of fin de stòcle movement, 1900).
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When the romanticist on the other hand discovers that 
his ideal of happiness works out into actual unhappiness 
i he does not blame his ideal. He simply assumes that the 
world is unworthy of a being so exquisitely organized as 
himself, and so shrinks back from it and enfolds himself 
in his sorrow as he would in a mantle. Since the superla­
tive bliss that he craves eludes him he will at least be 
superlative in woe. So far from being a mark of failure 
this woe measures his spiritual grandeur. “ A great soul,” 
as René says, “ must contain more grief than a small 
one.” The romàntic poets enter into a veritable compe- 
tition with one another as to who shall be accounted the 
most forlorn. The victor in this competition is awarded 
the palm not merely for poetry but for wisdom. In the 
words of Arnold:
Amongst us one
Who most has suffered, takes dejectedly 
His seat upon the intel·lectual throne;
And all his store of sad experience he 
Lays bare of wretched days.
Tells us his misery’s birth and growth and signs,
And how the dying spark of hope was fed,
And how the breast was soothed, and how the head,
And all his hourly varied anodynes.
This for our wisest! and we others pine,
And wish the long unhappy dream would end,
And waive all claim to bliss, and try to bear;
With close-lipped patience for our only friend,
Sad patience, too near neighbor to despair.
Though Arnold may in this poem, as some one has 
complained, reduce the muse to the role of hospital 
nurse, he is, like his master Senancour, free from the 
taint of theatricality. He does not as he said of Byron
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make “ a pageant of his bleeding heart” ; and the Byronic 
pose has a cióse parallel in the pose of Chateaubriand. 
An Irish girl at London once told Chateaubriand that “ he 
carried his heart in a sling.” He himself said that he had 
a soul of the kind “ the ancients called a sacred malady.” 
Chateaubriand, to be sure, had his cheerful moments 
and many of them. His sorrows he bestowed upon the 
public. Herein he was a true child of Jean-Jacques. We are 
told by eye-witnesses how heartily Rousseau enjoyed 
many aspects of his life at Motiers-Travers. On his own 
showing, he was plunged during this period in almost 
unalloyed misery. Froude writes of Carlyle: “ It  was his 
peculiarity that if matters were well with himself, it 
never occurred to him that they could be going ill with 
any one else; and, on the other hand, if he was uncom- 
fortable, he required everybody to be uncomfortable 
along with him.” We can follow clear down to Gissing 
the assumption in some form or other that “ art must be 
the mouthpiece of misery.” This whole question as to the 
proper function of art goes to the root of the debate 
between the classicist and the Rousseauist. “ All these 
poets,” Goethe complains to Eckermann of the roman- 
ticists of 1830, “ write as though they were ill, and as 
though the whole world were a hospital. . .  . Every one 
of them in writing tries to be more desolate than all the 
others. This is really an abuse of poetry which has been 
given to make man satisfied with the world and with his 
lot. But the present generation is afraid of all solid 
energy; its mind is at ease and sees poetry only in weak- 
ness. I  have found a good expression to vex these gentle- 
men. I  am going to cali their poetry hospital poetry.” 1 
1 Eckermann, September 24, 1827.
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Now Goethe is here, like Chateaubriand, mocking to 
some degree his own followers. When he suffered from a 
spiritual ailment of any kind he got rid of it by inoculat- 
ing others with it; and it was in this way, as we learn from 
his Autobiography, that he got relief from the Welt- 
schmerz of “ Werther.” But later in life Goethe was classi- 
cal not merely in precept like Chateaubriand, but to some 
extent in practice. The best of the poetry of his matu- 
rity tends like that of the ancients to elevate and consolé.
The contrast between clsssic and romàntic poetry in 
this matter of melancholy is closely bound up with the 
larger contrast between imitation and spontaneity. 
Homer is the greatest of poets, according to Aristotle, 
because he does not entertain us with his own person but 
is more than any other poet an imitator. The romàntic 
poet writes, on the other hand, as Lamartine says he 
wrote, solely for the “ relief of his heart.” He pours forth 
himself — his most intimate and private self; above all, 
his anguish and his tears. In his relation to his reader, as 
Musset tells us in a celebrated image,1 he is like the peli- 
can who rends and lacerates his own flesh to provide 
nourishment for his young {Pour toute nourriture il ap- 
porte son cceur) :
Les plus désespérés sont les chants les plus beaux,
Et j ’en sais d’imrmrtels qui sont de purs sanglots.2
To make of poetry a spontaneous overflow of powerful 
emotion, usually of sorrowful emotion, is what the French 
understand by lyricism (le lyrisme); and it may be ob-
1 See La Nuit de Mai.
2 These lines are inscribed on the statue of Musset in front of the 
Théátre Français. Cf. Shelley:
Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought.
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jected that it is not fair to compare an epic poet like 
Homer with a lyricist like Musset. Let us then take for our 
comparison the poet whom the ancients themselves looked 
upon as the supreme type of the lyricist — Pindar. He 
is superbly imaginative, “ sailing,” as Gray tells us, “ with 
supreme dominión through the azure deep of air,” but 
his imagination is not like that of Musset in the Service 
of sensibility. He does not bestow his own emotions upon 
us but is rather in the Aristotelian sense an imitator. He 
is indeed at the very opposite pole from Rousseau and 
the “ apostles of affliction.” “ Let a man,” he says, “ not 
darken delight in his life.” “ Disclose not to strangers our 
burden of care; this at least shall I  advise thee. Therefore 
is it fitting to show openly to all the folk the fair and 
pleasant things allotted us; but if any baneful misfortune 
sent of heaven befalleth man, it is seemly to shroud this in 
darkness.”1 And one should also note Pindar’s hostility 
towards that other great source of romàntic lyricism — 
nostalgia (“ The desire of the moth for the star”), and 
the closely allied pursuit of the strange and the exotic. 
He tells of the condign punishment visited by Apollo upon 
the giri Coronis who became enamoured of “ a strange 
man from Arcadia,” and adds: ‘ ‘ She was in love with things 
remote — that passion which many ere now have felt. 
For among men, there is a foolish company of those 
who, putting shame on what they have at home, cast 
their glances afar, and pursue idle dreams in hopes that 
shall not be fulfilled.” 2
We are not to suppose that Pindar was that most tire- 
some and superficial of all types — the professional opti-
1 Translation by J. E. Sandys of fragment cited in Stobseus, Flor. 
cix, i.
2 Pylhian Odes, i i i ,  20 ff.
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mist who insists on inflicting his “ gladness” upon us. 
“ The immortals,” he says, “ apportion to man two sor- 
rows for every boon they grant.”1 In general the Greek 
whom Kipling sings and whom we already find in Schiller 
— the Greek who is an incarnation of the “ joy of life 
unquestioned, the everlasting wondersong of youth” 2 — 
is a romàntic myth. We read in the Iliad :3 “ Of all the 
creatures that breathe or crawl upon the earth, none is 
more wretched than man.” Here is the “ joy of life un­
questioned” in Homer. Like Homer the best of the later 
Greeks and Romans face unflinchingly the facts of life 
and these facts do not encourage a thoughtless elation. 
Their melancholy is even more concemed with the lot 
of man in general than with their personal and private 
grief. The quality of this melancholy is rendered in 
Tennyson’s line on Virgil, one of the finest in nineteenth 
century English poetry:
Thou majestic in thy sadness at the doubtful doom of human kind. *
One should indeed not fail to distinguish between the 
note of melancholy in a Homer or a Virgil and the melan­
choly of the ancients, whether Stoic or Epicurean, who had 
experienced the hopelessness and helplessness of a puré 
naturalism in dealing with ultímate problems. The melan­
choly of the Stoic is the melancholy of the man who asso- 
ciates with. the natural order a “ virtue ” that the natural 
order does not give, and so is tempted to exclaim at last 
with Brutus, that he had thought virtue a thing and had 
found that it was only a word. The melancholy of the
1 Pythian Odes, ni, 81-82.
2 Song' o f the Banjo, in the Seven Seas. 3 xvn, 446-47.
4 A brief survey of melancholy among the Greeks will be found in Pro­
fessor S. H. Butcher’s Som e Aspects o f the Greek Genius.
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Epicurean is that of the man who has tasted the bitter 
sediment (amari aliquid) in the cup of pleasure. It  is not 
difficult to discover modern equivalents of both Stoic and 
Epicurean melancholy. “ One should seek,” says Sainte- 
Beuve, “ in the pleasures of René the secret of his ennuis,” 
and so far as this is true Chateaubriand is on much the 
same level as some Roman voluptuary who suffered from 
the taedium vitee in the time of Tiberius or Ñero.1 But 
though the Roman decadent gave himself up to the 
pursuit of sensation and often of violent and abnormal 
sensation he was less prone than a Chateaubriand to 
associate this pursuit with the “ infinite” ; and so he was 
less nostàlgic and hypersesthetic. His Epicureanism was 
therefore less poetical no doubt, but on the other hand 
he did not set up mere romàntic restlessness as a sort of 
substitute for religión. I t  was probably easier therefore 
for him to feel the divine discontent and so turn to real 
religión than it would have been if he had, like the 
Rousseauist, complicated his Epicureanism with sham 
spirituality.
To say that the melancholy even of the decadent 
ancient is less nostàlgic is perhaps only another way of 
saying what I  have said about the melancholy of the 
ancients in general — that it is not so purely personal. I t  
derives less from his very private and personal illusions 
and stili less from his very private and personal disillu- 
sions. In its purely personal quality romàntic melancholy 
is indeed inseparable from the whole conception of origi-
1 The exasperated quest of novelty is one of the main traits both of the 
ancient and the modern victim of ennui. See Seneca, De Tranquillitate 
animi: “ Fastidio illis esse coepit vita, et ipse mundus; et subit illud rabido- 
rum deliciarum: quousque eadem ? ” (Cf. La Fontaine: II me faut du 
nouveau, n’en fút-il plus au monde.)
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nal genius. The genius sets out not merely to be unique 
but unique in feeling, and the sense of uniqueness in 
feeling speedily passes over into that of uniqueness in 
i suffering on the principie no doubt laid down by 
/ H°race Walpole that life, which is a comedy for those 
I who think, is a tragedy for those who feel. To be a beauti- 
ful soul, to preserve one’s native goodness of feeling among 
men who have been perverted by society, is to be the elect 
of nature and yet this election turns out as Rousseau tells 
us to be a “ fatal gift of heaven.” I t  is only the disillu- 
sioned romanticist, however, who assumes this elegiae 
tone. We need to consider what he means by happiness 
while he stül seeks for it in the actual world and not in 
the pays des chiméres. Rousseau tells us that he based the 
sense of his own worth on the fineness of his powers of 
perception. Why should nature have endowed him with 
such exquisite faculties 1 if he was not to have a satisfac­
e n  commensurate with them, if he was “ to die without 
having lived ? We have here the psychological origins 
of the right to happiness that the romanticists were to 
proclaim. “ We spend on the passions,” says Joubert, 
“ the stuff that has been given us for happiness.” The 
Rousseauist hopes to find his happiness in the passions 
themselves. Romàntic happiness does not involve any 
moral effort and has been defined in its extreme forms as 
a “monstrous dream of passive enjoyment.” Flaubert 
has made a study of the right to happiness thus under- 
stood in his “ Madame Bovary.” Madame Bovary, who is
1 “A quoi bon m’avoir fait naltre avec des facultés exquises pour les 
laisser jusqu à la fin sans emploi? Le sentiment de mon prix interne en 
me donnant celui de cette injustice m’en dédommageait en quelque sorte
£ t o  £ ^ 56)™”  d6S lameS ^  j ’aÍma'S à IaÍSS6r COuler-” C e ss io n s ’,
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very commonplace in other respeets, feels exquisitely; 
and inasmuch as her husband had no such fineness the 
right to happiness meant for her, as it did for so many 
other “ misunderstood” women, the right to extra­
marital adventure. One should note the germs of melan- 
choly that lurk in the quest of the superlative moment 
even if the quest is relatively successful. Suppose Saint- 
Preux had succeeded in compressing into a single instant 
“ the delights of a thousand centuries” ; and so far as 
outer circumstances are concerned had had to pay no 
penalty. The nearer the approach to a superhuman in- 
tensity of feeling the greater is likely to be the ensuing 
languor. The ordinary round of life seems palé and insipid 
compared with the exquisite and fugitive moment. One 
seems to one’s self to have drained the cup of life at a 
draught and save perhaps for impassioned recollection 
of the perfect moment to have no reason for continuing 
to live. One’s heart is “ empty and swollen” 1 and one is 
haunted by thoughts of suicide.
This sense of having exhausted life 2 and the accom- 
panying temptation to suicide that are such striking 
features of the malady of the age are not necessarily asso- 
ciated with any outer enjoyment at all. One may devour 
life in revery and then the melancholy arises from the dis- 
proportion between the dream and the fact. The revery 
that thus consumes life in advance is not necessarily erotic. 
What may be termed the cosmic revery of a Senancour or 
an Amiel3 has very much the same effect.
The atony and aridity of which the sufferer from ro-
1 Nouvelle Hélcfise, Pt. vi, Lettre vm.
2 “Encoré enfant par la tète, vous ètes déjá vieux par le cceur.” Ibid.
3 See the examples quoted inArnold :Essays in Criticism, Second Series, 
305-06.
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mantic melancholy complains may have other sources 
besides the depression that follows upon the achieving 
of emotional intensity whether in revery or in fact; it may 
also be an incident in the warfare between head and heart 
that assumes so many forms among the spiritual poster- 
ity of Jean-Jacques. The Rousseauist seeks happiness in 
emotional spontaneity and this spontaneity seems to be 
killed by the head which stands aloof and dissects and 
analyzes. Perhaps the best picture of the emotionalist 
who is thus incapacitated for a frank surrender to his own 
emotions is the “ Adolphe” of Benjamín Constant (a 
book largely reminiscent of Constant’s actual affair with 
Madame de Staél).
0 Whether the victim of romàntic melancholy feels or 
analyzes he is equally incapable of action. He who faces 
resolutely the rude buffetings of the world is gradually 
hardened against them. The romàntic movement is filled 
with the groans of those who have evaded action and at 
the same time become highly sensitive and highly self- 
conscious. The man who thrills more exquisitely to pleas- 
ure than another will also thrill more exquisitely to pain; 
nay, pleasure itself in its extreme is allied to p ain ;1 so 
that to be hypersesthetic is not an unmixed advantage 
especially if it be true, as Pindar says, that the Gods 
bestow two trials on a man for every boon. Perhaps the 
deepest bitterness is found, not in those who make a
1 This is the thought of Keats’s Ode to Melancholy :
Ay, in the very temple of Delight 
Veil’d Melancholy has her sovran shrine,
Though seen of none save him whose strenuous tongue 
Can burst Joy’s grape against his palate fine.
Cf. Chateaubriand: E ssai sur les Révolutions, Pt. n, ch. lvii: “ Ces jouis- 
sances sont trop poignantes: telle est notre faiblesse, que les plaisirs 
exquis deviennent des douleurs,” etc.
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pageant of their bleeding hearts, but in those who, like 
Leconte de Lisie1 and others (les impassibles), disdain to 
make a show of themselves to the mob, and so dissimu­
late their quivering sensibility under an appearance of 
impassibility; or, like Stendhal, under a mask of irony 
that “ is imperceptible to the vulgar.”
Stendhal aims not at emotional intensity only, but 
also glorifies the lust for power. He did as much as any 
one in his time to promote the ideal of the superman. Yet 
even if the superman has nerves of steel, as seems to have 
been the case with Stendhal’s favorite, Napoleón, and 
acts on the outer world with a forcé of which the man in 
search of a sensation is quite incapable, he does not act 
upon himself, he remains ethically passive. This ethical 
passivity is the trait common to all those who incline to 
Uve purely on the naturahstic level — whether they sac­
rifice the human law and its demands for measure to the 
lust of knowledge or the lust of sensation or the lust of 
power. The man who neglects his ethical self and with- 
draws into his temperamental or private self, must 
almost necessarily have the sense of isolation, of remote- 
ness from other men. We return here to the psychology 
of the original genius to whom it was a tame and unin- 
teresting thing to be simply human and who, disdain- 
ing to seem to others a being of the same clay as them­
selves, wished to be in their eyes either an ángel or a 
demon — above all a demon.2 René does not, as I  have
1 See his sonnet Les Montreurs. This type of Rousseauist is anticipated 
by “ Milord” Bomston in L a  Nouvelle H élñse. Rousseau directed the 
engraver to depict him with “ un maintien grave et stoïque sous lequel 
il cache avec peine une extréme sensibilité.”
2 “ Qui es-tu? À coup súr tu n’es pas un étre pétri du máme limón et 
animé de la méme vie que nous! Tu es un ange ou un démon mais tu n’es
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said,1 want even the woman who loves him to feel at one 
with him, but rather to be at once astonished and appalled. 
He exercises upon those who approach him a malign fas- 
cination; forhe not only lives in misery himself as inhis 
natural element, but communicates this misery to those 
who approach him. He is like one of those fair trees 
under which one cannot sit without perishing. More- 
over René disavows all responsibility for thus being a 
human Upas-tree. Moral effort is unavailing, for it was 
all written in the book of fate. The victim of román- 
tic melancholy is at times tender and elegiae, at other 
times he sets up as a heaven-defying Titan. This latter 
pose became especially common in France around 1830 
when the influence of Byron had been added to that of 
Chateaubriand. Under the influence of these two writers 
a whole generation of youth became “ things of dark im- 
aginings,” 2 predestined to a blight that was at the same 
time the badge of their superiority. One wished like René 
to have an “ immense, solitary and stormy soul,” and 
also, like a Byronic hero, to have a diabolical glint in 
the eye and a corpse-like complexión,3 and so seem the 
“ blind and deaf agent of funereal mysteries.” 4 “ I t  was 
possible to believe everything about René except the 
truth.” The person who delights in being as mysterious 
as this easily falls into mystification. Byron himself we
pas une créature humaine.. .  Pourquoi habiter parmi nous, qui ne pou- 
vons te suffire ni te comprendre ?” G. Sand, Lélia, i, 11.
1 See p. 51.
2 See Lara, xvm, xix, perhaps the best passage that can be quoted for 
the Byronic hero.
3 Cf. Gautier, Histoire du romanlisme: “ II était de mode alors dans 
l’école romantique d’étre pále, livide, verdátre, un peu cadavéreux, s’il 
était possible. Cela donnait l’air fatal, byronien, giaour, dévoré par les 
passions et les remords.”
4 Hugo, Hernani.
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are told was rather flattered by the rumor that he had 
committed at least one murder. Baudelaire, it has been 
said, displayed his moral gangrene as a warrior might 
display honorable wounds. This flaunting of his own 
perversity was part of the literary attitude he had inher- 
ited from the “ Satanic School.”
When the romanticist is not posing as the victim of fate 
he poses as the victim of society. Both ways of dodging 
moral responsibility enter into the romàntic legend of the 
-poéte maudit. Nobody loves a poet. His own mother 
according to Baudelaire utters a malediction upon him.1 
That is because the poet feels so exquisitely that he is at 
once odious and unintelligible to the ordinary human 
pachyderm. Inasmuch as the philistine is not too sensi­
tive to act he has a great advantage over the poet in the 
real world and often succeeds in driving him from it and 
indeed from life itself. This inferiority in action is a 
proof of the poet’s ideality. “ His gigantic wings,” as 
Baudelaire says, “ keep him from walking.” He has, in 
Coleridgean phrase, fed on “ honey dew and drunk the 
milk of paradise,” 2 and so can scarcely be expected to 
submit to a diet of plain prose. I t  is hardly necessary to 
say that great poets of the past have not been at war
1 Lorsque, par un décret des puissances suprémes,
Le Poéte apparaít dans ce monde ennuyé,
Sa mère épouvantée et pleine de blasphémes 
Crispe ses poings vers Dieu, qui la prend en pitié.
Fleurs du m al: Bénédiclion.
Cf. Nouvelle HélcAse, Pt. ni, Lettre xxvi:
“ Ciel inexorable!. . .  O ma mere, pourquoi vous donna-t-il un fils dans 
sa colére?”
2 Coleridge has a side that relates him to the author of Les Fleurs du 
mal. In his Pains of Sleep he describes a dream in which he felt 
Desire with loathing strangely mix’d,
On wild or hateful objeets fix ’d.
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with their public in this way. The reason is that they 
were less taken up with the uttering of their own unique- 
ness; they were, without ceasing to be themselves, serv- 
ants of the general sense.
Chatterton became for the romanticists a favorite 
type of the poéte maudit, and his suicide a symbol of the 
inevitable defeat of the “ ideal” by the “ real.” The first 
performance of Vigny’s Chatterton (1835) with its pie- 
ture of the implacable hatred of the philistine for the 
artist was received by the romàntic youth of Paris with 
something akin to delirium. As Gautier says in his well- 
known account of this performance one could almost hear 
in the night the crack of the solitary pistols. The ordi- 
nary man of letters, says Vigny in his preface to this play, 
is sure of success, even the great writer may get a hear- 
ing, but the poet, a being who is on a far higher level than 
either, can look forward only to “ perpetual martyrdom 
and immolation.” He comes into the world to be a burden 
to others; his native sensibility is so intímate and pro- 
found that it “ has plunged him from childhood into in- 
voluntary ecstasies, interminable reveries, infinite inven- 
tions. Imagination possesses him above a l l . . . it sweeps 
his faculties heavenward as irresistibly as the balloon 
carries up its car.” From that time forth he is more 
or less cut off from normal contact with his fellowmen. 
“ His sensibility has become too keen; what only grazes 
other men wounds him until he bleeds.” He is thrown back 
more and more upon himself and becomes a sort of liv- 
ing volcano, “ consumed by secret ardors and inexplica­
ble languors,” and incapable of self-guidance. Such is the 
poet. From his first appearance he is an outlaw. Let all 
your tears and all your pity be for him. If he is finally
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forced to suicide not he but society is to blame. He is like 
the scorpion that cruel boys surround with live coals and 
that is finally forced to turn his sting upon himself. 
Society therefore owes it to itself to see that this exquis­
ite being is properly pensioned and protected by goverm 
ment, to the end that idealism may not perish from the 
earth. M. Thiers who was prime minister at that time is 
said to have received a number of letters from young 
poets, the general tenor of which was: “ A position or I ’ll 
kill myself.” 1
A circumstance that should interest Americans is that 
Poe as interpreted by Baudelaire came to hold for a later 
generation of romanticists the place that Chatterton 
had held for the romanticists of 1830. Poe was actually 
murdered, says Baudelaire — and there is an element of 
truth in the assertion along with much exaggeration —• 
by this great gas-lighted barbarity (i.e., America). All his 
inner and spiritual life whether drunkard’s or poet’s, was 
one constant effort to escape from this antipathetic 
atmosphere “ in which,” Baudelaire goes on to say, “ the 
impious love of liberty has given birth to a new tyranny, 
the tyranny of the beasts, a zoocracy” ; and in this hu­
man zoo a being with such a superhuman fineness of 
sensibility as Poe was of course at a hopeless disadvan- 
tage. In general our elation at Poe’s recognition in 
Europe should be tempered by the reflection that this 
recognition is usually taken as a point of departure for
1 Keats according to Shelley was an example of the poete maudit. “ The 
poor fellow” he says “ was literally hooted from the stage of life.” Keats 
was as a matter of faet too sturdy to be snuffed out by an artiele and had less 
of the quivering Rousseauistic sensibility than Shelley himself. Cf. letter 
of Shelley to Mrs. Shelley (Aug. 7, 1820): “ Imagine my despair of good, 
imagine how it is possible that one of so weak and sensitive a nature as 
mine can run further the gauntlet through this hellish society of men.”
insulting America. Poe is about the only hypersesthetic 
romanticist we have had, and he therefore fell in with 
the main European tendency that comes down from the 
eighteenth century. Villiers de lTsle-Adam, whom I have 
already cited as an extreme example of romàntic ideal- 
ism, was one of Poe’s avowed followers; but Villiers is 
also related by his sesthetic and “ diabòlic” Catholicism 
to Chateaubriand; and the religiosity of Chateaubriand 
itself derives from the religiosity of Rousseau.
Hitherto I  have been studying for the most part only 
one main type of modern melancholy. This type even in 
a Chateaubriand or a Byron and still more in their in­
numerable followers may seem at once superficial and 
theatrical. I t  often does not get beyond that Epicurean 
toying with sorrow, that luxury of grief, which was not 
unknown even to classical antiquity.1 The despair of 
Chateaubriand is frequently only a disguise of his love of 
literary glory, and Chesterton is inclined to see in the 
Byronic gloom an incident of youth and high spirits.2 
But this is not the whole story even in Byron and Cha­
teaubriand. To find what is both genuine and distinctive 
in romàntic melancholy we need to enlarge a üttle further 
on the underlying difference between the classicist and
1 Euripides speaks of the Xdpis y<W in his 'luenties (Latín, “ dolendi 
voluptas” ; Germán, “die Wonne der Wehmut”).
2 Chesterton is anticipated in this paradox by Wordsworth:
In youth we love the darksome lawn 
Brushed by the owlet’s wing.
Then Twilight is preferred to Dawn 
And autumn to the spring.
Sad fancies do we then affect 
In luxury of disrespect 
To our own prodigal excess 
Of too familiar happiness.
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Ode to Lycoris.
ROMÀNTIC MELANCHOLY 323
the Rousseauist. The Rousseauist, as indeed the modern 
m^ .n in general, is more preoccupied with his separate 
and private self than the classicist. Modern melancholy 
has practically always this touch of isolation not merely 
because of the proneness of the “ genius” to dwell on his 
own uniqueness, but also because of the undermining of 
the traditional communions by critical analysis. The 
noblest form of the “malady of the age” is surely that 
which supervened upon the loss of religious faith. This is 
what distinguishes the sadness of an Arnold or a Senan- 
cour from that of a Gray. The “ Elegy” belongs to 
the modern movement by the humanitarian note, the 
sympathetic interest in the lowly, but in its melancholy 
it does not go much beyond the milder forms of classical 
meditation on the inevitable sadness of life — what one 
may term pensiveness. L ite the other productions of the 
so-called graveyard school, it bears a direct relation to 
Milton’s “ II Penseroso.” I t  is well to retain Gray’s own 
distinction. “ Mine is a white Melancholy, or rather 
Leucocholy for the most part,” he wrote to Richard West 
in 1742, “ but there is another sort, black indeed, which 
I  have now and then felt.” Gray did not experience the 
more poignant sadness, one may suspect, without some 
loss of the “ trembling hope” that is the final note of the 
“ Elegy.” No forlornness is greater than that of the man 
who has known faith and then lost it. Renán writes of 
his own break with the Church:
The fish of Lake Baikal, we are told, have spent thousands of years in becoming fresh-water fish after being salt-water fish. I had to go through my transition in a few weeks. Like an enchanted cirele Catholicism embraces the whole of life with so much strength that when one is deprived of it everything seems insipid. I was terribly lost. The universe produced upon me the impression of a coid and arid
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desert. For the moment that Christianity was not the truth, all the 
rest appeared to me indifferent, frivolous, barely worthy of interest. 
The collapse of my life upon itself left in me a feeling of emptiness like 
that which follows an attack of fever or an unhappy love-affair.1
The forlornness at the loss of faith is curiously com- 
bined in many of the romanticists with the mood of 
revolt. This type of romanticist heaps reproaches on a 
God in whose existence he no longer believes (as in 
Leconte de Lisle’s "Quaïn,” itself related to Byron’s 
"C ain ”). He shakes his fist at an empty heaven, or like 
Alfred de Vigny (in his Jard ín  des Oliviers) assumes to- 
wards this emptiness an attitude of proud disdain. He 
is loath to give up this grandiose defiance of divinity if 
only because it helps to save him from subsiding into 
platitude. A somewhat similar mood appears in the 
“ Satanic” Catholics who continue to cling to religión 
simply because it adds to the gusto of sinning.2 A Barbey 
succeeded in combining the role of Byronic Titan with 
that of Champion of the Church. But in general the ro­
màntic Prometheus spurns the traditional forms of com- 
munion whether classical or Christian. He is so far as 
everything established is concerned enormously centri- 
fugal, but he hopes to erect on the ruins of the past the 
new religión of human brotherhood. Everything in this 
movement from Shaftesbury down hinges on the role 
that is thus assigned to sympathy: if it can really unite
1 Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse, 329-30.
2 “ [Villiers] était de cette famille des néo-catholiques littéraires dont 
Chateaubriand est le père commun, et qui a produit Barbey d’Aurévilly, 
Baudelaire et plus récemment M. Joséphin Peladan. Ceux-là ont goúté 
par-dessus tout dans la religión les chames du péché, la grandeur du 
sacrilège, et leur sensualisme a caressé les dogmes qui ajoutaient aux 
voluptés la supréme volupté de se perdre.” A. France, Vie Littéraire, in, 
121.
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men who are at the same time indulging each to the 
utmost his own "genius” or idiosyncrasy there is no 
reason why one should not accept romanticism as a 
philosophy of life.
But nowhere else perhaps is the clash more violent 
between the theory and the fact. No movement is so 
profuse in professions of brotherhood and none is so 
filled with the aching sense of solitude. "Behold me then 
alone upon the earth,” is the sentence with which Rous­
seau begins hislast book;1 and he goes on to marvel that 
he, the “ most loving of men,” had been forced more and 
more into solitude. “ I  am in the world as though in a 
strange planet upon which I  have fallen from the one that 
I  inhabited.” 2 When no longer subordinated to some- 
thing higher than themselves both the head and the heart 
(in the romàntic sense) not only tend to be opposed to 
one another, but also, each in its own way, to isolate. 
Empedocles was used not only by Arnold but by other 
victims3 of romàntic melancholy, as a symbol of intel- 
lectual isolation: by his indulgence in the “ imperious 
lonely thinking power ” Empedocles has broken the warm 
bonds of sympathy with his fellows:
thou art
A living man no more, Empedocles!
Nothing but a devouring flame of thought, —
But a naked eternally restless mind!
His leaping into iEtna typifies his attempt to escape from 
his loneliness by a fiery unión with nature herself.
According to religión one should seek to unite with 
a something that is set above both man and nature, 
whether this something is called God as in Christianity
1 Première Prcmenade. 2 Ibid. 3 E.g., Hòlderlin and Jean Polonius,
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or simply the Law as in various philosophies of the Far 
East.1 The most severe penalty visited on the man who 
transgresses is that he tends to fall away from this unión. 
This is the element of truth in the sentence of Diderot 
that Rousseau took as a personal affront: “ Only the 
wicked man is alone.” Rousseau asserted in reply, antici- 
pating Mark Twain,2 that “ on the contrary only the 
good man is alone.” Now in a sense Rousseau is right. 
“ Most men are bad,” as one of the seven sages of Greece 
remarked, and any one who sets out to follow a very 
strenuous virtue is likely to have few companions on the 
way. Rousseau is also right in a sense when he says that 
the wicked man needs to live in society so that he may 
have opportunity to practice his wickedness. Yet Rous­
seau fails to face the main issue: solitude is above all a 
psychic thing. A man may freqüent his fellows and suffer 
none the less acutely, like Poe’s “ Man of the Crowd,” 
from a ghastly isolation. And conversely one may be like 
the ancient who said that he was never less alone than 
when he was alone.
Hawthorne, who was himself a victim of solitude, 
brooded a great deal on this whole problem, especially, 
as may be seen in the “ Scarlet Letter” and elsewhere, 
on the isolating effects of sin. He perceived the relation 
of the problem to the whole trend of religious life in New 
England. The older Puritans had a sense of intimacy with 
God and craved no other companionship. With the weak-
1 A striking passage on solitude will be found in the Laws of Manu, iv, 
240-42. (“Alone a being is born: alone he goes down to death.” His kin 
forsake him at the grave; his only hope then is in the companionship of 
the Law of righteousness [Dharma]. “ With the Law as his companion he 
crosses the darkness diffieult to cross.”)
2 “ Be good and you will be lonely.”
ROMÀNTIC MELANCHOLY 327
ening of their faith the later Puritans lost the sense of a 
divine companionship, but retained their aloofness from 
men. Hawthorne’s own solution of the problem of soli­
tude, so far as he offers any, is humanitarian. Quicken 
your sympathies. Let the man who has taken as his 
motto Excelsior 1 be warned. Nothing will consolé him 
on the bleak heights either of knowledge or of power for 
the warm contact with the dwellers in the valley. Faust, 
who is a symbol of the solitude of knowledge, seeks to 
escape from his forlornness by recovering this warm 
contact. That the inordinate quest of power also leads to 
solitude is beyond question. Napoleón, the very type of 
the superman, must in the nature of the case have been 
very solitary.2 His admirer Nietzsche wrote one day: 
“ I have forty-three years behind me and am as alone as 
if I  were a child.” Carlyle, whose “ hero” derives like the 
superman from the original genius 3 of the eighteenth 
century, makes the following entry in his diary; “ My 
isolation, my feeling of loneliness, unlimitedness (much 
meant by this) what tongue shall say? Alone, alone!” 4
1 In the poem by the Swiss poet C. Didier from which Longfellow’s 
poem seems to be derived, the youth who persists in scaling the heights 
in spite of all warnings is Byron!
E t Byron . . .  disparaít aux yeux du pátre épouvanté.
(See E. Estéve, Byron en France, 147).
2 In the Mémoires d’Outre-Tombe Chateaubriand quotes from the jot- 
tings of Napoleón on the island of Elba. “ Mon cceur se refuse aux joies 
communes comme à la douleur ordinaire.” He says of Napoleón elsewhere 
in the same work: “ Au fond il ne tenait à rien: homme solitaire, il se suffi- 
sait; le malheur ne fit que le rendre au désert de sa vie.”
3 The solitude of the “ genius” is already marked in Blake:
O! why was I born with a different face?
Why was I not born like the rest of my race?
When I look, each one starts; when I speak, I offend;
Then I ’m silent and passive and lose every friend.
a Froude’s Carlyle, n, 377.
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I t  cannot be granted, however, that one may escape 
by love, as the Rousseauist understands the word, from 
the loneliness that arises from the unlimited quest either 
of knowledge or power. For Rousseauistic love is also un­
limited whether one understands by love either passion 
or a diffusive sympathy for mankind at large. “ What 
solitudes are these human bodies,” Musset exclaimed 
when fresh from his affair with George Sand. Wordsworth 
cultivated a love for the lowly that quite overflowed the 
bounds of neo-classic selection. I t  is a well-known fact 
that the lowly did not altogether reciprocate. “ A deso- 
late-minded man, ye kna,” said an oíd inn-keeper of the 
Lakes to Canon Rawnsley, “ ’T  was potry as did it.” If 
Wordsworth writes so poignantly of solitude one may in­
fer that it is because he himself had experienced it.1 Ñor 
would it be difficult to show that the very philanthropio 
Ruskin was at least as solitary as Carlyle with his tirades 
against philanthropy.
I  have spoken of the isolating effects of sin, but sin is 
scarcely the right word to apply to most of the romanti- 
cists. The solitude of which so many of them complain 
does, however, imply a good deal of spiritual inertia. 
Now to be spiritually inert, as I  have said elsewhere, 
is to be temperamental, to indulge unduly the lust for 
knowledge or sensation or power without imposing on
1 No finer lines on solitude are found in English than those in which 
Wordsworth relates how from his room at Cambridge he could look out on 
The antechapel where the statue stood 
Of Newton with his prism and silent face,
The marble index of a mind for ever 
Voyaging through strange seas of thought alone.
(Prelude m, 61-63.)
Cf. also the line in the Sonnet on Milton:
His soul was like a star and dwelt apart.
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these lusts some centre or principie of control set above 
the ordinary self. The man who wishes to fly off on the 
tangent of his own temperament and at the same time 
enjoy communion on any except the purely material level 
is harboring incompatible desires. For temperament is 
what separates. A sense of unlimitedness (“ much meant 
by this” as Carlyle says) and of solitude are simply the 
penalties visited upon the eccentric individualist. If we 
are to unite on the higher levels with other men we must 
look in another direction than the expansive outward 
striving of temperament: we must in either the human­
ístic or religious sense undergo conversión. We must pulí 
back our temperaments with reference to the model that 
we are imitating, just as, in Aristotle’s phrase, one might 
pulí back and straighten out a crooked stick.1 Usually 
the brake on temperament is supplied by the ethos, the 
convention of one’s age and country. I  have tried to show 
elsewhere that the whole programme of the eccentric 
individualist is to get rid of this convention, whatever it 
may be, without developing some new principie of con­
trol. The eccentric individualist argues that to accept 
control, to defer to some centre as the classicist demands, 
is to cease to be himself. But are restrictions upon tem­
perament so fatal to a man’s being himself? The reply 
hinges upon the definition of the word self, inasmuch as 
man is a dual being. If a man is to escape from his isola- 
tion he must, I  have said, aim at some goal set above his 
ordinary self which is at the same time his unique and 
separate self. But because this goal is set above his ordi­
nary self, it is not therefore necessarily set above his total 
personality. The limitations that he imposes on his ordi- 
» Eth. Nic., 1109 b.
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nary self may be the necessary condition of his entering 
into possession of his ethical self, the self that he pos- 
sesses in common with other men. Aristotle says that if a 
man wishes to achieve happiness he must be a true lover 
of himself. I t  goes without saying that he means the 
ethical self. The author of a recent book on Ibsen says 
that Ibsen’s message to the world is summed up in the 
line:
This above all, — to thine own self be true.
I t  is abundantly plain from the context, however, that 
Polonius is a decayed Aristotelian and not a precursor 
of Ibsen. The self to which Aristotle would have a 
man be true is at the opposite pole from the self that 
Ibsen and the original geniuses are so eager to get ut- 
tered.
To impose the yoke of one’s human self upon one’s 
temperamental self is, in the Aristotelian sense, to work. 
Aristotle conceives of happiness in terms of work. All 
types of temperamentalists, on the other hand, are from 
the human point of view, passive. The happiness that 
they crave is a passive happiness. A man may pursue 
power with the energy of a Napoleón and yet remain ethi- 
cally passive. He may absorb whole encyclopsedias and 
remain ethically passive. He may expand his sympathies 
until, like Schiller, he is ready to “ bestow a kiss upon the 
whole world” and yet remain ethically passive. A man 
ceases to be ethically passive only when he begins to work 
in the Aristotelian sense, that is when he begins to put 
the brake on temperament and impulse, and in the same 
degree he tends to become ethically efficient. By his 
denial of the dualism of the spirit, Rousseau discredited
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this inner working, so that inwardness has come to seem 
synonymous with mere subjectivity; and to be subjective 
in the Rousseauistic sense is to be diffusive, to lack 
purpose and concentration, to lose one’s self in a shoreless 
sea of revery.
The utilitarian intervenes at this point and urges the i 
romanticist, since he has failed to work inwardly, at least 1 
to work outwardly. Having missed the happiness of J 
ethical efficiency he may in this way find the happiness of 
material efficiency, and at the same time serve the 
world. This is the solution of the problem of happiness 
that Goethe offers at the end of the Second Faust, and 
we may afñrm without hesitation that it is a sham solu­
tion. To work outwardly and in the utilitarian sense,’ 
without the inner working that can alone save from ethi­
cal anarchy is to stimulate rather than repress the most 
urgent of all the lusts —  the lust of power. I t  is only ¡ 
too plain that the unselective sympathy or joy in Service 
with which Goethe would complete Faust’s utilitarian 
activity is not in itself a sufficient counterpoise to the 
will to power, unless indeed we assume with Rousseau 
that one may control expansive impulses by opposing 
them to one another.
A terrible danger thus lurks in the whole modern pro- 
gramme: it is a programme that makes for a formidable 
mechanical efficiency and so tends to bring into an ever 
closer material contact men who remain ethically cen- 
trifugal. The reason why the humanitarian and other 
schemes of communion that have been set up during the 
last century have failed is that they do not, like the tra- 
ditional schemes, set any bounds to mere expansiveness, 
or, if one prefers, they do not involve any conversión.
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And so it is not surprising that the feeling of emptiness 1 
or unlimitedness and isolation should be the special mark 
of the melancholy of this period. René complains of his 
“ moral solitude” ; 2 but strictly speaking his solitude is 
the reverse of moral. Only by cultivating his human self 
and by the unceasing effort that this cultivation involves 
does a man escape from his nightmare of separateness 
and so move in some measure towards happiness. But 
the happiness of which René dreams is unethical — 
something very prívate and personal and egoistic. Noth- 
ing is easier than to draw the line from René to Baude- 
laire and later decadents — for instance to Des Es- 
seintes, the hero of Huysmans’s novel “ A Rebours,” 3 
who is typical of the last exaggerations of the movement. 
Des Esseintes cuts himself off as completely as possible 
from other men and in the artificial paradise he has 
devised gives himself up to the quest of strange and 
violent sensation; but his dream of happiness along 
egoistic lines turns into a nightmare,4 his palace of art 
becomes a hell. Lemaítre is quite justified in saying of 
Des Esseintes that he is only René or Werther brought 
up to date — “ a played-out and broken-down Werther
1 James Thomson in The City of Dreadful Night says that he would have 
entered hell
gratified to gain 
That positive eternity of pain 
Instead of this insufferable inane.
8 R. Canat has taken this phrase as the title of his treatment of the 
subject: La Solitude morale dans le mouvement romantique.
3 Decadent Rome had the equivalent of Des Esseintes. Seneca (To 
Lucilius, c x x h ) speaks of those who seek to affirm their originality and 
attract attention to themselves by doing everything differently from 
other people and, “ ut ita dicam, retro vivunt.”
4 Tennyson has traced this change of the sesthetic dream into a night­
mare in his Palace of Art.
who has a malady of the nerves, a deranged stomach and 
eighty years more of literature to the bad.” 1 
Emotional romanticism was headed from the start 
towards this bankruptcy because of its substitution for 
ethical effort of a mere lazy floating on the stream of 
mood and temperament. I  have said that Buddhism saw 
in this ethical indolence the root of all evil. Christianity 
in its great days was preoccupied with the same prob- 
lem. To make this point clear it will be necessary to add 
to what I  have said about classical and romàntic melan­
choly a few words about melancholy in the Middle Ages. 
In a celebrated chapter of his “ Genius of Christianity” 
(Le Vague des passions) Chateaubriand seeks to give 
to the malady of the age Christian and mediseval origins. 
This was his pretext, indeed, for introducing René into 
an apology for Christianity and so, as Sainte-Beuve 
complained, administering poison in a sacred wafer. 
Chateaubriand begins by saying that the modern man 
is melancholy because, without having had experience 
himself, he is at the same time overwhelmed by the 
second-hand experience that has been heaped up in the 
books and other records of an advanced civilization; and 
so he suffers from a precocious disillusion; he has the 
sense of having exhausted life before he has enjoyed it. 
There is nothing specifically Christian in this disillusion 
and above all nothing mediseval. But Chateaubriand 
goes on to say that from the decay of the pagan world 
and the barbarían invasions the human spirit received 
an impression of sadness and possibly a tinge of misan- 
thropy which has never been completely effaced. Those 
that were thus wounded and estranged from their fellow- 
1 Contemporains, i, 332.
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men took refuge formerly in monasteries, but now that 
this resource has failed them, they are left in the World 
without being of it and so they “ become the prey of a 
thousand chimeras.” Then is seen the rise of that guilty 
melancholy which the passions engender when, left 
without definite object, they prey upon themselves in a 
solitary heart.1
The vague des passions, the expansión of infinite in­
determinate desire, that Chateaubriand here describes 
may very well be related to certain sides of Christianity 
—  especially to what may be termed its neo-Platonic side. 
Yet Christianity at its best has shown itself a genuine 
religión, in other words, it has dealt sternly and vera- 
ciously with the facts of human nature. I t  has perceived 
clearly how a man may move towards happiness and 
how on the other hand he tends to sink into despair; or 
what amounts to the same thing, it has seen the supreme 
importance of spiritual effort and the supreme danger of 
spiritual sloth. The man who looked on himself as cut off 
from God and so ceased to strive was according to the 
medieval Christian the victim of acedía. This sluggish- 
ness and slackness of spirit, this mere drifting and abdi- 
cation of will, may, as Chaucer’s parson suggests, be the 
crime against the Holy Ghost itself. I t  would in fact not 
be hard to show that what was taken by the Rousseauist 
to be the badge of spiritual distinction was held by the 
medioeval Christian to be the chief of all the deadly sins.
The victim of acedía often looked upon himself, like 
the victim of the malady of the age, as foredoomed. But 
though the idea of fate enters at times into medioeval 
melancholy, the man of the Middle Ages could scarcely
1 Génie du Christianisme, Pt. n, Livre m, ch. ix.
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so detach himself from the community as to suffer from 
that sense of loneliness which is the main symptom of 
romàntic melancholy. This forlornness was due not 
merely to the abrupt disappearance of the older forms 
of communion, but to the failure of the new attempts at 
communion. When one gets beneath the surface of the 
nineteenth century one finds that it was above all a 
period of violent disillusions, and it is especially after 
violent disillusion that a man feels himself solitary and 
forlorn. I  have said that the special mark of the half- 
educated man is his harboring of incompatible desires. 
The new religions or unifications of life that appeared 
during the nineteenth century made an especially strong 
appeal to the half-educated man because it seemed to 
him that by accepting some one of these he could enjoy 
the benefits of communion and at the same time not have 
to take on the yoke of any serious discipline; that he 
could, in the language of religión, achieve salvation with­
out conversión. When a communion on these lines turns 
out to be not a reality, but a sham, and its disillusioned 
votary feels solitary and forlorn, he is ready to blame 
everybody and everything except himself.
A few specific illustrations will help us to understand 
how romàntic solitude, which was created by the weak- 
ening of the traditional communions, was enhanced by 
the collapse of various sham communions. Let us return 
for a moment to that eminent example of romàntic mel­
ancholy and disillusion, Alfred de Vigny. His “ Chatter- 
ton” deais with the fatal misunderstanding of the original 
genius by other men. “ Mo'ise” deais more specifically 
with the problem of his solitude. The genius is so emi­
nent and unique, says Vigny, speaking for himself from
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behind the mask of the Hebrew prophet, that he is quite 
cut off from ordinary folk who feel that they have noth- 
ing in common with him.1 This forlornness of the genius 
is not the sign of some capital error in his philosophy. 
On the contrary it is the sign of his divine election, and 
so Moses blames God for his failure to find happiness.2 
If the genius is cut off from communion with men he 
cannot hope for companionship with God because he has 
grown too sceptical. Heaven is empty and in any case 
dumb; and so in the poem to which I  have already re- 
ferred (Le Mont des Oliviers) Vigny assumes the mask of 
Jesús himself to express this desolateness, and concludes 
that the just man will oppose a haughty and Stoic dis- 
dain to the divine silence.3
All that is left for the genius is to retire into his ivory 
tower — a phrase appropriately applied for the first time 
to Vigny.4 In the ivory tower he can at least commune 
with nature and the ideal woman. But Vigny carne at a 
time when the Arcadian glamour was being dissipated 
from nature. Partly under scientific influence she was 
coming to seem not a benign but a coid and impassive 
power, a collection of cruel and inexorable laws. I  have 
already mentioned this mood that might be further illus-
1 L’orage est dans ma voix, l’éelair est sur ma bouohe;
Aussi, loin de m’aimer, voilà qu’ils tremblent tous,
E t quand j’ouvre les bras, on tombe à mes genoux.
2 Que vous ai-je done fait pour étre votre élu?
Hélas! je suis, Seigneur, puissant et solitaire,
Laissez-moi m’endormir du sommeil de la terre!
8 Le juste opposera le dédain à l’absence 
E t ne répondra plus que par un froid silence 
Au silence éternel de la Divinité.
4 See Sainte-Beuve’s poetical epistle A M. Villemain (Pensées d’Aoút 
1837).
trated from Taine and so many others towards the middle 
of the nineteenth century.1 “ I am called a ‘mother,’ ” 
Vigny makes Nature say, “ and I  am a tomb.” 2 (“ La 
Maison du Berger”); and so in the Maison roulante, or 
sort of Arcadia on wheels that he has imagined, he must 
seek his chief solace with the ideal feminine companion. 
But woman herself turas out to be treacherous; and, 
assuming the mask of Samson (“ La Colére de Samson”), 
Vigny utters a solemn malediction upon the eternal 
Delilah (Et, plus ou moins, la Femme est toujours Dalila). 
Such is the disillusion that comes from having sought an 
ideal communion in a liaison with a Parisian actress.3
Now that every form of communion has failed, all that 
is left it would seem is to die in silence and solitude like 
the wolf (“ La Mort du Loup”). Vigny continues to hold, 
however, like the author of the “ City of Dreadful 
Night,” that though men may not meet in their joys, 
they may commune after a fashion in their woe. He 
opposes to heartless nature and her “ vain splendors” the 
religión of pity, “ the majesty of human sufferings.” 4 
Towards the end when Vigny feels the growing prestige of 
Science, he holds out the hope that a man may to a cer- 
tain extent escape from the solitude of his own ego into 
some larger whole by contributing his mite to “ progress.”
1 See Masters of Modem French Criticism, 233, 238.
2 Wordsworth writes
A piteous lot it were to flee from man 
Yet not rejoice in Nature.
(Excursión, iv, 514.)
This lot was Vigny’s:
Ne me laisse jamais seul avec la Nature 
Car je la connais trop pour n’en avoir pas peur.
But the symbol of this communion1 that he has chosen 
— that of the shipwrecked and sinking mariner who con- 
signs his geographical discoveries to a bottle in the hope 
that it may be washed up on some civilized shore — is it- 
self of a singular forlornness.
Vigny has a concentration and power of philosophical 
reflection that is rare among the romanticists. George 
Sand is inferior to him in this respect but she had a richer 
and more generous nature, and is perhaps even more in- 
structive in her life and writings for the student of román- 
tic melancholy. After the loss of the religious faith of 
her childhood she became an avowed Rousseauist. She 
attacks a society that seems to her to stand in the way of 
the happiness of which she dreams — the supreme emo- 
tional intensity to be achieved in an ideal love. In cele- 
brating passion and the rights of passion she is lyrical in 
the two main modes of the Rousseauist —  she is either 
tender and elegiae, or else stormy and Titanie. But when 
she attempts to practice with Musset this religión of love, 
the resuit is violent disillusion. In the forlornness that 
follows upon the collapse of her sham communion she 
meditates suicide. “ Ten years ago,” she wrote in 1845 to 
Mazzini, “ I  was in Switzerland; I  was still in the age of 
tempests; I  made up my mind even then to meet you, if 
I  should resist the temptation to suicide which pursued 
me upon the glaciers.” And then gradually a new faith 
dawned upon her; she substituted for the religión of love 
the religión of human brotherhood. She set up as an 
object of worship humanity in its future progress; and 
then, like so many other dreamers, she suffered a violent 
disillusion in the Revolution of 1848. The radiant ab-
1 La Bouleille à la Mer.
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straction she had been worshipping had been put to the 
test and she discovered that there entered into the actual 
make-up of the humanity she had so idealized “ a large 
number of knaves, a very large number of lunatics, and 
an immense number of fools.” What is noteworthy in 
George Sand is that she not only saved the precious prin-f 
ciple of faith from these repeated shipwreeks but towards\ 
the end of her life began to put it on a firmer footing. Like \ 
Goethe she worked out to some extent, in opposition to 
romanticism, a genuinely ethical point of view.  ^ J 
This latter development can best be studied in her 
correspondence with Flaubert. She urges him to exercise 
his will, and he replies that he is as “ fatalistic as a Turk.” 
His fatalism, however, was not oriental but scientific or 
pseudo-scientific. I  have already cited his demand that 
man be studied “ objectively” just as one would study 
“ a mastodon or a crocodile.” Flaubert refused to see any 
connection between this determinism and his own gloom 
or between George Sand’s assertion of will and her cheer- 
fulness. I t  was simply, he held, a matter of temperament, 
and there is no doubt some truth in this contention. 
“ You at the first leap mount to heaven,” he says, “ while 
I, poor devil, am glued to the earth as though by leaden 
soles.” And again: “ In spite of your great sphinx eyes 
you have always seen the world as through a golden 
mist,” whereas “ I am constantly dissecting; and when 
I  have finally discovered the corruption in anything 
that is supposed to be puré, the gangrene in its fairest 
parts, then I  raise my head and laugh.” Yet George 
Sand’s cheerfulness is also related to her perception of a 
power in man to work upon himself — a power that sets 
him apart from other animals. To enter into this región
340 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISM
of ethical effort is to escape from the whole fatal circle 
of naturalism, and at the same time to show some capac- 
ity to mature — a rare achievement among the roman- 
ticists. The contrast is striking here between George 
Sand and Hugo, who, as the ripe fruit of his meditations, 
yields nothing better than the apotheosis of Robespierre 
and Marat. I  wish to see man as he is,” she writes to 
Flaubert. “ He is not good or bad: he is good and bad. 
But he is something else besides: being good and bad he 
has an inner forcé which leads him to be very bad and a 
little good, or very good and a üttle bad. I  have often 
wondered,” she adds, “why your ‘Education Sentimen- 
tale’ was so ill received by the public, and the reason, as 
it seems to me, is that its characters are passive — that 
they do not act upon themselves.” But the Titaness of 
the period of “ Lélia” can scarcely be said to have acted 
upon herself, so that she is justified in writing: “ I  cannot 
forget that my personal victory over despair is the work 
of my will, and of a new way of understanding life which 
is the exact opposite of the one I  held formerly.” How 
different is the weary cry of Flaubert: “ I  am like a piece 
of dock work, what I  am doing to-day I  shall be doing 
to-morrow; I  did exactly the same thing yesterday; I 
was exactly the same man ten years ago.”
The correspondence of Flaubert and George Sand 
bears interestingly on another of the sham religions of 
the nineteenth century — the religión of art. Art is for 
Flaubert not merely a religión but a fanaticism. He 
preaches abstinence, renunciation and mortification of 
the flesh in the ñame of art. He excommunicates those 
who depart from artistic orthodoxy and speaks of heretics 
and disbelievers in art with a ferocity worthy of a Span-
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ish inquisitor. Ethical beauty such as one finds in the 
Greeksat their best resides in order and proportion; it is 
not a thing apart but the outcome of some harmonious 
whole. Beauty in the purely sesthetic and unethical 
sense that Flaubert gives to the word is little more than . 
the pursuit of illusion. The man who thus treats beauty ] 
as a thing apart, who does not refer back his quest of the 
exquisite to some ethical centre will spend his life Ixion- 
like embracing phantoms. “ O Art, Art,” exclaims Flau- ( 
bert, “ bitter deception, nameless phantom, which gleams 
and lures us to our ruin!” He speaks elsewhere of “ the 
chimera of style which is wearing him out soul and body.” 
Attaching as he did an almost religious importance to his 
quest of the exquisite he became like so many other 
Rousseauists not merely sesthetic but hypersesthetic. He 
complains in his oíd age: “ My sensibility is sharper than 
a razor’s edge; the creaking of a door, the face of a 
bourgeois, an absurd statement set my heart to throb- 
bing and completely upset me.” Hardly anywhere else, 
indeed, will one find such accents of bitterness, such 
melancholy welling up unbidden from the very depths of 
the heart, as in the devotees of art for art’s sake — 
Flaubert, Leconte de Lisie, Théophile Gautier.
George Sand takes Flaubert to task with admirable 
tact for his failure to subordínate art to something higher 
than itself. “ Talent imposes duties; and art for art’s sake 
is an empty word.” As she grew older she says she carne 
more and more to put truth above beauty, and goodness 
before strength. “ I  have reflected a great deal on what 
is true, and in this search for truth, the sentiment of 
my ego has gradually disappeared.” The truth on which 
she had reflected was what she herself calis total truth
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(le vrai total), not merely truth according to the natural 
law, which received such exclusive emphasis towards the 
middle of the nineteenth century as to lead to the rise of 
another sham religión — the religión of Science. “ You 
have a better sense for total truth,” she tells one of her 
correspondents “ than Sainte-Beuve, Renán and Littré. 
They have fallen into the Germán rut: therein lies their 
weakness.” And Flaubert writes to George Sand: “ What 
amazes and delights me is the strength of your whole 
personality, not that of the brain alone.”
Furthermore the holding of the human law that made 
possible this rounded development, this growth towards 
total truth, was a matter not of tradition but of immedi-
Iate perception. George Sand had succeeded, as Taine says, in making the difficult transition from an hereditary 
faith to a personal conviction. Now this perception of the 
human law is something very different from the panthe- 
istic revery in which George Sand was also an adept. To 
look on revery as the equivalent of visión in the Aristote- 
lian sense, as Rousseau and so many of his followers have 
done, is to fall into sham spirituality. Maurice de Guérin 
falls into sham spirituality when he exclaims “ Oh! this 
contact of nature and the soul would engender an in- 
effable voluptuousness, a prodigious love of heaven and 
of God.” I  am not asserting that George Sand herself 
discriminated sharply between ethical and sesthetic 
perception or that she is to be rated as a very great sage 
at any time. Yet she owes her recovery of serenity after 
suffering shock upon shock of disillusion to her having 
exercised in some degree what she terms “ the contem­
plative sense wherein resides invincible faith” (le sens 
contewplatif ou réside la fo i  invincible), and the passages
that bear witness to her use of this well-nigh obsolete 
sense are found in her correspondence.
Wordsworth lauds in trae Rousseauistic fashion a 
“ wise passiveness.” But to be truly contemplative is not 
to be passive at all, but to be “ energetic” in Aristotle’s 
sense, or strenuous in Buddha’s sense. I t  is a matter of 
no small import that the master analyst of the East and 
the master analyst of the West are at one in their solution 
of the supreme problem of ethics — the problem of happi- 
ness. For there can be no doubt that the energy1 in which 
the doctrine of Aristotle culminates is the same as the 
“ strenuousness” 2 on which Buddha puts his final em­
phasis. The highest good they both agree is a contem­
plative working. I t  is by thus working according to the 
human law that one rises above the naturalistic level. 
The scientific rationalists of the nineteenth century left 
no place for this true human spontaneity when they 
sought to subject man entirely to the “ law for thing.” 
This scientific determinism was responsible for a great 
deal of spiritual depression and acedía, especially in 
France during the second half of the nineteenth century.3 
But even if Science is less dogmàtic and absolute one 
needs to consider why it does not deserve to be given the 
supreme and central place in life, why it cannot in short 
take the place of humanism and religión, and the work­
ing according to the human law that they both enjoin.
A man may indeed effect through Science a certain
1 See Book ix of the Nicomachean Ethics.
2 “ Allsalutary conditions have their root in strenuousness” (appa- 
máda), says Buddha.
3 See Masters o f Modern French Cñlicism, Essay on Taine, passim. 
Paul Bourget in his Essais de Psychologie contemporaine (2 vols.) has 
followed out during this period the survivals of the older romàntic melan- 
choly and their reinforcement by scientific determinism.
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escape from himself, and this is very salutary so far as it 
goes; he has to discipline himself to an order that is quite 
independent of his own fancies and emotions. He be- 
comes objective in short, but objective according to the 
natural and not according to the human law. Objectivity 
of this kind gives control over natural forces but it does 
not supply the purpose for which these forces are to be 
t used. I t  gives the airship, for instance, but does not de­
termine whether the airship is to go on some beneficent 
errand or is to scatter bombs on women and children. 
Science does not even set right limits to the faculty that 
it chiefly exercises —  the intellect. In itself it stimulates 
rather than curbs one of the three main lusts to which 
human nature is subject — the lust of knowledge. Renán, 
who makes a religión of Science, speaks of “ sacred curi- 
osity.” But this is even more dangerous than the opposite 
excess of the ascetic Christian who denounces all curiosity 
as vain. The man of Science avers indeed that he does 
subordínate his knowledge to an adequate aim, namely
Ithe progress of humanity. But the humanity of the Baconian is only an intellectual abstraction just as the 
humanity of the Rousseauist is only an emotional dream. 
George Sand found, as we have seen, that the passage 
from one’s dream of humanity to humanity in the con­
crete involved a certain disillusion. The scientific or 
rationalistic humanitarian is subject to similar disillu- 
sions.1 Science not only fails to set proper limits to the 
activity of the intellect, but one must also note a curious 
Paradox in its relation to the second of the main lusts
1 “ Le pauvre M. Arago, revenant un jour de l’Hótel de Ville en 1848 
après une épouvantable émeute, disait tristement à l’un de ses aides de 
camp au ministére de la marine: ‘En vérité ces gens-lá ne sont pas raison- 
nables.” Doudan, Lettres, iv, 338.
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to which man is subject, the lust for emotion (libido 
sentiendi). The prime virtue of Science is to be unemo- 
tional and at the same time keenly analytical. Now 
protracted and unemotional analysis finally creates a 
desire, as Renán says, for the opposite pole, “ the kisses 
of the naüve being,” and in general for a frank surrender 
to the emotions. Science thus actually prepares clients for 
the Rousseauist.1 The man of Science is also flattered by 
the Rousseauistic notion that conscience and virtue are 
themselves only forms of emotion. He is thus saved from \ 
anything so distasteful as having to subordínate his own \ 
scientific discipline to some superior religious or human- \ 
istic discipline. He often oscillates between the rational- • 
istic and the emotional pole not only in other things but 
also in his cult of humanity. But if conscience is merely an 
emotion there is a cult that makes a more potent appeal 
to conscience than the cult of humanity itself and that is j 
the cult of country. One is here at the root of the most ¡ 
dangerous of all the sham religions of the modern age — 
the religión of country, the frenzied nationalism that is J  
now threatening to make an end of civilization itself. /
Both emotional nationalism and emotional interna- 
tionalism go back to Rousseau, but in his final emphasis 
he is an emotional nationalist;2 and that is because he 
saw that patriòtic “ virtue” is a more potent intoxicant 
than the love of humanity. The demonstration carne in
1 See Preface (pp. viii-ix) to his Souvenirs d’enfance et dejeunesse and 
my comment in The New Laokoon, 207-08.
2 Most of the political implications of the point of view I am develop- 
ing I am reserving for a volume I have in preparation to be entitled De- 
mocraey and Imperialism. Some of my conclusions will be found in two 
articles in the (New York) Nation: The Breakdoum of Inlemationalism 
(June 17 and 24, 1915), and The Polüical Influence of Rousseau (Jan. 18, 
1917).
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the French Revolution which began as a great interna* 
tional movement on emotional lines and ended in imperi- 
alism and Napoleón Bonaparte. I t  is here that the terrible 
peril of a Science that is pursued as an end in itself be- 
comes manifest. I t  disciplines man and makes him effi­
cient on the naturalistic level, but leaves him ethically 
undisciplined. Now in the absence of ethical discipline 
the lust for knowledge and the lust for feeling count very 
little, at least practically, compared with the third main 
lust of human nature — the lust for power. Henee the 
emergence of that most sinister of all types, the efficient 
megalomaniac. The final use of a Science that has thus 
become a tool of the lust for power is in Burke’s phrase 
to “ improve the mystery of murder.”
This unión of material efficiency and ethical unre- 
straint, though in a way the upshot of the whole move­
ment we have been studying, is especially marked in the 
modera Germán. Goethe as I  have pointed out is ready 
to pardon Faust for grave violations of the moral law 
because of work which, so far from being ethical, is, in 
view of the ruin in which it involves the rústic pair, 
Baucis and Philemon, under suspicion of being positively 
unethical. Yet Goethe was far from being a puré utilita- 
rian and he had reacted more than most Germans of his 
time from Rousseauism. Rousseau is glorified by Ger­
mans as a chief source of their Kultur, as I  have already 
pointed out. Now Kultur when analyzed breaks up into 
two very different things — scientific efficiency and emo- 
tionalism or what the Germans (and unfortunately not 
the Germans alone) term “ idealism.” There is no ques- 
tion about the relation of this idealism to the stream of 
tendeney of which Rousseau is the chief representative.
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By his corruption of conscience Rousseau made it possi­
ble to identify character with temperament. I t  was easy 
for Fichte and others to take the next step and identify 
national character with national temperament. The 
Germans according to Fichte are all beautiful souls, the 
elect of nature. If they have no special word for character 
it is because to be a Germán and have character are 
synonymous. Character is something that gushes up 
from the primordial depths of the German’s being with- 
out any conscious effort on his part.1 The members of 
a whole national group may thus flatter one another and 
inbreed their national “ genius” in the romàntic sense, 
and feel all the while that they are ecstatic “ idealists” ; 
yet as a resuit of the failure to refer their genius back 
to some ethical centre, to work, in other words, accord- 
ing to the human law, they may, so far as the members 
of other national groups are concerned, remain in a state 
of moral solitude.
Everything thus hinges on the meaning of the word 
work. In the abstract and metaphysical sense man can 
know nothing of unity. He may, however, by working 
in the human sense, by imposing, that is, due limits on 
his expansive desires, cióse up in some measure the gap 
in his own nature (the “ civil war in the cave”) and so 
tend to become inwardly one. He may hope in the same 
way to escape from the solitude of his own ego, for the 
inner unity that he achieves through work is only an 
entering into possession of his ethical self, the self that 
he possesses in common with other men. Thus to work 
ethically is not only to become more unified and happy 
but also to move away from what is less permanent
1 Reden an die deutsche Nation, x ii.
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towards what is more permanent and therefore more 
peacefnl in his total nature; so that the problem of happi- 
ness and the problem of peace turn out at last to be 
inseparable.
Souls, says Emerson, never meet; and it is true that a 
man never quite escapes from his solitude. That does not 
make the choice of direction any the less important. An 
infinite beckons to him on either hand. The one inspires 
the divine discontent, the other romàntic restlessness. 
If instead of following the romàntic lure he heeds the cali 
from the opposite direction, he will not indeed attain to 
any perfect communion but he will be less solitary. 
Strictly speaking a man is never happy in the sense of 
being completely satisfied with the passi ng moment,1 or 
never, Dr. Johnson would add, except when he is drunk. 
The happiness of the sober and waking man resides, it 
may be, not in his content with the present moment but 
in the very effort that marks his passage from a lower to 
a higher ethical level.
The happiness of which Rousseau dreamed, it has been 
made plain, was not this active and ethical happiness, but 
rather the passive enjoyment of the beautiful moment — 
the moment that he would like to have last forever. After 
seeking for the beautiful moment in the intoxication of 
love, he turned as we have seen to pantheistic revery. 
“ As long as it lasts,” he says of a moment of this kind, 
“ one isself-sufficing like God.” Yes, but it does not last, 
and when he wakes from his dream of communion with
1 I should perhaps allow for the happiness that may be experieneed in 
moments of supernormal consciousness — something quite distinet from 
emotional or other intoxication. Fairly consistent testimony as to moments 
of this kind is found in the records of the past from the early Buddhists 
down to Tennyson.
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nature, he is still solitary, still the prisoner of his ego. 
The pantheistic dreamer is passive in every sense. He is 
not working either according to the human or according 
to the natural law, and so is not gaining either in material 
or in ethical efficiency. In a world such as that in which 
we live this seems too much like picnicking on a battle- 
field. Rousseau could on occasion speak shrewdly on this 
point. He wrote to a youthful enthusiast who wished to 
come and live with him at Montmorency: “ The first bit 
of advice I  should like to give you is not to indulge in the 
taste you say you have for the contemplative life and 
which is only an indolence of the spirit reprehensible at 
every age and especially at yours. Man is not made to 
meditate but to act.”
The contemplative life is then, according to Rousseau, 
the opposite of action. But to contemplate is according 
to an Aristotle or a Buddha to engage in the most im­
portant form of action, the form that leads to happiness. 
To identify leisure and the contemplative life with pan­
theistic revery, as Rousseau does, is to fall into one of the 
most vicious of confusions. Perhaps indeed the most im­
portant contrast one can reach in a subject of this kind 
is that between a wise strenuousness and a more or less 
wise passiveness, between the spiritual athlete and the 
cosmic loafer, between a Saint Paul, let us say, and a 
Walt Whitman.
The spiritual idling and drifting of the Rousseauist 
would be less sinister if it did not coexist in the world of 
to-day with an intense material activity. The man who 
seeks happiness by work according to the natural law is 
to be rated higher than the man who seeks happiness in 
some form of emotional intoxication (including pantheis-
tic revery). He is not left unarmed, a helpless dreamer in 
the battle of life. The type of efficiency he is acquiring 
also helps him to keep at bay man’s great enemy, ennui. 
An Edison, we may suppose, who is drawn ever onward 
by the lure of wonder and curiosity and power, has little 
time to be bored. I t  is surely better to escape from the 
boredom of life after the fashion of Edison than after the 
fashion of Baudelaire.1
I  have already pointed out, however, the peril in a 
one-sided working of this kind. I t  malees man efficient 
without making him ethical. I t  stimulates rather than 
corrects a fearless, formless expansión on the human 
level. This inordinate reaching out beyond bounds is, as 
the great Greek poets saw with such clearness, an invi- 
tation to Nemesis. The misery that results from unre- 
straint, from failure to work according to the human law, 
is something different from mere pain and far more to be 
dreaded; just as the happiness that results from a right 
working according to the human law is something differ­
ent from mere pleasure and far more worthy of pursuit.
The present alliance between emotional romanticists 
and utilitarians 2 is a veritable menaee to civilization it- 
self. I t  does not follow, as I  said in a previous chapter, 
because revery or “ intuition of the Creative flux” cannot 
take the place of leisure or meditation, that one must 
therefore condemn it utterly. It  may like other forms of
1 I scarcely need say that I am speaking of the man of Science only in 
so far as he is purely naturalistic in his point of view. There may enter 
into the total personality of Edison or any particular man of Science other 
and very different elements.
2 M. René Berthelot has written a book on pragmatism and similar 
tendencies in contemporary philosophy entitled Un Romantisme utililaire. 
I have not read it but the title alone is worth more than most books on 
the subject I have read.
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romanticism have a place on the recreative side of life. 
What finally counts is work according to either the hu­
man or the natural law, but man cannot always be work­
ing. He needs moments of relief from tensión and con- 
centration and even, it should seem, of semi-oblivion of 
his conscious self. As one of the ways of winning such mo­
ments of relaxation and partial forgetfulness much may 
be said for revery. In general one must grant the solace 
and rich source of poetry that is found in communion 
with nature even though the final emphasis be put on 
communion with man. It  is no small thing to be, as 
Arnold says Wordsworth was, a “ priest of the wonder 
and bloom of the world.” One cannot however grant the 
Wordsworthian that to be a priest of wonder is necessa- 
rily to be also a priest of wisdom. Thus to promote to 
the supreme and central place something that is legití­
mate in its own degree, but secondary, is to risk starting 
a sham religión.
Those who have sought to set up a cult of love or 
beauty or Science or humanity or country are open to 
the same objections as the votaries of nature. However 
important each of these things may be in its own place, it 
cannot properly be put in the supreme and central place 
for the simple reason that it does not involve any ade- 
quate conversión or discipline of man’s ordinary self to 
some ethical centre. I  have tried to show that the sense of 
solitude or forlornness that is so striking a feature of 
romàntic melancholy arises not only from a loss of hold 
on the traditional centres, but also from the failure of 
these new attempts at communion to keep their prom­
ises. The number of discomfitures of this kind in the 
period that has elapsed since the late eighteenth cen-
tury, suggests that this period was even more than most 
periods an age of sophistry. Every age has had its false 
teachers, but possibly no age ever had so many dubious 
m oralista as this, an incomparable series of false prophets 
from Rousseau himself down to Nietzsche and Tolstoy. 
I t  remains to sum up in a closing chapter the results of 
my whole inquiry and at the same tune to discuss some- 
what more specifically the bearing of my whole point of 
view, especially the idea of work according to the human 
law, upon the present situation.
352 ROUSSEAU AND ROMANTICISMO
CHAPTER X
THE PRESENT OUTLOOK
I t has been my endeavor throughout this book to show 
that clàssic and romàntic art, though both at their best 
highly imaginative, differ in the quality of the imagina- 
tion. I  pointed out in my first chapter that in his recoil 
from the intellectual romanticism of the Renaissance and 
the mediseval romanticism of actual adventure the neo- 
classicist carne to rest his literary faith on “ reason” (by 
which he meant either ordinary good sense or abstract 
reasoning), and then opposed this reason or judgment to 
imagination. This supposed opposition between reason 
and imagination was accepted by the romàntic rebels 
against neo-classicism and has been an endless source 
of confusión to the present day. Though both neo-classi- 
cists and romanticists achieved much admirable work, 
work which is likely to have a permanent appeal, it is 
surely no small matter that they both failed on the 
whole to deal adequately with the imagination and its role 
whether in literature or life. Thus Dryden attributes the 
immortality of the ¿Eneid to its being “ a well-weighed 
judicious poem.1 Whereas poems which are produced 
by the vigor of imagination only have a gloss upon 
them at the first which time wears off, the works of judg­
ment are like the diamond; the more they are polished, 
the more lustre they receive.” 1 Read on and you will find 
that Dryden thus stresses judgment by way of protest 
against the Cavalier Marini and the imaginative unre- 
1 Dedication o f the M neis (1697).
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straint that he and other intel·lectual romanticists dis- 
play. Dryden thus obscures the fact that what gives the 
immortalizing touch to the iEneid is not mere judgment 
but imagination — a certain quality of imagination. 
Even the reader who is to enter properly into the spirit 
of Virgil needs more than judgment — he needs to pos- 
sess in some measure the same quality of imagination. 
The romàntic answer to the neo-classic distrust of the 
imagination was the apotheosis of the imagination, but 
without sufficient discrimination as to its quality, and 
this led only too often to an anarchy of the imagination 
— an anarchy associated, as we have seen, in the case of 
the Rousseauist, with emotion rather than with thought 
or action.
The modera world has thus tended to oscillate be- 
tween extremes in its attitude towards the imagination, 
so that we still have to tura to ancient Greece f or the best 
examples of works in which the imagination is at once 
disciplined and supreme. Aristotle, I  pointed out, is 
doing little more than give an account of this Greek 
practice when he says that the poet ranks higher than 
the historian because he achieves a more general truth, 
but that he can achieve this more general truth only by 
being a master of illusion. Art in which the illusion is 
not disciplined to the higher reality counts at best on 
therecreative side of life. “ Imagination,” says Poe, “ feel- 
ing herself for once unshackled, roamed at will among 
the ever-changing wonders of a shadowy and unstable 
land.” 1 To take seriously the creations of this type of 
imagination is to be on the way towards madness. Every 
madhouse, indeed, has inmates who are very imagina- 
1 Adventure of one Hans Pfaal.
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tive in the fashion Poe here describes. We must not 
confuse the concèntric or ethical with the eccentric imag­
ination if we are to define rightly the terms classic and 
romàntic or indeed to attain to sound criticism at all. 
My whole aim has been to show that a main stream of 
emotional sophistry that takes its rise in the eighteenth 
century and flows down through the nineteenth in­
volves just such a confusión.
The general distinction between the two types of 
imagination would seem sufficiently clear. To apply the 
distinction concretely is, it must be admitted, a task j 
infinitely difficult and delicate, a task that calis for the 
utmost degree of the esprit de ftnesse. In any particular 
case there enters an element of vital novelty. The relation 
of this vital novelty to the ethical or permanent element 
in life is something that cannot be determined by any 
process of abstract reasoning or by any rule of thumb; 
it is a matter of immediate perception. The art of the | 
critic is thus hedged about with peculiar difficulties. I t  
does not follow that Aristotle himself because he has laid 
down sound principies in his Poetics, would always have 
been right in applying them. Our evidence on this point 
is as a matter of fact somewhat scanty.
Having thus admitted the difficulty of the undertaking 
we may ourselves attempt a few concrete illustrations of 
how sound critical standards tended to suffer in connec- 
tion with the romàntic movement. Leaving aside for the 
moment certain larger aspects of the ethical imagination 
that I  am going to discuss presently, let us confine our­
selves to poetry. Inasmuch as the ethical imagination 
does not in itself give poetry but wisdom, various cases 
may evidently arise: a man may be wise without being
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poetical; he may be poetical without being wise; he may 
be both wise and poetical.
We may take as an example of the person who was 
wise without being poetical Dr. Johnson. Though most 
persons would grant that Dr. Johnson was not poetical, 
it is well to remember that this generalization has only 
the approximate truth that a literary generalization can 
have. The lines on Levet have been inserted and rightly 
in anthologies. If not on the whole poetical, Johnson 
was, as Boswell says, eminently fitted to be a “ majes- 
tic teacher of moral and religious wisdom.” Few men 
have had a firmer grasp on the moral law or been freer 
from the various forms of sophistry that tend to ob­
scure it. Unlike Socrates, however, of whom he reminds 
us at times by his ethical realism, Johnson rests his in- 
sight not on a positive but on a traditional basis. To say 
that Johnson was truly religious is only another way of 
saying that he was truly humble, and one of the reasons 
for his humility was his perception of the ease with which 
illusion in man passes over into delusion, and even into 
madness. His chapter on the “ Dangerous Prevalence of 
Imagination” in “ Rasselas” not only gives the key to 
that work but to much else in his writings. What he 
opposes to this dangerous prevalence of imagination is 
not a different type of imagination but the usual neo- 
classical reason or judgment or “ sober probability.” His 
defence of wisdom against the gathering naturalistic so- 
phistries of his time is therefore somewhat lacking in 
imaginative prestige. He seemed to be opposing innova- 
tion on purely formalistic and traditional grounds in an 
age which was more and more resolutely untraditional 
and which was determined above all to emancipate the
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imagination from its strait-jacket of formalism. Keats 
would not have hesitated to rank Johnson among those 
who “ blasphemed the bright Lyrist to his face.”
Keats himself may serve as a type of the new imagina­
tive spontaneity and of the new fullness and freshness 
of sensuous perception. If Johnson is wise without being 
poetical, Keats is poetical without being wise, and here 
again we need to remember that distinctions of this kind 
are only approximately true. Keats has written fines 
that have high seriousness. He has written other fines 
which without being wise seem to lay claim to wisdom — 
notably the fines in which, following Shaftesbury and 
other sesthetes, he identifies truth and beauty; an iden- 
tification that was disproved for practical purposes at 
least as far back as the Trojan War. Helen was beautiful, 
but was neither good ñor true. In general, however, 
Keats’s poetry is not sophistical. I t  is simply delightfully 
recreative. There are signs that Keats himself would not 
have been content in the long run with a purely recreative 
róle— to be “ theidle singer of an empty day.” Whether 
he would ever have achieved cenuine ethical purpose is a 
question. In working out a wise view of life he did not, 
like Dante, have the support of a great and generally 
accepted tradition. I t  is not certain again that he would 
ever have developed the critical keenness that enabled 
a Sophocles to work out a wise view of life in a less tra­
ditional age than that of Dante. The evidence is rather 
that Keats would have succumbed, to his own poetical 
detriment, to some of the forms of sham wisdom current 
in his day, especially the new humanitarian evangel.1
1 His attempt to rewrite Hyperion from a  humanitarian point of view 
is  a  dismal failure.
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In any case we may contrast Sophocles and Dante 
with Keats as examples of poets who were not merely 
poetical but wise —  wise in the relative and imperfect 
sense in which it is vouchsafed to mortals to achieve 
wisdom. Sophocles and Dante are not perhaps more 
poetical than Keats — it is not easy to be more poetical 
than Keats. As Tennyson says, “ there is something 
magic and of the innermost soul of poetry in almost every- 
thing he wrote.” Yet Sophocles and Dante are not only 
superior to Keats, but in virtue of the presence of the 
ethical imagination in their work, superior not merely 
in degree but in kind. Not that even Sophocles and Dante 
maintain themselves uniformly on the level of the ethi­
cal imagination. There are passages in Dante which 
are less imaginative than theological. Passages of this 
kind are even more numerous in Milton, a poet who on 
the whole is highly serious.1 I t  is in general easy to be 
didàctic, hard to achieve ethical insight.
If Keats is highly imaginative and poetic without on 
the whole rising to high seriousness or sinking to sophis- 
try, Shelley, on the other hand, illustrates in his imagi­
native activity the confusión of valúes that was so fos- 
tered by romanticism. Here again I  do not wish to be too 
absolute. Shelley has passages especially in his “ Adon- 
ais” that are on a high level. Yet nothing is more certain 
than that the quality of his imagination is on the whole 
not ethical but Arcadian or pastoral. In the ñame of his
1 There is also a strong idyllic element in Paradise Lost as Rousseau 
(Emile, v) and Schiller (Essay on Naiive and Sentimental Poetry) were 
among the first to point out. Critics may be found even to-day who, like 
Tennyson, prefer the passages which show a riehly pastoral imagination 
to the passages where the ethical imagination is required but where it does 
not seem to prevail sufficiently over theology.
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Arcadia conceived as the “ ideal” he refuses to face the 
facts of life. I  have already spoken of the flimsiness of 
his “ Prometheus Unbound” as a solution of the prob- 
lem of evil. What is found in this play is the exact oppo­
site of imaginative concentration on the human law. 
The imagination wanders irresponsibly in a región quite 
outside of normal human experience. We are hindered 
from enjoying the gorgeous iridescences of Shelley’s 
cloudland by Shelley’s own evident conviction that it 
is not a cloudland, an “ intense inane,” but a trae em- 
pyrean of the spirit. And our irritation at Shelley’s own 
confusión is further increased by the long train of his 
indiscreet admirers. Thus Professor C. H. Herford writes 
in the “ Cambridge History of English Literatura” that 
what Shelley has done in the “ Prometheus Unbound,” 
is to give “ magnificent expression to the faith of Plato 
and of Christ” ! 1 Such a statement in such a place is a 
veritable danger signal, an indication of some grave 
spiritual bewilderment in the present age. To show the 
inanit,y of these attempts to make a wise man of Shelley 
it is enough to compare him not with Plato and Christ, 
but with the poet whom he set out at once to continue 
and contradict — with iEschylus. The “ Prometheus 
Bound” has the informing ethical imagination that the 
“ Prometheus Unbound” lacks, and so in its total struc­
ture belongs to an entirely different order of art. Shelley, 
indeed, has admirable details. The romanticism of 
nympholeptic longing may almost be said to culminate, 
at least in England, in the passage I  have already cited 
(“ My soul is an enchanted boat”). There is no reason 
why in recreative moods one should not imagine one’s
i xii, 74.
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soul an enchanted boat and float away in a musical rap 
ture with the ideal dream companion towards Arcady. 
But to suppose that revery of this kind has anything to 
do with the faith of Plato and of Christ, is to fall from 
illusion into dangerous delusion.
We may doubt whether if Shelley had lived longer he 
would ever have risen above emotional sophistry and 
become more ethical in the quality of his imagination. 
Such a progress from emotional sophistry to ethical in- 
sight we actually find in Goethe; and this is the last and 
most complex case we have to consider. Johnson, I  have 
said, is wise without being poetical and Keats poetical 
without being wise; Sophocles is both poetical and wise, 
whereas Shelley is poetical, but with a taint of sophistry 
or sham wisdom. No such clear-cut generalization can be 
ventured about Goethe. I  have already quoted Goethe’s 
own judgment on his “ Werther” as weakness seeking to 
give itself the prestige of strength, and perhaps it would 
be possible to instance from his early writings even worse 
examples of a morbid emotionalism (e.g. “ Stella”). How 
about “ Faust” itself? Most Germans will simply d is m is s  
such a question as profane. With Hermann Grimm they 
are ready to pronounce “ Faust” the greatest work of the 
greatest poet of all times, and of all peoples. Yet it is not 
easy to overlook the sophistical element in both parts of 
“ Faust.” I  have already commented on those passages 
that would seem especially sophistical: the passage in 
which the devil is defined as the spirit that always says 
no strikes at the very root of any proper distinction be- 
tween good and evil. The passage again in which Faust 
breaks down all precise discrimination in favor of mere 
emotional intoxication is an extreme example of the
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Rousseauistic art of “ making madness beautiful.” The 
very conclusión of the whole poem, with its setting up of 
work according to the natural law as a substitute for work 
according to the human law, is an egregious piece of sham 
wisdom. The result of work according to the human law, 
of ethical efficiency in short, is an increasing serenity; and 
it is not clear that Faust is much calmer at the end of the 
poem than he is at the beginning. According to Dr. Santa- 
yana he is ready to carry into heaven itself his romàntic 
restlessness — his desperate and feverish attempts to 
escape from ennui.1 Perhaps this is not the whole truth 
even in regard to “ Faust” ; and still less can we follow 
Dr. Santayana when he seems to discover in the whole 
work of Goethe only romàntic restlessness. At the very 
time when Goethe was infecting others with the wild 
expansiveness of the new movement, he himself was be­
ginning to strike out along an entirely different path. 
He writes in his Journal as early as 1778: “ A more defi­
nite feeling of limitation and in consequence of true broad- 
ening.” Goethe here glimpses the truth that lies at the 
base of both humanism and religión. He saw that the 
romàntic disease was the imaginative and emotional 
straining towards the unlimited (Hang zura Unbegrenz- 
ten), and in opposition to this unrestraint he was never 
tired of preaching the need of working within boundaries. 
It  may be objected that Goethe is in somewhat the same 
case here as Rousseau: that the side of his work which 
has imaginative and emotional driving power and has 
therefore moved the world is of an entirely different 
order. We may reply that Goethe is at times both poetical 
and wise. Furthermore in his maxims and conversations
1 Three Philosophical Poets, 188.
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where he does not rise to the poetical level, he displays a 
higher quality of wisdom than Rousseau. At his best he 
shows an ethical realism worthy of Dr. Johnson, though 
in his attitude towards tradition he is less Johnsonian 
than Socràtic. Like Socrates he saw on what terms a 
break with the past may be safely attempted. “Any- 
thing that emancipates the spirit,” he says, “ without 
a corresponding growth in self-mastery, is pernicious.” 
We may be sure that if the whole modern experiment 
fails it will be because of the neglect of the truth con- 
tained in this maxim. Goethe also saw that a sound in- 
dividualism must be rightly imaginative. He has occa- 
sional hints on the role of illusion in literature and life 
that go far beneath the surface.
Though the mature Goethe, then, always stands for 
salvation by work, it is not strictly correct to say that it 
is work only according to the natural law. In Goethe at 
his best the imagination accepts the limitations imposed 
not merely by the natural, but also by the human law. 
However, we must admit that the humanístic Goethe 
has had few followers either in Germany or elsewhere, 
whereas innumerable persons have escaped from the im­
aginative unrestraint of the emotional romanticist, as 
Goethe himself likewise did, by the discipline of Science.
The examples I  have chosen should suffice to show how 
my distinction between two main types of imagination — 
the ethical type that gives high seriousness to Creative 
writing and the Arcadian or dalliant type that does not 
raise it above the recreative level — works out in practice. 
Some such distinction is necessary if we are to understand 
the imagination in its relation to the human law. But 
in order to grasp the present situation firmly we need
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also to consider the imagination in its relation to the 
natural law. I  have just said that most men have escaped 
from the imaginative anarchy of the emotional roman- 
ticist through Science. Now the man of Science at his f 
best is like the humanist at his best, at once highly im- I 
aginative and highly critical. By this coòperation of 
imagination and intellect they are both enabled to con­
céntrate effectively on the facts, though on facts of a 
very different order. The imagination reaches out and 
perceives likenesses and analogies whereas the power in 
man that separates and discriminates and traces causes 
and effects tests in turn these likenesses and analogies as 
to their reality: for we can scarcely repeat too often that 
though the imagination gives unity it does not give real­
ity. If we were all Aristotles or even Goethes we might 
concéntrate imaginatively on both laws, and so be both 
scientific and humanístic: but as a matter of fact the 
ordinary man’s capacity for concentration is limited. 
After a spell of concentration on either law he aspires to 
what Aristotle calis “ relief from tensión.” Now the very 
conditions of modern life require an almost tyranmcal 
concentration on the natural law. The problems that 
have been engaging more and more the attention oí the 
Occident since the rise of the great Baconian movement 
have been the problems of power and speed and utility. 
The enormous mass of machinery that has been accumu- 
lated in the pursuit of these ends requires the dosest 
attention and concentration if it is to be worked effi- 
ciently. At the same time the man of the West is not will- 
ing to admit that he is growing in power alone, he likes 
to think that he is growing also in wisdom. Only by keep- 
ing this situation in mind can we hope to understand how
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emotional romanticism has been able to develop into a 
vast system of sham spirituality. I  have said that the 
Rousseauist wants unity without reality. If we are to 
move towards reality, the imagination must be con- 
trolled by the power of discrimination and the Rousseau­
ist has repudiated this power as “ false and secondary.” 
But a unity that lacks reality can scarcely be accounted 
wise. The Baconian, however, accepts this unity gladly. 
He has spent so much energy in working according to 
the natural law that he has no energy left for work ac­
cording to the human law. By turning to the Rousseau­
ist he can get the “ relief from tensión” that he needs 
and at the same time enjoy the illusion of receiving a 
vast spiritual illumination. Neither Rousseauist ñor 
Baconian carry into the realm of the human law the keen 
analysis that is necessary to distinguish between genuine 
insight and some mere phantasmagoria of the emotions. 
I  am speaking especially, of course, of the interplay of 
Rousseauistic and Baconian elements that appear in 
certain recent philosophies like that of Bergson. According 
to Bergson one becomes spiritual by throwing overboard 
both thought and action, and this is a very convenient 
notion of spirituality for those who wish to devote both 
thought and action to utilitarian and material ends. It  
is hard to see in Bergson’s intuition of the Creative flux 
and perception of real duration anything more than the 
latest form of Rousseau’s transcendental idling. To 
work with something approaching frenzy according to the 
natural law and to be idle according to the human law 
must be accounted a rather one-sided view of life. The 
price the man of to-day has paid for his increase in power 
is, it should seem, an appalling superficiality in dealing
with the law of his own nature. What brings together 
Baconian and Rousseauist in spite of their surface differ- 
ences is that they are both intent on the element of 
novelty. But if wonder is associated with the Many, 
wisdom is associated with the One. Wisdom and wonder 
are moving not in the same but in opposite directions. 
The nineteenth century may very well prove to have 
been the most wonderful and the least wise of centuries. 
The men of this period — and I am speaking of course of 
the main drift — were so busy being wonderful that they 
had no time, apparently, to be wise. Yet their extreme 
absorption in wonder and the manifoldness of things can 
scarcely be commended unless it can be shown that hap- 
piness also results from all this revelling in the element of 
change. The Rousseauist is not quite consistent on this 
point. At times he bids us boldly set our hearts on 
the transitory. Aimez, says Vigny, ce que jam ais on ne 
vena deux fois. But the Rousseauist strikes perhaps a 
deeper chord when looking forth on a world of flux he 
utters the anguished exclamation of Leconte de Lisie: 
Qu’est-ce que tout cela qui n ’est pas éternel? Even as 
one swallow, says Aristotle, does not make a spring, 
so no short time is enough to determine whether a man 
deserves to be called happy. The weakness of the román- 
tic pursuit of novelty and wonder and in general of the 
philosophy of the beautiful moment — whether the 
eròtic moment1 or the moment of cosmic revery — is that
1 After telling of the days when “ il n’y avait pour moi ni passé ni 
avenir et je goútais à la fois les délices de mille siècles,” Saint-Preux 
concludes: “ Hélas! vous avez dispara comme un éclair. Cette éternité 
de bonheur ne fut qu’un instant de ma vie. Le temps a repris sa lenteur 
dans les moments de mon désespoir, et l’ennui mesure par longues années 
le reste infortuné de mes jours” (Nouvelle Hélmse, Pt. ni, Lettre vi).
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it does not reckon sufficiently with the something deep
Ídown in the human breast that craves the abiding. To pin one’s hope of happiness to the fact that “ the world is so 
full of anumber of things” is an appropriate sentiment for 
a “ Child’s Garden of Verse.” For the adult to maintain 
an exclusive Bergsonian interest in “ the perpetual gush- 
ing forth of novelties” would seem to betray an inability 
to mature. The effect on a mature observer of an age so 
entirely turned from the One to the Many as that in 
which we are living must be that of a prodigious periph- 
eral richness joined to a great central void.
What leads the man of to-day to work with such en- 
ergy according to the natural law and to be idle according 
to the human law is his intoxication with material suc- 
cess. A consideration that should therefore touch him is 
that in the long run not merely spiritual success or hap­
piness, but material prosperity depend on an entirely 
different working. Let me revert here for a moment to 
my previous analysis: to work according to the human 
law is simply to rein in one’s impulses. Now the strongest 
of all the impulses is the will to power. The man who does 
not rein in his will to power and is at the same time very 
active according to the natural law is in a fair way to 
become an efficient megalomaniac. Efficient megalo­
mania, whether developed in individuals of the same 
group or in whole national groups in their relations with 
one another, must lead sooner or later to war. The effi­
cient megalomaniacs will proceed to destroy one another 
along with the material wealth to which they have sacri- 
ficed everything else; and then the meek, if there are any 
meek left, will inherit the earth.
“ If I  am to judge by myself,” said an eighteenth-
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century Frenchman, “ man is a stupid animal.” Man is 
not only a stupid animal in spite of his conceit of his own 
cleverness but we are here at the source of his stupidity. 
The source is the moral indolence that Buddha with his 
almost infallible sagacity defined long ago. In spite of the 
fact that his spiritual and in the long run his material 
success hinge on his ethical effort, man persists in dodging 
this effort, in seeking to follow the fine of least or lesser 
resistance. An energetic material working does not mend 
but aggravate the failure to work ethically and is there­
fore especially stupid. Just this combination has in fact 
led to the crowning stupidity of the ages — the Great i 
War. No more delirious spectacle has ever been wit- ’  
nessed than that of hundreds of millions of human beings 
using a vast machinery of scientific efficiency to tum life 
into a hell for one another. I t  is hard to avoid concluding 
that we are living in a world that has gone wrong on first 
principies, a world that, in spite of all the warnings of the 
past, has allowed itself to be caught once more in the 
terrible naturalistic trap. The dissolution of civilization 
with which we are threatened is likely to be worse in 
some respects than that of Greece or Rome in view of the 
success that has been attained in “ perfecting the mys- 
tery of murder.” Various traditional agencies are indeed 
still doing much to chain up the beast in man. Of these 
the chief is no doubt the Church. But the leadership of 
the Occident is no longer here. The leaders have suc- 
cumbed in greater or less degree to naturalism 1 and so 
have been tampering with the moral law. That the brutal \ 
imperialist who brooks no obstacle to his lust for domin-/
1 The Church, so far as it has become humanitarian, has itself suc- 
cumbed to naturalism.
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ion has been tampering with this law goes without saying; 
but the humanitarian, all adrip with brotherhood and 
profoundly convinced of the loveüness of his own soul, 
has been tampering with it also, and in a more dangerous 
' way for the very reason that it is less obvious. This tam­
pering with the moral law, or what amounts to the same 
thing, this overriding of the veto power in man, has been 
largely a resuit, though not a necessary result, of the 
rupture with the traditional forms of wisdom. The Bacon- 
ian naturalist repudiated the past because he wished to 
be more positive and critical, to plant himself upon the 
facts. Yet the veto power is itself a fact, — the weighti- 
est with which man has to reckon. The Rousseauistic 
naturalist threw off traditional control because he wished 
to be more imaginative. Yet without the veto power the 
imagination falls into sheer anarchy. Both Baconian and 
Rousseauist were very impatient of any outer authority 
that seemed to stand between them and their own per- 
ceptions. Yet the veto power is nothing abstract, nothing 
that one needs to take on hearsay, but is very immediate. 
The naturalistic leaders may be proved wrong without 
going beyond their own principies, and their wrongness is 
of a kind to wreck civilization.
I  have no quarrel, it is scarcely necessary to add, 
either with the man of Science or the romanticist when 
they keep in their proper place. As soon however as they 
try, whether separately or in unisón, to set up some sub­
stitute for humanism or religión, they should be at once 
attacked, the man of Science for not being sufficiently 
positive and critical, the romanticist for not being rightly I imaginative.
This brings us back to the problem of the ethical im-
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agination — the imagination that has accepted the veto 
p 0W er _  which I  promised a moment ago to treat in its 
larger aspects. This problem is indeed in a peculiar sense 
the problem of civilization itself. A curious circumstance 
should be noted here: a civilization that rests on dogma 
and outer authority cannot afford to face the whole truth 
about the imagination and its role. A civilization in which 
dogma and outer authority have been undermined by the 
critical spirit, not only can but must do this very thing 
if it is to continue at all. Man, a being ever changing and 
living in a world of change, is, as I  said at the outset, 
cut off from immediate access to anything abiding and 
therefore worthy to be called real, and condemned to live 
in an element of fiction or illusion. Yet civilization must 
rest on the recognition of something abiding. l t  follows 
that the truths on the survival of which civilization de- 
pends cannot be conveyed to man directly but only 
through imaginative symbols. I t  seems hard, however,\ 
for man to analyze critically this disability under which | 
he labors, and, facing courageously the results of his I 
analysis, to submit his imagination to the necessary con- \ 
trol. He consents to limit his expansive desires only when ' 
the truths that are symbolically trae are presented to him 
as literally true. The salutary check upon his imagination 
is thus won at the expense of the critical spirit. The puré 
gold of faith needs, it should seem, if it is to gain currency, 
to be alloyed with credulity. But the civilization that 
results from humanístic or religious control tends to 
produce the critical spirit. Sooner or later some Voltaire 
utters his fatal message:
Les prélres ne sont pas ce qu’un vain peuple pense;
Notre crédulitéfait toute leur Science.
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The emancipation from credulous belief leads to an 
anarchic individualism that tends in turn to destroy 
civilization. There is some evidence in the past that it is 
not quite necessary to run through this cycle. Buddha, 
for example, was very critical; he had a sense of the flux 
and evanescence of all things and so of universal illusior: 
keener by far than that of Anatole France; at the same 
time he had ethical standards even sterner than those of 
Dr. Johnson. This is a combination that the Occident has 
rarely seen and that it perhaps needs to see. At the very 
end of his life Buddha uttered words that deserve to be 
the Magna Charta of the true individualist: “ Therefore, 
O Ananda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye refuges 
unto yourselves. Look to no outer refuge. Hold fast as a 
refuge unto the Law (Dhamma) 1A man may safely go 
into himself if what he finds there is not, like Rousseau, 
his own emotions, but like Buddha, the law of righteous- 
ness.
Men were induced to follow Rousseau in his surrender 
to the emotions, it will be remembered, because that 
seemed the only alternative to a hard and dry rational- 
ism. The rationalists of the Enlightenment were for the 
most part Cartesians, but Kant himself is in his ma.in 
trend a rationalist. The epithet critical usually applied to 
his philosophy is therefore a misnomer. For to solve the 
critical problem — the relation between appearance and 
reality it is necessary to deal adequately with the role 
of the imagination and this Kant has quite failed to do.2
1 Sulla of the Great Decease.
s If a man recognizes the supreme role of fiction or illusion in life while 
proeeeding in other respects on Kantian principies, he will reach results 
similar to the “ As-ifPhilosophy” (Philosophie des Ais Oh) of Vaihinger, 
a leading authority on Kant and co-editor of the Kantsludien. This
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Modera philosophy is in general so unsatisfactory because
it has raised the critical problem without carrying i
through; it is too critical to receive wisdom through the
traditional channels and not critical enough to achieve
insight, and so has been losing more and more íts human
relevancy, becoming in the words of one oí íts recent
votaries, a “ naxrow and unfruitful eccentricity. Ihe
professional philosophers need to mend their ways and
that speedily if the great world is not to pass them dis-
dainfully by and leave them to play their mystenous
little game among themselves. We see one of the most
recent groups, the new realists, fíat on. their faces before
the man of Science -  surely an undignified attitude for a
philosopher. I t  is possible to look on the kind of know -
edge that Science gives as alone real only by dodgmg the
critical problem -  the problem as to the trustworthmess
of the human instrument through which all knowledge is
received — and it would be easy to show, if this were the
place to go into the more technical aspects of the ques-
tion, that the new realists have been domg just this
whether through sheer naüveté or metaphysical despair i
am unable to say. The truly critical observer is unable
to discover anything real in the absolute sense smce
everything is mixed with illusion. In this absolute sense
the man of Science must ever be ignorant of the reality
behind the shows of nature. The new realist is, however,
iustified relatively in thinking that the only thmg real m
the view of life that has prevailed of late has been íts
working according to the natural law and the frmts oí this
work thou°fi not published until 1911, was composed, the author tolla worK, xnougu uu  ^ found to anticípate very
s a ls a s s  r S ï ï a *  -
been proclaiming so loudly of late its own bankruptcy.
working. The self-deception begins when he assumes that 
there can be no other working. What I  have myself been 
opposing to naturalistic excess, such as appears in the 
new realismos insight; but insight is in itself only a 
word, and unless it can be shown to have its own working 
and its own fruits, entirely different from those of work 
according to the natural law, the positivist at all events 
will have none of it.
The positivist will not only insist upon fruits, but will 
rate these fruits themselves according to their bearing 
upon his main purpose. Life, says Bergson, can have no 
purpose in the human sense of the word.1 The positivist 
will reply to Bergson and to the Rousseauistic drifter in 
general, in the words of Aristotle, that theend is the chief 
thing of all and that the end of ends is happiness. To the 
Baconian who wants work and purpose but according to 
the natural law alone, the complete positivist will reply 
that happiness cannot be shown to result from this one- 
sided working; that in itself it affords no escape from the 
misery of moral solitude, that we move towards true 
communion and so towards peace and happiness only 
by work according to the human law. Now the more indi- 
viduálistic we are, I  have been saying, the more we must 
depend for the apprehension of this law on the imagina- 
tion, the imagination, let me hasten toadd, supplemented 
by the intellect. I t  is not enough to put the brakes on the 
natural man —  and that is what work according to the 
human law means —  we must do it intelligently. Right 
knowing must here as elsewhere precede right doing. 
Even a Buddha admitted that at one period in his life
1 * ‘ C’est en vain qu’on voudrait assigner à la vie un but, au sens humain 
du mot.” L’Evolulion créatrice, 55.
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he had not been intelligent in his self-discipline. I  need 
only to amplify here what I  have said in a previous chap- 
ter about the proper use of the “ false secondary power” 
by those who wish to be either religious or humanis- 
tic in a positive fashion. They will employ their analyti- 
cal faculties, not in building up some abstract Sys­
tem, but in discriminating between the actual data of 
experience with a view to happiness, just as the man of 
Science at his best employs the same faculties in discrim­
inating between the data of experience with a view to 
power and utility.
I  havepointed out another important use of the analyti- 
cal intellect in its relation to the imagination. Since the 
imagination by itself gives unity but does not give real- 
ity, it is possible to discover whether a unification of life 
has reality only by subjecting it to the keenest analysis. 
Otherwise what we take to be wisdom may turn out to be 
only an empty dream. To take as wise something that is 
unreal is to fall into sophistry. For a man like Rousseau 
whose imagination was in its ultimate quality not ethical 
at all but overwhelmingly idyllic to set up as an inspired 
teacher was to become an arch-sophist. Whether or not 
he was sincere in his sophistry is a question which the 
emotionalist is very fond of discussing, but which the 
sensible person will dismiss as somewhat secondary. 
Sophistry of all kinds always has a powerful ally in man’s 
moral indolence. I t  is so pleasant to let one’s self go and 
at the same time deem one’s self on the way to wisdom. 
We need to keep in mind the special quality of Rous- 
seau’s sophistry if we wish to understand a very extraor- 
dinary circumstance during the past century. Durin g 
this period men were moving steadily towards the natu-
ralistic level, where the law of cunning and the law of forcé 
prevail, and at the same time had the illusion — or at 
least multitudes had the illusion — that they were mov- 
ing towards peace and brotherhood. The explanación 
is found in the endless tricks played upon the uncritical 
and still more upon the half-critical by the Arcadian 
imagination.
The remedy is not only a more stringent criticism, but, 
as I  have tried to make plain in this whole work, in an 
age of sophistry, like the present, criticism itself amounts 
largely to that art of inductive defining which it is the 
great merit of Socrates, according to Aristotle,1 to have 
devised and brought to perfection. Sophistry flourishes, 
as Socrates saw, on the confused and ambiguous use of 
general terms; and there is an inexhaustible source of 
such ambiguities and confusions in the very duality of 
human nature. The word nature itself may serve as an 
illustration. We may take as a closely allied example the 
word progress. Man may progress according to either the 
human or the natural law. Progress according to the nat­
ural law has been so rapid since the rise of the Baconian 
movement that it has quite captivated man’s imagination 
and stimulated him to still further concentration and 
effort along naturalistic lines. The very magic of the word 
progress seems to blind him to the failure to progress 
according to the human law. The more a word refers to 
what is above the strictly material level, the more it 
is subject to the imagination and therefore to sophistica- 
'tion. I t  is not easy to sophisticate the word horse, it is 
only too easy to sophisticate the word justice. One may 
affirm, indeed, not only that man is governed by his im- 
1 Metaphysics, 1078 b.
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agination but that in all that belongs to his own special 
domain the imagination itself is governed by words.1
We should not therefore surrender our imaginations 
to a general term until it has been carefully defined, and 
to define it carefully we need usually to practice upon it 
what Socrates would cali a dichotomy. I  have just been 
dichotomizing or “ cutting in two ” the word progress. 
When the two main types of progress, material and 
moral, have been discriminated in their fruits, the posi- 
tivist will proceed to rate these fruits according to their 
relevancy to his main goal —  the goal of happiness. The 
person who is thus fortified by a Socràtic dialèctic will be 
less ready to surrender his imagination to the first sophist 
who urges him to be “progressive.” He will wish to make 
sure first that he is not progressing towards the edge of a 
precipice.
Rousseau would have us get rid of analysis in favor of 
the “heart.” No small part of my endeavor in this work 
and elsewhere has been to show the different meanings 
that may attach to the term heart (and the closely allied 
terms “ soul” and “ intuition”) — meanings that are a 
world apart, when tested by their fruits. Heart may refer 
to outer perception and the emotional self or to inner 
perception and the ethical self. The heart of Pascal is not 
the heart of Rousseau. With this distinction once obliter- 
ated the way is open for the Rousseauistic corruption of 
such words as virtue and conscience, and this is to fling 
wide the door to every manner of confusión. The whole 
vocabulary that is properly applicable only to the super-
1 In the beginning was the Word! To seek to substitute, like Faust, the 
Deed for the Word is to throw discrimination to the winds. The failure to 
discriminate as to the quality oí the deed is responsible for the central 
sophistry of Faust (see p. 331) and perhaps of our modern life in general.
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sensuous realm is then transferred to the región of the 
subrational. The impulsive self proceeds to cover its 
nakedness with ali these fair phrases as it would with 
a garment. A recent student of war-time psychology asks: 
“ Is it that the natural man in us has been masquerading 
as the spiritual man by hiding himself under splendid
Íwords — courage, patriotism, justice — and now he rises up and glares at us with blood-red eyes?” That is pre- 
cisely what has been happening.
But after all the heart in any sense of the word is con- 
trolled by the imagination, so that a still more fundamen­
tal dichotomy, perhaps the most fundamental of all, is 
that of the imagination itself. We have seen how often 
the Arcadian dreaming of the emotional naturalist has 
been labelled the “ ideal.” Our views of this type of im­
agination will therefore determine our views of much that
Í now passes current as idealism. Now the term idealist mav have a sound meaning: it mav designate the man 
who isrealistic according to the human law. But to be an 
idealist in Shelley’s sense or that of innumerable other 
Rousseauists is to fall into sheer unreality. This type of 
idealist shrinks from the sharp discriminations of the 
critic: they are like the descent of a douche of ice-water 
upon his hot illusions. But it is pleasanter, after all, to be 
awakened by a douche of ice-water than by an explosión 
of dynamite under the bed; and that has been the fre­
qüent fate of the romàntic idealist. I t  is scarcely safe to 
neglect any important aspect of reality in favor of one’s 
prívate dream, even if this dream be dubbed the ideal. 
The aspect of reality that one is seeking to exelude finally 
comes crashing through the walls of the ivory tower and 
abolishes the dream and at times the dreamer.
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The transformation of the Arcadian dreamer into the 
Utopist is a veritable menaee to civilization. The ends 
that the Utopist proposes are often in themselves desir- 
able and the evils that he denounces are real. But whenwe 
come to scrutinize critically his means, what we find is not 
a firm grip on the ascertained faets of human nature but 
what Bagehot calls the feeble idealities of the romàntic 
imagination. Moreover various Utopists may come to- 
gether as to what they wish to destroy, which is likely to 
inelude the whole existing social order; but what they 
wish to erect on the ruins of this order will be found to 
be not only in dreamland, but in different dreamlands. 
For with the elimination of the veto power from person- 
ality —  the only power that can pulí men back to some 
common centre — the ideal will amount to little more 
t.han the projection of this or that man’s temperament 
upon the void. In a purely temperamental world an 
affirmative reply may be given to the question of Eury­
alus in Virgil: “ Is each man’s God but his own fell de- 
sire?” (An sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?)
The task of the Socràtic critic at the present time is, 
then, seen to consist largely in stripping idealistic dis- 
guises from egoism, in exposing what I  have called sham 
spirituality. If the word spirituality means anything, it 
must imply, it should seem, some degree of escape from 
the ordinary self, an escape that calls in turn for effort 
according to the human law. Even when he is not an open 
and avowed advocate of a “ wise passiveness,” the Rous- 
seauistic idealist is only too manifestly not making any 
such effort — it would interiere with his passion for self- 
expression which is even more deeply rooted in him than 
his passion for saving society. He inclines like Rousseau
to look upon every constraint1 whether from within or 
from without as incompatible with liberty. A right defi­
n í 011 of liberty is almost as important as a right definition 
of imagination and derives from it very directly. Where 
in our anarchical age will such a definition be found, a 
definition that is at once modern and in accord with the 
psychological facts? “ A man has only to declare himself 
free, says Goethe, and he will at once feel himself 
dependent. If he ventures to declare himself dependent, 
he will feel himself free.” In other words he is not free to do 
whatever he pleases unless he wishes to enjoy the free- 
dom of the lunatic, but only to adjust himself to the 
reality of either the natural or the human law. A pro­
gressive adjustment to the human law gives ethical effi- 
ciency, and this is the proper corrective of material effi- 
ciency, and not love alone as the sentimentalist is so fond 
of preaching. Love is another word that cries aloud for 
I Socràtic treatment.
A liberty that means only emancipation from outer 
control will resuit, I have tried to show, in the most 
dangerous form of anarchy — anarchy of the imagina­
tion. On the degree of our perception of this fact will 
hinge the soundness of our use of another general term — 
democracy. We should beware above all of surrendering 
our imaginations to this word until it has been hedged 
about on every side with discriminations that have be- 
hind them all the experience of the past with this form of 
government. Only in this way may the democrat know 
whether he is aiming at anything real or merely dreaming 
of the golden age. Here as elsewhere there are pitfalls
1 “ J’adore la liberté; j’abhorre la géne, la peine, rassujettissement.” Confessions, Livre I .
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manifold for the uncritical enthusiast. A democracy that 
produces in sufficient numbers sound individualists who 
look up imaginatively to standards set above their ordi- 
nary selves, may well deserve enthusiasm. A democracy, 
on the other hand, that is not rightly imaginative, but is 
impelled by vague emotional intoxications, may mean all 
kinds of lovely things in dreamland, but in the real world 
it will prove an especially unpleasant way of returning 
to barbarism. It is a bad sign that Rousseau, who is more 
than any other one person the father of radical democ­
racy, is also the first of the great anti-intellectualists.
Enough has been said to show the proper role of the 
secondary power of analysis that the Rousseauist looks 
upon with so much disfavor. It is the necessary auxiliary 
of the art of defining that can alone save us in an untra- 
ditional age from receiving some mere phantasmagoria 
of the intellect or emotions as a radiant idealism. A So­
cràtic dialèctic of this kind is needed at such a time not 
only to dissipate sophistry but as a positive support to 
wisdom. I have raised the question in my Introduction 
whether the wisdom that is needed just now should be 
primarily humanístic or religious. The preference I have 
expressed for a positive and critical humanism I wish to 
be regarded as very tentative. In the darle situation that 
is growing up in the Occident, all genuine humanism and 
religión, whether on a traditional or a critical basis, 
should be welcome. I have pointed out that traditional 
humanism and religión conflict in certain respeets, that 
it is difficult to combine the imitation of Horace with the 
imitation of Christ. This problem does not disappear en- 
tirely when humanism and religión are dealt with criti- 
cally and is indeed one of the most obscure that the
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thinker has to face. The honest thinker, whatever his own 
preference, must begin by admitting that though religión 
can get along without humanism, humanism cannot get 
along without religión. The reason has been given by 
Burke in pointing out the radical defect of Rousseau: 
the whole ethical üfe of man has its root in humility. As 
humility diminishes, conceit or vain imagining rushes in 
almost automatically to take its place. Under these cir- 
cumstances decorum, the supreme virtue of the humanist, 
is in danger of degenerating into some art of going 
through the motions. Such was only too often the de­
corum of the French drawing-room, and such we are told, 
has frequently been the decorum of the Chínese humanist. 
Yet the decorum of Confucius himself was not only genu­
ine but he has put the case for the humanist with his 
usual shrewdness. “ I  venture to ask about death,” one of 
his disciples said to him. “ While you do not know life,” 
Confucius replied, “ how can you know about death?” 1 
The solution of this problem as to the relation between 
humanism and reügion, so far as a solution can be found, 
lies in looking upon them both as only different stages 
in the same path. Humanism should have in it an ele­
ment of religious insight: it is possible to be a humble and 
meditative humanist. The type of the man of the world 
who is not a mere worldling is not only attractive in itself 
but has actually been achieved in the West, though not
1 Analects, xi, cxi. Cf. ibid., vi, cx x : “ To give one’s self earnestly to the 
duties due to men, and while respeeting spiritual beings, to keep aloof 
from them, may be called wisdom.” Much that has passed current as reli­
gión in all ages has made its chief appeal, not to awe but to wonder; and 
like many humanists Confucius was somewhat indifferent to the mar- 
vellous. “ The subjects on which the Master did not talk were: extra- 
ordinary things, feats of strength, disorder and spiritual beings” (ibid., 
v ii, cxx).
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perhaps very often, from the Greeks down. Chínese who 
should be in a position to know affirm again that, along- 
side many corrupt mandarins, a certain number of true 
Confucians1 have been scattered through the centuries 
from the time of the sage to the present.
If humanism may be religious, religión may have its 
humanístic side. I  have said, following Aristotle, that the 
law of measure does not apply to the religious life, but 
this saying is not to be understood in an absolute sense. 
Buddha is continually insisting on the middle path in the 
religious life itself. The resulting urbanity in Buddha and 
his early followers in India is perhaps the closest ap- 
proach that that very unhumanistic land has ever made 
to humanism.
I t  is right here in this joining of humanism and reli­
gión that Aristotle, at least the Aristotle that has come 
down to us, does not seem altogether adequate. He fails 
to bring out sufficiently the bond between the meditative 
or religious life that he describes at the end of his “ Eth- 
ics” and the humanístic life or life of mediation to which 
most of this work is devoted. An eminent French author- 
ity on Aristotle,2 complains that this separation of the 
two Uves encouraged the ascetic excess of the Middle 
Ages, the undue spurning of the world in favor of mystic 
contemplation. I  am struck rather by the danger of leav- 
ing the humanístic life without any support in religión. 
In a celebrated passage,3 Aristotle says that the “ mag-
1 One of the last Chínese, I am told, to measure up to the Confucian 
standard was Tséng Kuo-fan (1811-1872) who issued forth frompoverty, 
trained a peasant soldiery and, more than any other one person, put 
down the Taiping Rebellion.
2 See J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire’s Introduction to his translation of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, p. cxlix.
3 Eth. Nic., 1122-25.
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narámous” man or ideal gentleman sees all things in- 
cluding himself proportionately: he puts himself neither 
too high ñor too low. And this is no doubt true so far as 
other men are concerned. But does the magnanimous 
man put human nature itself in its proper place? Does 
he feel sufficiently its nothingness and helplessness, its 
dependence on a higher power? No one, indeed, who gets 
beyond words and outer forms would maintain that hu- 
mility is a Christian monopoly. Pindar is far more hum- 
ble 1 than Aristotle, as humble, one might almost main­
tain, as the austere Christian.
A humanism sufficiently grounded in humility is not 
only desirable at all times but there are reasons for think- 
ing that it would be especially desirable to-day. In the 
ffist place, it would so far as the emotional naturaiist is 
concerned raise a clear-cut issue. The naturaiist of this 
type denies rather than corrupts humanism. He is the 
foe of compromise and inclines to identify mediation 
and mediocrity. On the other hand, he corrupts rather 
than denies religión, turning meditation into pantheistic 
revery and in general setting up a subtle parody of what 
is above the ordinary rational level in terms of the sub- 
rational. On their own showing Rousseau and his follow- 
ers are extremists,2 and even more effective perhaps than 
to attack them directly for their sham religión would be 
to maintain against them that thus to violate the law 
of measure is to cease to be human.
Furthermore, a critical humanism would appear to be 
the proper corrective of the other main forms of natural-
1 I have in mind such passages as P., vm, 76-78, 92-96; N., vi, 1-4; 
N., xi, 13-16.
2 “ II n’y eut jamais pour moi d’intermédiaire entre tout et ríen.” 
Confessions, Livre vil.
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istic excess at the present time —  the one-sided devotion 
to physical Science. What keeps the man of Science from 
being himself a humanist is not his Science but his pseudo- 
science, and also the secret push for power and prestige 
that he shares with other men. The reasons for putting 
humanístic truth above scientific truth are not meta- 
physicai but very practical: the discipline that helps a m an' 
to self-mastery is found to have a more important bearing 
on his happiness than the discipline that helps him to a 
mastery of physical nature. If scientific discipline is not 
supplemented by a truly humanístic or religious disci­
pline the result is unethical Science, and unethical Science 
is perhaps the worst monster that has yet been turned 
loose on the race. Man in spite of what I have termed his 
stupidity, his persistent evasión of the main issue, the 
issue of his own happiness, will awaken sooner or later 
to the fearful evil he has already suffered from a Science 
that has arrogated to itself what does not properly belong 
to it; and then Science may be as unduly depreciated as it 
has, for the past century or two, been unduly magnified; 
so that in the long run it is in the interest of Science itself 
to keep in its proper place, which is below both humanism 
and religión.
It would be possible to frame in the ñame of insight an 
indictment against Science that would make the indict- 
ment Rousseau has framed against it in the ñame of 
instinct seem mild. The critical humanist, however, will 
leave it to others to frame such an indictment. Nothing 
is more foreign to his nature than every form of obscur­
antismo He is ready indeed to point out that the man of 
Science has in common with him at least one important 
idea — the idea of habit, though its scientific form seems
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to him very incomplete. One may illustrate from perhaps 
the best known recent treatment of the subject, that of 
James in bis “ Psychology.” I t  is equally significant that 
the humanist can agree with nearly every fine of James’s 
chapter on habit and that he disagrees very gravely with 
James in his total tendency. That is because James shows 
himself, as soon as he passes from the naturalistic to the 
humanístic level, wildly romàntic. Even when dealing 
with the “ Varieties of Religious Experience” he is plainly 
more preoccupied with the intensity than with the cen- 
trality of this experience.1 He is obsessed with the idea 
that comes down to him straight from the age of original 
genius that to be at the centre is to be commonplace. In 
a letter to C. E. Norton (June 30, 1904) James praises 
Ruskin’s Letters and adds: “ Mere sanity is the most 
philistine and at bottom unessential of a man’s attri- 
butes.” “ Mere sanity” is not to be thus dismissed, be- 
cause to lack sanity is to be headed towards misery and 
even madness. “ Ruskin’s,” says Norton, who was in a 
position to know, “ was essentially one of the saddest of 
Uves.” 2 Is a man to live one of the saddest of Uves merely 
to gratify romàntic lovers of the vivid and picturesque 
like James?
However, if the man of Science holds fast to the results 
reached by James and others regarding habit and at the 
same time avoids James’s romàntic fallades he might per- 
ceive the possibility of extending the idea of habit be-
1 Some wag, it will be remembered, suggested as an alternative title 
for this work: Wild Religions I have known.
2 Letters, II, 298; cf. ibid., 291: “I have never known a life less wisely 
controlled or less helped by the wisdom of others than his. The whole 
retrospect of it is pathetic; waste, confusión, ruin of one of the most gifted 
and sweetest natures the world ever knew.”
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yond the naturalistic level; and the way would then be 
open for an important coòperation between him and the 
humanist. Humanists themselves, it must be admitted, 
even critical humanists, have diverged somewhat in 
their attitude towards habit, and that from the time of 
Socrates and Aristotle. I  have been dwelling thus far on 
the indispensableness of a keen Socràtic dialèctic and of 
the right knowledge it brings for those who aspire to be 
critical humanists. But does right knowing in itself suffice 
to ensure right doing? Socrates and Plato with their 
famous identification of kiiowledge and virtue would seem 
to reply in the affirmative. Aristotle has the immediate 
testimony of consciousness on his side when he remarks 
simply regarding this identification: The facts are other- 
wise.1 No experience is sadder or more universal than that 
of the failure of right knowledge to secure right per­
formance: so much so that the austere Christian has been 
able to maintain with some plausibility that all the 
knowledge in the world is of no avail without a special 
divine succor. Now the Aristotelian agreeswith the Chris­
tian that mere knowledge is insufficient: conversión is 
also necessary. He does not incline, however, like the 
austere Christian to look for conversión to “ thunderclaps 
and visible upsets of grace.” Without denying necessarily 
these pistol-shot transíormations of human nature he 
conceives of man’s turning away from his ordinary self — 
and here he is much nearer in temper to the man of 
Science —  as a gradual process. This gradual conversión 
the Aristotelian hopes to achieve by work according to
2 Nic. Eth., 1145 b. The opposition between Socrates or Plato and Aristo­
tle, when put thus baldly, is a bit misleading. Socrates emphasized the 
importance of practice (fjtéXérni) in the acquisition of virtue, and Plato has 
made much of habit in the Laws.
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the human law. Now right knowledge though it supplies 
the norm, is not in itself this working, which consists in 
the actual pulling back of impulse. But an act of this kind 
to be effective must be repeated. A habit is thus formed 
until at last the new direction given to the natural man 
becomes automatic and unconscious. The humanístic 
worker may thus acquire at last the spontaneity in right 
doing that the beautiful soul professes to have received 
as a free gift from “ nature.” Confucius narrates the 
various stages of knowledge and moral effort through 
which he had passed from the age of fifteen and con­
cludes: “ At seventy I  could follow what my heart de- 
sired without transgressing the law of measure.” 1 
The keener the observer the more likely he is to be 
struck by the empire of habit. Habit, as Wellington said, 
is ten times nature, and is indeed so obviously a second 
nature that many of the wise have suspected that nature 
herself is only a first habit.2 Now Aristotle who is open 
to criticism, it may be, on the side of humility, still re- 
mains incomparable among the philosophers of the world 
for his treatment of habit on the humanístic level. Any
Ione who wishes to learn how to become moderate and sensible and decent can do no better even at this late day than to steep himself in the “ Nicomachean Ethics.” One of the ultímate contrasts that presents itself in a subject of this kind is that between habit as conceived by 
Aristotle and nature as conceived by Rousseau. The 
first great grievance of the critical humanist against 
Rousseau is that he set out to be an individualist and at 
the same time attacked analysis, which is indispensable
1 Analects, n, crv.
* This belief the Oriental has embodied in the doctrine of Karma.
if one is to be a sound individualist. The second great ( 
grievance of the humanist is that Rousseau sought to dis­
credit habit which is necessary if right analysis is to be 
made effective. “ The only habit the child should be 
allowed to form,” says Rousseau, “ is that of forming no 
habit.” 1 How else is the child to follow his bent or 
genius and so arrive at full self-expression? The point 
I  am bringing up is of the utmost gravity, for Rousseau 
is by common consent the father of modern education. 
To eliminate from education the idea of a progressive 
adjustment to a human law, quite apart from tempera­
ment, may be to imperii civilization itself. For civiliza- 
tion (another word that is sadly in need of Socràtic de- 
fining) may be found to consist above all in an orderly 
transmission of right habits; and the chief agency for 
securing such a transmission must always be education, 
by which I  mean far more of course than mere formal 
schooling.
Rousseau’s repudiation of habit is first of all, it should 
be pointed out, perfectly chimerical. The trait of the 
child to which the sensible educator will give chief atten- 
tion is not his spontaneity, but his proneness to imitate. 
In the absence of good models the child will imitate bad 
ones, and so, long before the age of intelligent choice and 
self-determination, become the prisoner of bad habits. 
Men, therefore, who aim at being civilized must come 
together, work out a convention in short, regarding the 
habits they wish transmitted to the young. A great civil­
ization is in a sense only a great convention. A sane indi- \ 
vidualist does not wish to escape from convention in i
1 “ La seule habitude qu’on doit laisser prendre à l’enfant est de n’en 
contracter aueune.” Emile, Livre I.
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J itself; he merely remembers that no convention is final 
— that it is always possible to improve the quality of the 
convention in the midst of which he is living, and that it 
should therefore be held flexibly. He would oppose no 
obstacles to those who are rising above the conventional 
level, but would resist firmly those who are sinking be- 
neath it. I t  is much easier to determine practically 
whether one has to do with an ascent or a descent (even 
though the descent be rapturous like that of the Rous- 
seauist) than our anarchical individualists are willing 
to acknowledge.
The notion that in spite of the enormous mass of expe- 
rience that has been accumulated in both East and West 
we are still without light as to the habits that make for 
moderation and good sense and decency, and that edu- 
cation is therefore still purely a matter of exploration 
and experiment is one that may be left to those who are 
suffering from an advanced stage of naturalistic intoxica- 
tion — for example, to Professor John Dewey and his 
followers. From an ethical point of view a child has the 
right to be born into a cosmos, and not, as is coming to 
be more and more the case under such influences, pitch- 
forked into chaos. But the educational radical, it may be 
replied, does stress the idea of habit; and it is true that he 
would have the young acquire the habits that make for 
material efficiency. This, however, does not go beyond 
Rousseau who carne out very strongly for what we should 
cali nowadays vocational training.1 I t  is the adjustment 
to the human law against which Rousseau and all the 
Rousseauists are recalcitrant.
\ Self-expression and vocational training combined in
1 Emile was to be trained to be a cabinet-maker.
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various proportions and tempered by the spirit of serv- \ 
ice,” are nearly the whole of the new education. But 
I  have already said that it is not possible to extract from 
any such compounding of utilitarjan and romàntic ele­
ments, with the resulting material efficiency and ethical 
inefficiency, a civilized view of life. I t  is right here in- 
deed in the educational field that concerted opposition 
to the naturalistic conspiracy against civilization is most 
likely to be fruitful. If  the present generation — and I 
have in mind especially American conditions —  cannot 
come to a working agreement about the ethical training 
it wishes given the young, if it allows the drift towards 
anarchy on the human level to continue, it will show 
itself, however ecstatic it may be over its own progres- 
siveness and idealism, both cowardly and degenerate.
I t  is very stupid, assummg that it is not very hypocriti- 
cal, to denounce Kultur, and then to adopt educational 
ideas that work out in much the same fashion as Kultur, 
and have indeed the same historical derivation.  ^ \
The dehumanizing influences I  have been tracing are 
especially to be deprecated in higher education. The de- 
sign of higher education, so far as it deserves the ñame, 
is to produce leaders, and on the quality of the leadership 
must depend more than on any other single factor the 
success or failure of democracy. I  have already quoted 
Aristotle’s saying that “ most men would rather Uve in a 
disorderly than in a sober manner.” This does not mean 
much more than that most men would like to live tem- 
peramentally, to follow each his own bent and then put 
the best face on the matter possible. Most men, says 
Goethe in a similar vein, prefer error to truth because 
truth imposes limitations and error does not. I t  is well
also to recall Aristotle’s saying that “ the multitude is 
incapable of making distinctions.” 1 Now my whole 
argument is that to be sound individualists we must not 
only make the right distinctions but submit to them until 
Üiey become habitual. Does it follow that the whole exper­
iment in which we are engaged is foredoomed to failure? 
Not quite though the obstacles to success are some- 
what greater than our democràtic enthusiasts suspect. 
The most disreputable aspect of human nature, I  have 
said, is its proneness to look for scapegoats; and my chief 
objection to the movement I  have been studying is that 
more perhaps than any other in history it has encouraged 
the evasión of moral responsibility and the setting up of 
scapegoats. But as an offset to this disreputable aspect of 
man, one may note a creditable trait: he is very sensitive 
to the forcé of a right example. If  the leaders of a com- 
munity look up to a sound model and work humanisti- 
cally with reference to it, all the evidence goes to show 
that they will be looked up to and imitated in turn by 
enough of the rank and file to keep that community 
from lapsing into barbarism. Societies always decay from 
the top. I t  is therefore not enough, as the humanitarian 
would have us believe, that our leaders should act vig- 
orously on the outer world and at the same time be filled 
with the spirit of “ service.” Purely expansive leaders of 
this kind we have seen who have the word humanity 
always on their lips and are at the same time ceasing to 
be human. “ That wherein the superior man cannot 
be equalled, ’ says Confucius, “ is simply this —  his work 
which other men cannot see.” 2 It  is this inner work and 
the habits that result from it that above all humanize a
, 1 Eth. Nic., 1172 b. 2 Doctrine of the Mean ( c .  x x x i i i , v . 2 ) .
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man and make hirn exemplary to the multitude. To per­
forin this work he needs to look to a centre and a model.
We are brought back here to the final gap that opens 
between classicist and romanticist. To look to a centre 
according to the romanticist is at the best to display 
“ reason,” at the worst to be smug and philistine. To look 
to a true centre is, on the contrary, according to the 
classicist, to grasp the abiding human element through 
all the change in which it is implicated, and this calis ior 
the highest use of the imagination. The abiding human 
element exists, even though it cannot be exhausted by 
dogmas and creeds, is not subject to rules and refuses to 
be locked up in formuke. A knowledge of it results frmn 
experience, — experience vivified by the imagmation. To 
do justice to writing which has this note of centrahty 
we ourselves need to be in some measure experienced and 
imaginative. Writing that is romàntic, writing m which 
the imagination is not disciplined to a true centre is best 
enjoyed while we are young. The person who is as much 
taken by Shelley at forty as he was at twenty has, one 
may surmise, failed to grow up. Shelley himself wrote to 
John Gisborne (October 22, 1821): “ As to real flesh and 
blood, you know that I  do not deal in those articles; you 
might as well go to a ginshop for a leg of mutton as ex- 
pect anything human or earthly from me.” The mature 
man is likely to be dissatisfied with poetry so unsubstan- 
tial as this even as an intoxicant and still more when it is 
offered to him as the “ ideal.” The very mark of genumely 
classical work, on the other hand, is that it yields its full 
meaning only to the mature. Young and oíd are, as 
Cardinal Newman says, affected very differently by the 
words of some classic author, such as Homer or Horace.
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“ Passages, which to a boy are but rhetorical common- 
places, neither better ñor worse than a hundred others 
which any clever writer might supply . . . at length come 
home to him, when long years have passed, and he has 
had experience of life, and pierce him, as if he had never 
before known them, with their sad earnestness and vivid 
exactness. Then he comes to understand how it is that 
Unes, the birth of some chance morning or evening at an 
Ionian festival or among the Sabine hilis, have lasted gen- 
eration after generation for thousands of years, with a 
power over the mind and a charm which the current Ut- 
erature of his own day, with all its obvious advantages, is 
utterly unable to rival.”
In the poets whom Newman praises the imagination 
is, as it were, centripetal. The neo-classic proneness to 
oppose good sense to imagination, and the romàntic 
proneness to oppose imagination to good sense, have at 
least this justification, that in many persons, perhaps in 
most persons, the two actually confüct, but surely the 
point to emphasize is that they may come together, that 
good sense may be imaginative and imagination sensible. 
If imagination is not sensible, as is plainly the case in 
Victor Hugo, for example, we may suspect a lack of the 
universal and ethical quality. All men, even great poets, 
are more or less immersed in their personal conceit and 
in the zones of illusion peculiar to their age. But there is
(the question of degree. The poets to whom the world has finally accorded its suffrage have not been megaloma-, 
niacs; they have not threatened like Hugo to outbellow the 
thunder or pulí comets around by the tail.1 Bossuet’s 
saying that “ good sense is the master of human Ufe”
1 See his poem Ibo in Les Contemplations.
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does not contradict but complete Pascal’s saying that 
“ the imagination disposes of everything, provided only 
due stress be laid on the word human. I t  would not be 
easy to Uve a more imaginative Ufe than Hugo, but his 
imagination was so unrestrained that we may ask whether 
he lived a very human life, whether he was not rather, 
in Tennyson’s phrase, a “ weird Titan. Man realizes 
that immensity of his being of which Joubert speaks only 
in so far as he ceases to be the thrall of his own ego. This 
human breadth he achieves not by throwing off but by 
taking on limitations, and what he limits is above all his 
imagination. The reason why he should strive íor a Ufe 
that is thus increasingly fuU and complete is simply, as 
Joubert suggests, that it is more delectable, that it is 
found practicaUy to make for happiness.
■o
T H E  E N D
CHINESE PRIMITIVISM
P e k h a p s  the closest approach in the past to the movement of 
which Rousseau is the most important single figure is the 
early Taoist movement in China. Taoism, especially in its popu­
lar aspects, became later something very different, and what 
I say is meant to apply above all to the period from about 
550 to 200 b .c . The material for the Taoism of this period will 
be found in convenient form in the volume of Léon Wieger 
(1913) — L es  P eres  du  S ystèm e tao ïste (Chínese texts with 
French translations of Lao-tzü, Lieh-tzü and Chuang-tzü). 
The Tao Tè King of Lao-tzü is a somewhat enigmatical docu­
ment of only a few thousand words, but plainly primitivistic in 
its general trend. The phrase that best sums up its general 
spirit is that of Wordsworth — a “ wise passiveness.” The unity 
at which it aims is clearly of the pantheistic variety, the unity 
that is obtained by breaking down discrimination and affirming 
the “ identity of contradictòries,” and that encourages a re­
versión to origins, to the state of nature and the simple life. Ac- 
cording to the Taoist the Chínese fell from the simple life into 
artificiality about the time of the legendary Yellow Emperor, 
Hoang-ti (27th century b .c . ) .  The individual also should look 
back to beginnings and seek to be once more like the new-born 
child1 or, according to Chuang-tzü, like the new-born calf.2 It 
is in Chuang-tzü indeed that the doctrine develops its full nat- 
uralistic and primitivistic implications. Few writers in either 
East or West have set forth more entertainingly what one may 
term the Bohemian attitude towards life. He heaps ridicule
1 La 55 p. 51. (In my references La. stands for Lao-tzü, Li. for Lieh-tzü, 
Ch. for Chuang-tzü. The first number gives the chapter; the second nmnber 
the page in Wieger’s edition.)
a Ch. 22 C, p. 391.
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upon Confucius and in the name of spontaneity attacks his 
doctrine of humanístic imitation.1 He sings the praises of 
the unconscious,2 even when obtained through intoxication,3 
and extols the morality of the beautiful soul.4 He traces 
the fall of mankind from nature into artifice in a fashion that 
anticipates very completely both Rousseau’s Discourse on the 
Arts and Sciences6 and that on the Origin of Inequality.6 See 
also the amusing passage in which the brigand Chi, child of 
nature and Champion of the weak against the oppressions of 
government, paints a highly Rousseauistic picture of man’s 
fall from his primitive felicity.7 Among the things that are 
contrary to nature and purely conventional, according to 
Chuang-tzü and the Taoists, are, not only the Sciences and arts 
and attempts to discriminate between good and bad taste,8 but 
likewise government and statecraft,9 virtue and moral stand- 
ards.10 To the artificial music of the Confucians, the Taoists op- 
pose a natural music that offers startling analogies to the most 
recent programmatic and descriptive tendencies of Occidental 
music.11 See especially Chuang-tzü’s programme for a cosmic 
symphony in three movements12 — the Pipes of Pan as one is 
tempted to cali it. This music that is supposed to reflect in all 
its mystery and magic the infinite Creative processes of nature 
is very close to the primitivistic music (“L’arbre vu du cóté 
des racines”) with which Hugo’s satyr strikes panic into the 
breasts of the Olympians.
The Taoist notion of following nature is closely related, as in 
other naturalistic movements, to the idea of fate whether in its 
stoical or epicurean form.13 From the references in Chuang-tzü14
1 Ch. 12 n, p. 305.
2 Ch. 11 D, p. 291. Ibid. 15, p. 331. See also Li. 31, p. 113.
3 Ch. 19 B, p. 357. 1 Ch. 19 L, p. 365.
6 Ch. 10, pp. 279-80. 6 Ch. 9, pp. 274-75.
7 Ch. 29, pp. 467 ff. 8 Ch. 2, p. 223.
0 La. 27, p. 37. 10 Ch. 8 A, p. 271.
11 Li. 5, p. 143. 12 Ch. 14 C, p. 321.
13 For an extreme form of Epicureanism see the ideas of Yang-ehu, Li. 7, pp. 
165 ff. For stoical ataraxy see Ch. 6 C., p. 253. For fate see Li. 6, p. 155, Ch. 
6 K, p. 263. 14 Ch. 33, pp. 499 ff.
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and elsewhere to various sects and schools we see that Taoism 
was only a part of a great stream of naturalistic and primitiv­
istic tendency. China abounded at that time in pacifists, in 
apostles of brotherly love, and as we should say nowadays 
Tolstoyans. A true opposite to the egoistic Yang-chu was t e 
preacher of pure altruism and indiscriminate sympathy, Mei-ti. 
Mencius said that if the ideas of either of these extremista pre- 
vailed the time would come, not only when wolves would de- 
vour men, but men would devour one another.2 In opposing 
discrimination and ethical standards to the naturalists, Mencius 
and the Confucian humanists were fighting for civilization. 
Unfortunately there is some truth in the Taoist charge that the 
standards of the Confucians are too literal, that m their de- 
fence of the principie of imitation they did not allow sufficiently 
for the element of flux and relativity and lllusion m things 
an element for which the Taoists had so keen a sense that they 
even went to the point of suppressing the difference between 
sleeping and waking 3 and life and death.4 To reply properly 
to the Taoist relativist the Confucians would have needed to 
work out a sound conception of the role of the imagination 
the universal key to human nature — and this they do not 
seem to have done. One is inclined to ask whether this is therea- 
son for China’s failure to achieve a great ethical art like that 
of the drama and the epic of the Occident at their best. The 
Taoists were richly imaginative but along romàntic lines. We 
should not fail to note the Taoist influence upon Li Po and other 
Bohemian and bibulous poets of the Tang dynasty, or t e re a 
tion of Taoism to the rise of a great school of landscape paintmg 
at about the same time. We should note also the Taoist de­
ment in “ Ch’an” Buddhism (the “Zen” Buddhism6 of Japan), 
some knowledge of which is needed for an understanding of 
whole periods of Japanese and Chínese art.
1 Ch. 33 C, p. 503. '  C h '6 E  pa 255 °h‘ 9'
3 l l V h e  m S n  T / Z s a L a i :  a  Study o f  Zen Pküosophy  (1913) by 
Kaiten Nukariya (himself a Zenist), p 23.
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In these later stages, however, the issues are less clear-cut 
than in the original struggle between Taoists and Confucians. 
The total impression one has of early Taoism is that it is a main 
manifestation of an age of somewhat sophistical individualism. 
Ancient Chínese individualism ended like that of Greece at 
about the same time in disaster. After a period of terrible con­
vulsions (the era of the “Fighting States”), the inevitable man 
on horseback appeared from the most barbarie of these states 
and “ put the lid” on everybody. Shi Hwang-ti, the new em- 
peror, had many of the scholars put to death and issued an 
edict that the writings of the past, especially the Confucian 
writings, should be destroyed (213 b .c . ) .  Though the emperor 
behaved like a man who took literally the Taoist views as to 
the blessings of ignorance, it is not clear from our chief au- 
thority, the historian Ssü-ma Ch’ien, that he acted entirely or 
indeed mainly under Taoist influence.
It is proper to add that though Lao-tzü proclaims that the 
soft is superior to the hard, a doctrine that should appeal to 
the Occidental sentimentalist, one does not find in him or in the 
other Taoists the equivalent of the extreme emotional expan- 
siveness of the Rousseauist. There are passages, especially in 
Lao-tzü, that in their emphasis on concentration and calm are 
in line with the ordinary wisdom of the East; and even where 
the doctrine is unmistakably primitivistic the emotional quality 
is often different from that of the corresponding movement in 
the West.
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ment of a fragment. I  have given, for example, only a fraction of the books on 
Rousseau and scarcely any of the books, thousands in numbers, whieh without 
being chiefly on Rousseau, contain important passages on mm. X may cite al- 
most at random as instances of this latter class, the comparison between Burke 
and Rousseau in the fifth volume of Lecky’s History o f  the Eighteenth Century; 
the stanzas on Rousseau in the third canto of Childe H arold; the passage on 
Rousseau in Hazlitt’s essay on the Past and Future (T a b leT a lk ) .
The only period that I have covered with any attempt at fullness is that from 
about 1795 to 1840. Books that seem to me to possess literary distinction or to 
deal authoritativeiy with some aspect of the subject I  have marked with a star.
I make no claim, however, to have read all the books X have listed, and my rat- 
ing will no doubt often be questioned in the case of those I  have read.
I  have not as a rule mentioned articles in periodicals. The files of the follow- 
ing special publications may often be consulted with profit. Those that have 
current bibliographies I have marked with a dagger.
t R em e d ’Histoire littéraire de la France. — t Annales romàntiques. t  R e~ 
vue germanique (Eng. and Germán).t Englische Studien — Anglia. — t Mitteilungen iïber Englische Spraohe und 
Literatur (Beiblatt zur Anglia). — t Arohiv fü r das Studium der neueren Sprach- 
en (H errigs Archiv) . — t Zeitsohrift fü r franzòsisohe Sprache una Interatur 
Kritisoher Jahresbericht der romanischen Philologie —  Germamsch-Romamsohe 
Monatschrift — Euphorion  (Germán lit.). —  t  Zeitsohnft fü r deutsches Alter- 
tum und deutsohe Literatur.
Publications o f  the Modern Language Association o f Am erica. — t  Modern 
Language Notes (Baltimore). — Modern Phüology (Chicago). — The Journal 
o f  English and Germànic Philology (Urbana, 111.). ■— t  Studies m  Philology 
(Univ. of North Car.). — t  The Modern Language Review (Cambridge, tung.j.
Works that are international in scope and that fall either wholly or in part in 
the romàntic period are as follows: L. P. Betz: *L a
bibliographique, 2 ' éd. augmentée,1904.- A .  Sayous:: L e XT M  • * *  * 
aer 2 vols. 1861. — H. Ilettner: * Literaturgesohwhte des 18. Ja h r . 1872. b vols. 
5th edn. 1909. (Still standard.) — G. Brandes: * M am  Cúrrente m  19th Century 
Literature, 6 vols. 1901 ff. Originally given as lectures in Damsh at the 
University of Copenhagen and trans, into Germán, 1872 ff. (.Oiten marred by 
political “ tendeney.”) — T. Süpfle: Geschichte des deutschen Kultureinflusses 
a u f Frankreich, 2 vols. 1886-90. - V .  Rossel: Hist. de la  h tt .fr . h orsd e France. 
2e éd. 1897. — C. E. Vaughan: The Rom anhc Revolt, 1900. — T. b. Omond. 
The Romantia Triumph, 1900. (A somewhat colorless book.)
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* The Cambridge History o f  English Literature, vols. x, xi, xu, 1913 ff. (Ex­
cellent bibliographies.) — See also articles and bibliographies in *Dietionary o f 
N ational Biography, Chambers Encyclopasdia o f  English Literature (new edn.) 
and Encyclopcedia Britannica  ( llth  edn.).
L. Stephen: * History o f  English Thought in  the 18th Century, 1876. (To be 
consulted for the deistic prelude to emotional naturalism. The author’s hori- 
zons are often limited by his utilitarian Outlook.) — T. S. Seceombe: The Age 
o f  Johnson, 1900. — E. Bernbaum’s English Poets o f  the 18th Century, 1918. 
(An anthology so arranged as to illustrate the growth of sentimentalismo — W. 
L. Phelps: The Beginnings o f  the English Romàntic Movement, 1893. — H. A. 
Beers: A History o f  English Romantioism in  the 18th Century, 1898. A History 
o f  English Romantioism in  the 19th Century, 1901. (Both vols. are agreeably 
written but start from a very inadequate definition of romantioism.) — C. H. 
Herford: The Age o f  Wordsworth, 1897.— G. Saintsbury: Nineteenth Century Lit­
erature, 1896. — A. Symons: The Romàntic Movement in  English Poetry, 1909. 
(Ultra-romantie in outlook.) — W. J. Courthope: History o f  English Poetry, vols. 
v and v i, 1911. — O. Elton: * A Survey o f  English Literature, 1780-1830,1912. 
(A distinguished treatment of the period, at once scholarly and literary. The 
point of view is on the whole romàntic, as appears in the use of such general 
terms as “ beauty ” and the “ infinite.”) — H. Richter: Geschichte der englis- 
chen Romantik, 1911 ff. — W. A. Neilson: The Essentials o f  Poetry, 1912. (The 
point of view appears in a passage like the following, pp. 192-93: According to 
Arnold high seriousness “ is the final criterion of a great poet. One might sug- 
gest it as a more fit criterion for a great divine. . . . The element for which Ar­
nold was groping when he seized on the onovliii of Aristotle was not seriousness 
but intensity.”) — P. E. More: * The Drift o f  Romantioism  (Shelbume Essays, 
Eighth Series), 1913. (Deals also with the international aspects of the move­
ment, especially in the essay on Nietzsche. The point of view has much in com- 
mon with my own.)
George Lillo: The London M erchant; or The History o f  George Barnwell, 1731. 
Fatal Curiosity, 1737. Both plays ed. with intro. by A. W. Ward, Í906. (Bibliog- 
raphy.) — E. Bernbaum: The D rama o f  Sensibility, 1696-1780, 1915.
S. Richardson, 1689-1761: Novéis, ed. L. Stephen, 12 vols. 1883.
D. Diderot: Eloge de R ., 1761. Reprinted in CEuvres complètes, vol. v. — J. 
Jusserand: L e  Roman Anglais, 1886. — J . O. E. Donner: R. in  der deutschen 
Romantik, 1896. — W. L. Cross: The Development o f  the English Novel (chap. n, 
“ The 18th Century Realists” ), 1899. — J . Texte: * J . - J .  Rousseau et les 
Origines du Cosmopolitisme littéraire. Eng. trans, by J .  W. Matthews, 1899.
— C. L. Thomson: Samuel Richardson: a  Biographioal and Critical Study, 1900.
— A. Dobson: S. R., 1902.
L .Steme, 1713-68: Collected Works, ed. G. Saintsbury, 6 vols. 1894. Ed. 
W. L. Cross, 12 vols. 1904.
P. Fitzgerald: L i f e o f  S., 2 vols. 1864. 3d edn. 1906. — P. Stapfer: Laurence 
Sterne, 1870. — H. D. Traill: Steme, 1882. — L. Stephen: Sterne. H o u rs in a  
Library, vol. i i i , 1892. — J. Czerny: Sterne, H ippel, und Je a n  Paul, 1904. — 
H. W. Thayer: L . S . in Germany, 1905. — P. E. More: Shelbume Essays, 3d 
Series, 1905. — W. L . Cross: The L ife  and Times o f  L . S., 1909. — W. Sichel:
Sterne, 1910. — L. Melville: The L ife  and Letters o f  L . S., 2 vols. 1911. F . B. 
Barton: Etude sur l ’influence de S. en France au  X V I IP  sièole, 1911.
Henry Mackenzie: The M an o fF eelin g , 1771. — Horace Walpole: The Castle 
o f  Otranto, 1765. — Clara Reeve: The Champion o f  Virtue, 1777. Title changed 
to The Old English Barón  in later edns. — Thomas Amory: L ife  o f  Jo h n  Bun- 
cle, Esq., 4 vols. 1756-66. New edn. (with intro. byE. A. Baker ,1904. — Henry 
Brooke: The Fool o f  Quality, 5vols. 1766- 70. Ed. E. A. Baker, 1906. William 
Beckford: An Arabian Tale [Vathek], 1786. In French 1787. Ed R. Garnett, 
1893. — L. Melville: The L ife  and Letters o f  W illiam  Beckford, 1910. — P. It. 
More: W. B ., in The Drift o f  Romantioism, 1913.
Edward Young, 1683-1765: Works, 6 vols. 1757-78. Poetical W orks (Aldine 
Poets), 1858, — George Eliot: The Poet Y., in Essays, 2d edn. 1884. — W. 
Thomas: Le poète E. Y., 1901. — J. L. Kind: E . Y. m Germany, 1906. — H.
C. Shelley: The L ife  and Letters o f  E . Y., 1914.
Tames Macpherson, 1736-96: Fingal, 1762. Temara, 1763. The W orks o f  
Ossian, ed. W. Sharp, 1896. — For bibliography of Ossian and the Ossianic 
controversy see Lovmdes's Bibliographer’s M anual, part vi, 1861. — J. »• 
Smart: * Jam es Macpherson, 1905.
Thomas Percy: Reliques o f Ancient English Poetry, 3 vols. 1765. Ed. H. B. 
Wheatley, 3 vols. 1876 and 1891. — A. C. C. Gaussen: Percy, Prelate and Poet, 
1908.
Thomas Chatterton, 1752-70: Complete Poetical Works, ed. with intro, and 
bibliography by H. D. Roberts, 2 vols. 1906. Poetical Works, with intro, by bir 
S Lee 2 vols. 1906-09. — A. de Vigny: Chatterton. Drame, 1835 D. Masson: 
Chatterton in Essays, 1856. -  T. Watts-Dunton: Introduction to poems of & , 
in Ward's English Poets. — C. E. Russell: Thomas Chatterton, 1909. — J. H. 
Ingram: The True Chatterton, 1910.
Thomas Warton: The History o f  English Poetry, 1774-88. — C. Rmaker: 
Thomas Warton, 1916 . - Jo s e p h  Warton: Essay on the Genius an dW n tm gs o f  
Pove 2 vols. 1756-82. — Paul-Henn Mallet: Introduction à  l Hist. de Danne- 
mnrr 2 vols. 1755-56 — F . E. Farley: Scandinavian Influence on the English 
Romàntic Movement, 1903 (Bibliography). — R. Hurd: Letters on Chivalry and  
Romance, 1762; ed. E. J .  Morley, 1911.
W. Godwin, 1756-1836: Political Justice, 1793. Caleb W illiams, 1794.
C K  Paul: W. G„ his Friends and Contemporaries, 2 vols 1876. — W. Hazlitt: 
W. G. in  The Spirit o f  the Age, 1902. — L. Stephen: W. G.'s NoveU. Studies o f  a 
Biographer, vol. in, 1902. -  P. Ramus: W. G. der Theoretiker des kommums- 
L h e n  Anàrohismus, 1907. -  H. Saitzeff: W. G. u n d d ie  Anfange des Anarchis- 
mus im  xviii Jahrhundert, 1907. — Helene Simón: W. G. und M ary Wollstone- 
craft, 1909. — H. Roussin: W. G., 1912.
R  Bum s 1759-96: The Complete Poetical Works, ed. J. L. Robertson, 3 
volsi 1896. —  J . C. Ewing: Selected List o f  the Works o f  R. B ., and o f Books upon 
his L ife  and Writings, 1899.
W. Wordsworth: Letter to a Friend o f  R. B um s, 1816. — T. Carlyle: Burns 
1828 Rptd 1854. On Heroes and Hero-W orship, 1841. J . G. Lockhart: L ife  
o f R  B um s  1828. — H. A. Taine: Histoire de la Littérature Anglaise, vol. in, 
1863-64. — J . C. Shairp: R. B u m s, 1879. — R. L. Stevenson: F am iliar Studies
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o f  M en and Books, 1882. — M. Amold: Essays in  Criticism, Second Seríes, 
1888. — A. Angellier: * R. B u m s: la me et les asuwes, 2 vols. 1893. — T. F. Hen- 
derson: R. B um s, 1904. — W. A. Neilsou: B u m s : How to Know  Him, 1917.
W. B lake, 1759-1827: The Poetical Works, ed. with an intro, and textual 
notes by J .  Sampson, 1913.
A. Gilchrist: L ife  o f  B ., 2 vols. 1863. New edn. 1906. — A. C. Swinburne: W.
B ., 1868. New edn. 1906.— A. T. Story: W. B ., 1893. — J. Thomson (B.V .): 
E ssay on the Poems o f  W. B ., in Biographical and Crílical Studies, 1896. — W. 
B. Yeats: Ideas o f  Good and, Evil, 1903. — F. Benoit: Un M aïtre de l’Art. B . le 
Visionnaire, 1906. — P. E. More: Shelbum e Essays, Fourth Series, 1906. — P. 
Berger: W. B ., 1907. — S. A. Brooke: Studies in  Poetry, 1907. — E. J. Ellis: 
The R eal B ., a  Portrait Biography, 1907. — B. de Selincourt: W. B ., 1909. — 
G. Saintsbury: A History o f  English Prosody, vol. m, 1910. — J. H. Wick- 
steed: B .’s Vision o f  the B ook  o f  Jo b , 1910. — H. C. Beeching: B.'s Religious 
Lyrias. Essays and Studies by Members o f  the Eng. Assooiation, vol. m , 1912.
— A. G. B. Russell: The Engravings o f  W. B ., 1912.
W. Wordsworth, 1770-1850: Poetical Works, ed. T . Hutchinson, 1904. 
Poem s, chosen and edited by M. Amold, 1879. Prose Works, ed. W. Knight, 2 
vols. 1896. Wordsworth’s Literary Crítieism, ed. N. C. Smith, 1905.
W. Hazlitt: The Spirit o f  the Age, 1825. — C. Wordsworth: M emoirs o f  W. 
W .,2  vols. 1851. — T. B. Macaulay: Critical and Historical Essays, 1852. — J. 
R . Lowell: Among my Books, 1870. — R. H. Hutton: Essays Theological and  
Literary, 2 vols. 1871. — J . C. Shairp: W ., 1872. — S. A. Brooke: Theology in  
the English Poets, 1874. lOth edn. 1907. — E. Dowden: Studies in  Literature, 
1878. New Studies in  Literature, 1895. — W. Bagehot: Literary Studies, 1879.
— F. W. H. Myers: W ., 1881. — J. H. Shorthouse: On the Platonism  o f  W ., 
1882.— W. A. Knight: M emorials o f Coleorton, 2 vols. 1887. Letters o f  the 
Wordsworth Fam ily  from  1787 to 1855, 1907. — M. Amold: * Essays in  Críti­
eism, Second Series, 1888. — P. Bourget: Eludes et Portraits, vol. n, 1888. — 
W. H. Pater: Appreaialions, 1889. — L. Stephen: Hours in  a  Library, vol. n, 
1892. Studies o f  a  Biographer, vol. x, 1898. — Dorothy Wordsworth: Jou m als , 
ed. W. Knight, 2 vols. 1897. — E. Legouis: * The Early L ife  o f  W., 1770-98. 
Trans, by J .  W, Matthews, 1897. — E. Yarnall: W. and the Colerídges, 1899. — 
W. A. Raleigh: W., 1903. — K. Bomig: W. W. im  Urteile sdner Zeit, 1906. —
A. C. Bradley: Eng. Poetry and Germán Philosophy in  the Age o f W ., 1909. •— M. 
Reynolds: The Treatment o f  Nature in  Eng. Poetry between P ope and W ., 1909. 
(Bibliography.) — L. Cooper: A Concordance to the Poems o f  W. W., 1911. —
E. S. Robertson: Wordsworthshire. A n Introduction to a  Poet’s Country, 1911.
W. Scott, 1771-1832: Poetical Works, ed. J .  L. Robertson, 1904. The Wav- 
erly Novéis (Oxford edn.), 25 vols. 1912. The M iscellaneous Prose Works, 30 
vols. 1834-71.
W. Hazlitt: The Spirit o f  the Age, 1825. — J. G. Lockhart: * Memoirs o f  the 
L ife  o f  S ir W. S. Baronet, 2 vols. 1837-38. — T. Carlyle: S ir W. S., 1838. — G. 
Grant: L ife  o f  S ir W. S ., 1849. — L. Stephen: Hours in  a  Library, vol. r, 1874. 
The Story o f  S .’s Ruin. Studies o f  a  Biographer, vol. n, 1898. — R. H. Hutton: 
S ir W. S., 1876. — W. Bagehot: The Waverley Novéis in  Literary Studies, vol. 
ii, 1879. — G. Smith: S ir W. S., in W ard’s English Poets, vol. iv, 1883. — R. 
L. Stevenson: A Gossip on Romance in M emòries and Portraits, 1887. — J .
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Veitch: The Feelin g  fo r  Nature in  Scottish Poetry  2 vols. 1887. 
and Poetry o f  the Scottish Border. 2d edn. 2 vols. 1893. —  C. D. Yonge. L·iJ 
o f S ir W ?S. (bibliography by J . P. Anderson), 1888. —  V. WaiUe : Le i2oman- 
tisme de Manzoni, 1890. —  A. Lang: L ife  and Letters o f  J .  G. Lockhart, 2 vols.
L  and the Border Minstrelsy, 1910.- F .  T . Palgrave: L a n d sc a p em  
Poetru 1896 —  A. A. Jack : Essays on the Novel as illustrated by S. and M iss 
1 S 9 7 .-G . Saintsbury: Sir W. S  1 8 9 7 . - R  M aig ™ : 
historioue à l’époque romantique. Essai sur Im fluence de W. S ., 1»98. _ W. L·. 
c Z ^ D e v e l o j L Z o f t h e  English Novel, 1899 - 1 d D otti:.DeU,
Promessi sposi di A. M anzoni dai R om anzidi W. S., 1900. —  W. H. Hudson. 
Sir W S  1901. — W. S. Crockett: The Scott Country, 1902. Footsteps o f  S., 
mrv7 Tho <Znntt Drininals 1912. —  A. Ainger: S. Lectures and Essays, vol. I.
1905 __A. S. G. Canning: History in  S .’s Novéis, 1905. S ir W. S. studied in
Eight Novéis, 1910. -  G. Agnoli: Gli Albori del romanzo ston com  M i s e *  pnrm  
• ‘i * • j,- n7 q iQOfi —  O A Young: The Waverley Novéis, 1907. G. 
Wyndham: S ir W. S ., 1908. —  F. A. MacCunn: Sir W. S .’s friends, 1909.
o T  Coleridge 1772-1831: Dramatic Works, ed. D. Coleridgè, 1852. Poetir 
J  W o r k ? Td^ r i th W a p h ic a l  intro. by J .  D. Campbell 1893. CompleU 
p L I a l W o r Í  e T  E. H. Coleridge. 2 vols. 1912. Prose W orks 6 vols. in 
B ohris Library, 1865íï. — Biographia Literaria, ed. with his 
bv I Shawcross, 2 vols. 1907. Anim a Poetae, ed. E. H. Coleridge, 1895 C. s 
L i L · a i  c r i t L ·m ,  with intro. by J .  W. Mackail, 1908. B iographia epistolaris, 
ed. A. Turnbull, 2 vols. 1911.
W Hazlitt- Mr. C„ in The Spirit o fthe Age, 1825. -  T. Allsop: Letters, Conver­
satione, and Recollections o f  S T  C o f
T. C. und die englishe Romantik, 1886 Eng. trans, by Lady Eastlake, 1887.
W. Pater: Coleridge. Appreeiations, 1889. -  T. De Qumcey: S. T. C . 889.
L Stephen- Coleridge, Hours in  a  Library, vol. m , 1892. — J .  D. Campbel . 
S. T. C„ 1894. 2d edn., 1896. -  E. Dowden: C. a s a  Poet. N ew Studieiri».I t ­
erature 1895. —  E. V. Lucas: Charles Lam b and the Llayds 1898. R. H. 
Shepherd: The Bibliography o fC .,  1900. -  C. Cestre: L a  
les poetes anglais (1789-1809), 1906. -  J .  Aynard: L a  me d 
1907 — A A. Helmholtz: T he Indebtedness o f  S . T. C. to A. W .Schlegel, 1907.
A. a '. Jack and A. C. Bradley: Short Bibliography o f  C., 1912.
C Lamb 1775-1834: L ife  and Works, ed. A. Ainger, 12 vols. 1899-1900. The 
W orkfofC harifs^ an d  M am  L ,  ed. E. V. Lucas, 7 vols. 1903-05. ^ e  W orks m  
Prose and Verse o f  Charles and M ary L ., ed. T . Hutchinson, 2 vols. 1908. T 
Letters o f  C. L . Intro, by H. H. Harper, 5 vols. 1907. Dramatio Essays o f  C. L ., 
ed. B. Matthews, 1891.
r  Pil611an- C L  vol. H, 1857. — B . W. Proctor: C. L ., 1866. — P- Fitz- 
gemíd?C. L ,  1866. L  A. Ainger: C. L ,  a  Biography, 1882 Lecíur^and Fs- 
, IT fonc __w  Pater- C. L . Appreeiations, 1889. —  L. V. pucas.
L 2 vols. 1905. — F. Harnson: L . and Keats, 1899. — G. E. WoodDen-y. u. 
L ,  1900. —  H. Paul: C. L . Stray Leaves, 1906.
W. Hazlitt, 1778-1830: Works, edd. A. R. Waller and A. Glover, 12 vols.and 
index, 1902-06.
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—  T . Medwin: Jou rn al o f  the Conversatione o f  Lord B ., 1824. —  L. Hunt: 
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1871. —  E . Castelar: V ida de Lord B ., 1873. —  A. C. Swinburne: B ., in Essays 
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son : T. De Q., 1881. — G. Saintsbury: De Q. Essays in  English Literature (1780- 
1860), 1890. — L. Stephen: Hours in  a  Library. New edn, vol. i. 1892. —  J. 
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